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FOREWARD

The federal income tax system has become increasingly more complicated and less
understandable in the past several years. This is the view of the taxpaying public
as well as the view of most practitioners, government officials, and academics. Both
the perception and the reality of this condition have caused many-including
administrators of the tax system-to question whether the tax system continues to
be administrable.
Many factors have led to this state of affairs. They include the following often
stated concerns:
(a)

frequent (annual and sometimes more frequent) amendment of the
Internal Revenue Code, including redefinition of the term "taxable
income";

(b)

increasing complexity to cover increasingly complex business situations;

(c)

major changes in the legislative process;

(d)

the Congressional response to the interplay between government
representatives and taxpayer representatives in the formation of tax
legislation;

(e)

the revenue driven basis of current tax legislation;

(f)

the constant choice of "equity" over "simplicity"; and

(g)

lengthy and enormously detailed regulations, coupled with long delays in
the issuance of both proposed and final regulations.

In response to these factors, the Tax Division of the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants and the Tax Section of the American Bar Association jointly
sponsored the Invitational Conference on the Reduction of Income Tax Complexity
in Washington, D.C., on January 11 and 12, 1990. Our committee, which was
charged with the responsibility for the organization and presentation of that
conference, is now pleased to publish this volume containing the papers presented
at that conference and a summary of the proceedings.
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Since this conference, there have been many encouraging developments and a
growing national awareness of the need to reduce the complexity in our federal tax
laws. We believe that this conference was a catalyst and that the publication of
these excellent papers and proceedings should further advance these efforts.

The committee wishes to thank all who participated. In particular we wish to
acknowledge the tireless and effective support given to our efforts by the staff of
the AICPA Tax Division under the direction of Carol B. Ferguson. We also wish
to thank Professor Silvia Madeo for her efforts as proceedings editor.

We do not expect that the solution to the perceived problems will be easy, nor that
there will be immediate change. We do hope that this conference has, however,
started a dialogue which will be continued by the publication of these papers and
that this will lead to substantial changes over the next few years.

The income tax system is vital to our American form of government. Our concern
is that it function well--if not, we fear that serious government deficiencies will
result.
Co-Chairmen:
H. Stewart Dunn, Jr.
Don J. Summa
Members:
David G. Glickman
Richard Katcher
Ray M. Sommerfeld
Jay Starkman
Alvin C. Warren, Jr.
Donald C. Wiese
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Part I

Papers Presented

THE BUDGET PROCESS AND TAX SIMPLIFICATION/COMPLICATION

CHARLES E. McLURE, JR.
*

It is without doubt the most significant reform in the history of the income tax.--Jeffrey
H. Birnbaum and Alan S. Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch (1987), commenting on
TRA ’86.

[T]he increasing complexity and incoherency of the current Internal Revenue Code
necessitates tax reform. True tax reform will not be achieved unless there is a
significant simplification of code provisions.’’-David Brockway, former chief of staff of
the Joint Committee on Taxation (1986), (speaking in February 1986).
Complexity is the hallmark of this legislation.--Arthur Andersen (1986).
INTRODUCTION

There seems to be little disagreement that the U.S. tax system has become much more
complicated in recent years. There is also substantial agreement that this increase in
complexity is undesirable. David Bradford has written the following:
A law that can be understood (if at all) only by a tiny priesthood of lawyers and
accountants is naturally subject to popular suspicion. By undermining popular
support, complexity undermines the self-assessment on which economical
compliance depends. Making taxpayers record and report information that is
inherently difficult to audit places an often prohibitive tax on honesty.
Furthermore, dealing with the law’s arcane provisions requires rare talents that
might be better applied to other tasks in the economic system.1

*Charles E. McLure, Jr. is a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford
University. From October 1983 through July 1985 he was Deputy Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury for Tax Analysis. As such he had primary responsibility for the development of
Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth, the department’s 1984 tax
reform proposals to President Reagan that became the basis for the Tax Reform Act of
1986. He wishes to thank David Bradford, Timothy Conlan, Ed Gramlich, Donald Keifer,
Paul McDaniel, Ron Pearlman, Catherine Rudder, Allen Schick, Karla Simon, Jay
Starkman, Gene Steurele Randall Strahan, Don J. Summa, Victor Thuronyi, James Verdier,
John Witte, Al Warren, George Zodrow, and especially David Brockway for their helpful
suggestions and comments on previous drafts of the paper. As always, and perhaps more
than usual, the views expressed here should be attributed only to the author, although he
has freely drawn on the wisdom of these persons and others. (At times, it has been difficult
to avoid the temptation to lift large sections of Brockway’s comments and incorporate them
in the paper!)
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This paper examines the extent to which increased complexity can be traced to recent
changes in the budget process.
The topic of this paper probably did not exist ten years ago, certainly not twenty years
ago.2 The pronounced interaction between the budget process and the simplification or
complication of the tax law seems to be a phenomenon of the 1980s. It has its origins in
several developments: the Budget Act of 1974; the end of the days of easy expansion of
federal spending on domestic programs and tax expenditures financed by sustained
economic growth, by "bracket creep" in the individual income tax, and by the end of the
reduction in the relative importance of defense spending; the massive tax cut of 1981 that
left a budget deficit of roughly 5 percent of the gross national product (GNP); the
subsequent promises of two presidents that we will have no new taxes; the "revenue
neutrality" mind-set that has characterized tax policy discussions since at least the Treasury
Department’s 1984 tax reform proposals to President Reagan; and the budgetary limitations
imposed by the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings targets for deficit reduction. These influences,
singly and jointly, have inhibited attempts to simplify the income tax, since to do so would
lose revenue, and have produced a tendency toward complexity, inequities, economic
distortions, and general fiscal craziness. (Examples of fiscal craziness are considered further
in the next section.) This is particularly disturbing, given the interest in some quarters in
a constitutional amendment that would require budgetary balance.3 These tendencies are
almost certainly aggravated by the "good government" changes in the tax legislative process
that have led to a pattern of erratic tax policy over the past dozen years. Reforms that
were intended to expose policy-making to the cleansing effect of sunlight also exposed it to
the intense scrutiny of lobbyists.

This interaction between budget process and tax policy takes at least four forms. First,
an atmosphere in which the tax-writing committees are "under the gun" to meet the revenue
targets of reconciliation resolutions is not conducive to deliberate and careful consideration
of tax policy alternatives. Even if the Congress begins its deliberations with a menu of
proposals that are defensible on policy grounds, at some point the process is likely to
become driven by revenue estimates instead of policy considerations. When this happens,
proposals are adopted because they raise revenue, not because they make sense. Others
may have complicating "bells and whistles" that either save or raise revenue that would not
be found in the absence of a revenue constraint. Similarly, budgetary constraints may
prevent the enactment of provisions that would lose revenue, including badly needed
technical corrections, even when needed to simplify the law, correct inequities, prevent
distortions of economic decision-making, or otherwise improve the law. Moreover,
provisions are enacted without due care to their consistency with other parts of the law,
producing a Code that lacks coherence and is inordinately complex.

Second, in a world in which the threat of a presidential veto implies that taxes cannot
be raised explicitly, resort must be had to various types of politically innocuous "loophole
closers," sometimes called "cats and dogs." These reforms generally have common
characteristics. They are likely to have only limited applicability; otherwise they would
cause a credibility problem for-and thus a veto from-a president who promises no new
taxes. (Thus we would place limitations on the availability of the ITC for property leased
to tax-exempt organizations in the "cats and dogs" category, but not repeal the ITC.) They
I-A-2

generally raise relatively little revenue, when considered singly; it is only by combining a
number of these minor provisions that Congress can raise significant amounts of revenue.

They may constitute good tax policy, in the sense of redressing inequities and
preventing tax-induced distortions in the allocation of resources. But they are generally
quite arcane and complicated.

The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (DEFRA) is a prime example of this phenomenon.
DEFA dealt with such matters as straddles, at-risk loss provisions, nonsimultaneous likekind exchanges, related-party transactions, premature accruals, prepaid expenses, availability
of the ITC on property leased to tax-exempt institutions, "golden parachutes," and
distributions involving tiered partnerships-hardly important concerns for most taxpayers.
Of course, DEFRA also contained some provisions of more general applicability.
Third, when tax reform occurs in a revenue-neutral context, it may be necessary for
committee chairmen to use highly targeted provisions such as "transition rules" to buy
support from their colleagues. In earlier days, when there was less concern for budgetary
outcomes, that same support might have been obtained with provisions of more general
applicability—and greater revenue cost.

The effects of highly targeted provisions are a mixed bag. They are not likely to add
much to the complexity faced directly by most taxpayers, for whom they simply are not
relevant. Beneficiaries of targeted tax preferences are unlikely to complain about
complexity; as Surrey has noted, "no taxpayer group ever rejects a new tax preference on
the ground it is complex."4 On the other hand, they do adversely affect the ability of both
private practitioners and tax administrators to master and deal with the Internal Revenue
Code, including the regulations. Moreover, by adding to the length of the Code and to the
number of forms and regulations, they contribute to an aura of complexity that, together
with the blatant inequity of such provisions, undermines faith in the tax system.
Fourth, in an atmosphere in which every proposal for new expenditures must be
accompanied by a proposed method of finance, too little attention may be devoted to
technical details of the design of revenue measures. When tax law is grafted onto spending
bills, sometimes almost as an afterthought, it is almost inevitable that complexity, inequities,
and distortions will result.5
Furthermore, mistakes that further complicate matters are likely to occur when policy
is made "under the gun" of reconciliation. Part of the added complexity results from the
need to revisit and revise flawed legislation in order to rectify earlier mistakes. This is not
to say that tax legislation should not be revisited. Legislation will inevitably contain flaws,
whether for political reasons, honest errors in policy, or technical defects; in many such
cases it may be possible to improve matters by revisiting. The point is that the need for
revisiting to correct technical defects is likely to be greater when legislation is enacted in
more of a rush. Revisiting is most likely to result in complexity not when it is motivated
by a need to correct real flaws, but when it is used as an opportunity for special interests
to change the law to suit themselves.
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But the news is not all bad. The combination of a deficit crunch and the demands of
revenue neutrality has forced greater congressional recognition of the fact that tax
expenditures (subsidies implemented through the tax system) are not costless, and should
compete against other possible uses of federal funds. If only budgetary expenditures are
subject to control, the President and the Congress will be tempted to use tax expenditures
to make an end run around the limitations. But if it is the deficit that is the object of
control, this ploy will not work.6 The lack of revenues also makes it much more difficult
than before for a particular member of Congress to gain enactment of special-interest
legislation that would create inequities and distortions and further complicate the system.
Moreover, the pressure of budgetary discipline may induce the Congress to take action to
reduce tax preferences that otherwise would survive intact. This certainly seems to have
been the case in 1982, 1984, and 1986.

This paper examines the interaction between budget process and tax policy. Although
it focuses on the impact of the budget process on the simplification and complication of the
tax system, it also touches on issues of equity and neutrality and on the phenomenon of
fiscal craziness.7 Moreover, it also discusses how the reforms of the tax legislative process
contribute to the problem created by budget processes. It does not address many of the
quite different issues covered in McDaniel’s excellent paper for the 1978 ALI-ABA
conference on the political process of federal income tax simplification.8 Nor does it
address many of the fundamental decisions underlying the present U.S. income tax system,
such as the choice between income and consumption as the basis of taxation,9 the use of
graduated rates,10 or the choice of the married couple as the basic taxpaying unit.11

The next section describes the changes that have occurred in the budget process in
recent years and the budgetary constraints under which policy-makers now labor. The third
section is an attempt to differentiate several types of complexity, indicate the sources of
complexity, and determine who experiences complexity. The fourth section provides
examples of complexity taken from recent changes in the law. The fifth section discusses
the congressional reforms and counterreforms that have rocked the tax-writing committees
and altered their way of doing business since the 1970s. The sixth section indicates how the
budget process contributes to complexity. The paper ends with some tentative suggestions
on how to improve matters; they are intended to be provocative rather than definitive.
Some readers may wish to skip directly to the sixth and seventh sections.

For the most part, descriptions of complexity in this paper are impressionistic and
subjective; complexity is not quantified. Thus the paper points the way to the need for
quantification of many of the effects mentioned. Among the many questions that might be
addressed are, Which are the most complex provisions? To what extent is complexity
inevitable in an income tax and to what extent is it avoidable, being the result of particular
ill-advised policies? Are "loophole closers" any more complex than other provisions? To
what extent is the complexity of certain rules offset by the greater simplicity of transactions
they produce? Does targeted relief seriously complicate the law? Are tax provisions that
are grafted onto spending bills extraordinarily complex? To what extent can complexity be
traced to the reconciliation process?
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THE BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS

This section describes in general terms the origin and effects of the budgetary
constraints that have operated on the tax policy process during the 1980s.
The 1974 Congressional Budget Act

The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (hereinafter the
"Act") has markedly changed the process of legislation on tax and expenditures, especially
since 1980.12 We need not be concerned with the details of the Act; the important point
is that a "reconciliation resolution" passed by Congress specifies the amount by which taxes,
spending, or both, is to be changed in order to meet budgetary targets. This has had the
effect of centralizing power in the budget committees and weakening the tax-writing
committees. In addition, the Act requires that each annual budget contain estimates of tax
expenditures. (The concept of tax expenditures is discussed in the third section below.
Though not strictly correct, for present purposes tax expenditures can be thought of as
deviations of taxable income from economic income.)
After a tentative start, the Act came to exert an important influence on budgetary
politics, including the making of tax policy. In 1980, for the first time, instructions to the
tax-writing committees mandated a one-year increase of revenues (of $4 billion)-a mandate
that was carried out.13 "Largely unnoticed at the time except within the halls of Congress,
the reconciliation process was successfully implemented, and the tax legislative process has
not been the same since."14 Since then, reconciliation has led to enactment of the following
tax bills, with their three-year revenue yields: 1982--(TEFRA)-Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982 98.3 billion; 1984-DEFRA-$50 billion; 1985-$6.6 billion; 1986-$5.7 billion; 1987-$38.2 billion.15 We will return to the process and nature of these
changes subsequently.

The Act contributes to fiscally responsible tax policy because the budget resolution
indicates to the revenue committees the amount of money that must be raised through tax
policy for the next three fiscal years. By setting a particular revenue target, the resolution
sets the stage for discussions of trade-offs involving alternative ways to raise that amount.
The tax expenditure budget helps in the evaluation of such trade-offs by quantifying the
revenue effects of various preferences, as well as by publicizing the use of this avenue of
supporting private activities. (The tax expenditure budget is sometimes characterized as a
"hit list" for tax reformers.) Whether this process makes for a simpler system is the subject
of this paper.
The 1981 Tax Cuts

The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) reduced federal revenues by an
amount estimated to exceed $700 billion over five years. Although the TEFRA and
DEFRA increased revenues substantially, the former by rescinding part of the 1981 tax cuts,
on balance taxes remained substantially lower than they would have been under pre-1981
I-A-5

law.16 Since spending was not cut by a corresponding amount, large deficits emerged. Thus
ERTA, in conjunction with the slowdown in economic growth, indexing of the individual
income tax, and the end of the decline in defense spending (to be discussed subsequently),
set the fiscal stage for the remainder of the 1980s. (It is probably largely responsible for
the Gramm-Rudman legislation, discussed subsequently.) The Congress has been loath to
adopt any proposal that would further increase the deficit.
Minarik goes even further in tracing the long shadow cast by the excesses of ERTA:
He writes:
[T]he 1981 Act reduced revenues drastically and assured that subsequent
revenue acts would not reduce revenues further. Rather, later acts became
a search for revenues which, given the political landscape, did not tolerate
rate increases. This almost preordained the elimination of tax preferences.
Preference closing was made easier by the outrageous features of the 1981
Act, in particular safe harbor leasing, that gave the public the perception that
many of America’s wealthiest and biggest corporations were paying no tax.17

The End of the Free Ride

For much of the period from the mid-1960s until the 1980s, the U.S. government was
able to increase domestic expenditures and tax benefits to special interests with relatively
little legislated pain in the form of higher taxes. This is true, because of, inter alia,
sustained economic growth, bracket creep in the individual income tax, and the relative
decline in the defense budget. These sources of domestic funding were essentially
eliminated during, if not before the beginning of, the 1980s.

Slowing Economic Growth18
During the post-Korean War part of the 1950s, real GNP grew substantially faster than
real outlays of the federal government (2.7 percent versus 1.2 percent annual increases),
reflecting in part a continuation of the demobilization after the war. The 1960s saw more
rapid economic growth (4.4 percent per annum); this made possible substantial growth in
both defense and nondefense spending, but an even more rapid growth of spending (4.9
percent) led to increased budget deficits. During the early 1970s, the rate of growth fell
markedly, to the neighborhood of 2.5 percent, where it has remained. Although the rate
of growth of federal spending has also declined, it has continued above the rate of
economic growth, producing even larger deficits than in the 1960s.
Inflation, Bracket Creep, Fiscal Dividends, and Indexing

Until passage of the 1981 tax reform, the income tax system of the United States was
totally unindexed; that is, when prices increased, figures stated in monetary terms, such as
personal exemptions and bracket limits in the rate tables, were not changed except through
explicit legislation.19 As a result, the inflation that began in the late 1960s produced the
phenomenon of "bracket creep," a situation in which taxpayers with a given real (inflationI-A-6

adjusted) income found themselves in increasingly higher tax brackets.
Besides
undermining the progressivity of the tax system (as described by the personal exemptions
and rate structure initially found in the law), bracket creep created a tendency for the
system to generate "fiscal dividends."20 These dividends were manifested in tax collections
that grew, as a percent of GNP, even in the absence of legislation to raise taxes.21

The additional revenues resulting from the absence of indexation were used for a
variety of purposes. First, taxes were cut several times to offset the effects of bracket
creep. Verdier has noted that sharp increases in individual tax burdens, stimulated often
by bracket creep, have historically led to major tax bills.22 In a similar vein, Leonard notes:
Inflation-driven, bracket creep was the single most important force for
legislative change throughout the 1970s. The Tax Reduction Act of 1975, the
Revenue Adjustment Act of 1975, the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the Tax
Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977, and the Revenue Act of 1978 were
all enacted to offset the effect of automatic increases in individual tax burdens
resulting from inflation. All these bills were designed to avoid what at the
time was called "fiscal drag."23

Tax reduction did not take the form of only--or even primarily--rate reduction.
Increased revenues were used to finance increased tax expenditures. Tax expenditures
increased from just over half of income tax revenues in 1974 to roughly 90 percent in 1984,
the year before indexing took effect; by 1986, before enactment of the Tax Reform Act of
1986 (TRA ’86), tax expenditures were estimated to be slightly larger than income tax
revenues.24
One of the important changes made in the 1981 law was the provision that, beginning
in 1985, many of the monetary figures in the tax code would be indexed; that is, they would
be adjusted annually to reflect increases in prices. This has had the important effect of
eliminating bracket creep and the fiscal dividends it produced. No longer can the federal
government rely on automatic increases in tax revenues created by inflation to cause tax
collections to increase more rapidly than GNP; by and large, if it wants to increase
spending or provide special-interest tax expenditures, it must be willing either to raise taxes
or incur increased deficits.25 Whereas eight of eleven major revenue measures passed from
1975 through 1981 lost revenue in the first three years following enactment, fourteen of the
seventeen major revenue measures enacted since 1981 have raised revenue.26 The dividing
point was, of course, ERTA which lost revenue and introduced indexing. Leonard notes
that the enactment of indexing as part of ERTA marked the end of administration
projections of balanced budgets?7

Ending the Decline of Defense
In 1967, at the peak of the Vietnam buildup, national defense absorbed 9 percent of
GNP. By 1978 that percentage had dropped to below 5 percent. The difference, more
than 4 percent of GNP, represented an enormous additional dividend that could be diverted
to nondefense uses (including tax reductions) without the need to increase taxes.28 At 1980
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levels of GNP, the "defense dividend" amounted to more than $100 billion; at 1988 levels
of GNP, it amounted to roughly $200 billion.

The fall in the fraction of GNP devoted to defense had ended by the time President
Reagan took office, and the defense buildup, begun under President Carter and continued
under Reagan, sharply reversed this downward trend in the relative importance of defense.
By the mid-1980s the percentage of GNP devoted to national defense had recovered to 6.5
percent. Expansions of domestic programs and increased tax expenditures could no longer
be financed in part by the funds made available by the relative decline in the defense
budget; indeed, proponents of defense and nondefense spending (including tax
expenditures) had become engaged in a highly competitive battle for budget dollars.
"No New Taxes"

Three actions taken under Reagan administration-the 1981 tax cuts, indexing of the
individual income tax, and continuation of the reversal of the relative decline in defense
spending-created an enormous budget deficit and made it difficult, if not impossible, to
increase spending without either increasing taxes or incurring even greater budget deficits.
But Reagan, in statements made early and often during his presidency, made it clear that
he would not tolerate a tax increase. During the 1988 presidential campaign George Bush
used the phrase "Read my lips: No new taxes," to reiterate Reagan’s promise. These
promises fed a popular "tax revolt," which had been evident in state capitals but was thus
far largely latent in Washington.29

They made everyone in Congress reluctant to try to "bell the cat" of budget deficits by
proposing a tax increase and thus evoking the threat of a presidential veto. If taxes were
to be raised, it would need to be by the "cats and dogs" approach rather than by explicit
increases in taxes that would hit a large portion of the population.

Of course, the cats-and-dogs approach was used in 1982 and 1984.
extended in a revenue-neutral context in TRA ’86. Minarik has written:

Then it was

[T]he tax rate cuts had become so much a part of the economic policy
baseline, not to mention of the President’s agenda, that raising revenue
required plugging loopholes in the tax base rather than raising rates. The
process exposed many obsolete and unjustifiable tax preferences . . ., and it
convinced many members of Congress that tax preferences could be repealed
without causing the sky to fall in?3
0
For the first three years after TRA ’86 became law, there seems to have been an
implicit contract not to reopen the Code for further revision, in part because many believe
that to do so would result in the "unravelling" of tax reform. (One can only speculate
whether such unravelling would occur in a revenue-neutral context or include a tax increase.
Certainly tax reform was opposed in part because of the prospect that once the base had
been reformed, rates would be raised to reduce the deficit.) As this is being written, this
contract may be dissolving, in large part because President Bush apparently has no
commitment to tax reform.
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Revenue Neutrality

During the process that led to TRA ’86 Ronald Reagan made it clear that tax reform
was not to be used as a front or an excuse for a tax increase. Yet, given the size of actual
and projected budget deficits, it was also clear that tax reform should not result in reduced
revenues. As a result, the Treasury Department, in its 1984 report to Reagan, established
"revenue neutrality" as one of the guiding principles for tax reform: Tax reform should
"leave revenues essentially unchanged from what they would be under current law."31

The requirement of revenue neutrality has been described as one of the keys to the
eventual passage of TRA ’86, a bill that could be characterized as fundamental reform.32
Acting initially on a "business as usual" basis, the Senate Finance Committee began by
yielding to so many requests for exceptions that its tax reform plan would have lost an
estimated $30 billion. Only by changing course and adopting the principle that any revenue
loser had to be matched by a provision that would restore the lost revenue could the
committee maintain the discipline to produce the historic agreement. Thus it virtually
retraced the steps the House Ways and Means Committee had made less than a year
earlier.
Revenue neutrality turned the tax reform process into a "zero sum" game in which the
tax benefits saved or expanded for one group had to be matched by the loss of benefits by
another group. As a result, the business community was split-or even fragmented; instead
of presenting a monolithic front (what Birnbaum and Murray call a "killer coalition)",
business, as it had often done in the past, business took an "every man for himself attitude
that proved disastrous to its cause.

The combination of the federal deficit and the revenue-neutral mind-set it helped
produce may have helped change the way the Congress views tax policy. There seems to
be less of a tendency to adopt provisions for tax reduction without caring about the revenue
consequences. This was seen perhaps most clearly in the 1986 tax reform exercise.
The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Targets

Growing concern over the size and intractability of budget deficits led to the 1985
enactment of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings bill, which specifies targets for deficit reduction.
Under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, deficits are to be reduced by specified amounts
each year until budgetary balance is reached in 1993 (1991 in the original legislation). In
the absence of agreement on a budget that would achieve these targets, the president is to
mandate an across-the-board sequestering of funds. Such sequestration would cut both
defense spending and nondefense spending not explicitly exempted equally; social security,
medicare, and interest on the national debt are among the exempt expenditures.
The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act is intended to impose discipline on an otherwise
undisciplined Congress (and President). In principle, expenditures and tax breaks cannot

I-A-9

be legislated willy-nilly without regard for their budgetary consequences; indeed, in the
absence of extraordinary economic growth, budgetary expenditures, tax expenditures, or
both must be reduced or tax rates must be raised if the targets are to be met. An
important result of Gramm Rudman Hollings might be described as the requirement of
"revenue neutrality at a lower level of deficit". That is, the deficit must be reduced by a
specified amount. Given that, any tax benefit that survives or is increased must be matched
by cuts in another. (Thus budgeting becomes a negative-sum game.)
As a result, some expenditure proposals are accompanied by proposed methods of
finance. (This is most common in the case of expenditures subject to the jurisdiction of the
tax writing committees, especially Ways and Means.) In addition, because of the discipline
of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings targets, proposals for changes in tax law that would lose
revenues are, almost of necessity, framed in a revenue-neutral context; that is, they are
accompanied by proposals for recouping the lost revenue.

The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings targets have been exceedingly difficult for the Congress
to meet. One result has been the increasing use of budgetary "gimmickry" to circumvent
the spirit of the law while observing its letter, what has earlier been called "fiscal craziness."
Undue attention is devoted to the short-range impact of tax changes, to the neglect of
long-term effects. A prime example is the recent spate of proposals to cut the tax rate
applied to long-term capital gains for only one or two years and index basis after that; this
is further examined below. As this is being written, there is talk of "back-loaded IRAs,"
individual retirement accounts into which taxpayers make after-tax deposits, receiving tax
exempt returns of both principal and interest. This is not necessarily a hair-brained idea
if one wants to restore IRAs; indeed, such accounts are an integral component of the socalled prepaid methods of implementing a direct tax on consumption rather than on
income.34 But it is no accident that talk of introducing yet a third form of IRA that
postpones revenue loss--and of the option of rolling over funds from conventional taxdeferred IRAs to the new back-loaded variety by paying tax currently on the amounts rolled
over--is occurring in the environment of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. The revenue-losing
effect of back-loaded IRAs would not be experienced until funds are withdrawn; by
comparison, under a conventional IRA, the revenue loss occurs when funds are deposited
and as interest is earned. A potentially more important kind of craziness, also predicated
by budgetary stringency and the desire to hide the true costs of public policies, involves the
requirement (sometimes called "mandating") that private firms provide services that
traditionally have been provided by the public sector.35 The effects of this type of
regulation, which can be characterized as quasi-tax/quasi-public spending, are beyond the
scope of the present paper.36

Another result has been to divert attention from eliminating the deficit to meeting the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings targets for the year.37 One possible effect in the tax area is to
focus on relatively smaller changes that would help meet the immediate targets, instead of
on larger changes, including changes in rates, that would eliminate the deficit.
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Synthesis

The requirement of revenue neutrality implied that in 1986 tax reform was a zero
sum game; any tax benefits left intact must be financed by eliminating or not conferring
other benefits. This process may improve the tax system in many ways, but it need not
contribute to simplicity.
Looking to the future, similar results can be expected, for the combination of forces
identified above create pressures that change the nature of decision-making on tax policy.
The 1981 tax cut-even after the 1982 and 1984 Acts-created an enormous federal budget
deficit that worries many observers. The slow down in economic growth, the end of the
decline in defense spending, and the elimination of fiscal dividends based on bracket creep
that was accomplished by indexing imply that there will be no easy solution to the deficit
problem; either expenditures (or the growth of expenditures) must be cut or taxes must be
raised. And yet the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act requires that the deficit must be cut.
Since President Bush threatens to veto a tax increase, revenues can be raised only in ways
that do not appear-at least to Bush-to increase taxes. That generally means the use of
base broadeners (the "cats and dogs" approach) rather than rate increases. This, in turn,
may increase complexity.
VARIOUS KINDS OF COMPLEXITY

Rather than discussing complexity as an undifferentiated glob, it is useful to try to
break it down in various ways. This section does that; it discusses (1) three different types
of complexity, (2) five different sources of complexity, and (3) the important question,
"complexity for whom?"
Three Types of Complexity

I do not attempt a precise definition of either simplicity or complexity. McDaniel
expresses the basic idea when he writes, "Whether by ‘simplification’ one means more easily
understood statutory language, increased ease of tax administration, greater certainty in
planning, more easily understood forms, or more coherent resolution of tax issues by the
courts, the fact is that all of these concerns derive fundamentally from the tax statute
itself."38 It may, however, be worthwhile to add several points. First, "simplicity" is being
accorded essentially its dictionary definition; it is not being used as a synonym for fairness,
what I have elsewhere called "simplicity for the other guy."
Second, it is useful to distinguish between several aspects of simplicity (and hence
complexity) that are subsumed in the foregoing quotation from McDaniel.3 The first is
what might be called "compliance simplicity," which is a matter of keeping records, filling
out forms, etc. It is probably primarily this type of simplicity that concerns most taxpayers
who have relatively simple financial affairs.
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"Simplicity of rules" is lacking when the Code and its supporting regulations can be
interpreted only by "a tiny priesthood of lawyers and accountants"—and even by them only
with great difficulty. Again, most taxpayers do not confront truly complicated rules
although it is probably appropriate to recognize that complexity is almost certainly in the
eye of the beholder.
Those with complicated financial affairs are often affected by what might be called
"transactional simplicity," the notion that under a simpler system, financial deals and
economic decisions need not be structured with an eye to their tax consequences; this is a
close cousin to-but not the same as-economic neutrality. Of course, the presence or
absence of this type of simplicity can be traced directly to the provisions in the Code. This
type of simplicity is likely to be of greatest relevance for corporations and for individuals
who are either relatively wealthy or engaged in business for themselves.

There are cases in which provisions that complicate rules or compliance lead to
transactional simplicity. As Bradford has written, "Rules with a high degree of economic
consistency serve transactional simplicity, although they may impose costs in the form of
compliance and rules complexity."40 For example, the complicated provisions of TRA ’86
that substantially eliminate tax shelters (at-risk rules, passive loss rules, etc.) simplify
economic decision making and create transactional simplicity. In the long run, to the extent
that such rules eliminate tax shelters, they indeed simplify the system on balance.41 If the
tax benefits of prior tax shelters are eliminated, it is only during the period when old
investments are subject to the new rules that the net complexity of the system increases.
Sometimes transactional complexity is increased by tax reform, including reforms that
are not even effective in reaching their (supposed) objectives of equity and economic
neutrality. For example, when safe-harbor leasing was repealed, it became necessary for
taxpayers to incur greater complexity in structuring leasing deals that would pass muster
under the tighter rules.
Five Sources of Complexity

In considering the interaction between budget process and simplicity, it is useful to
distinguish five types of provisions that complicate the Code.42
These are (1) rules
necessary for the accurate definition of real economic income, (2) provisions creating tax
expenditures, (3) "backstop" provisions intended to prevent the abuse of tax preferences or
the appearance of inequity, (4) transitional rules, and (5) complications that arise because
the tax system lacks internal coherence. Although the distinctions are far from watertight,
for reasons to be specified subsequently, they do help to organize the discussion that
follows. The five types of complexity are described in the remainder of this subsection; one
category, tax expenditures, is considered in greater detail at the end of the subsection.
Income Definition Rules

The first source of complexity consists of provisions that are necessary for the accurate
definition of a tax base that is roughly consistent with real economic income. (Since the
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classic definition of economic income, consumption plus the change in net worth, is
commonly associated with the names of two economists, Robert Haig and Henry Simons,
the term Haig-Simons income will sometimes be used interchangeably with the term
economic income)43 We might call these necessary or appropriate income definition rules.
Some income definition rules result from the need to draw lines in inherently fuzzy
areas. For example, under what circumstances should deductions be allowed for meals,
entertainment, and expenses away from home or for the expenses of a home office? Short
of meat-ax approaches that say that no such expenses are deductible (or that all are), this
type of complexity seems inevitable; but provisions such as the 2 percent floor on
miscellaneous expenses in the TRA ’86 reduces (and perhaps eliminates) compliance
complexity for many taxpayers who expect at the beginning of the year to be below the
threshold.

Much complexity comes from a quite different source. In principle, economic income
includes accrued income, as well as income that has been realized. Since accruals are often
not directly observable, it is necessary as a practical matter (as well as a matter of policy,
in cases in which taxation based on accrual would be administratively feasible but politically
unpopular) to base taxation on realization. (In addition to income definition rules that are
broadly consistent with an economic definition of income, there are rules providing for the
deferral of recognition of income. Some of these might best be treated as tax
expenditures.) Yet in some cases it is not sufficient to base the system on a purist (cash
flow) interpretation of realization, since to do so would be overly generous to the taxpayer,
who generally can control the timing of realization; rather a mixture of realization and
accrual rules is provided. Thus many of the most important of these rules involve issues
of the timing of recognition of income and the deduction of expenses. The rules governing
depreciation allowances, capitalization of costs of carrying inventories, costs of multi-period
production, original issue discount obligations, installment sales, reserves for bad debts, and
accruals for vacation pay would be examples of this type of provision.44 Income tax rules
governing such timing issues are inevitably complicated.45

The growth in complexity of this kind-and the purpose it serves-can be appreciated
from the evolution of the rules dealing with original issue discount (OID).46 The first OID
rules, enacted in 1954, were intended merely to prevent OID from being characterized as
capital gains; before 1969 the interest represented by OID was not taxed until received at
the time of redemption. Naturally this led to abuse and inequity, as taxpayers took
advantage of opportunities for tax arbitrage. While the rule adopted in 1969 (current
taxation based on straight-line accrual of implicit interest), complicated compliance and
administration, it only approximated the true pattern of accrual and was thus only partially
successful in preventing abuse and inequity, especially during the periods of high interest
rates of the 1970s. As a result, in 1982 accrual based on compound interest was adopted.
This rule, while extremely complicated, failed to cover debt issued by individuals and cases
in which both debt and property were publicly traded. These cases were brought under the
new rules by the 1984 Act.
Many such timing rules are likely to be complicated and to cause considerable
frustration for taxpayers and the practitioners dealing with their tax matters. This is
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especially true when tax rules diverge from generally accepted accounting principles, as do
the rules for the capitalization of the costs of holding inventories.
But for several reasons, it is necessary (or at least desirable) to have rules that provide
that taxable income approximates economic income fairly closely.48 First, in the absence
of such rules, the income tax will not be fair, in the sense of treating all taxpayers with the
same economic income similarly regardless of the source of their income. Second, and
perhaps equally important, the system may not be perceived to be fair. The public is not
likely to comply voluntarily with a system seen to be unfair. Third, without adequate rules,
the income tax will not be neutral; because income from various sources is treated
differently, investments and other business decisions will be motivated by tax considerations
rather than only by business considerations.
Finally, and of particular interest for the present discussion, the absence of adequate
rules can give rise to even greater complexity. For one thing, factoring tax considerations
into business decisions can be expected to complicate decision making, creating
transactional complexity.
Beyond that, the tax law itself is likely to become more
complicated over time, as taxpayers and their representatives look for ways to exploit
"loopholes" and the government attempts to stop them by both fine-tuning of the basic law
or the enactment of what are called "backstop" provisions in the following discussion.49
For this reason, apparently simple rules do not necessarily make for simplicity. Indeed,
deviations of taxable income from economic income that seems simple on face can cause
great complexity. The accelerated cost recovery system (ACRS) was simple, but it created
complexity. (This is discussed below.)
An additional potential source of considerable complexity, but one not yet found in the
Code, is inflation adjustment in the measurement of income from business and capital.
Essentially, it is necessary to adjust depreciation (and similar) allowances, cost of goods sold
from inventory, the basis of capital assets, and interest income and expense if real income
is not to be mismeasured.50 While inflation adjustment would undoubtedly complicate both
rules and compliance, it would reduce transactions complexity, especially in times of high
inflation, by increasing the correspondence of taxable income to real economic income. Of
course, it is also required for equity and neutrality.

Some complexities associated with income definition rules exist because current law
attempts to impose more than one tax on a certain streams of income, but only one tax on
other similar flows of income. This distinction is especially important in the case of the
taxation of equity income flowing from corporations to individual shareholders, compared
with taxation of income earned in partnerships.51 (Whether this is merely part of the
general income measurement problem or deserves to be treated as a separate form of
complexity, presumably incoherence (to be discussed subsequently), is left as an open
question.) For example, it is necessary to distinguish between interest and dividends,
since both are taxable to the individuals receiving them but corporations are allowed a
deduction for the former but not the latter. Moreover, it is necessary to have elaborate
rules that take account of the many ways relations between partners and partnerships can
be structured. Much of the debate over such provisions as at-risk rules and the uproar over
the repeal of General Utilities can be traced to this source. Yet attempting to treat interest
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and dividends similarly, by "integrating" the two income taxes or providing relief for double
taxation of dividends, has its own complications.52

It is useful to divide this category of complexity inherent in income definition rules into
two further groups, again realizing that the division is not watertight. On the one hand
there are the fundamental decisions that determine the basic nature of the income tax, for
issues such as (1) whether there is to be a separate corporate income tax or an integrated
system, and what is the nature of the system of integration (if one is to be provided); (2)
whether capital gains are to be taxed as ordinary income or preferentially, and what is the
nature of such preferential treatment; (3) whether there is to be a system of inflation
adjustment in the measurement of income from business and capital, and, if so, what type
of system is it; and (4) whether depreciation allowances are intended to track economic
depreciation or be more (or less) rapid, and what is the nature of the available rules for
acceleration. We will call these basic rules for income definition.
Once these basic rules have been chosen, there remain myriad details to be settled
before the basic rules can be implemented. These include matters commonly handled in
regulations under current practice, but many issues now determined legislatively also
properly belong in this category. These might be called derivative rules of income
definition. Recent discussion of tax reform provides a perfect example of the possible
distinction: It makes little sense for the Congress to be involved in such details of tax law
as the depreciation treatment of tuxedos.
Tax Expenditure Provisions

The second type of complicating provision is not needed to define economic income
accurately. Rather, these provisions represent (often explicit and intentional) deviations of
taxable income from economic income. Some of these provisions are adopted to encourage
certain activities; the continuing exclusion of interest on state and local securities is one
example. Others are adopted with the express purpose of simplifying the system. Thus
investment in intangible capital and expenditures on research and development (R&D)
are expensed in part because of the inherent difficulty of distinguishing capital outlays from
current expense and of specifying appropriate depreciation schedules. An example that
combines the two objectives of incentives and simplification would be the expensing of
capital assets (and of R&D); expensing encourages investment, and it is simpler than
economic depreciation (at least if we ignore problems of recapture and tax shelters, to be
considered subsequently).
Some provisions are intended to provide relief to certain groups of taxpayers, but not
necessarily to simplify returns or encourage the affected activity. Special benefits to the
blind and the elderly are examples of this category. Many such provisions are quite
complex, because of rules intended to limit their availability and because of the implied
revenue loss.

Provisions in this second category are sometimes called tax expenditures to indicate
their similarity to budgetary expenditures.53 In essence, because of deviations of the tax
base from economic income, federal dollars are spent by not collecting them.54 The
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concept of tax expenditures was given budgetary legitimacy in the Budget Act of 1974.55
By law, each annual budget submitted to the Congress must now contain estimates of tax
expenditures.56 McDaniel has observed that "the use of tax expenditures is the single
biggest cause of complexity in our tax system."57

Depending on their specificity, tax expenditures can be characterized as "general" or
"targeted", (that is, available only to a small number of taxpayers). Fortunately, little use
has been made of targeted tax expenditures, aside from the targeted transition rules to be
discussed subsequently. Following the suggestion made in connection with income
definition rules, it is useful to distinguish between the basic rules for tax expenditures,
which the Congress must determine, and the derivative rules that spell out details that
could be left to others.
"Backstop Provisions"

Congress has shown an amazing reluctance to adopt income measurement rules that
would cause taxable income to approximate economic income. There are a number of
explanations for this, including failure to understand the issue and its importance in
particular cases, the complexity of some of these rules, and (especially) the desire to
provide tax benefits (tax expenditures) in others. Whenever the absence of accurate income
measurement has conferred significant tax benefits, taxpayers have typically responded by
reaping the tax savings. In some instances the result has been abuse or the perception
that the system is unfair; the phenomenon of wealthy individuals and corporations paying
little or no taxes is commonly interpreted as politically unacceptable, even if totally legal
means are used to reduce taxes.58
Rather than reacting by eliminating (or substantially reducing) the distinction between
taxable and economic income, the Congress has sometimes adopted a variety of "backstop"
provisions that limit the latitude for abuse the impression that the system is unfair, or both.
This was especially true in TRA ’86, which included, inter alia, a tighter alternative
minimum tax (AMT) on individuals, a new AMT on corporations (including one based on
book income), a new limit on the deduction of passive losses, and tighter limits on the
deduction of interest expense.59 The AMT based on book income would guarantee that
corporations that showed a positive book income would pay at least some tax. Limitations
on the ability to use investment tax credits to offset income tax can be traced to the same
concern; they have no other apparent justification.60
These backstop rules are almost inevitably complex. (For example, it has been noted
that there are more than a half-dozen ways to treat various types of interest expense; see
subsequent "Interest Deduction" section below.) They would not be needed in a system
in which taxable income did more closely approximate economic income. "Thus the use of
tax expenditures has produced a double level of complexity in the tax laws; first when the
provision is introduced and, second, when tax reformers seek to limit the adverse effects of
the special tax provisions on tax equity. The net result has been a tax system that spirals
toward ever-increasing complexity."61 Yet the very existence of these rules may actually
reduce transactional complexity enough to produce a net reduction in complexity.62 This
possibility is discussed further below.
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To the extent that they restrict access to the benefits of tax expenditures, backstop rules
can be interpreted as a sign of congressional schizophrenia: benefits are given with the
ordinary tax expenditure provisions and then taken away with the backstop provisions. In
such cases they are presumably addressed at the perception of inequity, since the underlying
provision that creates the impression of abuse continues to have congressional approval.

Finally, it must be acknowledged 1) that basing a system entirely on taxation of accrued
but unrealized income suffers from overwhelming political and practical problems and 2)
that any system based substantially on realization will inevitably contain opportunities for
taxpayers to play games, unless such opportunities are carefully foreclosed by backstop rules
such as limitations on interest deductions and the deductibility of capital losses.

As with income definition rules and tax expenditure rules, it seems to make sense to
distinguish between the basic backstop rules that Congress should determine and the
derivative backstop rules that it need not establish explicitly.
Transition Rules

Transition rules are provisions that exempt income and expense related to
commitments made under prior law from ordinary treatment under the new law. Thus the
Internal Revenue Code still contains many provisions exempting income earned before the
introduction of the income tax in 1913. More recently, each time the investment tax credit
(ITC) has been suspended, care has been taken to be ensure that investments for which
there had been a firm commitment before a given date (usually the date of a presidential
proposal or the announcement of congressional consideration of the proposed change)
continue to qualify for the credit, even if placed in service after the date of suspension.
On the other hand, similar care is taken to ensure that only investments for which
commitments are made after a certain date benefit from reinstatement of the ITC.

In principle, transition rules can provide an important element of equity, by insulating
those who have made (have not made) such commitments from the retroactive effects of
harsh changes (benefits) in the law. Unfortunately, they can create considerable complexity,
because it is necessary to have rules for the treatment of many different transactions or
components of income. For example, every time depreciation schedules are changed, it is
necessary to create a distinction according to whether assets were placed in service before
or after the change. If indexation is adopted for capital gains, it will be necessary to value
the entire capital stock as of the date the indexation begins, or to have some rule for the
determination of the fraction of gain to tax in the case of assets held before introduction
of indexing.

Transition rules can also be used as "sweeteners" to buy the approval of recalcitrant
members of Congress for tax reform. So used, they generally detract from equity. (This
is discussed in a subsequent section below.)

In what follows it will be useful to distinguish between what might be called "true
transition rules of general applicability" and "transition rules used as sweeteners." The
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latter include both true transition rules that are highly targeted and targeted "transition
rules" that are really permanent benefits; the latter are generally more accurately
characterized as targeted tax expenditures.
"A Horse Designed by a Committee"

Some complexity can be identified directly with none of the foregoing four types.
Rather, the tax law is complex in part because it lacks coherence. Incoherence occurs
because tax policy has been put together badly-because tax policy is, in the words of the
old definition of a camel, a horse designed by a committee, and a committee operating
continuously and often under pressure for many years, at that.64 Witte has described the
problem as follows:65

Over the years, in trying to respond to the demands of diverse groups, to
meet the political needs of decision makers, and-so very important--to
correct, adjust, and fine-tune the system, the income tax as a fundamental and
ostensibly equitable means of raising revenue has been slowly but
continuously eroded. ... What has emerged may be a versatile and flexible
policy tool, but it is also devastatingly complex tangle of diverse legislative
provisions and administrative rules. 6
Handler has identified the following examples of why the tax law is complex: related
provisions that need rationalization and coordination; overly broad and imprecise language
that begs confusion and misinterpretation; overly complex solutions to admittedly complex
problems; "quick fixes" legislated to deal with problems perceived to be pressing without
adequate understanding of their implications; rules intended to provide limited relief that
turn out to have wider applicability, leaving essentially legislative tasks to be settled by
regulations; and complexity resulting from repeated uncoordinated amendment of the
statute.67

Among the many cases of incoherence in the Code are the multiplicity of rules defining
related parties, those governing the division of interest expense among various "baskets",
and the nondiscrimination rules. (The second and third of these are discussed further
below.) A particularly distressing type of incoherence is that affecting those just above the
tax threshold who must deal with the maze of incoherent provisions for filing status, marital
status, number of exemptions, standard deduction, earned income credit, and child care
credit. Schenk notes, "For many taxpayers, the tax return and instructions present a
bewildering morass of rules which cannot be easily mastered."68 Under a rational policy
there should be fewer such rules and the rules would be consistent. The problem is that
various definitions and limitations have been added to the Code over the years as the need
has arisen, without due regard for coherence.

This list is almost certainly incomplete. The point is that provisions that fall into one
or more of the foregoing categories (income definition, tax expenditure, backstop, and
transition) are put together in a way that lacks logical coherence and therefore creates
complexity. Minarik, in regard to the Tax Reform Act of 1976 has written, "[I]n its further
tinkering with the tax code provision by provision, and in its restriction and modification
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of preferential provisions rather than outright repeal, this Act continued the complication
of the law and of economic choices."69

A further source of complexity is what Chapoton, following Ward Hussey, has labeled
the use of vertical drafting, in which many concepts closely related to others in the Code
are included, with variations, in different sections of the law. By comparison, in horizontal
drafting each key concept is set out in one place and then incorporated by reference in
other sections. The result would be greater consistency in the treatment of similar factual
situations, and thus less incoherence and less transactional complexity.70

Making tax policy "under the gun" of reconciliation almost certainly adds to
incoherence. Handler notes, "The lack of internal coordination and the overwhelming
complexity of its provisions have been characteristic of the Code for many years." Yet he
notes, "The budget reconciliation procedure, however, has caused these problems with the
legislative process to be exaggerated."71

Which Is Which?

As indicated earlier, the distinctions between the five types of complexity that have
been identified are far from watertight. Yet it would seem that most practitioners with a
basic understanding of the economics of income measurement would have little difficulty
knowing into which category to place many provisions. For example, the OID rules are
clearly income measurement rules; they are not tax expenditures, backstop rules, transition
rules, or the result of incoherence. The ITC is just as clearly a tax expenditure, and the
rules for when it is and is not available (in the case of suspension or reinstatement) are
clearly transition rules. Moreover, virtually every knowledgeable observer would probably
agree that the various backstop provisions listed earlier (and others) are exactly that; they
are not required for accurate income measurement, they are not transition rules, they
certainly do not provide tax expenditures, and they are not just the result of unintended
incoherence in the Code (incoherence in the minds of the members of Congress, perhaps,
but not in the Code).
Probably the most difficult problem of definition involves the distinction between
income measurement rules and tax expenditures. Defining tax expenditures is no easy
task.72 The description of provisions that complicate the tax law in the previous section
began with a two-way distinction of provisions that are needed to approximate economic
income and those that represent deviations from that definition. It then went on to identify
the second group with tax expenditures, a concept that now appears in U.S. law. But it
should be recognized that the legal or budgetary definition of tax expenditures is not
couched in terms of deviations from a pure definition of economic income. Rather, it is
recognized explicitly that while the Haig-Simons definition of income is a useful starting
point in defining tax expenditures, practical difficulties render implementation of a purist
measure of tax expenditures impossible. Special Analysis F of the 1976 budget, the first
to be prepared after the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and the first to contain the
required analysis of tax expenditures, notes, that "Income tax provisions resulting in tax
expenditures are defined as exceptions to the ‘normal structure’ of the individual and
corporate income tax." It goes on to list the following components of a normal tax system
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that would be classified as tax expenditures under a strict application of the Haig-Simons
definition but are not so classified in the special analysis: unrealized capital gains and
losses, imputed income on owner-occupied housing, government services received in kind,
foreign tax credits, and treatment of corporations and individuals as separate entities. It
acknowledges explicitly with regard to depreciation, that "In the world of practical affairs,
there is no single, correct number." Yet it noted unequivocally that expensing of capital
assets would constitute a tax expenditure.73

In its 1983 budget the Reagan administration actually changed the baseline for
calculating the tax expenditure budget. Rather than using the "normal structure" of former
years, which the Joint Committee on Taxation and the Congressional Budget Office
continued to use, the 1983 tax expenditure budget was calculated using a "reference tax"
structure as its benchmark. Rather than relying on an external standard such as the HaigSimons definition, the 1983 budget used the "reference tax" as an internal standard. It
argued as follows:

[F]or a provision to involve a tax subsidy, two conditions are necessary:
--The provision must be "special" in that it applies to a narrow class of transactions
or taxpayers; and
—There must be a "general" provision to which the "special" provision is a clear
exception.74
The most important result of this redefinition of the tax expenditure concept was the
elimination of ACRS and the ITC from the list of tax expenditures.

The reasoning underlying this change was not compelling to some, who saw the change
as converting the tax expenditure budget into a "political tract."75 The 1986 budget, and
those prepared through the remainder of the Reagan administration, (that is, through fiscal
1990), resorted to a compromise in which estimates of tax expenditures are reported under
both "pre-1983" and "post-1982" concepts.
More on Tax Expenditures
An example is presented to illustrate the problems that can result from (1) failure to
have adequate income definition rules, (2) the conscious decision to modify such rules to
create tax expenditures, or (3) the use of ad hoc methods either as a substitute for
satisfactory explicit rules or to override tax expenditure rules.

Deviations of taxable income from economic income cause problems. As noted
previously, these problems can be generally characterized as inequity, perceptions of
inequity, economic distortions, and complexity.76 Moreover, they may give rise to political
pressures for complex backstop provisions to prevent the perception of abuse. In some
instances, on the other hand, such deviations can improve equity, perceptions of equity, and
simplicity, and at least as seen by some, they can improve the allocation of resources rather
than distorting it. The question is, in each case, whether the particular benefits of
deviations are worth the accompanying costs.
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Accelerated depreciation allowances such as ACRS provide a useful illustration of the
problems and the benefits that can arise if income is not measured accurately, either by
inadvertence or by design.77 The potential benefits of accelerated depreciation are
discussed first, and then the problems it causes.
Accelerated depreciation, at least in its ACRS version, is said to be simpler than
economic depreciation; after all, there are no records to keep other than the original date
and purchase price of the asset. It is also said to serve the ends of equity and economic
neutrality, by providing an ad hoc substitute for the indexing of the basis of depreciable
assets for inflation, a solution that is known to be extremely complicated.78 Many also favor
the increased incentives for capital formation that are produced by accelerated depreciation.

The potential problems of accelerated depreciation are formidable. First, depending
on the rate of inflation, the use of accelerated depreciation may cause income generated
by depreciable assets to be understated and thus may violate horizontal equity and-given
the inequality in the distribution of ownership of capital-vertical equity. According to this
line of reasoning, the combination of economic depreciation and explicit indexation of basis
is far superior.
Second, even if it can be argued that the benefits of accelerated depreciation are
passed on to customers, the perception of equity is damaged when wealthy individuals and
powerful corporations pay little or no tax because of the use of excessive depreciation
allowances to offset otherwise taxable income. Further damage to the perception of equity,
if not equity itself, occurs if taxpayers who do not have income enough to fully utilize
accelerated depreciation allowances are allowed to sell them to other taxpayers, as occurred
under "safe-harbor leasing."
Damage to the perception of equity is particularly unfortunate, since it undermines
taxpayer morale, which is essential to the operation of a system based on self-assessment.80
The availability of high-visibility tax shelters may undermine compliance by those who do
not make the distinction between legal shelters and illegal evasion.81 (This might be
dubbed the "cocktail party problem," referring to the fact that it can hardly be good for
taxpayer morale to hear at a cocktail party how someone else is avoiding taxes.)

In this sense tax expenditures are quite different from budgetary expenditures. If the
government spends public funds in ways that taxpayers find inappropriate, there may be a
sense of disapproval and frustration, but there is not likely to be a feeling that the tax
system is unfair. If, however, the government uses tax expenditures to "fund" programs
even programs that are agreed to be in the general interest and, a fortiori, those known to
be in the narrow interest of the taxpayers who benefit from them-there is likely to be a
feeling that the tax system itself is unfair.
Much the same can be said about the complexity created by tax expenditures. Direct
expenditures intended to achieve the same results would also presumably be complicated.
But such complications would not affect the complexity of the Code.
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If popular discontent with the perception of inequity becomes great enough, the
unpopular provision may be repealed outright, as occurred with safe-harbor leasing. Even
if that does not happen, the Congress may classify the provision as a tax preference subject
to the AMT. When TRA ’86 extended the AMT to corporations, one of the biggest
preferences caught in its net was the excess of accelerated depreciation over either fortyyear straight-line depreciation (real property) or 150-percent declining balance depreciation
based on ADR lives (personal property).

Third, to the extent that accelerated depreciation is more generous than (indexed)
economic depreciation, tax considerations artificially distort business decisions in favor of
tax-preferred investments. In extreme cases, the marginal effective tax rate applied to
earnings from certain investments will actually be negative, implying that the after-tax
return exceeds the before-tax return.82 Public policy that produces this result is, of course,
highly suspect, since it is likely to involve the waste of scarce resources.83 The use of the
AMT to limit access to the benefits of accelerated depreciation implies that the tax system
may not be neutral in its impact on otherwise similarly situated taxpayers, one of whom is
subject to the AMT and the other is not.
Finally, the apparent ease of compliance with a system such as ACRS hides
complexities that may not be obvious to the uninitiated. Complexity occurs as more and
more deals are structured to take maximum advantage of the preferential treatment of
depreciable assets and the government acts to prevent abuse or the appearance of abuse.
For example, recapture rules may be necessary to prevent taxpayers from paying only
preferential capital gains taxes on amounts that have previously been deducted at an
accelerated rate. The AMT was devised for the explicit purpose of preventing taxpayers
from using tax preferences such as accelerated depreciation to avoid taxation altogether;
in response to perceived abuses TRA ’86 Act extends the AMT to corporations and-in
perhaps the zaniest provision of all-bases it on book income, which is not even a Code
concept. In essence, the AMT is a parallel tax system. In the words of one of the large
accounting firms, "The AMT imposes heavy burdens on taxpayers in the form of complexity,
adverse economic effect, loss of incentives, and added record keeping. . . .[I]t is clear that
the hair-pulling complexity of the calculation will be both costly and time-consuming."84
The other complex anti-shelter rules of TRA ’86 (including the passive loss rules, expanded
at-risk rules, and the limitations on interest deductions) are also designed to prevent the
excessive use of various provisions, singly or in combination, to avoid taxes.
Complexity for Whom?

In discussing complexity it is useful to distinguish between two groups.85 The first
consists of individuals of modest means who have relatively uncomplicated financial affairs.
For them itemized deductions probably constitute the primary source of complexity,
although Schenk argues convincingly that there is still much unnecessary complexity,
especially for those least able to cope with it.86
For this group the tax system is probably not more complicated on average than in
1980, and it may be less complicated once one considers transactional complexity, rather
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than focusing only on rules and compliance complexity. The increase in personal
exemptions and standard deductions has removed many from the tax rolls, the 2-percent
floor on miscellaneous deductions reduces the need to keep track of minor expenses that
would otherwise be deductible, limitations on the availability of IRAs reduce the need to
be concerned with IRAs and the provisions affecting them, and the virtual elimination of
tax shelters removes this source of transactional complexity for the few who might otherwise
be involved in them. Perhaps most important among the primary counter-forces adding
to complexity is the limitation on mortgage interest deductions (discussed in the next
section).87
The second group is relatively heterogenous, including individuals in business for
themselves, other individuals with complicated financial situations, and corporations. For
many of these the system is probably more complicated on balance than in 1980, even
considering gains in transactional simplicity.88 These groups are likely to be affected by
many of the sources of complexity identified in the previous part of this section: income
definition questions (especially timing issues and questions of dual business-personal use),
subsidies provided through tax expenditures, backstop rules intended to limit the availability
of tax benefits, transition issues, and the general incoherence of the system as it affects the
taxation of income from business and capital. An especially important source of increased
complexity for this group is the increased sophistication of financial markets and the
instruments they produce; this complexity is multiplied when one gets into the international
arena, as many large and medium-sized firms must. Some of the most important sources
of complexity for this group are discussed in the next section.
COMPLEXITY IN RECENT LAW

Much has been made of the complexity of TRA ’86. This author has written, for
example, ”[I]t is horribly complex-so much so that we may have shown definitively that
attempting to implement a conceptually correct income tax (even one without inflation
adjustment) is impractical."89 Yet we should not lose sight of the fact that TRA ’86 Act did
simplify the tax system for many-especially by removing low-income individuals from the
tax rolls-and that the increased complexity is experienced primarily by relatively few highincome or wealthy individuals with complicated financial situations, by many small
businesses, and by corporations. Having said this, it will be useful to examine several of
the most complex features of recent legislation to attempt to classify them into the various
categories just described. Thus we consider the impact of these rules on three types of
complexity-rules, compliance, and transactions-as well as their probable overall impact.
We then consider the source of the complexity: income definition, tax expenditure,
backstop, transition, and incoherence. In several instances, one provision may have
characteristics of several categories. Finally, we may note at the outset that, with the
exception of some of the interest provisions, it is almost entirely relatively affluent
individuals and corporations who experience the complexity of the provisions examined.
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Nondiscrimination Rules

TRA ’86 Act continues the prior practice of using so-called nondiscrimination rules to
assure that the benefits of employee benefits are not reaped only by upper management
and other highly compensated employees. These are among the most complex provisions
of TRA ’86 Act outside the international arena--so much so that it appears as this is being
written that section 89 may be on the verge of repeal. These provisions are particularly
maddening for small businesses. While some transactions complexity may be avoided
because of the complication of rules and compliance, on balance these rules seem to
complicate the system.

The underlying tax treatment of the various employee benefits to which
nondiscrimination rules are applied can be traced to a combination of a failure to define
income adequately (failure to realize that, as an economic matter, fringe benefits should be
included in income for tax purposes) and a conscious effort to encourage the provision of
such benefits. Moreover, there may be more than a little bit of incoherence in the rules.90

The trouble with the tax expenditure approach to policy-making in this instance is that
while the provision of benefits to the rank and file may have justified enactment of the
initial tax expenditure, upper-income employees have typically been the primary ones to
benefit from the provisions. Nondiscrimination rules have been used to further the original
intent of the Congress and to limit the benefits if such intent is not achieved. Thus it
appears that the explanation of the complexity of these rules may have an element of at
least four categories: income definition problems, tax expenditure objectives, backstopping,
and incoherence.
Anti-shelter Provisions

Over the years the Congress has adopted increasingly stringent rules intended to limit
the opportunities to use excessive deductions to shelter income from tax. These include
at-risk rules, the AMT, the limitation on passive losses, and the limitations on interest
deductions, all of which were either newly enacted (corporate AMT and passive loss rules)
or tightened (at-risk rules, individual AMT, and interest limitations). Both the rules in
question and compliance with them are complicated. On the other hand, by essentially
killing tax shelters, these rules greatly simplify transactions. To the extent this occurs, the
rules make a net contribution to simplicity.91
These rules seem to fall almost entirely within the "backstop” category. Some are
needed because of the opportunities for arbitrage created by the juxtaposition of rules
based on accrual and on realization. They are not needed for income definition or for the
provision of tax expenditures. (Indeed, they are generally the result of congressional
reaction to perception problems stemming from faulty income definitions traceable to tax
expenditures.)

It appears that in TRA ’86 the Congress may have actually engaged in "overkill," in the
sense of using redundant provisions to attack tax shelters.92 In some cases, the rules have
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a retroactive effect that is inconsistent with at least some definitions of appropriate
transition rules.93 This may not have been unintentional; it may have been done as much
to extract revenue from holders of existing shelters as anything. Such a decision was almost
certainly driven largely by the demands of revenue neutrality; here was a source of badly
needed revenue that could be hit hard without evoking sympathy from the general public.

While one must welcome the curtailment of tax shelters, one must pause at the way
chosen to achieve this objective. It is useful to distinguish between what might be called
"regular" tax shelters and "abusive" tax shelters.94 Regular shelters are based primarily on
tax benefits that are clearly legal; they are subject to attack primarily because of their
adverse effects on equity, efficiency of resource allocation, and perception of equity. By
comparison, abusive shelters involve the use of techniques that are questionable, if not
clearly illegal, to shelter income beyond what would reasonably be expected from a reading
of the tax law; essentially, they involve fraud and tax evasion.

The at-risk rules were primarily an attack on abusive shelters involving overvalued
property and nonrecourse debt; they would have relatively little effect on regular shelters.
On the other hand, the passive activity limitations hit all shelters and were intended
virtually to eliminate them. As Koppelman notes, the limitation on artificial losses operates
in a much more satisfactory manner to reduce sheltering.95
While everyone agrees that abusive shelters should be ended, opinion is divided on the
benefits of eliminating regular shelters. (It should be clear from the previous discussion
that I am generally in the antishelter camp.) The limitations on passive activities have the
effect of denying current deductions for legitimate costs under certain circumstances. By
so doing they inject a schedular element into an ostensibly global income tax. In this way
the budget-driven process of tax reform has introduced into the U.S. income tax an element
that does not belong there-one that is generally decried as "backward" by tax advisers who
encounter schedular income taxes in developing countries.

Interest Deductions

TRA ’86 contains distinctions that produce more than a half-dozen identifiable types
of interest expense, each with its own tax treatment. Sunley identifies the following:
investment interest, passive loss interest, nondeductible personal interest, interest to carry
tax-exempts, construction period interest, home mortgage interest, and active business
interest. There are undoubtedly others.96 Interest expense incurred in the active pursuit
of a trade or business is fully deductible, as is mortgage interest paid to finance the
purchase or improvement of most owner-occupied housing.
On the other hand,
"investment interest" is subject to limitations, to prevent the deduction of interest expenses
incurred to finance investments yielding tax preferred income, including deferred income.
In one sense this rule is an extension of the old (1921) rule that forbids the deduction of
interest expense incurred to carry state and local securities paying tax-exempt interest. Nor
is interest incurred on unsecured personal debt deductible, even if used for the purchase
of the residence of the taxpayer 97 To make matters worse, even interest on mortgage debt
is not deductible to the extent the indebtedness exceeds the sum of the original purchase
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price of the house, plus improvements, except to the extent it is used to finance expenses
of health care and education. Construction-period interest must be capitalized rather than
deducted currently. Passive loss interest must be traced in order to comply with the
limitations on passive losses.

The fungibility of money implies that any time a taxpayer has more than one kind of
debt outstanding it is impossible to determine logically which debt is used for which
purpose. Over the years various categories of debt have been subjected to different rules
limiting deductibility, as the need to prevent abuse has become apparent. Thus it is not
surprising that so many different rules specifying the determination of the split of the
taxpayer’s total interest expense among different "baskets” have been enacted, without due
regard to the coherence of the various rules. For example, construction-period interest is
determined on a "stack first" basis. Interest incurred to carry tax-exempt securities is
determined under an imprecise set of rules based in part on the taxpayer’s purpose. The
portions of interest held to be investment interest, passive loss interest, and personal
interest are determined under IRS regulations by using a tracing approach.

Doernberg and McChesney have commented on this situation in the following terms:
Essentially the proposed regulations require taxpayers to trace how they use
a loan from the day they take it out until the day it is repaid. For example,
suppose a taxpayer borrows $10,000 and puts it in an interest-bearing checking
account. During the year the taxpayer buys a car, purchases stock, invests in
real estate, and expands his business, the single loan has generated four
different types of interest, each subject to its own limitations. Moreover, to
the extent the borrowed funds are commingled with nonborrowed funds, the
IRS has provided elaborate rules for tracing which money is used to make
which purchase.98
These rules increase both rules complexity and compliance complexity. Except for the
case of tax shelters, already discussed, it seems unlikely that there will be great offsetting
gains in transactions simplicity.

This mishmash of rules can be explained by a number of motivations. First, the
deduction for home mortgage interest is one of the most venerable and impregnable of all
tax expenditures.99 The nondeductibility of other personal interest (commonly called
consumer interest) can be seen as an attempt not to extend that tax expenditure to such
interest; unfortunately, in the case of home equity loans a drawing of the line becomes
necessary to prevent sophisticated taxpayers with equity in their homes from circumventing
the intent of this provision, and the confusion is compounded by the tax-expenditure
exception for home equity loans for the finance of spending on health care and education.
The limitation on deductions for investment interest, like the nondeductibility of interest
incurred to carry tax-exempt securities, can, as noted previously, be explained as a backstop
attempt to prevent taxpayers from abusing overly generous provisions in other parts of the
Code.
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Kiddie Tax

Few would argue that all the non-labor income of minor children should be taxed at
the marginal rate of the parent(s). Nor would many argue that it should be possible to
avoid the effects of progressive taxation by having non-labor income properly attributable
to the parent(s) taxed in the hands of minor children. The purpose of the ’’kiddie tax"
provisions of the 1986 Act is to achieve a reasonable compromise in which the worst abuse
is prevented, without causing either undue complexity or undesirable tax burdens on the
legitimate non-labor income of children.100 Thus this provision is properly placed in the
"income measurement" category.
The kiddie tax is a good example of a provision that, considered by itself, is
complicated in the rules and compliance sense for those affected by it. But it is not likely
to affect many who are not using tax planning to minimize taxes. Thus it is also a provision
whose effects can easily be avoided by most taxpayers; in this sense the provision may
reduce complexity on balance, by reducing transaction complexity. Its complexity is likely
to pose serious problems only for wealthy families whose minor children have been
accorded ownership of substantial wealth for non-tax reasons.101

Capital Gains

Capital gains has recently been a virtual battlefield between those who want more and
less generous treatment of gains.102 Some of the changes that have been made, and others
that have been talked about, illustrate possibilities for increasing or decreasing complication
in this area. It might be worth noting at the outset that one of the primary reasons for the
taxation of real capital gains like ordinary income-aside from the equity and neutrality
arguments for such an even-handed policy-is the elimination of the rules and transactions
complexity that results from allowing preferential treatment of long-term capital gains.103

In 1976 the Congress passed "carryover basis" for assets transferred at death; the
rationale was some combination of income measurement and backstopping (by avoiding
postponement of tax during lifetime being converted to immediate forgiveness of tax via
step-up of basis at death). This would not appear, at first sight, to be complicated; the
recipient of property transferred through bequests would simply take the basis of the
transferor in calculating future gains. The trouble comes in knowing what the transferor’s
basis is. By comparison, under present law (and law at that time), step-up of basis at death
obviates the need to know the transferor’s basis. In framing its 1984 tax reform proposals
to President Reagan, the Treasury Department considered, but rejected, the introduction
of "constructive realization" at death, a less generous approach to the same problem.104

Treasury I proposed that the basis of assets be indexed for inflation, in order to prevent
the taxation of fictitious gains; indexation is an income measurement technique that has
recently been championed as a more rational alternative to a return to a preferential rate
(or partial exclusion) for long-term gains. Indexation is inevitably complicated, not so much
because of the mechanics of indexation, which could be handled through tables of
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escalation factors based on time of acquisition, as because of the transitional difficulties of
shifting from an unindexed system to an indexed one. It would be necessary to value all
assets on a particular day in order that indexation take effect only from that day on.105

The 1986 Act eliminated the preferential taxation of capital gains (except for the
benefits of deferral), but without providing indexing. It is thus questionable on income
measurement grounds. It eliminates incentives to structure or characterize transactions in
such a way as to achieve capital gains taxation. In this way it contributes to transactions
simplicity, as well as to rules-and-compliance simplicity.
Recent days have seen a plethora of proposals for the reduction of taxes on long-term
capital gains. Among the candidates have been President Bush’s proposal to cut the rate
of tax on gains to 15 percent, with an optional 45 percent exclusion; Representative Ed
Jenkins’ plan to cut the rate to 19.6 percent for two years and them switch to indexation;
a more complicated scheme favored by Ways and Means Committee Chairman
Rostenkowski that would provide only indexation for gains on assets held between one and
five years, but would offer the choice between indexation and partial exclusion for gains on
assets held longer than five years; and a plan supported by Senators Bob Packwood and
William Roth for an exclusion that increases (by five percentage points per year, to a
maximum of 35 percent) with the length of time assets have been held.
(The
Packwood-Roth allows indexing as an option. It also contains the ’’back-loaded IRA"
mentioned earlier, which they call "IRA-Plus.")
The Jenkins proposal offers a glaring example of the fiscal craziness that current
budget rules encourage. The two-year reduction in the rate would encourage realizations
during the "window" of low rates, and therefore help solve the short-run budget problem;
but it would do so by borrowing revenues from the future-and leaving future budget
difficulties. Being almost entirely a windfall, it would not have the benefits commonly said
to result from (permanent) preferential treatment of long-term capital gains.

Moreover, the restoration of a preferential rate for capital gains would give rise to
transaction complexity, as well as rules-and-compliance complexity. One of the constant
themes of the recent AICPA/ABA conference on simplification was that restoration of a
capital gains preference would add greatly to complexity.106

Repeal of General Utilities

Handler offers the repeal of General Utilities as an example of how the Tax Code has
been complicated by the requirement of revenue neutrality, because of the failure to
consider collateral effects. In 1982 the American Law Institute proposed that General
Utilities be repealed, but only "in the context of an entire structure for the acquisition,
reorganization, and distribution provisions of subchapter C." Following hearings and several
years of further work by an ad hoc group, the staff of the Senate Finance Committee issued
a report and proposed the revision of subchapter C. Although Handler calls this proposal
"by no means perfect or uncontroversial," he asserts that "it was a comprehensive piece of
legislation accompanied by a thorough report." By comparison, he argues, the 1986 Act
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"contained virtually none of its features dealing with acquisitions and distributions .... The
repeal of General Utilities was selected solely as a means of closing a revenue
gap .... Thus this one provision was selected from the entire Subchapter C Revision Act
as a revenue measure unrelated to comprehensive tax reform."107
Handler goes on to identify the following problems with this outcome: The repeal of
General Utilities precluded any meaningful discussion of integration of the corporate and
individual income taxes; it foreclosed discussion of other aspects of the reform of
subchapter C; the Congress passed up the chance to repeal or revise complex statutes that
are no longer relevant and to correct a number of basic inconsistencies that have been
aggravated by the repeal of General Utilities.

Handler’s views on the repeal of General Utilities seem to be somewhat extreme;
certainly they are not shared by many who have commented on an earlier draft of this
paper. In particular, some would deny that it was inappropriate to separate the repeal of
General Utilities from other reforms of subchapter C; some view repeal as a viable standalone option?08 Handler’s views seem especially suspect as they relate to the possibility
of integrating the income taxes. First, relief from double taxation of dividends was
considered in the same bill as repeal of General Utilities; it simply was not adopted.
Second, repeal of General Utilities had a very small effect on revenue; it thus may not be
correct to suggest that it was primarily a revenue-raising provision. Finally, rather than
dooming all attempts at integration, the repeal of General Utilities-by making it difficult
to achieve "do-it-yourself integration"-may actually be the first step in a political process
that will lead eventually to integration (or to "dividend relief').109

Penalty Provisions

Beginning with TEFRA, penalty provisions, including rules governing interest on late
payments, have been tightened significantly.110 Given the growth in tax shelters, the rise
of willingness to play the "audit lottery," and the inflation-driven increase in interest rates
during the late 1970s and early 1980s, this development was appropriate, at least in a
general sense. But it appears that in the process of making penalties and interest rules
tighter, not enough attention has been devoted to rationalizing penalties. Thus layers of
penalties are piled upon each other, producing a system that is complicated as well as
arguably unfair. It appears that at least part of the political attraction of introducing
tougher and tougher penalties is the possibility of raising money from a segment of the
population that is relatively unlikely to receive much sympathy, without explicitly raising
taxes.
International Provisions

The provisions dealing with the taxation of international business are among the most
complicated of those in the 1986 Act. These include the provisions for the tracing and
allocation of income and deductions for purposes of both the determination of the
geographical source of income and the availability of foreign tax credits. This complication
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is the inevitable result of the attempt to relate foreign tax credits to the foreign income that
produced them, in order to prevent taxes paid on foreign-source income from being used
to offset tax on domestic-source income. This failure, in turn, can be traced to the lack of
a coherent international system for the taxation of the income of multinational
corporations. Since the present international tax order allows one nation to be played off
against another, each must have complicated rules to protect its fiscal interests. 1 The
rules for foreign currency transactions and foreign sales corporations are extremely complex.
INTO THE SUNLIGHT-AND BACK

Tax policy does not just happen. It is the result of deliberations by the tax-writing
committees, of the House and Senate acting independently on the reports of those
committees, and of the conference committees which iron out differences between House
and Senate versions of legislation. It is important to understand how these institutions
operate if one is to understand how budgetary constraints affect the relative simplicity of
tax legislation.
Before the "good-government" reforms of the 1970s brought Congressional decision
making into the sunlight, legislation on tax policy was written almost entirely by the House
Ways and Means Committee, largely behind closed doors in an environment that served to
insulate policymakers from the pressures of special interests; it was then considered under
rules that limited the opportunity for making changes on the floor of the House.112 While
the Senate, including its Finance Committee, operated under much more laissez-faire rules
that facilitated the introduction and passage of extraneous tax preferences, the House, via
the conference process, generally acted as an effective brake
on Senatorial irresponsibility. The result was that changes in tax policy generally were
made with greater deliberation and more careful consideration of their likely economic
effects than has been the case in recent years.

Congressional reforms brought policymaking much more into the open, with results that
are mixed, at best. Passage of the fundamental tax reforms of 1986 seem to have been
possible only because ways were found to retreat from the watchful eyes of lobbyists. This
section describes the history of these reforms and counter-reforms.113 Those familiar with
this history may wish to skip this section.
The Pre-reform Process

The following characteristics of tax legislative process in the pre-reform era have been
identified:
•

The Ways and Means Committee was small (25 members) and
congenial, operating without committees under a chairman chosen on
the basis of seniority.
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•

Members of the Committee were carefully chosen to be party
regulars from safe districts.

•

Tax legislation was written in executive sessions, away from the
scrutiny of lobbyists. It was then considered under a closed rule that
precluded amendment of particular provisions on the floor of the
House.

•

The constitutional assignment of power to initiate tax legislation to
the House of Representatives was carefully respected. This furthered
the Chairman’s ability to control the agenda of tax legislation.

•

The role of the Ways and Means Committee as the Committee on
Committees gave it the power to exercise power and discipline over
potentially recalcitrant non-members of the Committee, especially
those seeking assignments to choice committees.

•

"Members’ bills" were used to respond to the most pressing needs of
constituents.

As a result of these features, "The tax policy process in the House was not very democratic,
but it was skillfully controlled."114 Moreover, it was "stable and predictable."
Particularly important was the relative isolation of members of the Committee from
lobbyists and other representatives of special interests. "Because there were no public
records of their positions, committee members were free to take responsible positions on
issues without openly rejecting the demands of lobbyists or openly taking unpopular
positions . . . ."115 This stands in marked contrast to the picture we get from popular
descriptions of procedure under the good-government reforms to be described below.116

The Senate has traditionally operated under a very different set of rules that invited
irresponsibility-irresponsibility that, if unrestrained, would raise too little revenue and
produce a tax law that would be unfair, non-neutral, and overly complex.117 The primary
culprit was the Senate rule that tax bills be considered under an "open" rule; it invited
turning bills into "Christmas trees."118 McDaniel has noted, "The Senate ’open’ rule is a
prescription for a tax statute that is unnecessarily complex, however complexity is
defined."119 A common pattern developed, in which the most egregious provisions of the
Senate bill were eliminated in the House-Senate conference, often with the tacit approval
of the grandstanding senators who had sponsored them on the Senate floor.
Policymaking in the Sunlight120

The congressional reforms of the 1970s weakened the constraints that made the tax
policy process stable and predictable, if not democratic. The membership of the Ways and
Means Committee was expanded to thirty-seven. Committee chairmen are selected by
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secret ballot, instead of by seniority. The Committee now operates with subcommittees.
The proceedings of the Ways and Means Committee and of the House-Senate Conference
Committee have been opened, except when closed by majority roll call vote. The closed
rule has been modified to allow amendments on the floor of the House. Committee
assignments of Democrats are now made by the Democratic Steering and Policy
Committee, rather than by Ways and Means. Members from unsafe districts have routinely
been assigned to the Ways and Means Committee. The procedures established by the 1974
Budget Act serve both to weaken further the chairmen of the tax committees and to
strengthen the budget committees.

Contrary to the expectations of the advocates of good government reforms, enacting tax
legislation in the sunlight has not proven to be a success. Stanley Surrey has observed:

The consideration of tax legislation by the Congress has completely
disintegrated.
The picture has been one of almost utter chaos, without
responsible control residing anywhere. Tax legislation has become a catchas-catch-can affair that produces complexities, unfairness, conflicting moves
in all directions, almost mindless provisions....121

Another commentator has written the following equally pessimistic assessment:
The requirements for making responsible tax policy seem to run counter to
open, decentralized legislative procedures, especially when organizing forces,
such as strong political parties, that can facilitate cohesion are lacking.... The
congressional reforms of the 1970s have led to a loss of internal leadership,
heightened individualism, increased responsiveness to organized interests, and
erosion of the autonomy of Ways and Means. Although the reforms were in
accord with democratic precepts, the verdict on their effect on the capacity
of Congress to do its job has been distinctly negative.122
Several results of these changes have been identified. First, ad-hoc decision making
has replaced deliberate consideration of proposed changes in the tax law. Second,
traditional legislative procedures have been bypassed. For example, amendments affecting
tax law have been added to legislation on the floor of the House, and House resistance to
Senate provisions in conference has been weakened.123 Third, at least prior to the 1986
Act, the tax system has come increasingly to be used for non-tax purposes.124 Fourth, the
course of tax policy has become extremely erratic since the passage of the good-government
reforms. Tax reform occurred in 1976, but was reversed in 1978; in 1981 ERTA drastically
reduced taxes and provided generous investment incentives, but TEFRA and DEFRA,
passed in 1982 and 1984, respectively, took back many of the benefits of the 1981
legislation and increased taxes substantially; finally, TRA ’86 made fundamental changes
in the system, among the most important of which was the virtual elimination of the 1981
investment incentives.125 (In addition, repeal of one of the most fundamental features of
the 1986 Act, the taxation of long-term capital gains as ordinary income, is being actively
discussed as this is being written.) Of course, it can be questioned whether this pattern is
explained wholly-or even primarily-by the good-government reforms.
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Reese has noted that the advent of open sessions also changed the availability and
nature of advice given the tax-writing committees.126 First, it reduced somewhat the
influence of the Treasury Department and the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation,
who could participate much more actively in closed sessions than in open ones.127 Second,
it increased the influence of the personal aides of members, who could attend open
sessions, but not closed ones. Because of this and the easier access to lobbyists, Reese
ventures, "In general, I would guess that opening the markups has been a plus for
democracy but a minus for tax reform."128

The 1981 and 1982 Acts

The failure of the new system to produce responsible legislation is seen perhaps most
clearly in the 1981 Tax Act. The bill that became ERTA began in the Senate, contrary to
legislative tradition, if not constitutional requirements, and it received no careful
consideration by the Ways and Means Committee. It became the subject of a bidding war,
as House Democrats and the Reagan administration vied to see which could be more
generous in the tax cuts they proposed.129 Rudder has written, "Absent were careful
deliberation, a sense of limits, an ability to say no to claimants, and an overriding concern
for the quality of the bill and for the integrity of the tax code.130
This fiasco cannot be attributed entirely to the openness of the new legislative process;
it appears that partisan competition was the main culprit. Yet it seems unlikely that this
competition could have occurred or reached its 1981 levels under the pre-reform rules.131

Disarray in the Ways and Means Committee continued in 1982. Rather than preparing
its own tax bill for passage by the full House, the Committee simply went to conference
with the Senate without even having considered a bill. Three things about the ultimate
result are extremely interesting.132 First, the procedures used by Bob Dole, chairman of
the Senate Finance Committee, to produce a tax bill ran directly counter to the spirit of the
Congressional reforms that had rendered the Ways and Means Committee impotent, as well
as to traditional Senate procedures. (Dole’s initiation of action also ran counter to
tradition, based on constitutional requirement, that revenue bills begin in the House.) He
excluded the public, the press, and even Democratic members of his committee from the
meetings in which the tax reform package was put together. Then he employed a
germaneness rule to limit floor amendments in the Senate.133 In short, he achieved
substantial closing of loopholes, as well as raising a large amount of revenue, by stepping
around the good-government rules. One observer has suggested that "the reversal of the
spirit of the open-meetings reform that extended to most congressional deliberations may
have been indispensable in producing legislation."134

Second is the role played by the 1974 Budget Act. Congress, acting under that
legislation, specified the revenue target and set the deadline for action. Moreover, the
Budget Act provided the germaneness rule that allowed Dole to fend off floor amendments.
Third, as things actually transpired, tax reform may have been furthered by the lack of
a House bill. Lacking instructions from the House, Chairman Rostenkowski of the Ways
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and Means Committee had a relatively free hand to negotiate with the Senate conferees.
Rather than acting in their traditional restraining role on an overly generous and
irresponsible Senate, the House conferees simply accepted many tough provisions that had
been placed in the Senate bill with the expectation that they would be softened or
eliminated in conference.135 Despite this practical success, one observer has concluded
that:
The tax bills of 1981 and 1982 give credence to the assessment that the
congressional reforms failed. The decentralization and democratization of
Congress, and of the House in particular, seem to have left the legislative
branch in a state of semianarchy and capable of acting responsibly on taxes
only by circumvention of normal procedures, such as reverting to secret
sessions, and only in response to severe economic crisis.136
Witte has reached the following similar conclusion:
Political reforms have often been called in the name of openness and
"sunshine." However, . . . window shades and moonlight may be the more
appropriate prescription. Opening the process allows claimants an additional
forum, and, even legislators inclined to duck such pressure will have fewer
places to hide. . . . While the theory was that open meetings and recorded
committee votes would expose those conferring special favors, it seems more
plausible that these "reforms" result in an inability of legislators to not confer
such favors.137
Back into the Shadows

The period since 1981 has seen a de facto retreat from some of the sunlight of the
good-government procedures created by Congressional reform into the shadows of prior
practice, producing a return to more fiscally responsible decision making in tax policy. This
was especially true of the passage of TRA ’86.
The shift in legislative techniques used by Dole in 1982 presaged changes to be made
on the House side, both in the abortive 1983 attempt at deficit reduction and the 1984
passage of DEFRA. Such changes included the use of closed markup sessions to insulate
committee members from outside pressures, the use of Democratic caucuses in the
committee to develop partisan support, molding legislation to meet the concerns of
Democratic committee members, using "sweeteners" to gain the support of other members
of the House, and consideration of legislation on the floor of the House under a closed
rule.138

In the process leading up to TRA ’86 these techniques were used by Rostenkowski in
dealing with the House Ways and Means Committee and (in general, if not in detail)
eventually by Senator Bob Packwood, the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee
(after an initial business-as-usual effort that lost $30 billion in revenue and threatened to
kill tax reform).139 Weekend retreats were used to gain the undivided attention of
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committee members.140 The Ways and Means Committee was divided into working groups
that were given revenue targets.
Insulation from lobbyists was carried to unusual lengths in the House-Senate
conference; after the first two days of open meetings, the conferees did not meet publicly
until the last night of the conference, three weeks later, by which time the die had been
cast. In the face of a potential impasse, the two committee chairmen were simply
empowered to work out compromises to be ratified later by the full conference
committees.141 Witte notes, "One of the undeniable hallmarks of this legislation was a
retreat to a more closed and controlled process that had been lost in tax politics for over
a decade."142

Packwood has defended this procedure in the following terms:

Common Cause simply has everything upside down when they advocate
"sunshine laws." . . . When we’re in the sunshine, as soon as we vote, every
trade association in the country gets out their mailgrams and their phone calls
in twelve hours, and complains about the members’ votes. But when we’re
in the back room, the senators can vote their conscience. They vote for what
they think is good for the country. Then they go out to the lobbyists and say,
"God, I fought for you. I did everything I could. But Packwood just wouldn’t
give in, you know. It’s so damn horrible.143
Rostenkowski has echoed essentially the same sentiments: "I’ve heard some [committee
members] say--not all-that I give them cover so they don’t have to compromise with the
pressure groups on the outside-blaming the chairman."144
An additional important element was the rule of revenue neutrality, under which any
proposal for a tax benefit had to be accompanied by a proposal for a method of paying for
it. This rule had first been reluctantly accepted by the Senate Finance Committee. The
out-of-character Senate agreement to abide by this constraint on the floor made it much
more difficult to gain agreement to insert new benefits into the bill.145

One of the most popular means of providing sweeteners in the 1986 legislation was
through the use of so-called transition rules."146 Targeted transition rules were used on an
unprecedented scale in moving the 1986 legislation through the tax-writing committees and
then the two houses of Congress. In comparing the 1986 experience with historical practice,
Boris Bittker has said, "The scale of these precedents bears about the same relationship to
the exemptions of the 1986 Act that a child’s lemonade stand bears to a regional shopping
mall."147
This has been the source of great inequity, as transitional rules have been applied to
quite narrowly targeted situations (sometimes involving only one influential taxpayer)
chosen to gain the support of key members of Congress and described in the statute
carefully enough to prevent their general applicability. Birnbaum and Murray note:
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In past years, transition rules were included in the bill for the benefit of special
constituents, but were drafted in ways that would also aid others who were similarly
situated. The tax-reform rules, however, were frequently written like rifle shots to
benefit only the constituent companies or individuals-and no one else. That
meant that two companies or people with exactly the same tax situation could well
be treated very differently under the bill.148
Moreover, often they are not transitional in any meaningful sense of the term; they are
permanent tax breaks masquerading under the guise of transition rules.

PROCESS AND COMPLEXITY

There is little doubt that the budgetary process has had an adverse effect on the
attempt to simplify the U.S. income tax. Simon has noted, "The impact of the current
budget reduction law, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH), on the tax policy process has been
quite severe. Numerous examples of revenue concerns having outweighed policy concerns
in recent years provide anecdotal evidence that supports the notion that balanced-budget
rules-when they work--frequently result in bad policy choices."149

In much discussion of the topic of this paper, there is an unfortunate tendency to
confuse two conceptually separate ideas: revenue neutrality and policymaking "under the
gun" of reconciliation. Thus, for example, Handler connects the two quite explicitly:
It now has become commonplace for the budget reconciliation process to
involve substantive revision of the Internal Revenue Code solely for the
purpose of raising revenue. TEFRA, DEFRA, and the 1987 Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Bill involved major efforts at raising revenues almost
exclusively by means of substantive tax revisions. Even the Tax Reform Act
of 1986, one of the most comprehensive tax reform measures ever adopted,
followed a similar process since it was adopted under strict principles of
"revenue neutrality" as mandated by the companion Budget Reconciliation
Bill. This required numerous instances of "reform" measures to be adopted
to close revenue gaps.150

Since the two can be separated, it is useful to do so.
Policymaking "Under the Gun"

There seems to be substantial agreement that reforming the tax system under the
pressure of reconciliation is much more likely to lead to complexity than to simplicity. This
is true, in part, because the process simply does not lend itself to orderly and deliberate
consideration-by the staff and the public as well as by the Congress-of various proposals
and how they interact with each other. The reconciliation process allows only two months
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between the adoption of the instructions to the tax-writing committees in April and the due
date for the revenue bill in June.

Handler provides the following contrast of policy making before and after the 1974
Budget Act and reconciliation:

This is a dramatic departure from prior tax legislation. Throughout the
twenty-six years, from 1954 to 1980, many pieces of major tax legislation were
adopted. These bills were refined, to some extent, by the appropriate
legislative processes-bills were first introduced in the House, hearings and
testimony were solicited, draft legislation was circulated for comment, and
meaningful debate occurred on the House floor, all prior to adoption of the
legislation. The process was repeated in the Senate, and was usually followed
by a conference at which the differences between the House and Senate bills
were compromised.151
Budget reconciliation has clearly changed this tax legislation process. It is
now common for both Houses of Congress to consider simultaneously two
materially different substantive tax revision measures, disguised as "revenue
enhancement." This substantive reform is conducted without hearing or
reports, frequently is conducted in secret, often is adopted as a conceptual
matter with the drafting done later, and is usually passed on the floor of both
houses without permitting amendments or serious debate.152
Former Assistant Treasury Secretary John Nolan has described the problem as follows:
"[T]he real problem here is that we have departed from an orderly and predictable process
for identifying the legislative issues in advance and dealing with them in some wellorganized way through the process."153 Handler has noted:

There can be little question that substantive tax revision solely for revenue
raising purposes is not a sensible reform process .... [T]he Internal Revenue
Code is an incredibly complex document dealing with vast areas that require
considerable correlation and coordination. It is virtually impossible to
imagine that any kind of sensible tax reform can be effected in a helterskelter fashion under circumstances where the only rationale for developing
any reform is the revenue-raising function of the budget reconciliation
process."154
The following have been identified as defects of revenue-driven tax legislation:
"constant churning of the Tax Code, voluminous technical corrections bills, sizeable
regulations-projects backlogs, and growing administration and compliance costs." A few
data provide an indication of the magnitude of the problem. The technical corrections of
the 1984 and 1986 Acts required roughly one fourth as many pages (24.9 and 27.7 percent,
respectively) as the acts they were correcting; by comparison, the comparable figures for the
1976 and 1982 Acts were just over 11 percent. As of April 30, 1989, there were 510
uncompleted regulations projects at the IRS.155
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The Discipline of Revenue Neutrality

Revenue neutrality has obvious advantages, aside from any salutary effect of restraining
the growth of the deficit; most notably, it forces the Congress to consider trade-offs
between various tax expenditures and to think about the cost of government spending.
Thus, Strahan notes, ". . .Ways and Means Committee decisionmaking on tax issues has
shown very limited responsiveness to clientele interests since the appearance of large
deficits in 1982. . . . Responsiveness to clientele interests seeking to maintain tax
preferences was strictly constrained by the political imperative to at least maintain the
existing revenue base."156

The desirable discipline imposed by revenue neutrality has, however, become somewhat
of a Frankenstein that sometimes leads to questionable changes and sometimes precludes
desirable ones. Rob Leonard, chief of staff of the House Ways and Means Committee,
wrote in early 1988, "The most significant obstacle to prompt enactment of the technical
corrections bill remains the obligation to offset any revenue loss associated with the bill-a task made more difficult by the determination of some to include costly extensions of
expiring provisions."157 Further, commenting on how budgetary pressures for additional
revenues encourages continual "reform," Leonard has written, "Unless and until those
deficits are reduced to more acceptable levels, many budget analysts, economists, and
politicians will propose a ’revenue component’ to any deficit-reduction package with all the
destabilizing effects and turmoil that attends the budget reconciliation process."158
With emphasis on revenue effects during only the first five years, changes in timing that
bring revenues forward, with little or no long-term gain in revenues look attractive. This
ploy was used in 1986; this "revenue-neutral" legislation is expected to reduce revenues by
almost $21 billion in 1992.159 The structure of transition rules has also been affected
adversely by the demands of revenue neutrality.

John Colvin, chief minority counsel for the Senate Finance Committee at the time the
1986 Act was enacted, has noted that the Budget Act, reconciliation, and the GrammRudman-Hollings sequestration procedure have placed more focus on the revenue
estimators.160 This is in marked contrast to prior practice.161 One observer has written the
following: "In the past, policy makers were accustomed to making decisions on particular
issues, and then receiving estimates of the effect of the provision on total tax receipts.
While the estimates played a vital role in projecting the end result of legislation, the
numbers did not dictate policy. However, the requirement that the tax reform be revenue
neutral changed all this."162 Also, ". . .the Administration and the Congress had agreed to
the principle that the tax bill should not raise more revenue than it lost, or vice versa. . . .
For the first time, the numbers alone dictated what could and could not be done.163
This has not been a happy experience. One observer appraises it in the following
terms:

Congress has moved away from rate-setting adjustments, or the establishment
of new levies, and relied on reform measures as the sole instrument for
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raising revenue. This has profoundly changed the development of coherent
tax legislation, exaggerating the problems described above by failing to
rationalize or coordinate substantive revisions with the existing Code,
encouraging "quick-fix" provisions to be adopted without real debate, and
creating an environment in which lobbying ceases to be a legitimate activity
to clarify and refine legislation, but rather becomes a tawdry practice outside
of the public spotlight.164

Simon has echoed these sentiments: [S]ubstantive tax reform should be accomplished
because it is sound tax policy regardless of its revenue impact. There is an inherent danger
in using tax expenditures analysis for substantive tax changes at a time when revenue
constraints are important. The danger is that revenue losers will not be enacted despite
their theoretical appropriateness from a tax policy standpoint."165
An Alternative Process

A somewhat idealistic if naive view of the way income tax policy should be conducted
runs something like this. First, you define full taxable income to approximate real
economic income as closely as possible, given administrative realities and economic
conditions.166 Second, you allow for tax expenditures structured as deductions to the extent
appropriate; this produces an estimate of the tax base.167 Third, you add to the amount of
revenue needed the amount to be spent via tax expenditures structured as credits, plus the
foreign tax credit, and subtract amounts estimated to be raised from revenue sources other
than the income tax; this gives needed before-credit income tax revenues. Fourth, you
compare the tax base to the figure for needed before-credit revenues to determine the rates
required to meet the revenue objective. (In the case of a flat-rate tax levied at the same
rate on both individuals and corporations, this step involves simple division. In a world
with progressive individual rates [and even graduated corporate rates, another anomaly of
the present system], the process is only analogous to division.) Fifth, if revenue needs
change, tax rates are adjusted.168 Large changes in revenue needs might cause one to
reassess deviations of taxable income from real economic income (allowed for either
practical or tax expenditure reasons) and credits, but one would not ordinarily expect the
basic decisions on the allocability of such deviations to be altered by changing revenue
needs.

Several aspects of this hypothetical process are worth noting. First, taxable income is
defined to approximate real economic income, except as dictated by practical considerations
and modified by tax expenditures agreed to be appropriate. Both income-measurement
issues and deviations of the tax base from economic income are decided as a matter of
principle, largely independently of revenue needs. This implies that the type of revenue
neutral redefinition of the tax base we have seen recently would generally make no sense.
Second, tax rates are a residual in this calculation, determined by the interplay of revenue
needs and the tax base (and credit-type tax expenditures).
In such a world, the charge to the tax committees might include a mandate that tax
rates be raised (or lowered) by enough to meet reconciliation targets; it presumably would
not ordinarily include changes in the base. (How the pattern of automatic rate changes
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would be determined need not concern us in this simplistic description.) Third, it might
very well be that federal spending would be greater under this system than the present one;
that would depend on the relative strength of those who do and do not want tax rates to
be raised.

In this idealistic view of things, the tax system would be less complex. The complexity
that results from rules for accurate income measurement would not be avoidable, and the
provision of tax expenditures would also complicate matters. Moreover, some backstopping
rules would be necessary to prevent arbitrage resulting from the inherent inconsistency of
rules based on both accrual and realization. But the other types of complexity identified
in section III would be minimized. That is, there presumably would be less need for
backstop provisions if taxable income reflected economic income more closely. (There
might still be a call for backstop provisions if taxpayer use of tax preferences was thought
to create perception problems. This is one of many reasons not to use tax expenditures to
accomplish social and economic goals.) And in an orderly process the various provisions
of the tax law would be coordinated much more closely than at present. With the tax law
(aside from rates) being less subject to change for revenue reasons, there would be less
need for transition rules. Transition rules would be based on principle, and not revenue.
Under current practice, this process is stood on its head. Tax rates are fixed by
presidential fiat. This means that if revenue targets are to be met, it is the tax base that
must be adjusted. Income measurement is made to reflect economic income more or less
closely, depending on revenue needs and the effect a particular proposal would have on the
ability to meet those needs (and, of course, the relative ability of lobbyists). Transition
rules are structured with revenue consequences in mind. In short, the process of tax reform
has become driven by revenue needs and revenue estimates.169

Of course, we do not start with a tax structure that has been created by following the
rules outlined earlier. Tax expenditures of dubious merit permeate the system. As a result,
revenue-driven tax changes may bring improvements in areas that have long resisted reform.
Such reforms may clearly be preferable to raising rates on those who are already paying
their fair share of taxes. There is little doubt that more true tax reform has occurred since
1981 than in any comparable period in the history of the Code.170 This must give pause to
anyone who would advocate the "rates-only reconciliation" procedure discussed below.
The Deficit and Complexity

To this point, primary emphasis has been on the budgetary process and complexity.171
What may not be fully appreciated is the enormous role the budget deficit plays in this
drama. If there were no deficit problem, it is much less likely that the Congress would be
measuring revenue effects in teaspoonsful or that "no new taxes" would be a seriously
binding constraint on policy-makers; in that case, the budget process would almost certainly
not have created the machinations and the complexity we have seen since 1981.
One possible interpretation of events of the past decade is that the budget deficit,
together with the reconciliation process, has opened up the tax-writing process as never
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before to the influence of non-experts in the Congress-non-experts who have little
appreciation for the damage their seemingly well intentioned proposals can wreak on
simplicity (not to mention equity and neutrality) and no allegiance to a coherent and stable
tax system.172 According to this view, it is not the budget process per se that is to blame
for complexity; it is the deficit. As James Verdier has expressed it in personal
correspondence with the author, "The problem is not the process; the problem is the
problem."

WHAT TO DO

Prescribing a solution to the problems identified in this paper is no easy task. To some
extent, the problems can be traced directly to the system of checks and balances included
in the Constitution, and to the system of government it has produced. As in so many areas,
the pluralism that is the strength of the American political system is also its weakness.
It is clearly not productive to suggest fundamental changes in this system, since to do so
would take us well beyond both the topic of this paper and the realm of political reality-not to mention the expertise of its author. Rather, we focus more narrowly on changes
that would improve the tax legislative process, given our basic political institutions.174

Part of the objective is to create a framework for decision making that produces results
similar to those under the ideal system described at the end of the last section-a
description acknowledged to be naive. The need to create an improved framework for
decision making is emphasized because otherwise, we are left with little but platitudes
urging the Congress and the president to act responsibly in the formulation of tax policy.
As Rudder has noted:

[R]ules and procedures matter, since they structure the situation in a
particular way. . . . The bias needed in tax policy is one of responsibility,
defined here as a concern for raising appropriate levels of revenue fairly,
efficiently, simply, and in a manner consistent with other element of fiscal
policy.
To do that, the legislative process must be structured to permit careful consideration
of the implications and long-run consequences of proposals. Deliberation of this sort is not
facilitated by the current policy process.175

The following discussion of potential solutions is intended to be provocative, rather
than to advance definitive proposals. (I am not even sure where I stand on some of these
proposals.) It begins with a suggestion that involves relatively little departure from current
practice and then proceeds to one that involves a more fundamental restructuring of the
way tax legislation is considered in this country. It ends with the possibility that perhaps
the budgetary process (or at least the tax-writing part of it) does not need to be changed-at least not to address the complexity problems identified in this paper.
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"Rates-Only” Reconciliation

One possibility would be to legislate a procedure similar to the ideal solution described
above. That is, there would be a presumption that revenue target for reconciliation would
be met by changes in rates, rather than by changes in the base. The reconciliation mandate
might also specify that a fall-back increase (decrease) in rates would automatically be
implemented via a surcharge (proportionate reduction in liabilities) in the absence of
adequate revenue-raising (reducing) action by the tax committees and the two houses.176
This would preserve the committees’ latitude to make changes in the tax base or the level
and pattern of rates (or in other sources of revenue), in order to prevent the automatic
changes from coming fully into effect. (Presumably, partial solutions would be acceptable,
with automatic changes in rates occurring only to the extent that application of existing
rates—possibly to an expanded base-would not raise the mandated revenue.) This approach
appears to be broadly consistent with that suggested by Handler, who would prohibit
reconciliation from containing any substantive reform. He writes:
The budget reconciliation process, as valuable as it may be in controlling the
budget, must not be allowed to control substantive tax revision. While there
is no question that substantive tax reform is necessary, . . . the budget
reconciliation process is clearly not the appropriate legislative environment.
The coherence and substance of the Code would be better served if political
considerations were allowed to affect only the rate of tax, or the type of tax
imposed. . . . Thus the budget reconciliation process should be prohibited
from containing any substantive reform. If revenues need to be raised,
Congress should adjust rates, establish new forms of tax, or adopt other forms
of revenue-raising techniques that are unrelated to substantive tax reform.
[Emphasis added.]177

There are some obvious problems with this approach. First, in an environment
permeated by presidential promises of no new taxes (and no increases in old ones), there
is the risk that nothing would be done about the deficit. But this outcome may be
somewhat less likely to produce undesirable results than it appears at first glance. There
are several possible scenarios. First, the Congress might decide to reduce federal spending.
Second, it might try to raise taxes, thereby incurring a veto that, if sustained, would lead to
a legislative stalemate and sequestration. Third, the president might give in, either when
presented with reconciliation legislation that raised taxes or in anticipation of an over-ride
of his veto. Fourth, his veto might be over-ridden. Fifth, the Congress might do nothing.
We examine these alternatives.
In principle, one can hardly object to the first, third, and fourth outcomes. If the
Congress accedes to the wishes of the public for no new taxes, as personified in a strong
president, and for reduced spending, or if the president gives in to the Congress and allows
it to raise taxes, democracy would have worked, at least by some definitions. (Of course,
advocates of greater or lesser spending or of deficit reduction may object to the actual
outcome, if not to the principle.) Indeed, the rates-only approach to reconciliation has
the advantage of helping to break the present stalemate in which the president says, "no
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new taxes," and no one in Congress has the courage to try to "bell the cat" by proposing a
tax increase; at least there would be a process that would force the Congress collectively
to confront the president with some kind of action, so that the American public can have
a legislated decision on the question of whether taxes should be raised, rather than a
decision (more accurately, a non-decision) by default.
The prospect of a legislative stalemate and sequestration is more troubling if, as now,
sequestration is limited to spending; after all, sequestration is a terrible way to set budget
priorities. But the sequestration process could be redesigned to trigger an automatic tax
increase as well as spending cuts. This might have a salutary effect. Whereas the effects
of across-the-board sequestration of spending are diffuse and not readily noticed, even a
small across-the-board tax increase would gain immediate and adverse public attention. It
probably would not take much experience with sequestration-cum-automatic-tax-increase
for the American public to demand that the Congress and the president act responsibly.

There is another more troubling problem with a rates-only reconciliation rule. We
are not starting from an ideal system that approximates the taxation of economic income,
with only a few well-chosen tax expenditures; the present system is badly flawed and is in
need of further fundamental reform. Recent experience with policymaking under the gun
of reconciliation and revenue neutrality has brought with it some benefits, in terms of a tax
system that is fairer and more neutral, as well as substantially more complicated for some.
After all, it was the fact that some taxpayers were getting away with murder that made it
possible to use the cats-and-dogs approach to achieve some reform while raising revenue
in 1982 and 1984 and to achieve fundamental reform in 1986.178 Under a rates-only rule,
much of the pressure that has brought this type of improvements would be gone. The
question, then, is how to institutionalize tax reform, so that progress continues to be made
in the absence of budgetary pressure. A full answer to this question would take us
somewhat beyond the terms of reference for this paper--though not much beyond, since
until one has answered it, one cannot be confident one is not throwing out the baby (the
possibility of tax reform for equity, simplicity, and economic neutrality) with the bath
(prohibition of structural reform for purposes of reconciliation).
One part of the answer is to note that there is no reason for a strict rates-only rule;
the tax committees could be left the option of changing the base. It might be argued that
this would leave the status quo largely unchanged; after all the committees now have the
prerogative of changing either the base or the rates. But there is a potentially important
difference. The advantage of a default "rates automatically as a last resort" rule is that it
provides the tax committees with cover in case they fail to increase the base enough to
avoid a rate increase; by voting for a reconciliation with a change in rates to be triggered
in the absence of adequate base-broadening, the entire Congress would be on record. In
a sense the "bell the cat" problem is handled automatically under this process. Of course,
it remains an open question how, from a political point of view, automatic tax increases
could ever be added to the sequestration process, since the effort to do so would probably
be attacked as a thinly veiled plot to raise taxes.
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A More Radical Proposal

Much of the current complexity in the income tax-and much of the inequity-results
from the efforts of the Congress to fine tune-tax legislation, not to improve it, but to satisfy
the pleadings of special interests. Witte describes the problem as follows:
The answer is not to reform the representative process but to insulate policy
from it. . . . What is implied is that democracy must be contained-that it must
be tempered to prevent elected officials from offering constituents, in good
conscience, what those constituents want. The underlying malady is the
hyperresponsiveness of the system. It is not that the ’electoral connection’ is
too loose or disjointed; it is that it is too much tied to personal interests, too
shortsighted, and too often exercised. Decisions that appear rational and
proper in each individual case are in the aggregate and over time a
disaster.”179

Witte is suggesting that details are legislated that be better left to administrative directives.

Simon has employed a "separation-of-powers” argument to reach the following strong
conclusion:
Looking at the recent past and the legislative morass that has developed in
the tax area, it is clear that we are in the precise state that the Framers
sought to avoid. Congress has, in many situations, seized control of the detail
of the tax laws. This tendency has made the laws themselves hypertechnical
and hence susceptible to frequent change, with the result that they are almost
unadministrable. If the laws that Congress writes were simpler, the proper
role of Treasury in the governmental process would be better preserved. The
management of detail would be entrusted to the executive branch, where it
properly belongs. In that way the structure adopted by the Framers would be
respected and its purpose of guarding against tyranny would be best
effectuated.180
Supposing that this viewpoint is accepted, which types of details should be delegated? And
to whom should authority be delegated?181

In answering the first question, it seems useful to distinguish between those sources of
complexity that result from decisions the Congress should make and those it currently
chooses to make but could better delegate to others. It appears that the Congress must
retain responsibility for what has been identified earlier as basic income-definition rules,
general tax-expenditure rules, basic backstop rules, and true transition rules of general
applicability. By comparison, it has neither the time nor the expertise to deal with
derivative income-definition rules, derivative tax-expenditure rules, derivative backstop
rules, or technical changes needed to bring coherence to the law.
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The Congress should not simply be absolved of blame for complexity, as it appears
Chapoton would do, when he writes, "It is not correct, however, to indict the members of
the tax-writing committees for the internal complexity of the rules they adopt. The
members should and must rely on their staffs with respect to technical matters, and
reducing complexity is a technical matter."182 If the buck does not stop with the elected
members of Congress, where will it stop? Surely not with Congressional staffs.
More important, it is highly inappropriate, as a matter of principle, that the Congress
be engaged in the business of providing highly targeted tax expenditures or targeted
transition rules.183 Simon has argued the last point in the following terms:

In a sense, the grant of a special tax break that no one else gets is analogous
to a grant of money from the Treasury. ... In general, however, it is clear
that the authority to make grants of money is an inherently executive one,
normally exercised under guidelines set out by Congress in general
legislation. ... By writing special tax laws that allow only a select few to
receive monetary benefits in the form of reduced taxes, Congress exercises an
executive power that it properly should delegate to an agency with the
requisite expertise to make determinations of merit. Congress should not on
its own elect to decide which taxpayers are entitled to relief from general
laws.184

Having said all this, one must admit that it would inevitably be difficult to distinguish
between the basic rules that should be written by Congress and the derivative rules that
would be similar to regulations of those rules and thus should be off-limits to Congress.
Moreover, there is the concern that tax law will be too complicated if left in the hands of
the experts-who understand their own specialty well (perhaps too well) and will try to tie
down all the loose ends. (See also the discussion of a simplification czar that follows.)
If authority for details of tax law is to be delegated, the two obvious alternatives for the
delegee would seem to be the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation and the Treasury
Department, including the Internal Revenue Service. Given that, it seems clear that
Treasury is the appropriate choice for several reasons.185 First, Treasury, in conjunction
with the Internal Revenue Service, is already involved in writing regulations; the
preparation of details on tax law would be a natural extension of that function.

Second, though it is clearly far less political than the staffs of members, the staff of the
JCT is simply too close to the members on the tax writing committees. It would be too
difficult to avoid pressures to insert provisions favorable to constituents into ostensibly
objective renderings of the details of general laws passed by the Congress.

It may be objected that a similar risk would arise at Treasury, given the susceptibility
of the White House-and thus Treasury-to political pressure to support tax breaks for
special interests; certainly the gutting of Treasury I on the way to the Congress as the
President’s 1986 proposals for tax reform gives one pause.186 Several considerations suggest
at least guarded optimism on this score. First, whereas everyone might expect the staff of
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the JCT to be somewhat compliant in meeting the desires of members, similar Treasury
Department compliance to pressure from the White House would probably be seen as
scandalous, especially once the nature of the new process was appreciated. Indeed, it can
be argued that whereas it is currently acceptable for political pressure to be exerted on
both the Congress and the White House, similar pressure on the interpretative division of
the Treasury would not be permissible.
Second, and supporting this view, it appears that Treasury and the IRS have generally
been relatively immune from political influence in the promulgation of regulations. It does
not seem impossible that, if charged with responsibility for putting flesh on relatively barebones legislation, the Treasury and IRS could discharge that duty in an impartial manner.
The ability to withstand political pressure in attempting to determine depreciable lives of
assets, as required by the 1986 Act, will be a test of the feasibility of this approach.187

Some may argue that the Treasury and IRS have shown scarce little concern for
simplicity in either legislative proposals or regulations in the past.
Former IRS
Commissioner Egger does not provide much comfort when he admits candidly that "because
most of the regulations issued by the Service are interpretive regulations as distinguished
from so-called legislative regulations, and (sic) they are not really subject to any significant
administrative impact review." Chapoton notes, by way of explanation, "History clearly
teaches us that conceptual purity and comprehensiveness will win the hearts of the very
able individuals who devolop (sic) technical policy rules; simpler, less precise rules will not
as quickly capture their enthusiasm."188
Both Egger, with his requirement for sign-off from the taxpayer ombudsman, and
Chapoton, with his "simplification czar," would combat this tendency by placing a watchdog
over these bright individuals who seemingly do not understand that simplicity is prized for
its own sake. I agree with the view that only the assistant secretary for tax policy can serve
as the simplification czar, since anyone else is likely to be ignored. (Of course, the assistant
secretary could properly assign staff responsibility for being on the lookout for complexity
to one or more individuals.) The assistant secretary and the IRS commissioner can
emphasize to their staffs (a) that simplicity is inherently important, and not merely a luxury
that is nice to have once all the technical details have been solved, and (b) that those who
write complicated laws when simple ones would do almost as well are not doing--and may
not continue to hold-their jobs. In addition, it seems appropriate that general explanations
of legislative proposals include as a matter of course a discussion of whether and how
complexity will be affected, along with discussions of the reason for the change, the
economic effects of the change, and the revenue implications of the change. This would
at least help assure that someone has focused on the issue.
It seems almost inevitable that such a system would result in substantial litigation as
taxpayers questioned the interpretation of basic laws. This might lead some to argue that
uncertainty would be increased by this change in procedures. I am inclined to agree with
Mattson’s view that "more intricate language in the statute leads to greater uncertainty."
Even if there were more litigation, this would seem to be consistent with the separation of
powers under which the Congress makes the laws, the Executive branch enforces them, and
the judiciary assures that enforcement is true to the intent of legislation. Of course, it
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might be necessary to make important changes in the judiciary system dealing with tax
matters. Such changes are beyond the scope of this paper.
This proposal suffers from several important political problems. First, while it might
be true that the system outlined would protect the integrity of a good system—one based
more closely on economic income-one wonders whether fundamental reform of the existing
highly flawed system could ever occur. Such a reform would slaughter sacred cows, with
no opportunity for legislated relief through targeted transition rules or other sweeteners.
Experience suggests that those benefitting from existing tax preferences would fight hard,
and perhaps successfully, against broad-brush reforms that contained no such sweeteners
and left the details to an impartial interpretive agency of government.

A final question is how to get the tax writing committees to give up their present
power, which conveys enormous potential for favoring supporters and punishing
opponents.189 On that the present author has no special advice. The real issue is whether
the members of these committees will be allowed to continue to subjugate the public
interest in tax simplification to their own desires to maintain control of details of the tax
reform process in order to help assure their reelection.
Do Nothing

According to one line of reasoning identified earlier, the problems we have described
above have relatively little to do with budget process, per se, and everything to do with the
state of budgetary balance.190 In this view, if, as, and when we deal with the federal budget
deficit, rationality will return to the tax-writing process. If that is true, there may be little
need for the type of changes just discussed.

There is much to be said for this view.191 Yet I believe it goes too far. It seems that
rates-only reconciliation may generally be a sensible approach to the revenue side of
reconciliation, even in more normal times. If small amounts of revenue are needed-or if
small tax reductions are needed-it seems far more sensible to adjust rates slightly than to
change the tax base. (This is not to say that rate changes should be used for fine-tuning
the economy; that is a topic this paper properly does not address. But whatever type of
tuning is at issue, rate changes are generally more appropriate than changes in the tax
base.)
The other problem with the do-nothing approach is that, like the rates-only approach,
it makes no contribution to the improvement of the tax base, whatever it does to reduce
the growth of complexity. There may be something to be said for insulating the process of
policy-making from the grossest types of pandering to special interests. This is true whether
we solve the deficit problem or not.
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NOTES

1 Bradford (1986), 266. Witte (1985), 68, argues along the same lines:

[T]here is overwhelming consensus among tax experts that voluntary
compliance is absolutely essential in collecting income tax revenues.
Voluntary compliance depends on both the capacity of taxpayers to
understand the tax code and on their willingness to comply. The complexity
of an income tax system loaded down with the sort of tax-reducing and
tax-delaying devices that characterize the U.S. system affects compliance and
legitimacy in several ways. ... [I]t is difficult for many people to understand
the intricacies of the tax system that is extracting their money. The system
also gives an impression of special privilege-of "loopholes" that exist primarily
for the wealthy....
Additionally, while we know little about the psychology of tax avoidance, it
is reasonable to assume that the easier it is to go undetected, or the easier
it is to escape punishment once caught, the greater the temptation.
Complexity allows both in that it makes the task of enforcement significantly
more difficult, and it makes it easier to plead ignorance or error when the
intent was truly fraud. Notes that this quotation contains an important
element of an argument for "simplicity for the other guy," as well as for
simplicity, per se.
2 McDaniel (1979), an excellent and far-ranging paper on tax simplification written for a
conference in January 1978, less than four years after passage of the 1974 Budget Act,
devotes less than five pages to the topic.
3 Rivlin (1987), 6, notes, "Recent experience with trying to reduce the federal deficit along
the fixed path specified by the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings amendment, for example, has
given us a taste of some of the possible disadvantages of a balanced budget rule." Rivlin
goes on to say, "The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings experience, however, has suggested the
usefulness of a different approach to deficit reduction than a balanced budget rule; namely
a deficit neutral amendment rule." (The difference in these two rules is that under the
former total receipts must be at least as great as total expenditures, whereas under the
second a change in policy could not increase the excess of expenditures over receipts.) Part
of the implicit purpose of this paper is to shed light on the net benefits of such a rule.

4 Surrey (1970), 691.

5 On the plan to finance catastrophic health insurance passed in 1988, Steuerle (1989), 455,
has written:

Too little attention to the financing side of the issue has now left Congress
in a quandary. The surtax that was enacted is too complicated for the amount
of revenues generated and is barely administrable by the IRS. It involves
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grafting an annual collection process on a monthly benefit system, which is
akin to grafting tree branches onto leaves of grass and hoping that the hybrid
is going to bear fruit months later. It appears that this program will be
repealed for political reasons having little to do with its complexity.
6 For this reason, it appears that David Bradford’s suggestion in his comment on my paper
at the AICPA/ABA conference that there is no economic difference between budgetary
expenditures and tax expenditures is largely beside the point (besides failing to deal with
the perception problems of tax expenditures, to be discussed below). If it is the budgetary
balance that is being controlling, nothing is gained from converting budgetary expenditures
to tax expenditures.

7 Since the focus of the paper is fairly narrowly defined as the impact of budget process
on tax simplification/complication, there is no attempt to provide an overall appraisal of
the end product of tax reform or to discuss the political process, more broadly defined, that
led to tax reform. See, however, Birnbaum and Murray (1987), Doernberg and McChesney
(1987), Galvin (1987), Minarik (1987), Verdier (1988), Witte (1989), Conlan et al. (1989),
and Strahan (1990).
8 McDaniel (1979).
9 See, however, Bradford (1986) and McLure (1988). I must not let the opportunity pass,
especially with David Bradford as one of my discussants, to emphasize that many of the
most important sources of complexity, those associated with timing problems, simply do not
exist under a consumption-based direct tax.
10 As Bradford (1986), pp. 276-80, notes, much of complexity can be traced to graduated
rates. See also Hall and Rabushka (1983) and (1985).

11 On this topic, see, for example, McIntyre and Oldman (1977) and the papers in Penner
(1983).
12 On this act and its consequences for the tax-policy process, see inter alia, Shuman (1984),
chapters 8-10, Ellwood (1985), and Simon (1988), 628-30.
13 In earlier years, the Budget Committees made abortive attempts to mandate the
particular means of raising revenues; these were rebuffed by tax-writing committees jealous
of their constitutional prerogatives. See McDaniel (1979), 537-38, and Davenport (1979),
263-64.
14 Leonard (1988), 973.

15 Leonard (1988), 971.
16 The 1981 act is estimated to reduce fiscal 1990 revenues by $323 billion ($398 billion
in 1992). TEFRA and DEFRA reduced this by only $88 billion ($103 billion in 1992).
Even after all subsequent revenue legislation, including the 1983 amendments to social
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security and the ill-fated catastrophic medical care legislation, estimated revenues remain
$195 billion ($258 billion in 1992) below their projected level under pre-1981 law. See
Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1990, 4-4.
17 Minarik (1987), 1359.

18 This discussion draws on Ellwood (1985).
19 There is another conceptually different but important form of adjustment for inflation,
which also has never been enacted in the United States. Inflation distorts the measurement
of income from business and capital when such measurement is based on historical
(unindexed) values of assets and liabilities. This is discussed briefly in section III.
20 For an excellent description of the effects of bracket creep, see Steuerle and Hartzmark
(1981).

21 Growth in real GNP also generates a fiscal dividend, in the sense that taxes grow with
output. Indeed, with a progressive rate structure, taxes can be expected to grow as a
percentage of GNP. The reduction in the progressivity of the rate structure during the
1980s reduces this source of increase. This type of fiscal dividend is not the subject of the
present discussion.
22 Verdier (1987), 172.
23 Leonard (1988), 971.
24 Leonard (1988), 971. On the growth of tax expenditures, see Witte (1985), chapter 13.
The concept of tax expenditures is discussed in Section III and in Special Analysis G of the
U.S. Budget. It should be noted that it is generally inappropriate to add together the
amount of individual tax expenditures; it is done here only to provide a rough indication
of the growth in the use of the tax system to interfere with market decisions.

25 Kies (1987) emphasizes the importance of indexing in creating a watershed between
pre-ERTA and post-ERTA policymaking. As a consequence of indexing, "legislation must
in the aggregate either raise revenue, or at least not lose revenue." He notes, "in the
post-ERTA period, it is common for Members to request a revenue estimate of a bill
before its introduction, much less actively urging its enactment. This approach contrasts
with the pre-ERTA period when it was not uncommon for a tax-writing committee to
complete consideration of legislation without knowing its revenue effect." These quotations
are from page 182.

26 Merrill, Collender, and Cook (1989).
27 Leonard (1988), 972.
28 By far the largest increase in non-defense spending was, of course, for social security.
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Surrey (1979) provides a detailed discussion of the passage of the 1978 tax act that
suggests that the tax revolt had reached Washington before Ronald Reagan became
president.

30 Minarik (1987), 1364.
31 U.S. Department of the Treasury, (vol. 1, 1984), 14.

On the importance of the discipline enforced by the requirement of revenue neutrality,
see Birnbaum and Murray (1987), Conlan et al (1989), and Verdier (1988).

33 Birnbaum and Murray (1987), 287. See also Verdier (1988).
34
For a detailed discussion of the two alternative methods of implementing
consumption-based direct taxes, see Zodrow and McLure (1988).
35 It is true, of course, that such efforts are fully funded.

36 See, however, Summers (1989). Among the obvious examples of fiscal craziness outside
the tax area are the various schemes that were considered to keep the cost of bailing out
the savings and loan industry from being reflected in the budget deficit and thus triggering
sequestration under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
37 This point is made in Merrill, Collender, and Cook (1989).

38 McDaniel (1979), 509.
39 This discussion draws heavily on Bradford (1986), chapter 12. See also the discussion
of different types of complexity in Koppelman (1990).
40 Bradford (1986), 267.

41 For some potential investors in tax shelters the mere prospect of a compliance burden
of staggering complexity may be enough to deter investment, even if tax benefits are not
eliminated. More commonly it is the elimination of the tax benefits that can be expected
to deter investment.
42 This discussion draws heavily on McDaniel (1979). Note, however, that McDaniel
considers only the first two categories of complexity identified here, income-measurement
rules (which he dubs "structural") and tax expenditures. He appears to be much more
sympathetic than the present author to the use of tax expenditures for the achievement of
social and economic objectives. He argues that complexity exists in part because rules
written with a tax mindset are not necessarily appropriate for a tax expenditure program.
Some such complexity could be identified with the "backstop" provisions of the current
discussion.

43 For a discussion of the Haig-Simons definition, see Bradford (1986), chapters 2 and 3.
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Actually there is no real need for installment sales rules. Existing rules--and their
predecessors-are examples of what happens when special treatment is provided via special
rules that are not appropriate.
45 By comparison, timing issues and problems of inflation adjustment (to be discussed
below) largely disappear under a system of direct taxation based on consumption, which
utilizes cash-flow concepts; see, for example, Bradford (1986), McLure (1988), or Zodrow
and McLure (1988).
46 The description that follows is based on Graetz (1988), 954-59.
47 The 1984 act also requires that market discount be treated as ordinary income, rather
than capital gain, but does not require current taxation on an accrual basis; thus market
discount is now taxed on the same basis as OID under pre-1969 law. Graetz (1988), 958,
notes with regard to market discount, "Future adjustments seem likely."

48 How closely the definition of income for tax purposes should mirror economic income
is a matter of judgment. Clearly it is possible to go too far in specifying complex rules in
the attempt to achieve congruence between taxable income and economic income; some
would argue that this was done in Treasury I (U.S. Department of the Treasury, [1984]).
What is required is a more refined version of what is often called "rough justice" in the
literature on taxation in developing countries.
49 Thus Brockway (1986), 1804, has written, "after laws have ‘been on the books’ for a
period of time, taxpayers against whom the laws are directed devise loopholes’ or plans
to get around them. Congress in turn is forced to come up with increasingly complex rules
to close loopholes-the result being a Code that is several volumes thick and difficult to
use."
50 See also U.S. Department of the Treasury, vol. 2, (1984), chapters 8 and 9. For a more
exhaustive discussion of inflation adjustment, see McLure et al. (1989), chapter 7.
51 On this, see Surrey (1969), 679-82.

52 See McLure (1979).
53 The classic reference on tax expenditures is Surrey (1973).
McDaniel (1985), Witte (1985), and Thuronyi (1988b).

See also Surrey and

54 This characterization, in terms of deviations of taxable income from economic income,
is not totally accurate, because some tax expenditures take the form of tax credits. A more
satisfactory characterization might be deviations of tax liabilities from those that would
result from application of the statutory rate structure to economic income. The description
in the text appears satisfactory for present purposes. Note that neither of these is the
definition actually used in preparation of the tax expenditure budget; see also the discussion
in subsections 6 and 7 below.
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55 Perhaps it should be noted that the tax expenditure concept made its public debut in
official government publications in 1969 in the Annual Report of the Secretary of the
Treasury for Fiscal 1968.

56 It should be noted explicitly at this point that the tax expenditure concept used to
prepare the tax expenditure budget does not adhere slavishly to a definition couched in
terms of deviations from the pure concept of economic income; as noted in Section III, it
modifies that concept in the interest of practicality.
57 McDaniel (1979), 528-29.

58 See Birnbaum and Murray (1987), 11-13, for a description of the political use made of
the fact that wealthy individuals and large corporations paid no income tax in gaining
passage of the 1986 Act.
59 Sunley (1986) notes that we now have three corporate taxes, each with its own definition
of income and its own rate: the regular tax with ACRS depreciation and a 34% rate, the
"regular" minimum tax with non-incentive depreciation and a 20% rate, and the minimum
tax based on book income with book depreciation and a 10% rate. In addition, Simon
(1989) notes the need to calculate earnings and profits.
60 On this point McDaniel (1979), 514, has written:
It makes no sense in a spending program. What secretary of commerce
would suggest, or even think of, limiting a direct subsidy for machinery and
equipment to a percentage of the recipient’s tax liability to the Treasury
Department?

61 McDaniel (1979), 515. Kies (1987) suggests that there may be pressure to impose
limitations on leasing induced by the AMT based on the excess of book income over
otherwise minimum taxable income.
62 In private correspondence with the author, Paul McDaniel has suggested that this
assessment may be overly optimistic, since transactions are being structured in extremely
complicated ways in order to circumvent the PALs.
63 Birnbaum and Murray (1987), 88, describe the following episode during the process
leading to the 1986 act in which cynicism about the perception of equity reached its apex:
Baker and Darman wanted to make certain those stories about millionaires
and corporations escaping all taxes never surfaced again. Baker even
suggested an unusual proposal requiring large companies with no other tax
liabilities to pay one dollar tax.

Sunley (1986), 137, provides the following more favorable assessment of minimum taxes:

Many might view the enactment of minimum taxes as a sign that basic,
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comprehensive tax reform had failed or is unattainable. If the United States
ever adopted a truly comprehensive income tax, the minimum tax with all its
complexities would presumably not be needed....I do not view the enactment
of a minimum tax as a sign of failure. Instead, it is an admission that the
U.S. income tax involves tradeoffs among competing objectives....A minimum
tax can ensure that no taxpayers with substantial economic income can reduce
their tax liabilities to zero by combining tax preferences. But this objective
can only be achieved at the cost of considerable complexity and a blunting of
incentives.
Steuerle (1986) adds another interesting explanation for the use of backstop provisions
having its origin in the structure of the economic model used by the Joint Committee on
Taxation to estimate distributional effects of tax changes: "The tax model will readily show
an increase in tax on those subject to higher minimum taxes but, because it does not impute
to partners particular partnership items, it will not show any increase in tax on partners if
direct changes are made to items of preferences used by partnerships." By comparison,
estimates of the distributional effects of Treasury I, which significantly did recommend the
repeal of the minimum tax, did take account of the distributional effects of a frontal attack
on the preferences that give rise to tax-shelter partnerships.

64 For a masterful discussion, see Surrey (1969), 686-89.
65 This is one of the important themes of Witte (1986), who on p. 257, also describes the
problem as follows:

[Although incremental changes are by definition non radical departures from
the status quo, it is a major error to interpret the long-term result of this
process or producing little change. The reason is that modifications are
cumulative. This simple fact has produced the policy results with which we
are all so familiar-a hopelessly large tax code that is unbearably complex,
and riddled with particularized sets of benefits for all ranges and types of
taxpayers.
66 Witte (1986), 369-70.
67 Handler, (1987), 1260-61. It may be worthwhile to note at this point that the author
of the present paper is an economist; being neither a tax lawyer nor a tax accountant, he
is at somewhat of a disadvantage in specifying particular instances of incoherence and other
types of complexity that are well-known to practitioners.

68 Schenk (1990).
69 Minarik (1987), 1363.

70 Chapoton (1990).
71 Handler (1987), 1260.
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72 Simon (1988), 630-34 comments on the difficulty of defining tax expenditures, noting
(632) that, "the malleability of the concept is troublesome" and suggesting, regarding the
inclusion of the effects of General Utilities as a tax expenditure, that "a desire to achieve
certain social and economic goals by eliminating it played a part in the classification." See
also Thuronyi (1988b), which came to my attention after this paper was essentially
completed.

73 Special Analysis, 1976 101-4.
74 Special Analysis G. 1983, G-5.
75 See McDaniel and Surrey (1982) and Surrey and McDaniel (1985), 194-96.

76 Inequities, as well as the pressures to transfer deductions to high-income taxpayers that
create tax shelters and perception problems, result from the inverse subsidy characteristic
of deductions; deductions are worth more, the higher the marginal tax bracket of the
taxpayer.
77 Accelerated depreciation is perhaps most accurately treated as a tax expenditure, rather
than as merely a failure to provide adequate income measurement rules. In the context of
inadequate income measurement rules, the discussion that follows is most appropriate to
a system that simply leaves the choice of depreciation methods to the discretion of the
taxpayer.
78 See Feldstein (1981) for this line of argument. It is worth noting that while inflation
adjustment is complicated, it is clearly feasible. Chile has had a comprehensive system of
inflation adjustment based on adjustment of items in the balance sheet for over a decade.
79 See U.S. Department of the Treasury, vol. 2, (1984), chapters 8 and 9, for the
elaboration of this argument.

80 For a less pessimistic assessment, see McDaniel (1983). Note, however, that at the time
McDaniel’s paper was written, the nation had barely begun to experience the related
phenomena of abusive tax shelters and high-income individuals and corporations paying no
taxes as a result of the provisions of ERTA.

81 Under the "hang ‘em high" theory of punishing evasion, high-visibility tax evaders are
given stiff penalties, and even prison sentences, in order to deter others from engaging in
similar practices. Conversely, the spectacle of wealthy individuals and corporations paying
no taxes may encourage evasion.
82 The METR is calculated as the difference between the before- and after-tax rates of
return, divided by the before-tax return. For the basic methodology, see King and Fullerton
(1984).
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83 Waste is not inevitable, since social benefits of activities subsidized through the tax
system may exceed private benefits. Yet there is a high probability that in many cases,
even taking account of external benefits, costs of tax expenditures exceed benefits.
84 Arthur Andersen (1986), 120 and 129; the second sentence quoted refers to the
calculation of "adjusted current earnings."

85 Chapoton (1990) distinguishes between three groups. For his level-one taxpayers, "who
are not self-employed, have no investments that raise tax complexities, do not itemize
deductions, and have no unusual events during the taxable year...the tax system is not
unduly complex." For his level-two taxpayers, "who itemize deductions, or invest in
partnerships, or have unusual tax events during the year...the tax system becomes
considerably more complex...The overwhelming majority of taxpayers who address leveltwo complexities do not engage in any substantive tax planning...[T]ax complexity for them
is primarily the difficulty of accounting to the government after the fact." "Taxpayers who
seek tax assistance in planning business, financial, and professional transactions and events-which includes most medium and large business taxpayers-face an entirely different type
of complexity," what Chapoton calls level-three complexity. "For such taxpayers, complexity
means either lack of certainty in the tax rules or that a satisfactory level of certainty can
be achieved only at excessive cost...[V]irtually all anti-abuse amendments to the Code are
aimed at level-three taxpayers." Shapiro (1990) confirms that for individuals the issue of
complexity revolves around tax planning.

86 Schenk (1990).
87 One the complexity of recordkeeping for this group, see Schenk (1990).

88 Speaking of the effects of the 1986 Act on essentially this group, Shapiro (1990) has
written, "the additional complexity was enormous."
89 McLure (1988), 303.

90 For examples of incoherence in this area, see Kautter (1990).
91 For a detailed assessment leading to the same conclusion, see Koppelman (1990). He
notes, "PALs (passive activity limitations) represent the broadest attack ever launched
against tax shelters. They have virtually shut down the tax-shelter activity in this country."
He also argues, "Notwithstanding the length of PALs, they represent, in my opinion, ... a
net simplification of the system."

92 I sometimes call this the "vampire approach." In order to be safe when dealing with a
vampire, one drives a stake through the heart, hangs a cross around the neck, places a
mirror over the eyes, and fills the coffin with wolfsbane. (I acknowledge my indebtedness
to Victor Thuronyi for pointing out the error in an earlier draft, where this was identified
as the "werewolf approach.")
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93 See, however, the contrary views of Graetz (1977) and Kaplow (1989). These are also
discussed in Zodrow (1989). Of course, this is not to say that investors in shelters who had
taken deductions at pre-reform tax rates should have been allowed to enjoy the full benefits
of rate reduction. On this, see the proposal for a "windfall recapture tax" in The President's
Tax Proposals (1985), pp. 192-96.

94 This discussion draws on Koppelman (1990).
95 Koppelman (1990).

96 Sunley (1986) makes this point.
97 It might be relatively unusual that unsecured debt is used to purchase a house. But see
the discussion of the fungibility of money that follows.

98 Doernberg and McChesney (1987), 912-13.

99 It might be worth noting that the true tax expenditure in this case is the failure to tax
the gross imputed income from owner-occupied housing; if such income were taxable, the
deduction for mortgage interest (and for the property tax) would be perfectly appropriate
as an expense of earning income. Much the same thing can be said about interest incurred
to finance the ownership of municipal bonds, but here policy has long forbidden the
deduction of such interest.
100 On the rationale for the kiddie tax, see Thuronyi (1988a).

101 For such an argument, see Thuronyi (1988a), 597-600.
102 For a clear discussion of this issue, see Ginsberg (1990).
103 Without indexing, however, tax may be collected on fictitious (inflationary) gains. It may
also be worthwhile to note explicitly an often-neglected fact-that because of the benefits
of deferral, capital gains would remain tax-preferred if they were indexed and taxed as
ordinary income when realized.
104

U.S. Department of the Treasury, vol. 1, (1984), 147, and personal knowledge of the
author.
105 Treasury I adopted the controversial alternative of indexing basis starting in 1965.
Under at least one current proposal, indexing would begin with 1913 values.

106 Ginsberg (1990) notes that the ABA Section on Taxation concluded in a 1989 report
that the 1986 elimination of the capital-gain preference has resulted in significant
transactional simplification.
107 Handler (1987), 1264.
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108

See Simon (1989) and references cited there.

109 A contrary view, expressed, for example, in Kies (1987), is that the increased use of
pass-through entities will lead to limitations on this form of pass-through vehicle.

110 Kies (1987) identifies measures to improve compliance as a possible source of
additional revenues following the 1986 act.
111 On the need for a new international tax order, see Bird (1988).

112 See Shuman (1984), 114-25, for a brief historical sketch of the development of the
procedures and practices of the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees.
The classic treatment of the Ways and Means Committee, now quite dated, is Manley
(1970).
113 This topic is considered only briefly, because it is the subject of another paper for this
conference. The present discussion draws heavily on Rudder (1983), (1985), and (1989).
See also Witte (1985), 238-43 and chapter 15; Reese (1979); Surrey (1981), 185-86, and
196-97; McDaniel (1979), 522-28; and Strahan (1987) and (forthcoming, 1990). For a
catalog of the abuses in the Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance
Committee that contributed to the reform movement, see Spohn and McCollum (1975).

114 Rudder (1983), 199.
115 Rudder (1983), 197.
116 See, for example, the descriptions of "Gucci Gulch" in Birnbaum and Murray (1987),
3-4.

117 See, generally, Rudder (1983), 200-201.
118 On the origin of this term, see Shuman (1984), 122-24.
119 McDaniel (1979), 542.

120 This discussion draws heavily on Rudder (1983), (1985), and (1989); see also Reese
(1979); Witte (1985), 238-43; and Strahan (forthcoming, 1990).
121 Surrey (1981), 185. He adds, "Thus, open markup sessions’ designed to flood the
committee process with sunlight only flooded the committee rooms with business lobbyists."

122 Rudder (1983), 196 and 201-3. Witte (1985), 241, has noted that advocacy of the good
government reforms depended on three questionable assumptions: that the public cares
about narrow tax benefits of others, that they would care enough to follow complicated and
tedious Congressional tax proceedings (or expect their representative to do so), and that
they would express their displeasure with such benefits to their representatives, who would
vote accordingly.
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123 Rudder (1983), 210-11 notes that limitations on spending (e.g., prohibiting the issuance
of regulations) are sometimes used to circumvent House restrictions on placing tax-related
amendments in appropriations bills.

124 Witte (1985) surveys the history of U.S. income-tax policy through the 1981 act. On
the growth of tax expenditures, see chapter 13.
125 Rudder (1983), 208-13 and (1985), 211-212, emphasize these points.

126 Reese (1979), 249-50.
127 Birnbaum and Murray (1987), 275, describe a public attack by Packwood on JCT Chief
of Staff Brockway, which they characterize as "cruel and mindless."

128 Reese (1979), 250.
129 Witte (1985), chapter 11, provides a detailed description of the bidding war that led
to the excessive tax cuts of 1981. On this episode, see also Rudder (1983), 205-6, and
Shuman (1984), 264-68.

130 Rudder (1983), 206.
131 Witte (1985), 242, has argued, "Once the position of the chairmen was weakened and
the power to add tax provisions was spread out over many centers of influence, trade-offs
and even judicious restraint became very difficult, as the only power available to the
chairmen was the power to create policy packages that outbid whatever competing
combinations were proposed elsewhere."

132 See, generally, Rudder (1983), 206-8. On the role of the Budget Act, see Rudder
(1985), 217.
133 Rudder (1983), 207. The germaneness rule was applicable because the tax bill was a
reconciliation bill under the Congressional Budget Impoundment and Control Act of 1974.

134 Rudder (1989), 232.
135 Rudder (1983), 207.

136 Rudder (1983), 207-8.
137 Witte (1989). Simon (1989) has expressed a similar view: "...It would be disingenuous
to suggest that the public has as much impact on the legislative outcome under the current
tax legislative procedures as the lobbyists and their clients do."
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138 Rudder (1985), 218. Strahan (1990) has also noted a return to the practice of choosing
new members from relatively safe districts: "Since 1981 neither party has appointed a
member who has won less than sixty percent of the vote in the previous election."
139 Witte (1989) has argued, "Tax reform is most likely to be successful the more insulated
the political process is from public pressures. This applies to actions in both Treasury and
in Congress." Though little noticed (except, for example, by Witte, [1989]), it is worth noting
that some of the same techniques used by Rostenkowski and Packwood were used in the
preparation of Treasury I. Treasury Secretary Donald Regan met with only a small group
of high-level political appointees to discuss the proposals, which were not shared even with
the White House until after they had been finalized. Besides allowing the President to
distance himself from the proposals if they should prove to be politically unacceptable, this
strategy minimized the possibility that the reform package would be leaked by members of
the White House staff unsympathetic to tax reform and picked to pieces. On this, see
Birnbaum and Murray (1987), chapter 3.

140 Another important ploy was utilized by Rostenkowski in dealing with the Ways and
Means Committee; beginning debate from a set of "staff options" (subsequently identified
as "Rostenkowski’s plan") rather than from current law meant that tie votes resulted in
approval of proposed changes, rather than retention of current law. See Birnbaum and
Murray (1987), 123-24. In effect the same strategy was used in the Senate Finance
Committee, once Packwood developed the "27% solution."
141 Birnbaum and Murray (1987), 161-75, 237, and 253-83, noted by Verdier (1988).

142 Witte (1989).
143 Quoted in Birnbaum and Murray (1987), 260.
144 Quoted in Strahan (forthcoming, 1990), chapter 7.
145 Birnbaum and Murray (1987), 229, 237. Rudder (1989), 242, calls the requirement of
revenue neutrality a "critical parameter." This brief discussion is not intended to be a
comprehensive explanation of why and how the Tax Reform Act of 1986 became law,
despite all odds. On that topic, including the use of techniques devised to overcome the
limitations of the good-government reforms, see, for example, Birnbaum and Murray (1987),
Verdier (1988), Witte (1989), Conlan, Beam, and Wrightson (1989), and Strahan
(forthcoming, 1990) and sources cited therein.
146 Verdier (1988) notes the observation by Congressman Barney Frank (D-Mass.) that
these rules help members make the transition from voting No to voting Yes.

147 Bittker (1987), 50, quoted in Doernberg and McChesney (1987), 903, note 61.
According to Witte (1989), there were 682 transition rules. For a nearly complete list of
transition rules identifying both beneficiaries and estimated revenue costs, see "Conference
Agreement Transition Rules and Beneficiaries," 1986. Birnbaum and Murray (1987), 240,
note, "The mere volume of these special handouts in the Senate alone also was unique at
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a staggering $5.5 billion." Official estimates of the cost of transition rules in the final Act
place the figure at somewhat in excess of $10 billion.

148 Birnbaum and Murray (1987), 240. Birnbaum and Murray, (241), cite the following
examples of specifically targeted transition rules: "an automobile manufacturer that was
incorporated in Delaware on October 13, 1916" (General Motors) and "a mass-commuting
facility that provides access to an international airport" (Dulles).
149 Simon (1989)

150 Handler (1987), 1263)

151 Handler (1987), 1262.
152 Handler (1987), 1263.
153 Quoted in Federal Tax Association (1988), 1583.
154 Handler (1987), 1266.
155 These figures are cited by Merrill, Collender, and Cook (1989).

156 Strahan (forthcoming, 1990), chapter 7.
157 Leonard (1988), 974. In a similar vein, Chapoton (1990) writes, "..presently the joint
Committee Staff, like the other staffs, is very restricted in its latitude for simplification,
given the need to maximize the revenue impact of virtually all amendments with which it
is presented."

158 Leonard (1988), 978.
159 Budget of the United States Government. Fiscal Year 1990, 4-4.

160 Federal Bar Association (1988), 1583.
161 Bob Shapiro, former Chief of Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, has noted that
in the 1960s revenue estimates were not even made until the committees had made their
decisions; they were not even mentioned in markup. See "Panel Discussion" (1979), 274,
quoted in Federal Bar Association (1988), 1582.

162 Teuber (1986b), 882.
163 Teuber (1986a), 699.

164 Handler, (1987), 1263-4.
165 Simons (1988), 633.
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166 Thus, for example, whether the measurement of income should be adjusted for inflation
would depend on the expected rate of inflation, the ability of the private sector and the IRS
to deal with inflation adjustment, and the harm to equity and economic efficiency that
would result from not adjusting for inflation.

167 As section III should make clear, the author is not a fan of tax expenditures. But the
Congress is. Given that, one can hardly argue with Simon’s assertion ([1988], 627) that
"the integration of tax lawmaking into the budget process is appropriate." This is not the
place to discuss how the level and nature of tax expenditures should be determined. On
this, see Surrey (1973) and Surrey and McDaniel (1985) and references therein.
168 A decision might, of course, be made to raise additional revenues from sources other
than the income tax. This complication is not considered further.
169 On the role and present practice of revenue estimators, see Teuber (1986a) and
(1986b). This issue is not pursued further in this paper.

170 Thus Merrill, Collender, and Cook (1989), writing about the results of a revenue-driven
process, have noted, "Traditional tax policy objectives, such as equity and efficiency, may
not have suffered." I am tempted to quote David Brockway’s eloquent comments on this
part of an earlier draft; I will, however, defer to him in his role as a discussant.
171 This discussion reflects correspondence with James Verdier.

172 Verdier, in correspondence with the author, notes, "E.E. Schattsneider’s political science
classic, The Semi-Sovereign People...notes that much political conflict can best be
understood as an effort by each side to widen or narrow the scope of conflict in ways that
serve its particular interests. ... What the budget process has done in the 1980s is to force
tax policy repeatedly onto the legislative agenda, and always in a context in which
revenue-raising concerns dominate all others."
173 In a comparative analysis of tax policy in Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United
States, Steinmo (1989), 505, 510, 511, and 515, has made the following observations:
[O]ne of the major distinguishing characteristics of the American tax system
is the huge number and amount of tax expenditures that complicate the tax
code. ... [N]o other tax system comes close to being as particularistic and as
complex. ... The U.S. tax system is not littered with these special amendments
because tax policy makers feel that it is a good way to write tax law. ...
Madison’s fragmented institutions provide a profoundly important variable for
explaining the complexity, low revenue yield, and ultimately the distribution
of effective tax in the United States. The diffusion of political authority and
responsibility, and consequent openness to particularistic demands, has
encouraged policy activists to pursue their objectives via narrow interest group
organizations and to define their objectives as narrowly as possible. Lacking
central authority to which to defer, politicians are uniquely vulnerable to
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these particularistic demands. Since no one is in control, accountability is
missing, and it becomes nearly impossible for politicians, interest groups, and
bureaucrats to pursue long-range objectives.

While one might agree with Steinmo’s basic premise about why tax expenditures are
enacted in the United States, it should be noted that the tax laws of foreign
countries are not as lily white as he seems to believe; see McDaniel and Surrey
(1985).

174 Thus it stops short of considering such unlikely changes in the method of governance
as adopting a parliamentary system of the type found in the United Kingdom. It is,
however, worth noting the conclusion of Steinmo (1989) that tax policy is subject to much
greater swings and to greater incoherence (but not complexity) in the United Kingdom than
in either the United States or Sweden.
175 Rudder (1983), 213. This softens the apparently contradictory view expressed by Rudder
in the immediately preceding paragraph, "Rules and procedures are no substitute for
political will. If members have no desire to preserve the integrity of the tax code, it is
unlikely that procedural changes would measurably improve the situation." Improved rules
and procedures may force somewhat greater responsibility. Writing in 1983, Rudder
(213-16) seems to overstate the power of the 1974

Budget Act as "a new source of responsibility." She focuses primarily on the amount
of revenue raised under the gun of reconciliation and the advantage of forcing
members to make "specific trade-offs between one tax expenditure and another," to
the virtual exclusion of consideration of the complexity of the resulting legislation.
176 For a similar proposal, see Shapiro (1990). For a contrary view, see Mattson (1990),
who argues, "To require simplification to be directly tied into a revenue-raising bill has the
result of being ‘ground-ruled’ into complexity. Simplification then becomes merely a
stalking horse for a tax increase."
177 Handler (1987), 1267.
178 One commentator on an earlier draft of this paper has expressed this as follows: "[T]he
need for additional revenue (and the prohibition against raising rates) has forced legislators
to adopt reforms they never would have considered otherwise. After all, the tax base was
eroded during years when the Congress paid little or no attention to revenue effects of tax
provisions. I do not think we would have had the base broadening that has occurred during
the 1980s without the budget crunch."

179 Witte (1986), 381.
180 Simon (1989).

181 We do not consider proposals that bipartisan commissions be employed to bring
rationality to the process of formulating tax policy. See, however, Reese (1986). Such
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proposals seem to be aimed primarily at the achievement of substantive reform, rather than
simplification, per se.
182 Chapoton (1990).
183 In this regard it is instructive to quote from Federalist 10: "The apportionment of taxes
on the various descriptions of property is an act which seems to require the most exact
impartiality." (Quoted in Steinmo [1989], 511.)
184 Simon (1989).
185 On this question, see the insightful discussion by Surrey (1970).
186 Recent experience at the Department of Housing and Urban Development is also
worth remembering.
187 John Nolan noted at the AICPA/ABA conference on simplification that the Office of
Industrial Economics was not able to withstand such pressure under the Asset Depreciation
Range System.

188 Chapoton (1990). See also Hickman’s comments on Chapoton’s paper for the same
point.
189 See Doernberg and McChesney (1987a) and (1987b) for development of the view that
members of the tax committees are essentially engaged in contracts with supporters for
whom they attempt to gain favorable legislation.

190 I am grateful to James Verdier for comments that outline the line of reasoning pursued
in this subsection.
191 This is not to say that I believe we will soon solve the deficit problem. The discussion
that follows accepts the hypothesis that we may do so and examines its implications.
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COMMENT ON THE "BUDGET PROCESS
AND TAX SIMPLIFICATION/COMPLICATION"

DAVID F. BRADFORD
*

Charlie McLure has covered a lot of ground in his stimulating paper. As he makes
clear, the increase in income tax complexity has occurred simultaneously with several
political trends. Among those are the breakdown of old political power organizations and
the evolution of budgetary institutions and contexts. One can also impute, as Charlie does,
various logical connections, if not causal ones, between the changing conditions (the
revenue-neutrality constraint on tax bills, for example) and the complexity that has been
generated. The paper led me to the conclusion, though, that there is no particularly
compelling link in principle between the annual budget policy cycle and an increasingly
complex tax law.
Indeed, Charlie’s paradigm for the making of tax law is the persuasive reason the
budgetary process per se (as opposed to the policies and capabilities of the people working
through the process) cannot be blamed for the increasing complexity. His paradigm is the
traditional reform ideal: First define the base, January 5, 1990; then determine the rates
necessary to generate the required revenue. This concept apparently governed the 1986 tax
reform to which he contributed so much. But in actual experience tax law is not shaped
in this way. Rather, a peculiar reverse principle seems to apply: First set the rates, then
define the base to generate the required revenue.

Charlie’s description leads me to assign the blame for increasing complexity not on
weaknesses in the budget process (in terms of its annual cycle, deficit limits, reconciliation,
*David F. Bradford is Professor of Economics and Public Affairs at Princeton
University, having joined the Princeton faculty in 1966. He is currently Associate Dean of
the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs and directs the John M.
Olin Program for the Study of Economic Organization and Public Policy. He has also, since
1977, been a Research Associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research and
director of the Bureau’s Tax Program. Professor Bradford’s research has centered on
public finance and he is particularly noted as an authority on taxation. His 1986 book,
Untangling the Income Tax (Harvard University Press), provides a comprehensive review
of income taxes and their alternatives, including consumption taxes.
Professor Bradford has served as a consultant to a variety of governmental agencies
and businesses. His nonacademic experience includes a stint as Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Tax Policy in the Department of the Treasury, during which he directed a study resulting
in a published volume, Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform, (2nd ed., Tax Analysts, 1984), that
is widely regarded as the forerunner of the major U.S. income tax reform enacted in 1986.
Professor Bradford graduated from Amherst College (B.A. 1960) and holds advanced
degrees from Harvard University (M.S. 1962) and Stanford University (Ph.D. in Economics
1966).
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etc.) but on the inadequacy of the budgetary language. The "backwards" approach to tax
policy that I have just described illustrates the inadequacy. To put the point in general
terms, our budgetary language obliges us to work under constraints that are grossly
incomplete as descriptions of the underlying reality.

In the instance of tax reform, the constraints took the form of prescribed tax rates.
Such parameters taken by themselves impose no true economic limits, because they fall well
short of specifying policy. But to accomplish the objectives of policy within such
constraints-- let me call them "nominal" constraints-may require complex rules. For
example, to increase revenue under a nominal constraint of a fixed schedule of rates, we
must resort to "cats and dogs," to substitute effective rate increases for a simple adjustment
of the nominal schedule.

Budget Director Darman’s famous "looks like a duck, quacks like a duck" method
of identifying taxes is a wonderful instance in the present context of what I am talking
about. The problem is that ducks in the minds of the population or policymakers are not
well-defined economic animals.

Let me illustrate the matter with my secret plan for eliminating the budget deficit
without raising taxes and without jeopardizing any of our spending priorities.1 Step 1 of the
Bradford plan is to cut the weapons procurement appropriation to zero. Step 2, designed
to offset any negative impact on defense readiness, calls for the enactment of a new
"weapons supply tax credit" (WSTC). To qualify for the WSTC, manufacturers will sign
appropriate documents prescribed by the secretary of defense and deliver to the appropriate
depots weapons of specified characteristics (namely, those previously specified under
procurement contracts). The WSTC might under other circumstances be thought of as
payment for goods and services rendered, but in this case the amount of the credit can be
used only in payment of income tax. Step 2 is, of course, a tax cut.

Taken by themselves, steps 1 and 2 result in equal cuts in spending and taxes. But
a time of budget deficit is a time to be cutting spending while holding the line on taxes.
Step 3 of the Bradford Plan, then, rounds out the tax program into a revenue-neutral
"reform" by eliminating the taxation of interest receipts and the deductibility of interest
payments (including cap health insurance and all social security benefits in the income tax)
eliminating the deduction for state and local taxes for individuals, limiting benefit payments
out of qualified retirement plans to $25,000 per year (with any excess subject to a penalty
of 10 percent), and introducing a toll charge in lieu of dividend taxes on nondividend
distributions by corporations. (Lest there be any doubt, all the details are made up.)
It is evident that the Bradford Plan, or something like it, would permit us to
accomplish, in the guise of a program of apparent spending cuts and revenue-neutral tax
reform, what we here would call a tax increase sufficient to eliminate the budget deficit.
It may be thought that no one would be taken in by this budgetary slight of hand. But the
basic logic of the plan is very close to what one sees in actual budget politics. Furthermore,
I believe the description accurately conveys why the Bradford Plan, if actually implemented,
would be recorded under existing budgetary conventions.
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Note especially that steps 1 and 2 would change the budget numbers dramatically.
The accounts would show a big cut in spending and a big cut in taxes. But the underlying
economic reality would be absolutely unchanged. Everyone would be getting paid the same;
the same weapons would be getting produced; the same programs would be going on in
every real sense.

Arbitrariness between what is a spending program and what is a tax program is not
confined to manipulations that leave the balance unchanged. As Kotlikoff2 has shown,
similar "relabeling" exercises can be devised to achieve any desired level of current budget
deficits without implementing any real change.)

Everyone here will recognize my secret plan as the manipulation of "tax
expenditures." Steps 1 and 2, for example, relabel the weapons program as a tax credit and
thereby reduce both spending and taxes, but they leave the deficit unchanged. What has
been labeled a revenue-neutral tax program most of us would regard as a tax increase in
disguise. But where is the duck?
Charlie implies (page 33) that part of the solution to this problem is to sharpen the
concept of tax expenditures. If what is meant is to refine the definition of the reference
income tax against which tax expenditures are measured, I would disagree. I do not think
there is an economically meaningful distinction between tax and expenditure programs as
we now use these terms. What is needed is a more radical reform of our budgetary
language.

We presently lack a budgetary language with clear, economic content. In no small
part, this lack is due to the incomplete absorption into practice of what economists know
about the equivalence of different transactions (for a simple example, lending and buying
appreciating assets). The analysis is not easy even for those with training - -1 would say
the Treasury got the analysis wrong, for example, in favoring accelerated depreciation over
investment credits as a way of offsetting the investment-discouraging effect of the income
tax. The spread of sophisticated handling of economic ideas into the wider political process
is sure to be slow.
Furthermore, beyond the areas in which there is, arguably, a body of knowledge
waiting to be applied lies a huge region in which economic analysis is simply inconclusive.
(Consider, for example, the debate over capital gains.) Nowhere is the lack of conclusions
more severe than in the analysis of the incidence of government programs and rules. Budget
policy ought to be about benefits and costs for people. But budget policy is just very hard
to figure out, and therefore it is hard to specify constraints on policy in the form "Do good
for this group and not too much bad for that group." Instead we say, "Don’t touch the tax
rates."
I am pessimistic about achieving sufficiently sophisticated and widespread knowledge
to greatly change the situation in the foreseeable future. Instead, my positive suggestion
would be to seek movement toward a system in which inadequacies of the income definition
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will do less harm and in which complexity will be concentrated among fewer taxpayers. The
program can be summarized by two operating principles: (1) Tax business (capital) income
uniformly, and (2) tax business (capital) income at source.

Uniform taxation can greatly reduce the significance of legal form (basically because
what is deducted by one taxpayer is included by another at the same tax rate), thereby
rendering complexity less important. Uniform taxation of business income would permit
adoption of the second principle, taxing business income at source. This principle, in effect,
extends our traditional method of simplification: Drop taxpayers from the tax rolls. By
drastically reducing the number of taxpayers who need to deal with complex tax rules,
taxation at source would put the problem of tax law complexity into the same category as
banking law complexity--a nuisance, perhaps costly, but not a threat to the social fabric.
These thoughts have been stimulated by Charlie’s very good paper. I hope I will
not be regarded as drifting too far from his text, and I look forward to our further
discussion.
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ENDNOTES

1 In the following, I am borrowing freely from my 1988 paper "Tax Expenditures
and the Problem of Accounting for Government,” presented at the John Deutsch
Conference on Tax Expenditures and Government Policy, Queen’s University, Kingston,
Ontario, November 17-18, 1988.

2 Lawrence J. Kotlikoff, "The Deficit Is Not a Well-Defined Measure of Fiscal
Policy," Science 241 (August 1988): 791-795.
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COMMENT ON "THE BUDGET PROCESS
AND TAX SIMPLIFICATION/COMPLICATION”

DAVID H. BROCKWAY
*

Let me say that this whole experience here is somewhat surreal to me. The notion
of attending a two-day conference of 250 tax professionals, probably the most influential
tax professionals in the country, to discuss how to simplify the tax laws, I just find difficult
to get my arms around, particularly looking out into the audience, where everybody has got
his red button on to testify to his commitment to tax simplification. To me it is somewhat
like going to a Hell’s Angels conference to talk about the decline in social graces in
America.

It was only last night at the speakers’ dinner that our moderator told me that what
we were supposed to talk about was not complexity in the tax law, but ways to get rid of
it. That was somewhat surprising to me, knowing the players in the room.
My comments really aren’t all that facetious. The fact of the matter is that to my
view, the complexity of the tax system is not something that comes out of the ether
somehow, and it does not exist because there are some wild and crazy people sitting
around, thinking up ways of how to make the tax system more and more complex: At
least outside the pension area, that is not an accurate description.

The reality is, I think, that we are the problem in this room. I don’t just mean myself
in my former role as chief of staff-Lord knows, if anybody has responsibility for the
problem, certainly I share that--but I think each and every one of you out there is part of
the problem. The reason for complexity in the tax system is that by and large it is a

*David H. Brockway is a tax partner in the New York and Washington, DC offices of
Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood. From 1983 to 1988, Mr. Brockway was the
Chief of Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation of the U.S. Congress. He joined the
Joint Committee staff in 1976 as a Legislation Attorney, subsequently serving as
International Tax Counsel and Deputy Chief of Staff.

Mr. Brockway graduated from Cornell University (B.A., 1968) and Harvard Law
School (J.D., 1971). He is a member of the New York State Bar Association, serves on the
Executive Committee of the Tax Section of the New York Bar Association, is a member
of the Advisory Group on corporation taxation appointed by the Chairman of the Ways and
Means Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures, a consultant on the American Law
Institute project on tax treaties, and a member of the Advisory Group for the American
Law Institute project on Subchapter C.
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reflection of a variety of powerful, significant forces in our society, and those forces get
expressed. The vehicle for having those forces reflected in the tax law is you. I don’t mean
to say that somebody just writes in a letter and says, "Make the system more complicated.”

Rather, you all are coming to the Hill and saying, "Change the law to benefit me;
simplify the law when it hurts someone else." But in my fifteen years up there, no one ever
came to me that I can remember--perhaps some of you can correct me if I’m wrong--and
said, "Really, you ought to simply the law in a way that adversely affects me or the interests
that I represent." It doesn’t surprise me. I mean, it would have been a little off-the-wall
if you did. But that is the nature of how we get here.
And I don’t mean that this pressure comes only from lobbyists for special interests.
It also comes from tax reformers, people who feel that it is very important that we have
horizontal and vertical equity in the tax system, that it accurately reflects income or
whatever. By and large their bias also is to put those interests ahead of simplification when
they conflict.
I think you can see my point just from looking at the papers prepared for this
conference. Those writing papers from the business community talk about, "Well, we ought
to get rid of those very complicated loophole closers that have been enacted in the last ten
years; that’s what the problem is." The tax reformers say, "Well, actually, the real problem
is that we still have R&D credit out there or what have you," and that we could repeal
those preferences, or we could get rid of the pass-through of losses through limited
partnerships, and of those changes that would limit vast areas of complication. Everybody
has just got a different view of how you do it. We all know how to simplify the law a great
deal; each one of us could do it fairly easily. It’s just that we’d all do it a different way, and
the reason it doesn’t get done is that we do have these different views, and none of us has
a majority interest.
I personally think, in contrast to the impression you get from reading a lot of the
conference papers, that these policy issues, in fact, are more important by and large than
purely the interest in simplification. The primary tax policy concern to my mind is revenue.
The whole notion that has come into vogue lately, that the problem we have is that all this
recent tax legislation focuses on revenue, absolutely boggles my mind. Try and ask yourself
what that process is about, what the tax law is about, if it is not to raise revenue. That’s
what the whole thing is about. It is not simply to come up with a variety of rules that tax
advisors can all make our livings by. The purpose of the tax system actually is to raise
revenue to fund the government, and that is the primary thing that the policy makers
happen to be thinking about, and it is the primary thing that we all think about. There is
probably no one in this room who thinks that simplification is more important than revenue,
because you can obviously accomplish total simplification by repealing all taxes. Actually,
last night at the speakers’ dinner I saw Norman Ture, and if he’s here then maybe it’s not
100 percent, but by and large, I think that it would be the shared view that at least to some
extent, revenue is more important than simplification. Most people in the room also share
the view that horizontal and vertical equity are more important. Bob Shapiro points out
that you can raise the same amount of tax in the very simple way of having a head tax.
That has been discussed for many years in the literature as a very simple way of raising

I-C-2

revenue. Nevertheless, I think that virtually everybody would reject that as an approach to
the issue. Economists by nature will tell you that the way you can simplify the whole tax
system is to have a consumption tax. I don’t really think that is going to happen. The
people who oppose shifting to a consumption tax understand it may be less complicated
than an income tax, but their real concern is the distributional effect, and they think that
that is a more serious issue than simplification. Or they may oppose arguably simpler
consumption taxes just because of their general unpopularity with the voters, who, after all,
do have some say, and, appropriately, should have some say, in how we ought to structure
our tax system.
A lot of you strongly hold the view that having the tax system promote savings and
investment, promote low-income housing, or whatever other social cause you can think of,
and so on and so forth, are, on balance, more important goals than simplification. You can’t
explain the various provisions we have in the law any other way. You cannot, for example,
say that the R&D credit is simple; it clearly is not.

You’ve got to think of the whole issue of tax simplification in the context of those
overriding policy goals. Beyond that, I think that a certain amount of the complexity is
irreducible, assuming we are going to live with the income tax system, which is my basic
assumption. We have a complex society, as Charlie points out in his paper. The
transactions that people engage in are very complex; they are far more sophisticated than
they used to be. The tax law naturally has followed that trend. In every other profession
in the business community, life is becoming far more specialized; it is perfectly natural that
the tax profession would as well. The tax law has been around for sixty-five years.
Knowledge is basically cumulative. You set up one set of rules, and people understand
those rules and figure out ways to operate around them so the rules have a different impact
than was originally intended. As a result, the laws have to be continuously amended. They
get more and more sophisticated, and people start to specialize. In the same way, science
gets more and more sophisticated, mathematics gets more and more sophisticated: It is the
natural state of affairs and not one that we can do much about.

Also, as Charlie points out, our society is very complex. Different people think we
ought to have different things--they have different self-interests, and even when they do
have similar self-interests, they often have different views about what our public policy
ought to be. In our form of government, those diverse views are reflected through a
competition of factions that leads, through our democratic process, to sets of rules that
are not totally coherent. It is very difficult for one viewpoint to command the field.
That is a trade-off we make, and to my mind it is a fairly decent trade-off. I am
much less troubled than Charlie indicates in his paper that he is, and a lot of other people
appear to be, that we do have internally inconsistent provisions in the tax law. The notion
that the policy makers are schizophrenic, I just think, totally misunderstands what is going
on.
It isn’t that the same guy is sitting there, saying, ’’Well, gee, I’d like to have fast write
off for something, and I’d also like to have the minimum tax." These are different people;
they are different interests. There is one group that says, "I want to have this tax benefit,"
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and there is another group that says the tax benefit is a lousy idea'. They either have to
compromise and come out with something that is in between and sometimes internally
inconsistent, or there is a shift in relative power from time to time, so that one has the
upper hand, and, at other times, another has the upper hand. But you can’t expect the
political process to have a uniform view and set of rules when the society that it is reflecting
doesn’t share that uniformity.

Having said that, I think simplification of the tax law is an important goal. I think
that it is impossible to look at the tax law and not come to the conclusion that it is
extraordinarily complex and also that there are many areas where you can simplify the
rules. It may be reaching a point that a number of people have talked about where the
complexity of the whole system is overwhelming both the government and the taxpayers.
I share that concern, and it may be that after we have had this major shift in the eighties
of who ends up paying the tax, which is the really big question, how you cut up the pie, that
people may have accepted this change in the relative burden of the taxes, and now we can
turn to a period of consolidation and perhaps smooth out some of the edges.
To do that, though, to get some simplification, don’t think that it is merely some
technical exercise. There are some areas where we can make some changes that nobody
particularly cares about but that are important changes, and changes along these lines have
been going on for some time. The projects last year on rationalizing the penalty rules and
the minimum tax are examples. Projects such as these have been going on for years,
instituted both as a result of interest of outside groups or self-starters on the Hill or self
starters in the Treasury and IRS. A lot more can be done. The more people view
simplification it as an important issue, the more that will be done, and I think that is an
important thing to accomplish.
But to get major simplification, somebody is going to get hurt, and somebody is going
to get helped. You can’t get around that fact. Most simplification of any significance is
going to have a substantive impact, and people are going to fight heavily about it, and in
order to get it, you all are going to have to be willing to compromise on some of your
substantive desires.

A few comments on Charlie’s paper more directly: First, I personally don’t share
the view that the budget process has a great deal to do with the increasing complexity of
the tax system or that the language of the Budget Act or, indeed, even the size of the deficit
itself has much to do with it. I think that a certain amount of the revenue-driven legislation
has increased the complexity of the tax law, and a certain amount of it has decreased it.
Where the balance comes out, I don’t know. I don’t think anybody has done a very
disciplined analysis of the question or looked through the legislation in the last decade to
assess the overall balance or to determine the extent to which the items that are
complications really don’t have much to do with the budget process. Section 89, I think,
is a good example of a complex provision that was not driven by the budget process. You
could fight about the policy, but it is not a revenue issue.

Charlie’s paper, I think, is--if you haven’t read it, you ought to read it--a great
discussion of the tax legislative process, of the development of the budget process, and of
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the nature of complication of the tax laws and a number of other issues. From my view,
the principal failing of the paper comes when he had to follow the instructions of the
moderator and tie together the two issues of the budget process and the complication of
the tax laws, because I think that the relationship is fairly tangential.
I certainly don’t think that you will have these overall changes in the political process
that Charlie recommends and that would take the legislative process away from Congress.
I personally don’t think that would be a very sensible idea. But in any event, I don’t think
it is realistic to assume that it will happen. I personally would vigorously oppose the notion
of attempting to accomplish simplification by providing in the budget process that in order
to satisfy the revenue target, the legislation can’t modify the base of the tax system but can
only increase tax rates. I think that that would be a policy disaster, and I think there is
zero evidence that that would increase the simplification of the tax law. That is like saying
that in the 1960s and 1970s, the tax law got simpler rather than more complicated. That
just simply is not true. In any event, I think that proposal is unlikely to be adopted.
I do generally support the notion that a lot of things can be delegated to Treasury.
Keep in mind, however, that a common criticism of recent legislation is that too much has
been delegated. Certainly some areas, indeed the one that Charlie cites on tuxedos, in fact
were delegated to the Treasury Department. Treasury was supposed to go out and provide
depreciable lives for assets. That was something that staff tried very hard to have done; we
got it into the legislation, and it was stripped out in 1988, I guess. But it wasn’t stripped
out by staff saying,"Look, let’s complicate the tax system," or, "Let’s take authority away
from Treasury." They wanted to send it down there. It was taken out because there were
interests out there that were affected, whether it was the noncommercial aircraft or formal
wear industries, whoever cared about it-they were the ones that wanted it out of the system
because they were worried about what Treasury was going to do. They were worried that
simplification might have increased their taxes.

As the final point, I think that it is unrealistic to look at any one party for the
solution-to look solely at Treasury, the IRS, or the Joint Committee. Certainly, I think
it is a very big mistake to think solely of the Joint Committee staff as opposed to the Hill
staff generally. I think that all of them, historically, worked actively together on this, and
they are going to continue to work on it. Everybody out here can push towards giving
simplification a greater significance. My hope is that those who get involved in the effort
try to work in bits and pieces rather than trying to do it all in one fell swoop. I do think
you can accomplish some simplification in the tax law, and I think that the test you face
really is whether that is your principal goal rather than using the banner of simplification
to accomplish some substantive political objective that you might have, in which event I
think that seeing much simplification occur is relatively less likely.
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THE ROLE OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT
IN REDUCING TAX COMPLEXITY

JOHN E. CHAPOTON
*

No one would argue with the proposition that the tax system is complex. The
question is whether the tax system is unnecessarily complex. Most people-taxpayers and
tax experts alike-would answer that question with a resounding yes.

Unanimity begins to dissipate, however, when one seeks the definition of tax
complexity, much less its causes, and views diverge widely when realistic solutions are
sought.
One solution uniformly advanced is a reduction in the frequency of tax legislation.
Without question, even the most complicated tax provision becomes more "simple" over
time; if it remains on the books unchanged, taxpayers and their advisers learn the meaning
of the provision and how it will be applied by the government. There is great truth in the
expression "An old tax is a good tax." Those responsible for tax legislation should be often
reminded that by continually amending the Code, they are adding immeasurably to its
complexity. For the purposes of this paper, however, it is assumed that the forces causing
increasingly frequent tax legislation are beyond the influence of tax professionals who can
be expected to become familiar with the ideas generated by this conference and the
contents of this paper.

There are many causes of tax complexity beyond the frequency of legislation, and tax
professionals both in and out of government, if they are motivated, can strike a blow against
these factors. This paper is an attempt to demonstrate how tax professionals in the U.S.
Department of Treasury can make a significant contribution toward reduction of tax
complexity. In my view, the Treasury’s Office of Tax Policy (OTP) offers the greatest hope
for meaningful simplification in the tax system.
* John E. Chapoton is a partner with the law firm of Vinson & Elkins in Washington,
D.C. Mr. Chapoton served as Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Tax Policy in Washington
D.C. From March 1981 to August 1984. He joined the Treasury Department staff in 1969
as Associate Tax Legislative Counsel, subsequently serving as Deputy Tax Legislative
Counsel and Tax Legislative Counsel.

Mr. Chapoton graduated from the University of Texas (B.A. 1958) and the University
of Texas School of Law (LL.B. 1960). He is a member of the Texas State Bar Association,
the Houston Bar Association, the American Bar Association Section of Taxation, the
District of Columbia Bar, and the American Law Institute.
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DEFINITION OF COMPLEXITY

Ward Hussey has defined a simple tax provision as one that is not hard to
understand in the abstract and is not hard to apply.1 He defines complex as the opposite.
This is probably the best general definition of complexity, and it is helpful to keep this
straightforward, two-pronged definition in mind. It is necessary for the purposes of this
paper, however, to be more specific and to attempt to recognize the different meanings of
complexity for different levels of taxpayers and tax professionals.
Level 1 Complexity

For taxpayers who are not self-employed, have no investments that raise tax
complexities, do not itemize deductions, and have no unusual events during the taxable year
(such as the sale of a home, a divorce, an employment-related move or retirement), the tax
system really is not unduly complex. Admittedly, to the taxpayer who confronts it once a
year, the income tax return is still a formidable document.
Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to expect such a taxpayer to be able to complete his
own return, reporting his wages and relatively small amounts of interest and perhaps
dividend income. Completion of the form is not a pleasant chore, even for this type of
return, but with repetition it can become a relatively simple task (complicated, of course,
by changes in the law, which require changes in the forms). For purposes of this discussion,
complexity with respect to these taxpayers who might reasonably be expected to complete
their own tax returns will be referred to as "level 1" complexity.
Level 2 Complexity

For taxpayers who itemize deductions, invest in partnerships, or have unusual tax
events during the year (excessive medical expenses, casualty losses, a sale of property, the
necessity of claiming an income tax credit, etc.) the tax system becomes considerably more
complex. If the taxpayer is self-employed, the level of complexity is increased significantly.
For such taxpayers some understanding of income tax jargon and concepts is required to
gather the proper information and compute taxable income and tax liability for the year.
Complexity with respect to these taxpayers will be referred to as "Level 2" complexity.

Government officials developing legislation, regulations, and the income tax forms
to be used by taxpayers facing this degree of complexity may reasonably assume that such
taxpayers will receive some professional assistance in completing their income tax return.
It is important to note, however, that the overwhelming majority of taxpayers who address
level 2 complexities generally do not engage in any substantive tax planning. They rarely
engage in, or refrain from engaging in, a particular transaction or activity because of the
tax consequences, or tax uncertainty, it presents; tax complexity for them is primarily the
difficulty of accounting to the government after the fact.
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Level 3 Complexity

Taxpayers who seek tax assistance in planning business, financial, and personal
transactions and events-which includes most medium-sized and large business
taxpayers--face an entirely different type of complexity in the tax system. For such
taxpayers, complexity means either lack of certainty in the tax rules or that a satisfactory
level of certainty can be achieved only at excessive cost. For such taxpayers the significant
problem is ascertaining the rules of the game in advance with an acceptable degree of
certainty and at a reasonable cost. Where the rules are not clear, or can be determined
only by time-consuming and expensive professional assistance, the rules are said to be too
"complex.” Tax complexity facing this most sophisticated category of taxpayers
is referred to in this discussion as "level 3" complexity.

It is obvious that virtually all anti-abuse amendments to the Code are aimed at level
3 taxpayers, those who seek advice before engaging in a transaction. Unfortunately, few of
the anti-abuse provisions we have seen adopted over the last several years successfully
employ any technique to limit their scope to this category of taxpayers, thus imposing
unnecessary complexity on other levels of taxpayers.
SOURCES OF COMPLEXITY IN THE TAX LEGISLATIVE PROCESS

All of us who have worked with the tax legislative and regulatory process can point
an accusing finger at a number of factors inherent in the process that contribute to its
confusing state. I would list the following.
Frequency of Legislation

As discussed earlier, too much tax legislation enacted too often is clearly a major
enemy in the war against complexity; unfortunately, this factor is also beyond the influence
of the audience to which this paper is directed.
Speed of the Legislative Process

The orderly tax legislative process that existed in the 1960s and into the 1970s has
been replaced with a chaotic system that often adopts major changes overnight with no
opportunity for thoughtful analysis or input from professional groups or academia and little
time for the staffs to consider all of the ramifications of the changes. Errors are inevitable
in such a process, and the thought and time required to reduce complexity is a luxury that
is simply not available.
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Lack of Effort

The tax professionals involved in the legislative process do not expend meaningful
effort to seek simpler concepts and rules as new legislation is developed. Staff devotion is
to conceptual purity and breadth over ease of comprehension and application, with the
following results:
1.

New concepts and new rules are devised when existing provisions might be
utilized. Time constraints do not permit those who have the technical abilities
to complete a thorough analysis of the consequences of adoption of a new
concept.

2.

There is little effort to confine the scope of a new provision, often because
of concerns that such limitations would necessarily be arbitrary and thus
conceptually unsupportable or that the limitations might miss the mark,
excluding some taxpayers who should be included.

Lack of a Constituency

There is generally no constituency for simplicity in the tax legislative process. It
does not exist to any meaningful degree at the elected-official level, the appointed-official
level, or the staff level. Each of the parties involved in the legislative and regulatory
process must respond to other demands (increased revenue, political considerations,
correctness, prevention of abuse, etc.) that override any concern for the complexity caused
by a particular proposal.
Diffusion of Responsibility

The legislative process diffuses responsibility for the adoption of new, complex rules
among a number of offices within the government. The result is that no single office or
individual is charged with, or accepts accountability for, the complexity of tax legislation.
Impact on Tax Forms Ignored

Insufficient time is devoted during the development of new concepts and rules to the
impact of such changes on the income tax forms and on the individual taxpayers or
professionals who must complete the forms.
Revenue

Since 1981 an overriding consideration in any tax legislation has been its impact on
federal revenues. The need to maximize revenues from complex, technical changes has
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tended to expand the breadth of such changes, and the need to minimize revenue loss in
correcting policy errors has prevented or limited corrective action.
It would be difficult to obtain a consensus on the relative amount of blame to be
accorded these factors, but I believe most tax professionals would agree that each of the
factors listed (and others that could be added) is a significant contributor to complexity in
the tax system. Since all of these factors with the exception of the first two-frequency of
tax legislation and speed of the legislative process-are to some degree within the control
of tax professionals (in and out of government), there is certainly reason to think that
complexity could be reduced if these flaws in the process were seriously addressed.

These flaws will not be dealt with in a meaningful way, however, unless individuals
having leadership roles in the process are motivated to implement changes to reduce tax
complexity. Like the weather, everyone in the tax business talks about complexity, but no
one does anything about it. No one in a position to take steps to change the process is
motivated to do so. It is submitted that lack of motivation is due in large part to the
absence of accountability for complexity.
It is the premise of this paper that responsibility for minimizing complexity should
be fixed on the OTP in the Treasury Department. The basis for that conclusion, together
with suggested changes that could be adopted by the OTP to address the causes of tax
complexity, is the subject of this paper.

TREASURY’S OFFICE OF TAX POLICY SHOULD ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY
FOR REDUCING INCOME TAX COMPLEXITY

It is obvious that the OTP plays a key role in the tax legislative process. On the
specific subject of reducing income tax complexity, however, its role is-or should bepivotal. The other participants in the legislative process lack either sufficient interest in
simplification or sufficient influence over the process.
Members of the Tax-Writing Committees

Congressmen and senators on the tax-writing committees can quite properly be
criticized for the frequency of tax legislation, the speed of the legislative process, and the
tremendous complexity these factors impose on the tax system for all levels of taxpayers.
Additional publicity about the complexity and confusion resulting from frequent tax
legislation would certainly be desirable and might stem the tide eventually. It is not correct,
however, to indict the members of the tax-writing committees for the internal complexity
of the rules they adopt. The members should and must rely on their staffs with respect to
technical matters, and reducing complexity is a technical undertaking.
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Members cannot realistically be expected to react to the complexity problem in a
meaningful way unless and until it becomes a political issue accompanied by some political
accountability. If that were to occur, which seems unlikely at present, the members would
be motivated to direct their staffs to produce less complex provisions even at the cost of
more arbitrary and less comprehensive rules; such instructions would contribute significantly
to simplification. It is not within the power of the tax professionals to whom this paper is
addressed to bring about such a change, however.

The tax staffs of individual members should be classified for these purposes with
the members they serve. They are often very competent technicians and thus may have the
ability to address complexity issues, but their first duty is to carry out the specific goals of
their members, and as indicated, simplification will not be one of those primary goals.
Tax-Writing Staffs

The House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee are
each served by very able technical tax staffs who develop legislative proposals of interest
to their members. These staffs must be regarded as partially responsible for unnecessarily
complex tax laws. It is difficult, however, to place primary responsibility here; they, like the
personal tax staffs of individual members, must first serve the views of the committee
members (particularly the committee chairman or ranking member, as the case may be),
and thus considerations will be imposed upon them that will outweigh concerns for
complexity.2
Joint Committee Staff

The Joint Committee staff is clearly a responsible participant in the creation of tax
complexity. Indeed one might argue that this staff and its chief of staff bear almost equal
responsibility with the Treasury’s OTP for failure to alter complex amendments and to
implement changes in its procedures to foster simplification. However, unlike the Assistant
Secretary for Tax Policy, the chief of staff functions more as a staff member than as a
principal in the legislative process; consequently, he is less able to initiate or insist upon
action that would reduce complexity. In addition, the Joint Committee staff, like the other
staffs, is very restricted in its latitude for simplification, given the need to maximize the
revenue impact of virtually all tax amendments with which it is presented.3

Private Sector Tax Professionals

Members of the tax bar and the tax accounting profession in the private sector can
make significant, though less direct, contributions toward combating complexity in the tax
law. They have the technical ability to identify complexity and to develop solutions or
avoidance techniques. Unfortunately, the speed of the tax legislative process over the last
decade has made it difficult for private sector tax professionals to have a meaningful impact,
especially since they often do not see statutory language until the legislative process is
almost completed.
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Probably the most meaningful contribution private sector tax professionals can make
is to identify particular existing areas of unnecessary complexity and suggest solutions, thus
increasing awareness of specific problems. On a more comprehensive basis, conferences
such as this can obviously suggest substantive solutions for review by government tax
professionals and can spotlight process changes that should be considered.
Private tax professional groups should also continue to stress that complexity is
exacerbated by the frequency of tax legislation, with the hope that taxpayer groups and
individual taxpayers will begin to focus on that fact and communicate their objections in
political terms to their elected representatives.

Tax Lobbyists

Although tax lobbyists are significant participants in the tax legislative process, they
will not be motivated to address complexity issues. To be convinced of that, one need
only conjure up the possibility of advising a client or company chairman that the legislative
change sought was obtainable but it would have added too much complexity to the Internal
Revenue Code.
Office of Tax Policy

Responsibility for addressing the complexity problem should be placed in the
Treasury’s OTP because of the limitations on the effectiveness of the other participants in
tax legislation, if for no other reason. The Executive Branch, generally speaking, is
expected, and has the capability, to initiate legislative changes. The Treasury Department
certainly has the resources to analyze both the theoretical and practical impact of tax
change simplification.

From the technical standpoint, the OTP plays a major role in the early stages of
development of all tax legislation. This is obviously so with respect to proposals made by
the Administration; however, even with respect to tax legislation initiated by individual
congressmen and senators or the Joint Committee staff, Treasury’s views are always sought
informally and through the hearing process.

In addition, the Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy has almost complete independence
in dealing with tax policy issues of a technical nature. No other office within the Executive
Branch will have any significant interest in or influence over the type of technical policy
issues that are raised by most efforts to reduce tax complexity. Thus no other office would
likely express opposition to restrictions on legislative proposals intended to make the
proposed legislation less complex. By the same token, no other office could be expected
to initiate tax change simplification. In brief, responsibility falls on the Assistant Secretary
for Tax Policy, since no one above him will have the necessary technical expertise or
interest, and no one below him will have sufficient authority.
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In addition, the OTP can, with the cooperation of the IRS, develop complete
information on the impact of tax law changes on the forms, return preparers, and the
administrative process of providing interpretative guidance through regulations, rulings,
and announcements. The regulations process itself is the joint responsibility of the OTP
and the IRS and is thus within the direct control of these offices for purposes of
coordinating with the regulatory process the simplification of legislative changes.

It is submitted that this conference would be considered a success if we agreed on
only one thing: Principal responsibility and accountability for reducing complexity in the
tax system should be placed on the Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy. With accountability
thus "publicly" pinpointed, the occupant of that office and his staff would feel the necessity
of addressing complexity issues in the legislative process and in public forums. Public
explanations of efforts to reduce complexity (or the failure to do so) would be subject to
analysis and criticism by the tax community. The result would be that an important
participant in the tax legislative process would be motivated to reduce complexity and, one
hopes, complexity would gain an important constituency.
Recommended Actions to be Taken by The office of Tax Policy to Reduce Tax Complexity

Motivating the Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy institutionally to become seriously
committed to reducing complexity is essential if the OTP is to carry the lead role in the
simplification effort; as already indicated, that office must carry the lead role.

Designation of a "Simplification Czar"
Just as the responsibility among the participants in the legislative process should be
focused on the Assistant Secretary, the responsibility for overseeing reduction of complexity
within the OTP should be pinpointed. It is not sufficient for the concept of "simplicity" to
be articulated as an office policy (but then have that effort diffused by making it the
responsibility of individual staff members working on the various legislative projects in the
office). History clearly teaches us that conceptual purity and comprehensiveness will win
the hearts of the able individuals who-develop technical policy rules; simpler, less precise
rules will not as quickly capture their enthusiasm. Thus, responsibility for reducing
complexity must be directly placed within the OTP, and it must be accompanied by
authority sufficient to achieve its purpose.

It would not be necessary for the selected individual to be of a senior rank in the
OTP, but it would be essential that he or she be an experienced tax professional who is
well-respected within the OTP. The essential points are that the job of overseeing the
simplification effort within OTP be made a prestigious one and that the effort not become
an additional layer of bureaucracy. Ideally, the individual would be an energetic,
well-respected tax professional who would also carry on other substantive projects within
the OTP. The individual would need the full support of the Assistant Secretary and the
Deputy Assistant Secretaries. Finally, it is probably essential that the individual be a lawyer
rather than an economist because of the technical drafting skills needed.
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Development of a "Hypothetical" Proposal for Reducing Complexity in the Existing Code

Under the direction of the simplification czar, who I shall refer to as the "director
of simplification," the OTP should commence a "hypothetical" program for reducing
complexity in the existing Internal Revenue Code. This program should not have the
impossible goal of designing an entirely new and less complex Code; the magnitude of such
a task would be overwhelming, the project would then be classified as a "study," and the
entire program would be gradually nudged to the back burner. Instead, the hypothetical
simplification program should focus on the development of techniques for simplifying
specific areas of the existing Code. It should involve a substantial effort, requiring the OTP
to commit meaningful resources to it. Moreover, the simplification program should be
given full publicity outside of Treasury, including a public description of the specific
proposals developed, except where they might cause political embarrassment for the
administration then in office (which could have a decidedly negative effect on the entire
effort).

The simplification program should be hypothetical only in the sense that no prior
decision will have been made to proffer any of the proposals it develops as part of a
Treasury legislative program. The OTP director of simplification and the staff working
on this program should not be inhibited by political reality (or the lack thereof) or even
by the revenue consequences of their simplification efforts. They should, however, have
authority from the Assistant Secretary to seek and obtain estimates of the revenue impact
of their proposal, because revenue information is a helpful analytical tool.
The purposes of this "hypothetical" program would be twofold:
1.

Credibility. It should be designed to give the simplification effort intellectual
credibility within the OTP, and the position of simplification director prestige.
To accomplish that, it must be an intellectually challenging exercise and not
just a bureaucratic drag on the tremendous demands already imposed on the
staff in that office.

2.

Development of simplification techniques. It should seek methods and
techniques to reduce tax complexity in many contexts. In working on
simplification proposals for portions of the existing Code, techniques will
necessarily be developed that can be applied to future legislation.

A spin-off benefit of the program would be that the OTP would then have specific
proposals on the shelf for simplification of the reviewed Code provisions should the
opportunity, politically and fiscally, for reducing complexity be presented at some future
date. This should not be regarded, however, as the primary purpose of the effort; the
possibility of Treasury actually presenting significant simplification proposals as a package
would be remote, since it would likely lose revenue and win few political friends. As
mentioned, to impose political reality as a consideration would inhibit this effort.

With the stated purposes of this simplification program in mind, the first task of the
program should be to develop (1) a plan specifying what areas of the Code will be
I-D-9

addressed initially and (2) a timetable for completion of the effort. The timetable should
call for specific proposals not later than six months after the effort is initiated, so that a
concrete work product will be in hand within a foreseeable time frame. (Additional
projects can of course be added after completion of the first phase, but the important
benefits from the hypothetical simplification program would come from the initial phase.)
The effort should be specific and comprehensive with respect to the portions of the Code
attacked, yielding detailed proposals for their simplification.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the substantive areas that should be
addressed in this initial phase of the OTP’s hypothetical simplification program. I would
suggest, however, that a guide be the previously quoted principal, ”An old tax is a good tax."
There are certainly ample new tax provisions that many would regard as "bad" taxes if
complexity were the test.

I would list the following areas as prime candidates for the hypothetical
simplification project: the corporate alternative minimum tax, the passive activity loss rules,
the uniform capitalization provisions, and the time-value-of-money rules (sections 483,
1271-1288, and 7872 of the Code).4 Each of these sets of rules is complex to the point
that serious doubt of raised that they can and will be applied properly and evenly by the
Service. They epitomize the frequently expressed concern that the law intended by the
Congress and the law applied in the field are different sets of rules.
Simplification Techniques

One direct benefit that could be expected from the hypothetical simplification
program described previously would be the development of various techniques that could
serve as a reservoir of ideas to be used in future simplification efforts. I will not discuss
in detail the types of simplification techniques that might be considered in the OTP’s
simplification program, but a review of the literature on tax simplification clearly indicates
that some techniques deserve consideration in the practical laboratory that the OTP’s
hypothetical program should represent.

In developing such techniques, it is important that Treasury bear in mind that
complexity should be measured by reference to the taxpayers to whom the proposal is
intended to apply. In that exercise, it is submitted that the focus should be on the levels
used in defining complexity at the beginning of this paper.
With respect to level 1 complexity, the objective is to prevent, to the extent possible,
level 1 individuals from becoming level 2 individuals (that is, those who will need
professional assistance in preparing their returns). In that regard, it should be noted that
level 1 complexity has been addressed with a considerable degree of success over the years.
For example, the short Form 1040 (both 1040A and 1040EZ), increases in the standard
deduction, reduction in allowable personal deductions, painstaking attempts to bring
withholding as close as possible to actual tax liability, comprehensive third-party information
reporting, and many other changes have contributed to a much simplified tax reporting and
payment process for a substantial number of taxpayers. While frequent changes in the tax
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laws are the main culprit for level 1 taxpayers, a constituency for level 1 simplification
currently exists in the legislative process. This appears to be the result of the true
"grassroots" concerns of our elected officials that the tax laws need to be simplified
whenever possible for the vast majority of their constituents. Thus, it is submitted that level
1 complexity is generally not the principal problem we should be addressing.

Our main simplification efforts should be focused on level 2 and level 3 complexity.
In this context simplification has two broad facets: Simplification is achieved to the extent
that it is successful in preventing level 2 taxpayers and their return preparers from having
to deal with complex provisions aimed at level 3 taxpayers; simplification is also achieved
to the extent that it is successful in minimizing the costs to level 3 taxpayers of obtaining
"certainty" with respect to the tax law treatment of their past and future dealings. The
techniques described below (and others developed by Treasury as part of its "hypothetical"
simplification program) can be used to address simplification within this framework.
Dollar Thresholds
The idea of dollar thresholds for anti-abuse or other restrictive rules is an established
technique that is well suited for limiting level 2 complexity (that is, relieving level 2
taxpayers and their tax-return preparers from the burden of dealing with provisions aimed
primarily at level 3 taxpayers). It appears, however, that in general, such thresholds have
been too restrictive. The drafters have erred on the side of making the anti-abuse proposal
more comprehensive. Just as important, these types of thresholds have usually been
individualized to each specific Code section so that each must be separately learned, along
with its limitations. For example, working through the "layered" exceptions for the
applicability of the original issue discount rules of section 1272, versus the deferred payment
rules of section 483, versus the below-market interest loan provisions of section 7872, is a
feat in itself; but once learned, these exceptions are of no assistance in determining the
applicability of other rules (such as the passive activity loss or at-risk rules) which have their
own specific exceptions.
Consideration must be given to much more ambitious exclusions from such
complicated anti-abuse rules. For example a high-dollar, per-transaction exclusion from
all of the time-value-of-money provisions (sections 483, 1272, and 7872) could be provided
without exception. In other circumstances where it is not appropriate to provide universal
rules, it would seem appropriate, at a minimum, to present the threshold and other
exceptions in a uniform fashion (that is, by placing such exceptions in the same place from
section to section).

Another technique that should be considered is exclusion of a taxpayer from
applicability of enumerated anti-abuse provisions of the Code based on the gross income
of the taxpayer. For example, making many of the more complex provisions simply
inapplicable with respect to taxpayers whose gross income does not exceed $75,000 would
provide much needed certainty to the vast majority of taxpayers.

Such broad exclusions would, of course, reduce revenues, and that will always be a
problem in today’s budget-driven revenue packages. Such rules would also exclude some
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taxpayers from the ambit of these anti-abuse provisions even though on an individual basis
the particular taxpayer should be subjected to them (that is, it will make the rule less
conceptually pure). Thus, there may also be some '’psychological” cost to the extent such
taxpayers would be thought to have beaten the system. All of those concerns, however,
would seem outweighed by the understandability of these Code provisions that would result
as they relate to the vast majority to taxpayers.

In addition, the application of many of the anti-abuse provisions should in concept
be confined to taxpayers whose behavior can be affected (that is, primarily level 3
taxpayers), as contrasted with taxpayers who simply learn the rules (or whose tax return
preparer learns the rules) at the end of the year when they are accounting for their
activities in preparing their income tax returns. Anti-abuse rules should be directed toward
taxpayers who engage in transactions, or who restructure transactions, to take advantage of
benefits offered under the general tax rules; there is little reason in terms of policy for
visiting the complexity that such rules represent on taxpayers who would not be expected
to consult advisers in advance of a particular transaction. The better policy would be to
exclude them, even if to do so means also excepting some other taxpayers who are engaging
in such planning. To accomplish this would require thoughtful analysis of the particular
abuse that is being addressed, so that exceptions and exclusions could be tailored to that
particular provision. The objective in each instance, however, would be to provide
bright-line rules excepting those taxpayers who would not be expected to engage in that type
of tax planning.
"Horizontal" vs. "Vertical" Drafting

Ward Hussey has suggested that significant simplification could be obtained in the
statute itself by the use of what he labeled "horizontal drafting."5 He described chapter 1
of the Code as a typical example of "vertical drafting": One substantive area of the income
tax laws is dealt with in depth in one subchapter. Matters relating to corporations are
found in subchapter C, matters relating to estates and trusts in subchapter J, and matters
relating to partnerships in subchapter K, even though many of the principles applying to
these different types of taxable entities are the same. The principles are simply repeated,
often with variations, in each of the subchapters. Mr. Hussey contrasted this with the
horizontal treatment of administrative matters contained in subtitle F, where rules relating
to assessments of deficiencies, interest on deficiencies, refunds, and similar administrative
matters are set forth in one place, even though they apply across the boundaries of the
income tax, the estate and gift taxes, and excise taxes and even though they apply to all
types of taxpayers.

Mr. Hussey concluded that horizontal drafting would not only use fewer words in
the statute but would also provide more consistent and predictable results by using
established concepts and principles. The possibility of a new rule being developed for a
particular type of taxpayer to achieve a purpose for which there is already an existing rule
elsewhere in the Code would be avoided.
As an example, Mr. Hussey pointed to an amendment in the ninety-fourth Congress
providing that for certain income and excise tax purposes Native American tribal
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governments shall be treated as if they were states. Originally, this required amendments
relating to Indian tribes in some twenty-two provisions of the Code. The final version of
the legislation (H.R. 4089) utilized one generalized Code section (new section 7871), which
was put in new subchapter C of chapter 80 (General Rules), entitled "Provisions Affecting
More Than One Subtitle." Cross-references to the new section 7871 were added in the
principal provisions of the Code affected by the legislation. He points out that as a result
of this technique, understandability of twenty-one provisions of the Code as they apply to
other than Indian tribes was not impaired.
It is worth noting that while new subchapter G is still in existence, the drafting
approach it represents has not been widely used. Subchapter C now contains section 7872
(relating to the treatment of loans with below-market interest rates--the legislative response
to the Dickman case) and section 7873 (relating to federal tax treatment of income derived
by Indians by exercise of fishing rights). Certainly there have been more than two
amendments since the ninety-fourth Congress that could have been properly included in a
general provision affecting more than one subtitle.

The concept of horizontal drafting deserves closer attention than it has received
since it was suggested by Mr. Hussey in 1978. Not only is it a drafting technique worthy of
consideration in future legislation but, it also offers the hope of dramatic simplification if
the substantive rules of the present Code could be altered to facilitate horizontal drafting.
To take an extreme example, if all of the constructive ownership rules in the Code were
resolved into a single set of rules, those rules could be stated in one place in the Code and
would have to be learned and understood only once regardless of the type of entities that
were being tested and regardless of the context in which the question of relationship might
arise.
An even more dramatic proposal for this type of drafting technique would be the
development of a new set of rules for pass-through entities. That is, the same tax rules
would be applicable to partnerships, subchapter S corporations, real estate investment
trusts, and similar entities. Although that is substantively a far-reaching and initially
disruptive proposal, the simplification it could afford would be even more far-reaching.
Not only would the Code be made considerably easier to read and understand, the number
of rules taxpayers and their advisers would be required to learn would be significantly
reduced. Perhaps most important, tax planning would be greatly simplified, since the choice
of entity to be used in a particular transaction would be much less tax-sensitive.
Thus it can be seen that "horizontal" drafting could reduce both level 2 and level 3
complexity. Level 2 complexity could be reduced because the professional tax return
preparer would be better able to address those events or circumstances that cause his client
to require his assistance, without having to command a working knowledge of many
different provisions and concepts. In addition, this type of drafting could greatly reduce
level 3 complexity, since a taxpayer and his advisers in structuring future business
transactions or dealings would not have to spend great amounts of time analyzing the
disparate tax consequences that would result from different, though economically similar,
arrangements.
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The fact that a thorough tax analysis cannot be avoided in many instances should
not deter us from attempting to eliminate or reduce that aspect of business planning where
feasible. It seems obvious that a good-faith attempt at meaningful simplification of the tax
laws would involve serious work toward Mr. Hussey’s concept of horizontal drafting.
Institutional Changes

In addition to the development of the hypothetical simplification proposals and the
substantive techniques to achieve simplification that would be derived from that program,
the OTP should take steps to institutionalize the active role of the director of simplification
in the legislative process. The objective would be to have the director involved at the right
time in the development and presentation of a rule or concept, regardless of the genesis of
the proposal or whether it concerns legislation, regulations, or both. Following are some
of the steps that OTP should consider toward this end.

Adoption of OTP Simplification Policy for Future Legislation

The OTP simplification director should be given responsibility and accountability for
reducing complexity in future legislation. He should have clear authority to require the
staff people responsible for individual areas in which legislation is being considered to
explain the complexity issues raised by a particular legislative proposal and why that
complexity cannot be reduced. Again, it would be essential that the Assistant Secretary
and the Deputy Assistant Secretaries fully support the authority of the simplification
director to examine the complexity aspects of all developing legislative proposals and to
require that simplifying modifications be made where appropriate. To that end, the
simplification director should have the authority to obtain revenue estimates so he can
present to the Assistant Secretary the revenue cost of simplification.
The director of simplification obviously must be given free rein to examine all active
legislative efforts in the OTP. Again, great care should be taken that this exercise does
not become simply another level of review; it should instead be an effort carried on by
the staff people primarily responsible for the particular legislative proposals, with assistance
from the simplification director. The result should be a careful analysis of the complexity
that would be caused by each legislative proposal being developed in OTP and
consideration of potentially simplifying alternatives. It should be made clear that the
simplification director will be held accountable within the OTP if unnecessarily complex
legislation is proposed. Thus, it will often (but not always) be advisable for the
simplification director to provide a memorandum to accompany a legislative proposal
documenting the factors that made greater simplification impossible. Such factors might
include the following: the revenue cost was too great, the required changes were politically
unacceptable, or even time constraints precluded the required analysis. It would be
important to show, however, that the effort had not been ignored even when it could not
be implemented. This memorandum should not be released to the public, since that would
reduce its candor.
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This process of reviewing the Administration’s legislative proposals with an eye
toward simplification should also be applied to all serious legislative proposals originating
outside the Administration. Indeed, Treasury could use its insistence that the Code not be
made unnecessarily complex as a practical weapon in attempting to reshape legislative
proposals originating on the Hill. While there is no organized constituency for simplicity,
it would be difficult for any member of the tax-writing committee or the Hill staff to object
publicly to Treasury complaints that a particular proposal is too complex, especially if
Treasury’s objections were accompanied by specific suggestions for simplification. The OTP
should make it known that it will be reviewing all proposals for complexity and will make
meaningful suggestions for reducing complexity in its proposals, as well as in those advanced
by others.
Treasury Drafting of Proposals

The OTP should institute a policy of preparing actual drafts of legislative proposals
it presents to the Hill. This can be a time-consuming process, but it is an extremely
valuable technique. The resources of the Legislation and Regulations Division of the Chief
Counsel’s office could be called upon to assist in this effort. This process has been utilized
on an ad hoc basis in the past when the Assistant Secretary considered it beneficial.
As a technique for reducing tax complexity, focusing early in the process on the
changes in legislative language that would be necessitated by a particular proposal is
extremely beneficial. This does not mean to suggest that the principal complexity problems
in the Code are attributable to poor draftsmanship-the statutory language of the Code is
not itself a primary culprit with respect to complexity. While there are drafting techniques
that could be utilized to reduce complexity, the greatest benefit of early attempts to reduce
a proposal to draft statutory language is that it requires a close analysis of the reach of the
proposal itself.

In the initial "drafting sessions," before an individual is directed to prepare statutory
language, a legislative proposal is dissected and its implementation carefully considered.
At that time many aspects of a proposal may be shown to be unwise, impractical, or simply
unworkable. A poor statutory draft is often a symptom of a poorly considered proposal.6
Without an effort to reduce the proposal to legislative language, however, a detailed
analysis of the practical ramifications of the proposal is really not accomplished.

The drafting session provides a structured environment for analyzing a proposal; it
requires review of other sections of the Code that will be affected and thus must be
cross-referenced or amended if the proposal is added to the Code. The process will identify
obvious simplification possibilities that may require slight or even major alterations of the
proposal itself, and if these are discovered at an early stage, they are much easier to
address; if discovered after the proposal is finalized and made public, such changes are
often not feasible.
Simplification techniques can alter proposals in ways that will reduce complexity and
will, in addition, permit simpler legislative language. For example, adoption of a single
set of attribution/related-party rules for use throughout the Code, as suggested earlier,
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would obviously be a substantive change in the law, and would be a change that would
permit significant reduction in statutory language, thus simplifying the Code. The
simplifying technique in that case would be the uniform use of an established concept
throughout the Code, and the drafting would follow suit.

Other simplifying changes could have meaningful impact while requiring little
imaginative drafting. For example, if the number of taxpayers affected by the uniform
capitalization rules, the time-value-of-money rules, or the passive loss rules could be
reduced by dollar thresholds or by some other easily understood and applied technique, a
significant reduction of complexity would be achieved. The drafting of this device would
be important, but the substantive change in the law would be the significant ingredient. The
point is that we should never lapse into the assumption that better drafting efforts alone can
solve most of the complexity problems; nor should we assume, however, that the careful
analysis and clear understanding of rules that is required in the process of converting a
proposal to statutory language will not provide opportunities for meaningful benefit by
reshaping legislative proposals to reduce their complexity.

Coordination With the IRS

The OTP director of simplification should have the unqualified support of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Chief Counsel of the IRS. Ideally, a
counterpart would be named in the IRS to ensure that the Service assists in the
simplification director’s efforts. The simplification director should have the ability to call
on the resources of the IRS in considering the impact of legislative proposals on income tax
forms and on the needs of computer programmers who serve tax return preparers. He will
need a pipeline into the proper IRS offices for feedback on the many ramifications of tax
legislation in the practical world of return preparation, filing, and IRS auditing.
Regulations Process

The simplification director should have the same authority and responsibility for the
regulations process that he has in the legislative process. His activity in the regulations
process should not be nearly as comprehensive, however. The simplification director would
have to be selective in the regulations projects he chooses for input, lest his efforts be
spread too thin. But once the simplification director decides that reduction of complexity
could be achieved in a particular regulations project, his responsibility and authority for
working toward simplification of those regulations should be the same as his responsibility
and authority in dealing with legislative projects.
The director should coordinate most closely with his counterpart in the IRS with
respect to regulations projects selected for his input and with respect to the process of
attempting to make the regulation less complex.
Instituting any review of regulations in an attempt to reduce their complexity could,
of course, further delay and complicate the regulations process. That will be a matter of
particular concern in the OTP and IRS if the simplification director becomes too involved
in regulations. Care would have to be taken to minimize this impact. This could best be
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accomplished by limiting the number of regulations projects that are selected for
simplification input.

While, undoubtedly, review of many regulation projects with an eye to reducing their
complexity could yield substantial benefits, one should not set unrealistic goals. It is simply
not feasible to institute a wholesale review of regulations for the purpose of reducing their
complexity given the mammoth regulation task facing the Treasury and IRS now and for
the foreseeable future. Thus, it will be much more productive for the focus to be on
legislation, with the thought that the "ripple effect" of less complex legislation will eventually
lead to less complex regulations. In addition, the effort on the legislative side should create
an understanding of the need for reducing complexity in all the rules, including regulations.
If a constituency for that viewpoint can be created, it will have a positive impact on the
regulation process. Finally, the techniques devised for systematically simplifying legislative
projects will have applicability in the context of regulations projects as well. Bright-line
exclusions, horizontal drafting, even dollar thresholds where permitted by the statutory
language, and other techniques can be employed to simplify the understanding and
application of regulations if the drafters are sufficiently concerned about reducing
complexity.
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ENDNOTES

1 C. Gustafson, ed., Federal Income Tax Simplification (1979), 28, reporting the
proceedings of ALI-ABA Conference on Federal Income Tax Simplification held on January
4-7, 1978.
2 It should be noted that the committee staffs have on occasion addressed concerns
about unnecessary complexity in tax legislation. This was most recently reflected in the
effort initiated by the Ways and Means Committee majority staff to simplify the corporate
alternative minimum tax.
3 The Joint Committee staff has also initiated programs to simplify the tax law. It
initiated the highly successful, if long in coming, "deadwood" bill enacted as part of the
Tax Reform Act of 1976, as well as comprehensive revision and simplification of subchapter
S of the Code, enacted in 1982.

4 Of course, the employee benefits rules of the recently enacted--then, more recently
repealed-section 89 of the Code would have been at the head of that list had it not been
repealed. The story of section 89 is the paradigm of provisions that attempt (and probably
obtained) conceptual purity, but that are lost entirely under the weight of the complexity
necessary to accomplish that objective.

5 See Gustafson, Federal Income Tax Simplification, 31-34.
6 Ward Hussey has said that the process of thoroughly analyzing a legislative proposal
should consume 95 percent of the available time and that less than 5 percent of the effort
should involve actual drafting. See above.
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COMMENT ON "THE ROLE OF THE TREASURY
DEPARTMENT IN REDUCING TAX COMPLEXITY”

FREDERIC W. HICKMAN
*

I want to describe and comment on two general conditions that prevail at the
Treasury Department that will limit and shape any effort at Treasury to do the kinds of
things Buck Chapoton is suggesting, and then, having commented on those general
conditions, I want to comment on four specific points in his paper.
The first of the general conditions is that the Treasury has a hyper-intelligent but
hyper-inexperienced staff. And at the risk of putting you to sleep at the very outset, I want
to read you a short excerpt from a paper that Bayliss Manning delivered to the ABA half
a dozen years ago. He was asked in as a non-tax expert to comment on the then debt
equity rules which Buck worked so hard on. His comments were not kindly. He said,
The lawyer’s urge to elaborate is not confined to the drafting of
statutes and regulations. The same impulse drives us in our daily practice-drafting a contract, writing a prospectus, preparing a will-but every
experienced private practitioner knows that as he does such work, he will
eventually reach a point where he must make a calculated judgment to go no
further in the elaboration. The veteran lawyer will deliberately decide not to
draft against every contingency he can foresee. The veteran lawyer will make
a similar judgment about the level of particularization at which he chooses
to set the provisions of his documentation. He will consciously decide not to
pursue the drafting to a finer grain of definition. The veteran lawyer makes
these decisions consciously as a matter of self will and discipline, well aware
that he will always leave some things open-ended and that there are risks
inherent in doing so.

The inexperienced lawyer does not do these things. He has not the
perception, the judgment, or the self-confidence to tell him where to stop in
the process toward particularization and elaboration. Not knowing where to
stop, the inexperienced lawyer will try to define every term, then define every
*Frederic W. Hickman is a senior partner with the law firm of Hopkins & Sutter.
He has been engaged in the private practice of law in Chicago since 1951, except for four
years when he was assistant secretary of the Treasury for tax policy (1972-75).

Mr. Hickman is currently president of the National Tax Association-Tax Institute
of America. He has held numerous positions in the tax sections of the American Bar
Association and the Chicago Bar Association. He is a frequent speaker and author on tax
subjects, both political and technical. Mr. Hickman received his A.B. and LL.B from
Harvard (1948 and 1951, respectively). He served as editor of the Harvard Law Review.
I-E-l

term in the definition. He will also seek to deal with every prospective
contingency he identifies, not yet having learned from bitter experience that
it will often turn out that he drafted against every contingency except the one
that actually occurs.
So the veteran lawyer proceeds one way, and the inexperienced lawyer
the other way, with what results? The work of the experienced lawyer will
be brief, graspable, and ambiguous on certain points. The work of the
inexperienced lawyer will be extended, difficult to comprehend, and
ambiguous on certain other points. Elaboration in drafting does not result
in reduced ambiguity.

A point which he then pursues.

It is an excellent paper. I commend it to you. It appears in Volume 36 of The Tax
Lawyer.
But coming back to the Treasury specifically: the Treasury wants-needs—must have-the intelligence that it does presently have in the staff. It is, in effect, not permitted to pay
for the experience. There is every incentive for the younger, inexperienced lawyers to do
as Manning describes. That is how they demonstrate their ability and how they make their
brownie points. Most of their efforts are directed at what Buck has described as level 3
complexities-the kinds that deal with bigger deals--while the big problems in complexity
and complication are really in levels 1 and 2. That is only natural. Level 3 complexity is
where the bright minds naturally go--to the complex problems. Who, after all, is going to
hire them when they leave Treasury? Who wants an expert in simplicity?

When I left my office yesterday for the airport, one of my younger partners said to
me, "Be sure you leave enough complication for us to live on."

There is no way for Treasury, or for us, to avoid all this. It is an unavoidable
condition. I am reminded that the Israeli prime minister when asked about Syria said,
"No problem."

The questioner asked, "What do you mean, ‘No problem’?" He said, "A ‘problem’
is something that you solve. Syria is a ‘condition’. A ‘condition’ is something you have to
live with, and you do the best you can." And that is what we are faced with-a condition.
Only the assistant secretary and the senior, experienced members of the Treasury
can deal with this condition. They must ride herd. They can teach; they can make sure
that there are incentives to deal with these things more maturely; they can set the kinds of
priorities that really need to be set. Mind you, these remarks are not intended as a
criticism or a complaint about either the individuals on the staff or the Treasury as an
institution. They are both extraordinarily impressive, as individuals and institutions go. I
am only reporting on a condition that springs from human nature and is unavoidable and
that must be taken into account. So that’s the first condition that prevails at Treasury.
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The second condition that is prevalent is one that seems to have infected even the
senior officials. It is what I would describe as a theological--I am tempted to say
pathological, but I’ll leave it at theological-commitment to the Haig-Simons definition of
income. There is abroad in the Treasury Department, as well as elsewhere, the view that
tax policy is synonymous with conforming to the Haig-Simons definition of income.
I think it would be a great help, perhaps, if everyone from the tax policy office,
from the assistant secretary on down, were required to pull Henry Simons’ book off the
shelf and read it. I suspect if we took a poll in this room we wouldn’t find many who had
seen it, let alone read it, even though they propose to treat it as "gospel.” I am told it is
even out of print. If you did read it, you would find that Professor Simons himself makes
it very clear that his definition of income is framed in terms of how an income tax ought
to be shaped. It was not proposing definition to be enacted, but a direction toward which
one should try to move and a standard against which one should test things. Simons said:

... One may remark at the outset that no government has ever undertaken
to graduate taxes really on the basis of personal income ... If three be any
excuse for a treatise like this, it must lie in the importance of maintaining
some broad-and perhaps quite "impractical"...conception in terms of which
existing and proposed practices in income taxation may be examined, tested,
and criticized." (Henry Simons, Personal Income Taxation [Chicago: U. of
Chicago Press, 1938], 103-106).

Good tax policy, is not conformity to Haig-Simons. It is something else. It requires
frequent departures from ideal theory. And even if it did not, you can’t go to the HaigSimons definition and answer a lot of the purely theoretical questions. Nowhere is there
discussion of liabilities, for example, which is one of the things that plague us and that has
created a great deal of the recent complication.
This theological commitment to Haig-Simons seems in large part to be a
generational problem-that is, my generation isn’t quite so affected by it. The current
generation grew up hearing it. It is a sort of an intellectual spin-off, I think, from Stanley
Surrey’s tax expenditure campaign, which relied heavily on Haig-Simons. But Surrey
himself wasn’t looking for a Haig-Simons world; he was looking for his vision of a fair and
administrable world. And I know from dealing with him over the years that Haig-Simons
was often jettisoned by him when it interfered with those more practical goals.

Well, how do these two conditions relate to Buck’s paper? His proposals need to
be tempered with these basic conditions in mind. Specifically, I would make four
comments.

The first deals with his proposal for a "simplification czar." I think that would be
a move in the right direction, but the only chance of making it work, it seems to me, is to
make the assistant secretary himself the czar. No lesser person can be a czar. A lesser
person might be an ombudsman, maybe, but most ombudsmen end up regarded by the
regular staff as being something between a dilettante and a public nuisance. And who can
you get to do it at today’s salary schedules, without the lure of public prestige; who is likely
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to have the kind of experience that I talked about as well as the intelligence to do the job,
even if he were to be promised the authority and the resources? (And who would believe
such a promise?)
So I would suggest that the basic idea is a good one, but I think the way that it was
framed in the Treasury Department would be very important, and the assistant secretary
ought to think in terms not of a czar, but of a special assistant, to help him be the czar.

Second, the paper nominated the Office of Tax Policy to be the designated hitter.
The reasons given for that are probably sound. That is the only office that it is practical
to hold publicly accountable to the general public for trying to simplify. It can and should
get out in front, and it should have to live in the spotlight. But it isn’t necessarily the most
influential office, and it shouldn’t necessarily be thought of as the leader. It would, rather,
be a kind of public conscience. The Joint Committee on Taxation is, in fact, much more
responsible for legislation (although it can’t really function as a representative to the public
at large without compromising its role as a staff for the tax writing committees). It is fine
and no doubt useful for the Office of Tax Policy to publicly carry the simplification monkey
on its back, but there will, in fact, be no real simplification unless the Joint Committee is
an enthusiastic partner in the real work.

Third, the suggestion for focusing on drafting techniques to reduce complexity is a
useful proposal It is not a new idea, but it is an idea that is not an easy as it sounds and
that is perennially lost in the shuffle. In any event, making it work would require that input
of any experienced persons. It is not practical near term to redraft the Internal Revenue
Code using the suggested horizontal drafting techniques. We can focus on it and apply it
incrementally, but it would be tilting at windmills to think in terms of doing anything in
wholesale fashion at an early date.
Fourth, and finally, the one point in the paper with which I seriously disagree is the
de-emphasis the paper puts on regulations. Regulations cannot change the statutory
provisions, but they can (and too often don’t) make the statutory provisions enormously
easier to live with. Regulations are the one place that the Office of Tax Policy and the
Internal Revenue Service can strike a real blow for simplification--all by themselves, and
without endless political compromises-and make it stick. In this connection, I applaud
Commissioner Goldberg’s emphasis on drafting regulations that emphasize basic principles
and less detail. If the regulations clearly state the broad principles and approaches, and
don’t try to answer all of the details that may come up, my own experience tells me that
we will have better guideposts and less complication.
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COMMENT ON "THE ROLE OF THE TREASURY
DEPARTMENT IN REDUCING TAX COMPLEXITY’

DONALD C. LUBICK
*

I think Buck Chapoton has appropriately differentiated the complexity problems
according to the kinds of taxpayers affected, and I concur that as far as level 1 and level
2 taxpayers are concerned, the situation today is really better than I can recall it in over
forty years of practice. The ’86 [Tax Reform] Act provided simplification in taking lowincome taxpayers off the rolls and in reducing difficulties for ordinary taxpayers. It doesn’t
mean that there aren’t problems for low-income taxpayers involving dependency, eligibil
ity, status, head-of-household, things like that, fringe benefits and the like, but I don’t think
they are any more serious than those problems we have been coping with for many, many
years, and in many ways they are better. There is a lot less record-keeping; we don’t have
to worry about sales taxes, a high threshold for medical expenses, lack of deductibility of
personal interest. There is even a threshold for employee expenses, which I may not agree
with, it may not be the right threshold, but it certainly reduces the level of compliance
complexity.

The level 3 taxpayers that Buck refers to do constitute the bulk of our everyday
concern as practitioners, and that is really where the IRS has monumental problems in
dealing with their returns. Still, we don’t want to lose track of the fact that there has been
some easing in this area. When we worry about the complexity of the passive loss rules,
we have to give credit for those mindless hours that we had to spend in advising tax shelter
promoters.
Now, without diminishing the seriousness of the problem, we must take into account
the fact that the number of taxpayers affected by serious complexity is probably a good deal
fewer than historically, even though for the remainder it may be a more serious problem.

*Donald C. Lubick is a partner in the firm of Hodgson, Russ, Andrews, Woods &
Goodyear. He formerly served as assistant secretary of the Treasury for tax policy (197881) and received the Treasury Department’s highest departmental award, the Alexander
Hamilton Award. Mr. Lubick also served the Treasury Department as deputy and the
acting assistant secretary for tax policy (1977-78) and tax legislative counsel (1961-64).
Mr. Lubick has been a lecturer in Law at the University of Buffalo Law School and
a teaching fellow in law at Harvard University. His professional activities include serving
as chairman of the City of Buffalo Tax Revision Committee, as a former member of the
Executive Committee of the Tax Section for the New York State Bar Association, as former
chairman of the Committee on Domestic Relations Tax Problems for the American Bar
Association Section of Taxation, and as a member of the American Law Institute. Mr.
Lubick received his B.A. from the University of Buffalo (1945) and his J.D. from Harvard
University (1949).
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I’d like to deal primarily with Buck’s suggestion. He would assign a pivotal role in
addressing the problem for the remaining group to the Office of Tax Policy (OTP) and
would focus, in my judgment, undue responsibility on OTP. I don’t think it is either fair
or wise to take any of the heat off Joint Tax or off Ways and Means or Senate Finance
staffs by saying that they have to answer to legislators who can’t be expected to care. I
think, in a sense, that is a Nuremberg defense.
Section 89, PFIC, the pension rules-these things were not the creations, the recipes
of the members. They were concocted by staff; they were sold to the members as carrying
out some general policy of nondiscrimination or fairness or anti-abuse in the most general
terms. But essentially the responsibility is on the staff in so many of these areas of
complexity.

The same from the point of view of OTP. Even though members may have limited
concern as to complexity and may make proposals that are inherently complex, I think OTP
answers to an administration that may be disposed to do the same thing. I wonder if OTP
were left completely to its own devices if it would be carrying the ball for the current
capital gains proposals, research and development incentives, or the savings initiatives that
are likely to be on their agenda this coming session. I do have a hunch that maybe OTP
might be making some different proposals and that it is also answerable to a higher
authority, not concerned with simplification.

Beyond that, I think OTP can bear a measure of culpability for the lunatic debacle
of section 89, the horrors of our pension rules, many of the foreign area intricacies. OTP
has always been assiduous in pressing for the adoption of intricate devices to keep
waterproof the legislative dikes, just as the IRS has in its regulation proposals, and it is the
analog, as has been referred to, of the professionals trying to build sieves out of the same
dikes.
Simplification, as has been pointed out, always seems so admirable in the abstract,
but with neither side willing to cede ground in practice, complex compromises always have
and likely always will emerge.
So I have very grave doubts that a simplification czar, through jawboning, is going
to be able to move many persons on either side of a substantive proposal. And I doubt that
either the administration or congressional Santa Clauses are going to reach into their bags
to take out presents to pass out to the kiddies if the simplification ones are charged against
the budget that is allotted for those items that are on the big shopping lists that have been
presented.

Now, I don’t mean to give up on the notion, and I concur 100 percent with Fred
that the motivation and the personal responsibility have to come from the Assistant
Secretary himself or herself. It must be simply a high concern in the design efforts, and
the assistant secretary has to insist and make sure that everyone on the staff has it as well.
But the Joint Committee and the Senate Finance and Ways and Means chiefs of staff also
have the same high responsibility in areas where they shape proposals. And as Fred has
indicated, on each of the staffs are people who have practiced and can appreciate the
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consequences of their actions. Too many of them have not paid concern to that, and the
chiefs of staff have to see to it that they are sensitized to it and at least have the good sense
to listen to those who have the experience, and they have to inculcate these attitudes.
Now, if there is going to be an effort to devise particular areas along the lines that
Buck has talked about, I would say the way to do it is to take some of the contract money
that is available to OTP to engage some of these alumni of the Treasury and staffs who
have had practical experience both in the government, perhaps those who are now in
academia, and let them be mini-ALI reporters. They can gather together professionals, IRS
representatives, Treasury representatives, and do many projects for simplification. In that
way, the precious staff resources of the OTP can be preserved and conserved for their
current activities.
I think there is a major role for Treasury to play. I don’t think that Treasury can
be the designated point man as far as simplification is concerned. I think each of the staffs
has to, under the direction of its particular head, have that as a concern of the head and
the principal deputies, and that has to be communicated to the staff. I don’t think we can
simply pin the tail on the simplification czar’s you-know-what.
Thank you.
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TAX ADMINISTRATION CONSIDERATIONS IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF TAX POLICY

ROSCOE L. EGGER, JR.
*

A former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy once said that no tax
increase is sufficiently simple or administrable but no tax decrease is too complex. I suspect
that today not many people would really agree with Don Lubick’s observation that certain
features of recent tax legislation, although involving tax reduction, are not too complicated.
When the TRA ‘86 was in its infancy, it was dubbed "tax reform for fairness, simplicity, and
economic growth." As we look back, most of us would conclude, at least from the viewpoint
of the corporate or business community, that the effort to achieve the simplicity objective
fell far short. A few reminders will make my point. We were introduced to a laundry list
of new terms, each of which required considerable definition and explanation. We were
treated to such terms as uniform capitalization rule, passive loss rules, and the alternative
minimum tax. Along with the alternative minimum tax came a new concept, business
untaxed reported profits, or fondly, BURP. That has since been replaced with a thing
called ACE, which stands for adjusted current earnings. Many practitioners and taxpayers
still are not sure what these terms mean or how they are applied. In the installment sale
area a new "proportionate disallowance rule was promulgated, and in the long-term contract
area a complicated look back rule was developed to keep taxpayers honest.

In the foreign area, the complexity really shows up in such requirements as the new
interest allocation rules or what is essentially a schedular tax concept in the new income
"basket" approach for foreign tax credit limitation purposes. The new rules, requiring a
virtual tracing of funds through corporate systems, seem almost like a game of "Can you top
this?"
*Roscoe L. Egger, Jr. is presently a consultant with Price Waterhouse Washington
National Tax Service, Washington, D.C. His experience includes more than 35 years in
professional pursuits, including more than five years of service as Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, six years of private law practice, and over 25 years in public accounting. During
more than five years as the head of the nation’s tax agency, Mr. Egger was required to deal
with literally every problem-procedural, administrative, or substantive-to be encountered
in federal taxation. He was also required to testify before Congress and was a key advisor
in the formulation of the Administration’s tax reform proposals.
Before becoming Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Mr. Egger was with Price
Waterhouse from 1956 to 1973 and was engaged directly in the firm’s tax practice as a
specialist. He assumed responsibility for the firm’s tax practice in Washington, D.C. from
the beginning and continued in that role until 1973, when he organized and assumed
responsibility for the firm’s Office of Government Services. In addition, in 1971, Mr. Egger
served as one of several private sector members appointed to the Commissioner on
Administrative Review of the U.S. House of Representatives.
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Surely one must ask, "Was this trip necessary?” Traditionally, the parent about to
punish his or her child says, "This hurts me more than it does you.” There is more truth
than poetry in that statement in the case of the Internal Revenue Service, since the IRS is
in fact hurt as much or more than taxpayers by complexity in the tax laws. Let’s not lose
sight of the fact that the job of the Service is to administer the entire system, and
complexities in the law make that a nearly impossible task. The necessity to write
regulations and to issue published ruling positions is merely step one in the job of trying
to provide guidelines for taxpayers to assist them in meeting their compliance
responsibilities. The job becomes really difficult when it is necessary to answer taxpayers’
specific questions concerning the application of a new law or ultimately to pass judgment
on taxpayer returns in the examination process.

Given the nearly impossible task of recruiting, training, and retaining adequately
competent staff in the face of severe budget and salary limitations, new and increasingly
complicated tax laws fly right in the face of the main strength of our system: voluntary
compliance.

The standard question is, Why don’t they do something about it? The real questions
are, Who is they? and Where does the problem really lie? Is it in an overcomplicated
statute?
Does the Congress discharge its responsibility in the development of tax legislation?
Are the regulations too complicated? Does the Service misconceive the intent of Congress
in enforcing the law? Is the IRS too aggressive? Is the present system, including the
structure within the IRS and Treasury Department, adequate to protect the taxpaying public
against the ravages of complexity? Probably every one of these is a contributing factor in
the difficulties of taxpayers and tax administration.
Let’s talk first about the Congress. Prior to about 1962, tax legislation was enacted
typically by the introduction of specific legislative language in the form of a bill that was
then referred to the Ways and Means Committee of the House, and after a respectable
period of time for taxpayers to familiarize themselves with the bill, hearings would be held
to give the taxpaying public an opportunity for comment. Since that time, the pattern has
changed from hearings on a specific bill to hearings on concepts without the benefit of
legislative language and, even more recently to the development of concepts within the
committees or in caucus groups, which after having been twisted and tortured beyond
recognition, are frequently passed in committee in the wee hours of the morning, followed
by a hurried drafting job by overtired, overworked staff with virtually no opportunity to
review the proposals in their final form from an administrability point of view. To
paraphrase an old saying: People should never be required to see how either their tax laws
or their sausage is made.
Is the Congress alone responsible for this state of things? The answer is pretty
clearly no, since both the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service have participated in
the development of legislative initiatives, including such things as the penalty interest and
other portions of the Code leading to ludicrous results for both taxpayer and government
when it comes to application and enforcement of the law. Many of these provisions are
LG-2

neither simple nor understandable. As Pogo said about nuclear physics, ”It doesn’t seem
new and it surely isn’t clear." Consider, for example, the requirement for tax shelter
registration. This provision, both sponsored by and encouraged by the IRS, turned out to
be an administrative nightmare that ultimately did not serve any particular purpose except
possibly as a deterrent. I hasten to say, however, that it seemed like a good idea at the
time. A recent proposal that has been encouraged by the Service and Treasury in the
international area would require the maintenance of voluminous and detailed records in the
United States by affiliates of foreign institutions.
As this proposal went through its varying stages of the legislative development
process, one was reminded of the title to a mystery movie, I Wake Up Screaming. Often
the tax administrator, frustrated with taxpayers taking positions that are "aggressive" or
worse, discerns the need for information or aids to enforcement without really seeing the
burden thrust upon the taxpayer by the requirements.
Some of you will recall the requirement for the filing of returns by small one- or
two-person deferred compensation plans such as Keogh plans, etc. The response of the tax
administrator was to require the filing of then-Form 5500. It’s fair to say that probably no
one in the Service at that time--and that includes me--really thought through the headaches
the use of that particular form for small plans would create. The controversy that followed,
of course, gave rise to the rapid development of a simplified Form 5500. Another
illustration of the kind of problem had to do with the famous auto log regulations. Here,
although this was a congressional initiative, the Service undoubtedly was in favor of some
such rules because of the extreme difficulty of enforcing the rules on any reasonably
uniform basis.

It’s hard to say whether the regulations should have been as extreme as they were,
but in defense of tax administration, the regulations followed the committee report pretty
closely. In the sometimes-heated comments that followed in hearings on these particular
regulations, one member was heard to say that he hadn’t read the report but expected the
tax administrators to exercise good judgment.
Probably the outstanding example of the century was the yo-yo actions of the
Congress in deciding to require withholding on interest and dividends and then replacing
the withholding requirement immediately with the present rules, called "back-up
withholding." In terms of complexity for everyone, this takes the prize. Watching the
process was a little like watching an old Keystone Cops movie.
And then of course there was the famous W-4 controversy, where taxpayers were
faced with the necessity of filing a form that they found virtually impossible to understand
and to prepare. Forget that the form was designed by people who had a fairly thorough
understanding of the legal requirement; forget that the W-4 did, in fact, do the job that
Congress had mandated. The fact remains that the burden thrust on the taxpayer was
overwhelming.
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Clearly, some of these problems could have been headed off or at least attenuated
had there been a mechanism within the Congress and the Administration for a thorough
review of the administrative impact. I’m reminded of the clamor for environmental impact
studies before certain actions take place, as well as the requirement for regulatory impact
review before regulations are issued. Although in theory Internal Revenue Service
regulations are subject to this same rule, the plain facts are that because most of the
regulations issued by the Service are interpretive regulations as distinguished from so-called
legislative regulations, they are not really subject to any significant administrative impact
review. Moreover, these regulations are reviewed by staff in the Office of Management and
Budget who are rarely qualified to look at these regulations from the standpoint of the true
administrative burden placed on either the Internal Revenue Service or the taxpayers.
And also, one has to reckon with the fact that in any large bureaucracy (government
or private sector), people and groups concentrate so intently on solving their own problems
that they are frequently impervious to the problems of others--and sometimes they don’t
even care.

On the congressional side, the Congressional Budget Office is supposed to opine on
certain impacts of tax legislation such as the impact on the budget, the impact on inflation,
etc., and almost uniformly, the letters that accompany each tax act are perfunctory at best
and shed almost no light on any of the real problems.
One of the suggestions that is frequently made is to have more direct involvement
by the Internal Revenue Service in the development of tax legislation itself. While
recognizing that members of the Office of Chief Counsel typically participate in the drafting
sessions on Capitol Hill, the individuals involved in this activity are almost never really
knowledgeable with or experienced in the enforcement functions of the Service (such as
examination collection or criminal investigation), and even less with respect to the
processing function. Accordingly, they have little, if any, real ability to recognize or do
much about the administrative burden falls on the Service and probably little experience
to recognize an undue administrative burden on the taxpayer.
In the case of the TRA ‘86, the Internal Revenue Service was more than usually
involved in the process. In 1984, at the request of the then-secretary of the Treasury,
Donald Regan, the Internal Revenue Service assembled a sizable team, who worked right
along with the staff of the Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy in the development of the first
proposal, which went to the White House and was immediately dubbed Treasury I. This
was a working document that provided the basis for the President’s proposal for tax reform,
which was submitted to the Congress the next year. Throughout both of these efforts, the
Internal Revenue Service played a significant role. This was followed up by direct
participation on Capitol Hill by senior IRS staff working with the staffs of the Treasury and
the tax-writing committees of the Congress. Notwithstanding this involvement, as we know,
the final version of the TRA ‘86 contained many, many highly complicated provisions.
Certainly, some of these could have been recast or even eliminated in the interest of
administrative ease.
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Frequently, ideas for compliance or other initiatives in the area of tax administration
are developed by the enforcement functions or other groups within the Service and are
passed on to the Treasury, and sometimes even to Capitol Hill, by such groups without
going through the normal legislative review staff process.

Given the extent of the problem and the involvement of so many groups and
branches of government, we need to recognize that as desirable as simplification sounds,
there are built into our system definite enemies of simplification; for example, in the recent
past almost all tax legislation has been revenue-driven. As a result we’ve seen the Congress
time after time enact provisions that have the effect of increasing revenues but have little
or no tax policy justification. Specifically, in the rate structure we have the so-called 33
percent bubble, in which many middle income taxpayers are pushed into a third 33 percent
bracket at the margin. One is put to the test to discern any really justifiable tax policy
rationale for this result. Clearly, the uniform capitalization rules are another example of
the same thing. These rules have a onetime impact for the purpose of raising revenue, but
again have little to recommend them in terms of logic or tax policy justification.

Second, almost all tax legislation has been enacted on a kind of crises or last-minute
basis, recognizing that in part this may have become necessary in view of extensive lobbying
efforts, which tend to ’’water down" changes in the law but which nevertheless result in
ill-conceived provisions. Finally, we must recognize that taxpayers and practitioners have
become much more aggressive in the compliance area. This has been thought to have
made necessary the provision of more specific rules in the statute as well as penalties, which
in the day-to-day world often create ridiculous results.
I think we need to understand that in the vast majority of cases, the consequences
of complexity might be more acceptable to the taxpaying public if there was some
mechanism in our system of tax administration for the quick resolution of difficulties when
they arise, a better system for the development of guidance, and a more efficient method
of correcting inadvertent errors of inadvertence on the part of both government and
taxpayers.
With those thoughts in mind, let’s turn to what possible steps could be taken to
alleviate the situation. It seems to me that these problems can be categorized as those
that are peculiarly within the control of the Congress and those that are peculiarly within
the control of the administrative process.

In the case of the matters on the side of the legislative branch of government, most
observers would probably agree that as long as the budget pressures remain and the tax
writing committees continue to try to respond to specified dollar objectives, I see little
likelihood that the Congress can return to the old days of introduction of tax bills and
hearings. The political implications, the opportunities for horse trading, and of course the
necessity of making sometimes distasteful decisions are also factors at work to maintain the
present approach.
Is there then room for more and effective input from tax administration in the
legislative process? The answer to that is probably yes. The Assistant Commissioner’s for
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legislative liaison has ongoing contact with the staff and the members on Capitol Hill.
Clearly, this role could be expanded and a regular process of review with knowledgeable
people in the enforcement functions could become a part of the role. This individual could
then have regular liaison with the Treasury Tax Legislative Counsel (TLC) and TLC staff.
This would of course include sitting in on taxpayer group meetings, for example, in order
to make the Commissioner’s assistant as knowledgeable as possible. Although I believe the
expansion of this role is a good idea and will provide some benefits, I seriously doubt that
many dramatic results will follow. The Congress primarily will simply not resist the political
advantages of the hang fire or the last minute tinkering with legislative proposals, and since
so many of the problem areas in the Code arise because of last minute or eleventh-hour
decisions, it is not likely that even an expanded liaison of this sort would make many
significant changes.

But wait, maybe not all is lost. Is there a role here for the oversight functions of the
tax writing committees? Could the oversight subcommittees through a regularized hearing
process develop specific instances of needed changes in the statute when experience shows
the result of existing law to be much too burdensome, either to the taxpaying public or to
our system of tax administration? Wouldn’t an open forum of this sort provide a
mechanism through which problems could surface without rising to the crisis stage?
On the administrative side, having in mind such problems as the auto logs and W4s, what can be done to ensure that regulations, published rulings, revenue procedures, and
so on are reviewed objectively for administrative impact? Clearly, this effort should receive
the same high-level consideration and attention as the substantive questions and issues that
arise in the regulatory process. After all, the effectiveness of the system turns very heavily
on voluntary compliance, and this in turn depends on both an understanding, and ease of
administration, of the tax laws.

It seems to me that there needs to be a role of true advocacy for taxpayers within
the system. Such a function would have to include some activity such as an administrative
impact study of significant regulations or rules, as well as some sort of public liaison in
order to receive information from the taxpaying public. I mean the advocacy in this sense
to be in addition to the present advocacy role of the taxpayer ombudsman, who deals
essentially with cases that have gone awry in some manner in the normal process.
A number of things suggest themselves: a true ombudsman role for the purpose
of nipping problems in the bud as they are identified and before they get to the point of
creating a public uproar. For example, could such an advocacy role have identified the
problems that arose from the auto log regulations or from the W-4 form design in advance?
I think so. If a comprehensive ombudsman role could be developed that merges the two
needs and is adequately staffed, I believe much could be accomplished. I could see the
Commissioner requiring a sign-off by the taxpayer ombudsman before any regulations or
rulings go to publication.
Clearly, this should be a permanent position filled by an individual who is highly
knowledgeable in the enforcement functions of the Service and is at a sufficiently high
level to have some clout within the system. Who other than the ombudsman is in a better
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position to hear the complaints and take the pulse of the system from the taxpayer’s
viewpoint? Why not the same system for an analysis of the problems of the Service in
articulating guidance on the application of the law and the enforcement of it. Shouldn’t
each have a place to go and someone who will listen and respond?
With the possible exception of Canada, most of the other developed countries in the
free world do not have anything like the degree of split between tax policy and tax
administration that we have in the U.S. I might also say that typically, parliamentary forms
of government provide an opportunity for the tax administrator to have much greater
involvement in the process of developing tax legislation and presenting it to the legislative
body. With that thought in mind, one suggestion, which is not a new suggestion, is that
there be created in the Department of the Treasury a new position of Undersecretary of
Treasury - Taxation, or some such title. This position would have as a part of its
responsibility both tax administration and tax policy. In other words, the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue and the Assistant Secretary of Treasury would both report to the
undersecretary, and it would therefore be the responsibility of this particular function or
position in the Treasury to coordinate both tax administration and tax policy.

Given this kind of a structural arrangement, it would then be feasible for the
taxpayer, ombudsman, or advocacy role to be part of the staff of the undersecretary. This
would provide a mechanism for informing the responsible officials at the highest level of
the need for changes or reconsideration in either tax legislative proposals or in the
regulatory sense.
Having stated the proposition, I hasten to say that in most of the other countries
where these functions are combined in one ministry or cabinet post, the positions tend to
be more frequently career positions rather than political appointees. That suggests a degree
of objectivity that might not be present in the case of an appointee serving at the pleasure
of an elected president and thus obligated to carry out the policies of the appointing
administration.

Historically, the Internal Revenue Service has been positioned to be as nonpolitical
as possible. While that has not held true in some instances throughout our history,
nonetheless, it is the case; and the Commissioner, together with the staff of the IRS, has
been reasonably free of significant influence by those whose incentives are basically
politically oriented.
One negative in this suggestion is that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is
already a level III appointee, thus giving him the same rank as an undersecretary.
Reporting to another person of the same rank would probably prove distasteful to many
candidates for the job, and the downgrading of the Commissioner position would have a
negative effect on the entire agency. Therefore, while I feel it is important to identify this
as a possible structural change that could have, under the right circumstances, some
beneficial effects in the administrative impact of our tax laws and tax administration, I
believe that the disadvantages are considerably greater and therefore it is not my
recommendation.
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So let me return then to the suggestion for an expanded role for the ombudsman.
The present position is usually filled by knowledgeable, experienced people, but clearly the
job is viewed as a stepping stone to higher, more authoritative positions in the Service such
as District Director or Assistant Regional Commissioner. Accordingly, the position is less
of a permanent career position than it should be.
I believe the whole function should be greatly expanded to encompass not only the
present program for resolution of problems but also a significantly broadened program
along the lines described earlier. The position would be at least at an Assistant
Commissioner level and staffed to provide for listening to problems of every kind from the
taxpaying public and from the various factions within the Service. Broad powers to cut
across the traditional lines of authority would be necessary.
I will not attempt to lay out in excruciating detail the activities and staffing of this
function, but clearly it must serve the objective of providing a forum through which curable
problems within the system can be identified; an effective liaison can be maintained with
Treasury Tax Policy, with the Legislative Analysis of IRS, and the enforcement functions;
and last but not least, a solid pipeline can be laid out to the tax-writing committee of
Congress.

What a great day it would be to be able to take your frustrations to someone who
will listen and take curative action!
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COMMENTS ON "TAX ADMINISTRATION CONSIDERATIONS
IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAX POLICY"

WILLIAM F. NELSON
*

We are supposedly talking about the administrator’s role in simplification or capacity
to assume just blame for existing complexity.
Roscoe Egger mentioned several situations over the past fifteen years in which the
Internal Revenue Service made the mistake of suggesting something that it later regretted-car log regs and things of that nature. In general, however, I hope and think that the
Service has learned its lesson over the past four or five years.
I can’t think of a situation, and maybe somebody in this room will, where the Service
has actually advocated complicating legislative change in the past few years. Indeed, the
Service is often put in the position of trying to tell Congress and others, you know, You may
think you can score revenue from this additional information or from these additional
records that you want to require, but the fact is we can’t change our computer system fast
enough to transcribe that information for three or four or five or six years. So please don’t
do it to us now."

The fact is that in the current environment, in my judgment, you can assume that
two or three things are true. Whether they can be changed is different. One is that the
Service is at the end of the whip when it comes to increase in complexity. The Service is
clearly overburdened in trying to absorb and assimilate the ’86 Tax Reform Act. The
Service recognizes that it has no interest in greater complexity.
*William F. Nelson is a partner in the firm of King & Spaulding. From 1986 to 1988,
he served as chief counsel for the Internal Revenue Service. He is co-author with McKee,
Nelson, and Whitmire of Federal Taxation of Partnerships and Partners, (published by
Warren, Gorham, and Lamont, in 1977) and with Whitmire, Nelson, McKee, and Kuller
Structuring and Drafting Agreements (published by Warren, Gorham, and Lamont, in 1989).
Mr. Nelson is also the author of numerous articles on tax law published in various journals
including The Tax Law Review, Taxes, and The Virginia Tax Review.
Mr. Nelson has served as a lecturer at the University of Virginia Law School. He
has also been a speaker at various tax institutes, including the New York University Tax
Institute, the University of South California Tax Institute, the University of Chicago Tax
Institute, the University of Texas Tax Institute, the University of Virginia Tax Institute, the
Southern Federal Tax Institute, the New England Tax Institute, the Tax Executives Institute,
ALI/ABA, and PLI. Mr. Nelson received his B.S. from Mississippi State University (1969)
and his J.D. from the University of Virginia (1972). He also served as editor in chief of the
Virginia Law Review.
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The second fact of life is that of all constituencies that affect legislation, the Service
is the most hamstrung and the least able to affect the outcome of complicating legislation.
Congress clearly can determine what policies it chooses to advance. Simplicity has not been
a major Congressional concern. Base broadening, revenue raising without increasing rates,
fairness, all kinds of tax expenditures, tax incentives--those things are the policy
considerations that concern Congress. Simplicity is not among the issues.

With respect to the Treasury, the Treasury obviously speaks for the administration
on matters of policy--and by the way, if it is not clear, I believe that the primary motor
driving increased complexity is legislation, not administration. But as the spokesman for
the administration, Ken Gideon must stand up and say, "I think that differential capital
gains rates are a good thing." That is a predominant administration policy. Yes, it will add
complexity to the statute and to the system, but this policy concern outweighs any concern
about simplicity.

One of the difficulties in dealing with simplicity is that simplicity is really at the other
end of that seesaw from all of the other policy considerations. We can broaden the base,
we can be fair, we can raise revenue, and we can do all those things simultaneously, but
none of those things can we generally do and make life simpler.

So the Service’s plaintive whining about complexity is simply not being heard.
Moreover, the Service is constrained--for good reasons, mind you--from speaking its mind
to Congress about the complexity of proposed legislation.

The Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, the Secretary of Treasury and the President
have to run the tax policy system for the administration. Suppose the Service runs up to
Congress and tells somebody how complicated the capital gains proposal is. You may think
that is good, you may think that is candid, you may think that is honest. The problem is
that the members have a selective ear. If they oppose the Administration on other policy
or political grounds, they will listen to complaints about complexity and use them against
the Administration’s proposals.
If, on the other hand, we say something that the Hill proposes is complex, and the
Treasury opposes it, then the view on the Hill is that we are simply the lackeys for
Treasury, and these protestations of complexity are simply being made to put up a
smokescreen for other policy motivations of the administration.
So the Service has a very difficult time in actually having an impact, positively or
negatively, on complexity in the legislative process. But, the Service can be helpful. The
Service does know how to go out and test forms, for example. It has done this from time
to time in the past when time permitted with respect to legislation. One example is the
funding for catastrophic health care in which the Service made very clear from focus groups
and otherwise that this was going to be a big-time problem, complicated and politically
difficult. Nobody wanted to listen. The Service can only be effective as an advocate for
simplification if somebody cares enough to listen, and in general other policy considerations
and other political concerns and other political agendas cause the Service’s comments about
simplification to be, in general, ignored.
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Now, I want to reiterate, I think that the Service can help, and, given time--and time
to react is very important in the legislative process-I think the Service can get organized
to provide the sort of basic ground-level research for the legislative process that the Service
routinely conducts in development of forms.

In any event, the Service at the present time has little capacity to impact the
legislative process. Unfortunately, it is the institution that tends to be blamed for
complexity, and it is certainly the one that has to live with it.

As to guidance, the Service with the Treasury can make some modest difference, in
my judgment. I do not, however, believe that "short" is a synonym of "simple." If questions
need to be answered and they go unanswered, the questions have not gone away.
Moreover, I submit that the net effect of letting questions go unanswered is greater
complication, certainly greater expense, in developing the law.
Secondly, if a regulation is short, and the view is we’ll answer these other questions
ad hoc in revenue rulings, in five years what the practitioner has to do is drag out fourteen
volumes of the Cumulative Bulletin along with our regs to look at the law. To my mind,
that is not simplification. It is great for book salesmen, but to my mind it is not good for
simplification.
I do think--and I take a fair amount of the blame for this in the past few years-that
there are questions that got answered that didn’t need to be answered, at least in the first
cut. Most of those questions that were answered were asked by somebody, and most of
them were answered for a reason. And the courage that it takes for the administrator to
not answer a question is to know that the taxpayer will in fact snug himself, herself, or itself
right up to the line you draw, and if you don’t answer a question-at least if you intend to
give a revenue-positive answer to the question if you ever get around to it-you are giving
away money. And it is simply not easy or appropriate in my judgment, notwithstanding
protestations to the contrary, for the people who are writing regulations to implement
revenue-driven laws to ignore the revenue impact of what they are doing. Having said that,
I do think that the Service is not compelled to anticipate the answer all questions in a
regulation.

The next thing the Service can do to simplify is to write more clearly in the regulatory
process. There is a cost to that, and the cost is time. Every person in this room, I will
warrant, has done a deal. Every one of you has sat down and either written or reviewed
the first draft of a contract. That contract was reasonably well organized and consistent
when you got through writing it. But then you had to negotiate it, and you negotiated it
with a lot of folks. And every time somebody had something else to stick in or a different
thought, or a change was made, or you had a second thought, you made the change in
place, or you figured out how to make the change without having to rewrite your whole
contract. Regulations writing is no different. Regulations, like contracts, are negotiated.
I warrant to you that you have never gone back and rewritten one of your negotiated
contracts to put everything in flowing prose. Perhaps the Service and the Treasury ought
to do that. Perhaps, once all policy decisions are made and a full draft is agreed to,
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perhaps it makes sense to back up, hand the project to somebody with a clean slate and all
the notes, and let him do it over again from scratch and put everything in place in logical
order. That takes time. And the cost of doing that is that you get the guidance later.

Now, I am anxiously awaiting Commissioner Goldberg’s and Assistant Secretary
Gideon’s efforts at publishing rougher cut regulations. I will warrant, however, that if my
clients are on the wrong side of a roughline, I will be up here telling the administration that
fairness is the only way, to hell with complexity, and my guess is, unless you all bite your
tongues, you will also be in that position.
I am therefore somewhat--well, I am clearly-pessimistic about the ability of the
Service qua Service to have a major impact on simplification. I think that the Service can
be helpful in the legislative process, and I think the Service working with the Treasury can
make marginal improvement in the regulatory process.
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COMMENT ON "TAX ADMINISTRATION CONSIDERATION
IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAX POLICY”

JENNIE S. STATHIS
*

I did want to say, and maybe I shouldn’t, that in preparing for this conference and
thinking a little bit about what is complex, what is simple, and what forces might affect
complexity, my mind started going to all of the changes in Europe and the increasingly
global economy that I see; and my final guess was that most business taxpayers are going
to have a lot more complexity to deal with over the next decade than they have in the past.
I’ll quickly get off that sad prediction and go to Roscoe Egger’s paper.

I think that all the parties in the tax system are continually making trade-offs among
a variety of objectives--equity, accuracy, simplicity, just to name a few. Implicit in Roscoe’s
paper is the view, with which I agree, that one basic reason for complexity is the lack of
credible evidence of the effects of proposals or even laws after they are passed. Often
Congress is forced to act without a clear picture, and why is this so?

When special interests advocate a particular tax change, they often only know how
it will affect their constituents; they don’t really know how it might affect other taxpayers.
I think that similarly, tax professionals view a change in the context of their own clients,
their own knowledge base. And the IRS is such a large and decentralized agency that
there is rarely any one person who can tell you the total effect of something that Congress
is contemplating.
Aside from those reasons for lack of good, systemic kinds of information, there is
always the worry that all of these different parties who are coming to visit someone on the
Hill have some bias or some self-interest in what they are saying.

As Roscoe Egger pointed out in his paper, people and groups are interested in their
own problems and are frequently unresponsive to the problems of others. An example here
is the W-4 situation, which Roscoe mentioned. When a lot of taxpayers complained, the
*Jennie S. Stathis is Director of Tax Policy and Administration Issues for the U.S.
General Accounting Office. The Tax Group, which she heads, has a role that is similar
to that of an external auditor in the private sector. Mrs. Stathis has spent her entire
professional career with the GAO. She served for five years as a Legislative Advisor to the
Comptroller General, responsible for the GAO’s liaison with eleven congressional
committees. She previously served in diversified audit and staff positions.

Mrs. Stathis is a certified public accountant and a member of the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants. She has been a national officer and chapter president of
organizations. Mrs. Stathis received her B.S. from East Tennessee State University and her
M.B.A. from George Washington University.
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media carried stories, the oversight subcommittees held hearings, and a resolution was
reached. But the cost to the IRS was great and included not only in the cost to develop
that one form, but also in the opportunity cost (that is, the time and effort that could have
been spent somewhere else.)
So I think that Roscoe’s idea that one of the ways of avoiding complexity is to come
up with a way to quickly develop and convey good information about effects is a good one.
I think that the IRS has a lot of this information already. It is just in a lot of different
places. And one way that Roscoe’s proposal could be implemented would be by bringing
together a lot of information that already exists. The tax form committee puts together
mock ups of forms; when those have been introduced in the legislative process, they have
sometimes shown how complex something can be. Similarly, I don’t believe that the focus
groups the IRS began using after the W-4 incident are used on all forms but only on the
ones that apply to more taxpayers. That particular process could be expanded, and that
information factored in sooner in the process.
The IRS is using compliance teams in the service centers to look at tax returns when
they come in and identify problems. Teams could be used to collect information. There
are industry specialists in the coordinated exam program who have a lot of knowledge about
particular industries. And there the IRS has town meetings, polls taxpayers, and does a
variety of interviews; all that information could be funneled in and used in this particular
process.

Note that all of these mechanisms I have mentioned deal with effects on taxpayers.
I believe that one of the least understood and least known effects of proposals is their
effect on the IRS. Who gives any thought to how many weeks of programming it is going
to take to change the computer system to implement something; whether it even can be
done, given the system that they have; or whether some simple change would make it a lot
more easily implemented?

To get at those kinds of questions will require some new mechanisms. The IRS now
uses task forces when a particular problem develops, and that same concept may have to
be used when proposals are coming along.
I think that the office of this selected official that Roscoe mentions could also be
used as an avenue-a hotline, if you will--to which IRS employees on the front line can
suggest ideas. There are a lot of tax examiners, revenue agents, people out there who
deal with taxpayers every day. They often know what the effect is going to be. They have
some sense of what kinds of complaints they are going to hear, and we have found in our
work that they often have some really good ideas. But they often don’t have an easy way
to convey that information to the right people or don’t know where to send that
information.
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I also think that there is a role for professional groups, such as the ABA and AICPA,
either individually or combined. The more widespread your information, the more systemic
it is and the more valuable I think it will be in providing some early warnings of problems
that might arise.
And what will we do with that systemic way of collecting all that information? How
will it be used? I think that the IRS can use it administratively to try to simplify some of
the programs it has responsibility for. But there may not be enough time in the legislative
process to do that, as Roscoe mentions. I think that delayed effective dates when the
situation will allow that is one way of providing more time for those things to be factored
in. Another way is to provide in the legislation itself that we are going to think about the
effects and collect the information that will be necessary to make that kind of judgment.

Another important consideration is how all the folks and the staff responsible for
drafting laws and regulations are going to value and use that information. I was thinking
about my own staff. I have a multidisciplinary staff of economists, some attorneys, some
accountants--a variety of specialists and a whole bunch of generalists. Yet, I think that they
all view things in somewhat stereotypical ways. You can always expect the economists to
raise a particular kind of question and to view something in a particular way. I also think
that by the time we have finished looking at an IRS program, we have enough knowledge
of the IRS and its problems to know whether our recommendations are really going to
work.

I worry that staff members don’t have enough practical business experience to really
know how business is going to react a tax law change, and I often send people out to try
to get that information. But it occurred to me that some of the other organizations that are
responsible for developing legislation and regulations may also need to think through either
the professional backgrounds or experience levels of people that they have involved in the
process.
I guess my one quibble with Roscoe’s paper concerns his comment on revenue (and
I think that my comments parallel those of Ken Gideon and of Dave Brockway), and that
is as long as we have a budget deficit, we are going to have to be concerned about
revenues, as unpalatable as that may sound.

So I would think that finding a solution to the structural deficit problem might be a
good step in the direction in which we want to head.
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COMPLEXITY IN THE TAX LEGISLATIVE PROCESS:
PROBLEMS AND PROPOSALS; ROLE OF CONGRESSIONAL STAFF
AND TAXPAYER REPRESENTATIVES

BERNARD M. "BOB” SHAPIRO
*

INTRODUCTION

Complexity in the U.S. income tax system has been well documented. Authoritative
pieces have been written on the causes, and many views expressed on what should be done.
Although many of the proposed solutions are commendable and necessary to foster the
need for simplification, two that are gaining academic interest--the holding of a
simplification convention and encouraging taxwriters to draft simple statutory laws leaving
technical details to Treasury interpretation and regulations--are unlikely to occur given
present congressional attitudes as well as the pressure for more, not less, statutory certainty.

This paper is designed to focus on tax simplification from the view of "how to do it" in
the present environment of the legislative process. It does not focus on specific provisions
except where necessary to discuss tax policy within the context of the process.

Two elements are critical for tax simplification to occur. First, there must be a vocal
constituency for simplification, rather than just general lip service to the goal of a simpler
tax code. Second, there must be changes in the tax legislative process. These changes will
not occur quickly.
I am making several proposals to foster tax simplification in the tax legislative process.
One may be viewed as controversial and possibly radical in the present political climate,
while the others are more within the traditional process. Nevertheless, changes must occur
if Congress is to make a serious effort to achieve simplification.
*Bernard M. "Bob" Shapiro is the National Director of Tax Policy and Legislative
Affairs for Price Waterhouse. He joined the firm in 1981. From 1977 to 1981, he had
been Chief of Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation of the U.S. Congress and had
been a member of that staff since 1967.

Mr. Shapiro received his B.A. from Washington Lee University in 1964 and his J.D.
in 1967 and his LL.M in taxation in 1970 from Georgetown University Law School. He
is a certified public accountant in Maryland and a Member of the Bar in the District of
Columbia. Mr. Shapiro is an Adjunct Professor in the Graduate Tax Program at
Georgetown University Law School and has taught courses on tax subjects at other schools.
In addition, he had been a frequent speaker at various institutes, conferences, and other
meetings, focusing on current developments in federal taxation.
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Questions do have to be raised: first, Is there a constituency for tax simplification?
second, Where is the need? and third, Who wants simplification?
Since politics and economics have dramatically affected the process of and complexity
in the tax system, it is important to review the congressional reforms in the 1970s and the
major political influences on tax policy in the 1980s. Only by looking back can we
understand how the present system developed. This will better enable us to look ahead to
decide how the present system can be improved.

Tax policy and process have also been significantly affected by the roles of
congressional staffs and taxpayer representatives (lobbyists). Each has had a major impact
on our tax system in recent years. Consequently, their roles and influences must be
understood if meaningful simplification is to be achieved.
This paper, in chronicling the tax policies over the last two decades that have produced
much of the complexity of our present tax system, repeats many of the same facts to explain
or illustrate different points. As a result, there will be repetition from one section to
another. The full development of each section is dependent on this repetition, particularly
for those readers who do not read all sections in the order in which they are presented.
Accordingly, please bear with the author in this respect.
This background information lays a foundation. The author lived through this period,
first as a member of a congressional tax staff, and closely involved with the process and
then as an observer of the process from the outside looking in. The views expressed are
therefore the author’s alone.
PROBLEMS: POLICY AND PROCESS CAUSES OF COMPLEXITY

Is There a Public Constituency for Tax Simplification?

In a poll of members of Congress asking whether they support tax simplification, the
answer clearly would be yes. If Congress supports tax simplification, then why don’t we
have it? The reason is more obvious than many of us may want to admit: there is really
no public constituency for tax simplification.

If you asked the public whether they support tax simplification, the answer also would
come back yes. But then, if you asked whether they would support the elimination of
particular exclusions or deductions, coupled with rate reductions, in order to have
simplification, I think the answer would be no. On the other hand, if you asked what areas
should be simplified in the tax laws, the responses would probably be that the rules for
employee expenses and miscellaneous itemized deductions, passive losses, or investment
interest should be simplified (which means liberalized or repealed). Thus, when taxpayers
say they support tax simplification, they really may mean this: "If simplification means that
I pay less tax, I support it; but if simplification means that I would or may pay more in
taxes, count me out."
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The business community often shares this attitude as well. Few concerns for complexity
were voiced about proposals for the investment credit, accelerated depreciation, domestic
international sales corporation benefits, or research and development credits. It is true that
these proposals had desirable objectives, but at the same time each added significantly to
the complexity of administering the tax laws.

Each senator or congressman represents a constituency of individuals and businesses
within his or her state or district. If there were a strong public constituency for tax
simplification, Congress would make simplification a major goal during its consideration of
revenue bills.

It is clearly within this context that we should analyze tax simplification as we look at
the role of the Congress, its staffs, and lobbyists. It is all too easy for us to blame these
groups for complexity; but members of Congress, as elected representatives, respond to the
voice of their constituents, and these constituents have not favored simplification when it
gets down to the specifics of accomplishing it.
Let’s begin with a review of some basic tax policy concepts. This is necessary to assess
how the problem of complexity might be dealt with from a legislative perspective.
Simplification: Where Is The Need? Who Wants It?

What Is Tax Policy?

The basic purpose of our federal tax system is to raise the necessary revenues for our
government to carry on its national obligations and responsibilities. These revenues come
mainly from individual and corporate income taxes; other sources include payroll taxes,
selected excise taxes, estate and gift taxes, customs duties, and various user fees.

When legislators evaluate tax proposals from a tax policy perspective, three major
criteria should be taken into account: equity, economic efficiency, and simplicity. This
means that our tax system should raise revenue in a manner that is fair, causes little
unintended distortion in the economy, and is easy to understand, comply with, and
administer. Proposals should meet these criteria as far as possible to be considered
consistent with good tax policy objectives.
Is A Simple Tax System Fair To Individual Taxpayers?
Certain federal taxes are models of simplicity for most individuals. The payroll tax
on employees and the telephone excise tax are examples. They are simple because the
individual taxpayers by and large have had no rules to learn, no decisions to make, no
information to assemble and process, and no forms to complete. Those sources of
complexity are dealt with by someone else.

Conceptually, a head tax would be the simplest of all taxes. More realistically, a
broad-based, low-rate tax system on gross income would be a very simple tax system for
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individuals. (There would still be considerable complexity in a gross income tax system,
both in terms of adding back many individuals to the tax rolls--who are off the tax rolls
today-and in defining income.) If all income were taxed with no deductions, it would take
a flat rate for individuals of about 12 percent to produce the same amount of receipts as
from our individual income tax. But would this be a fair or efficient system? Would it be
fair to tax the poor at the same rate as the wealthy? Is a progressive rate structure that is
based on the ability to pay a fairer system? Would it be fair to disregard the size of the
family, casualty losses, large medical expenses, charitable contributions, and other indicia
of the ability to pay? Are certain nontax objectives or incentives encouraged by deductions
or credits appropriate? Should fringe benefits be treated as income? and how should they
be valued? These and many other questions about the appropriateness and reasonableness
of such a tax system are valid.
What this suggests is that it is not possible to have a tax system with both considerable
simplicity and complete fairness. As we add equity by adapting the tax to the personal
circumstances of the taxpayer, we sacrifice simplicity. We have trade-offs and degrees of
simplification and equity. This is also why tax simplification means different things to
different people. Those who pay additional taxes as a result of the simple system are likely
to argue that it is unfair.
Is the Tax System Too Complicated for Individuals?

The fundamental norm of the individual income tax in the United States has always
been that an individual’s tax liability should reflect his or her ability to pay taxes. The
practical meaning of this principle has changed from one reform bill to the next, but the
principle itself has lasted and no doubt will be with us for a long time.
The upshot of the ability-to-pay norm is that taxpayers must participate in the
computation of tax because it is they who have most of the information about their ability
to pay, as defined legislatively: How large is the family? Has money been borrowed or
loaned? Have earnings been depleted by uninsured casualty losses or medical bills? Have
earnings been contributed for the benefit of others? What business costs have been
incurred in producing gross income?
In short, complexity enters the individual income tax in varying degrees for all taxpayers
because the income tax is meant to adapt to personal circumstances. Moreover, additional
complexity is faced by individuals who make investments or have business interests. The
tax rules for these activities were particularly complicated by the base-broadening aspects
of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA ’86).

Measuring Complexity for Individuals
Measuring how complex the system is and where the need for simplification may be
usually relates to the cost of the system to taxpayers. For most individual taxpayers, this
means the annual filing of their tax returns.
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Individuals who have income essentially from wages and take the standard deduction
are eligible to file the short form. The process for these people is relatively simple.

Individuals who have the same type of income but find it more advantageous to itemize
deductions, mainly because of home interest and state taxes, must file the long form. For
the majority of these people, the process is not complex, although they may use tax return
preparers to avoid the work, to ensure that they "get every deduction," or as insurance that
they comply appropriately.

The complexity increases as individuals have income from sources other than wages,
such as investment income. This tends to be more common in the case of higher-income
or wealthier individuals. These people also tend to have the type of expenses that are
related to their investments, which also adds to complexity. Most of these taxpayers use tax
return preparers, so for them the complexity lies in keeping and collecting the records for
the tax return preparer.
Those individuals who are self-employed or operate small businesses also have more
complicated situations, but most of these people need accounting assistance for their
business; the data retention and collection for tax filing usually takes place as a result of
the accounting service.
Although this analysis may be oversimplified, the issue raised here is whether there is
a real need for simplification for the great majority of individuals. Could the income tax
system ever be made so simple that individuals could do their own returns without
professional assistance? Probably not. Much of the complexity in the income tax reflects
the inherent complexity of many business and investment decisions. Filing tax returns is not
the criteria for simplicity as long as the compliance costs (tax return preparer fees) are
within an acceptable range.

The issue of complexity in the case of individuals instead revolves around the concerns
of tax advisers or practitioners who advise individuals on their investment and estate
planning. Although the perception of most individuals is that the tax system is very
complicated, they have accepted the use of tax return preparers. Few of these individual
taxpayers complain about complexity in the tax system, because they just are not exposed
to it.
The annual tax return filing process is generally accepted and routine. As long as the
compliance costs are reasonable, the only real taxpayer focus is on the amount of taxes due.
Thus, a taxpayer constituency is more focused on tax liability than on tax complexity. There
is just no large public constituency for tax simplification.
What About Corporations?

The highest degree of income tax complexity now falls on corporate taxpayers. Because
of the TRA ’86, all corporations must compute not one but two separate, fully elaborated
federal income taxes every year: the regular tax and the alternative minimum tax. TRA
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’86 also introduced new concepts for capitalizing expenses and taxing foreign income, and
corporate taxpayers regard these as especially burdensome.
Some believe that the greater complexity of the corporate income tax reflects a view
among tax policymakers that corporations have a vastly greater capacity than individuals to
cope with complexity and absorb its costs. In a phrase, "Computers can do anything."
However, it now appears that concern over complexity of the income tax is leading to the
formation of study groups and task forces, both in and out of government, for the purpose
of finding less complicated means of accomplishing the current objectives set for the
corporate income tax.
Some believe that one of the political reasons why the corporate tax has become so
complicated is that since corporations don’t vote in elections, it is more expedient to look
to that sector when there are revenue needs. Also, polls have consistently shown that the
public favors a corporation income tax. Thus, corporate base broadening gets all the
attention. As discussed in more detail later in this paper, the frequency of change and
multiplicity of new tax proposals--even before the ink is dry on recently enacted legislation
and before regulations are issued on the prior changes-have added enormous complexity
to the corporate sector.

To a much greater extent than individuals, most of whose basic exposure to the tax
system is to file annual tax returns, corporations take taxes into account in planning for
the future as well as for current transactions. The constant change and complex new
provisions have made sound and rational business planning a mine field of uncertainty for
many corporations, both large and small.

Compliance costs have skyrocketed for almost all corporations. Most corporations do
not have the staff to deal with all the new requirements for complianceand, therefore,
must use outside tax advisers, which may add appreciably to their compliance costs. Even
larger corporations with bigger in-house tax staffs are struggling today. The system has
become just too complicated for most corporations.
What About Tax Practitioners?

In one sense, tax complexity brings benefits for the tax professional because of the
continued and growing need for tax planning and compliance services. On the other hand,
this group should shoulder the professional responsibility of developing a constituency for
simplification. In the final analysis, cumbersome and complex tax rules, written without
proper regard for their administration, will hamper sound business decision making and
curtail new investment.
Tax professionals will share the responsibility for these
inefficiencies.
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What Are the Tax Policy Causes of Complexity?

There are three basic tax policy causes of complexity:

1. Use of the tax system for purposes other than raising revenue
2. Tax reform/base broadeners

3. Compliance

Each of these factors leads to the next one. The more the tax system is used for
economic, social, and other nonrevenue objectives, the greater the complexity. When the
system has too many incentives so that many taxpayers are perceived as not paying their fair
share of taxes or when revenues are needed for deficit reduction, tax reform or base
broadening becomes necessary, which adds significantly to complexity. With so many new
rules, additional compliance provisions are necessary to ensure that taxpayers comply with
the new law. Complexity is added and compounded at every stage.

Use of the Tax System for Purposes Other Than Raising Revenue
Although the main purpose of our tax system is to raise revenue, it also has been used
as a substitute for, or complement to, federal spending. What has been at issue is whether
an economic, social, health, energy, or trade objective is better accomplished by creating
tax incentives for decentralized, private action or by creating a centralized spending
program for public action.

Incentives for special activities through exclusions, deductions, or credits add complexity
to the system. The proliferation of these special provisions multiplies the complexity of the
tax system as it expands the general application of the rules to more taxpayers and sets up
interactions between the provisions.
As the statute grows, with different intentions and interpretations placed on the various
provisions, it becomes more difficult to understand the meaning of the language. In
addition, planning for transactions requires a greater level of sophistication than is necessary
or appropriate for our tax raising and collection process.

These special provisions have proliferated to serve various nontax objectives. For
example, the investment tax credit (ITC), accelerated depreciation rules, and the research
tax credit were adopted to encourage particular types of business investments deemed
beneficial to the economy. The substantial rewriting of the ACRS provision since 1981, the
tortured history of the ITC over the period 1962-86, and the two major restructurings since
1981 of the research credit illustrate how tax incentive provisions carry complexity into the
tax law. As a further illustration, to carry out one objective--increased employment of
certain disadvantaged individuals--three differing credit provisions have been used.
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Other special provisions have focused on incentives or tax relief for individuals. These
have included savings incentives (the short-lived "all savers" certificate and the
often-modified IRA provisions), the earned income credit for low-income workers with
dependents, and the child care credit, which has been revised on a number of occasions.

Effect of Incentives on Complexity
Each special tax incentive has had a desirable purpose and a constituency. Although
the tax policy objectives of equity, efficiency, and simplification should be taken into
account in considering these proposals, it is not always possible to give each of these full
weight in designing a proposal. In fact, efficiency and simplification will always suffer when
a proposal is designed to promote a specific activity.
Even though some criticize the Congress for enacting these special incentives, which
have led to complexity in the system, we should remember that many were initially
proposed by the administration.
Congress enacted them (often with substantial
modifications) and had the encouragement of private industry, organized labor, or both, in
most cases.
As more special incentives were enacted, the tax system became more complex.
Individuals and businesses have responded by taking advantage of the provisions to obtain
the favorable exclusions, deductions, or credits. This behavior affects the economic
efficiency of the marketplace while at the same time complicating decision making, since
taxpayers must take into account the tax as well as the economic and business effects of a
decision.

Tax Expenditure Concept
Stanley Surrey, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy during 1961-1968, first referred to the
use of the tax system to achieve social or economic policy goals as "tax expenditures."
Whereas the congressional appropriations process provides public spending for a specific
purpose, the use of the tax system to energize private spending for a specified purpose
through tax expenditures is considered to be "backdoor spending."
Moreover, as these incentive provisions have been reviewed over the years and adjusted
to better fit their intended purposes, more complexity has been added. Thus, the
cumulative effect of all the special provisions--along with the efforts to narrow their
applicability--has been enormous additional complexity to the tax system.

Tax ReformlBase Broadeners

In the last twenty years, Congress has enacted three major tax reform bills: 1969,
1976, and 1986. The first two primarily represented reactions to taxpayers who used "too
many" tax preferences and tax shelters and thus were not viewed as paying their fair share
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of tax. TRA ’86 bill was initially developed to achieve simplification and fairness through
broadening the base and lowering the rates; however, it was a comprehensive tax reform
effort driven by a desire for very low rates, which resulted in significant base broadening.
The final legislation added much complexity, particularly for higher-income individuals and
corporations, with the emphasis shifting from simplification to other goals.
Genesis of Tax Reform
When the Treasury Department recognized in the early 1960s that individuals and
corporations with significant income were paying little or no tax through use of tax
preferences, studies were undertaken to review most of these provisions. These Treasury
studies were published at the end of the Johnson administration and served as the basis for
Congress’s consideration of tax reform in 1969.

The objective of tax reform in 1969 was to review tax preferences to see if there was
still a valid purpose for their continuation. If not, the incentive preferences were to be
repealed. If the desired purpose was still believed to be appropriate, the provisions were
to be limited in general application and targeted to be more directly effective. As a
backstop, a minimum tax was enacted to ensure that all taxpayers would pay some tax.
Base Broadeners to Raise Revenue

When there has been a need to generate revenue but rate increases could not be
enacted because of political or policy considerations, the only source has been the base.
Thus, the tax bills of 1982, 1984, 1987, 1988, and 1989 (as well as the TRA ’86)
cumulatively made an enormous number of changes in the base of the tax system, driven
by the pressure to raise revenues.
Effect of Tax Reform and Base Broadeners on Complexity

Although tax reform, as well as revenue-driven base broadener bills, has been designed
to increase equity and economic efficiency, a consequence has been an increase in
complexity. To implement the new policies, new, tightly drawn statutory language is drafted
covering many special situations and including limitations, caps, phaseouts, and transition
rules. Thus, to achieve equity, much additional complexity is added to the tax system.
From 1969 onward, there has been a consistent focus on more equity and reform for
our tax system. This has contributed to the explosion of new rules requiring a voluminous
amount of legislation, regulations, and rulings to explain and interpret the new rules.

Compliance
The compliance area has received more attention for two reasons. First, as the tax
laws have become more complicated, the Internal Revenue Service has raised compliance
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concerns and Congress has enacted additional compliance provisions with stiffer penalties.
Thus, reform-oriented legislation has led to a more elaborate compliance structure, which
in turn has had the effect of adding more complexity to the overall system. There does not
seem to be an easy way to avoid this merry-go-round.

The second source of complexity in the compliance area has been the recognition that
by accelerating the payment of taxes, additional revenue is generated on a onetime basis
to meet certain revenue or budgetary goals. Much fine tuning has been done in the
compliance area to speed up the collection process. Stiffer compliance and accelerated
collection requirements add to the complexity by forcing taxpayers and their representatives
to respond faster to the overall process.

Overall Effect on Complexity
The use of our tax system for nontax objectives significantly adds to complexity. As
more special uses of the tax system are made, the fine tuning of these provisions to make
sure they work as intended and do not bestow "too great" a benefit on any individual or
business, later cutbacks in the provisions to raise revenues, and the added compliance
provisions to ensure that taxpayers follow the new law (or pay sooner to generate onetime
revenue gains) all add to the complexity of our system.

Thus, it is obvious we are unable to have both a simple and equitable system. But
can we make it less complicated?
Major Influences on Tax Policy in the 1980s

Three major influences on tax policy in the 1980s have had a significant impact on
complexity: presidential politics, the enactment of indexing; and the federal budget deficit,
which has required the congressional tax-writing committees to raise revenue for deficit
reduction.

Presidential Politics
In all three presidential elections in the 1980s, tax policy has been a crucial issue.
The subsequent emphasis by the White House on tax policies and congressional reactions
have affected the tax legislative process and led to significant complexity in the tax system.
1980 Presidential Campaign

During the 1980 presidential campaign, Ronald Reagan campaigned on an economic
philosophy referred to as "supply-side economics." One of its basic components was the
Roth-Kemp three-year 30-percent reduction of individual tax rates and the "10-5-3" capital
cost recovery system. After winning the 1980 election, President Reagan used this program
as the centerpiece of his economic initiatives in 1981. Supply-side economics, including
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across-the-board income tax rate cuts, were part of a larger strategy to reduce the size and
role of the federal government by curtailing the ability to increase revenues for new or
expanded federal discretionary spending.

The political landscape also changed significantly in 1981. The 1980 elections were a
landslide victory for a new Republican President and swept into office a new Republican
majority in the Senate, bringing in a new Republican Finance Committee chairman, Bob
Dole, who would be an activist on tax policy and not willing to follow the traditional
legislative procedures of waiting for the House to take the lead on taxes. The 1980
elections also saw the defeat of the chairman of the Ways and Means Committee at the
polls. A new chairman, Dan Rostenkowski, became the House leader on tax policy. These
political changes, coupled with a new economic and tax policy program, significantly
affected tax policy in the early 1980s.
When President Reagan proposed his program in 1981, it set in motion a frenzy for tax
cuts and special economic incentives. The President personally led the effort, which became
very partisan. The Congress jumped in as both tax-writing committees began deliberations,
essentially at the same time. The committee and floor battles were intense as Democrats
and Republicans--as well as liberals, moderates, and conservatives—clashed both politically
and ideologically, each competing for success and credit. The result was the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA), with revenue reductions of approximately $750 billion
over a five-year period.

With such a large reduction in revenues and without commensurate spending cuts, the
Federal Reserve Board, led by Chairman Volcker, forecasted huge budget deficits, which
they believed would precipitate inflationary pressures. As a result, the Federal Reserve
Board further tightened monetary policy and maintained this fiscal control while
encouraging the administration and Congress to take strong deficit reduction measures.
Two major deficit reduction bills followed: the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act
of 1982 (TEFRA) and the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (DEFRA).
"Revenue enhancement" was the key driver in both of these bills; tax policy was not
a major focus of attention. As a result, with the increasing number of changes being added
to the tax system first from ERTA and then from TEFRA and DEFRA, the tax laws
became more complex, and a growing concern for simplification began to develop. In 1983,
Senator Bill Bradley, a member of the Finance Committee, and Congressman Richard
Gephardt, then a member of the Ways and Means Committee, cosponsored a tax
simplification and fairness bill, The Fair Tax Act of 1983, which sparked the interest in
simplification. The fact sheet stated: "This legislation will make the federal income tax
system simpler and fairer and the economy more efficient. It will reduce tax rates and
eliminate most existing deductions, credits and exclusions. It also will raise revenues
approximately equal to those collected under existing laws without changing the tax burden
for any income group." Its basic premise was broadening the base and lowering the rates
without increasing or decreasing revenues overall.
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1984 Presidential Campaign
In the 1984 presidential campaign, Senator Bradley and Congressman Gephardt
encouraged Walter Mondale, the Democratic candidate, to embrace their tax simplification
program as part of his platform. But Mondale declined, stating that he wanted to make the
deficit his campaign economic issue, since President Reagan had campaigned in 1980 that
his economic program would balance the budget by 1984. With the deficits skyrocketing
to $200 billion, Mondale announced that his economic program was to reduce the deficit
and, as part of this effort, to raise revenues. Further, he specifically indicated the areas in
which he intended to focus as revenue raisers.
President Reagan, on the other hand, avoided the deficit issue and, in response to
Mondale’s tax program, indicated that his tax program was not raising revenues but rather
tax simplification. He indicated that he did not want to bring the specifics of his program
into a presidential debate and he would present his program after the election.

During the course of the presidential campaign, the Treasury Department, under
instructions from the White House, had been drafting a tax simplification program largely
immune from political consideration. When this plan was reviewed in the White House
after the election, it was viewed as so radical and controversial that it was released as a
Treasury proposal in December 1984 rather than as the President’s program. This proposal
called for a sweeping overhaul of the tax system, eliminating many tax incentives while at
the same time reducing rates. When it was ultimately proposed to the Congress by the
administration in May 1985, it was modified in many respects and labeled The President’s
Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth, and Simplicity, but it was often referred
to as "Treasury II."

When the tax reform bill finally was enacted in 1986, it was so comprehensive that it
touched almost every aspect of our tax system and significantly affected every individual
and business. Its theme had shifted from tax simplification to an obsession for low rates,
requiring much broadening of the tax base to achieve revenue neutrality.
This historic overhaul of the income tax system brought tax rates for both individuals
and corporations to levels that no one had seriously expected. The trade-off was a
substantial increase in complexity, particularly for higher-income individual investors, small
businesses, and almost all corporations.
For most low-income or middle-income
individual taxpayers, the lower rates and limited effect from the base broadening actually
simplified the tax system (except for the transition rules), while at the same time providing
tax reduction. The number of taxpayers who itemize deductions was reduced from
approximately 36 percent to 30 percent, and approximately 6 million low-income
individuals were removed from the tax rolls. But for the others, the additional complexity
was enormous.
1988 Presidential Campaign

During the 1988 presidential campaign, then-Vice President Bush uttered his "Read
my lips--no new taxes" pledge that carried him not only through the campaign but also
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into the beginning of his presidency.
rate to 15 percent.

He also advocated reducing the capital gains tax

This capital gains reduction became the centerpiece of President Bush’s first budget
proposal to the Congress and was the most controversial issue in this year’s deficit
reduction bill. This resulted in enormous political tension between the congressional
Democratic leadership and the administration and congressional Republicans.
When the President submitted his budget, he proposed raising about $5 billion in
revenues, mostly from his proposal for capital gains rate reduction. The Congress agreed
with the revenue amount (which lessened the amount of spending cuts to be made) but
not on the specifics, with the congressional Democrats again opting for base broadeners.
The battle ensued; and when the smoke cleared, the capital gains proposal had been
deferred to 1990 and another significant base broadening bill had been enacted, bringing
with it another wave of complexity.

Indexing

Prior to 1981, the government received a revenue benefit-viewed by some as an
unfair windfall-resulting from the fact that the tax system was not indexed for inflation.
As inflation-based wage increases pushed individuals into higher marginal rate brackets
(referred to as "bracket creep"), this hidden tax accounted for substantial additional
revenues to the Treasury.

The administration and Congress actually received a double benefit because, in
addition to receiving a revenue increase without new legislation, Congress was able to
use this money periodically to provide apparent tax reductions. In addition, the Treasury
and Congress were able to address inequities within the tax system with the use of this
money. This all changed after indexing for individuals became effective in 1985, after the
phase-in of the 1981 tax rate reductions was complete.
Although indexing in the tax system for individuals may very well be appropriate tax
policy, the result was that the government lost this revenue at a time when deficits grew
and political pressure to cut tax rates intensified. Congress found itself in a political bind:
It required revenue increases from complex base broadeners but was unable to enact
important corrective changes that might achieve greater simplicity or equity because of
revenue constraints. Thus, a tax policy initiative, indexing, has made a significant
contribution to complexity because of the huge revenue cost associated with it and other
major provisions of ERTA.
On the other hand, it should be noted that many of the tax bills in the 1970s, which
initiallywere designed to put the "inflation-generated tax" back into the economy, attracted
many other initiatives that contributed to the complexity that occurred in the 1970s.
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Federal Budget Deficit

Presidential politics has influenced tax policy in the 1980s in several significant respects.
First, by campaigning for, and then proposing a major reduction in, revenues, President
Reagan, with a vigorous assist from Congress, put the budget deeply in deficit. If this
program had been coordinated by linking revenue reductions to spending cuts, the huge
deficits might have been avoided. But the Reagan administration pursued a strategy of
suffering a large budget deficit and reducing taxes to emphasize spending cuts and a
diminution in the size and role of the federal government. The Federal Reserve Board’s
concern for the inflationary effect of this huge deficit caused it to use its monetary policies
to check the potential inflationary spiral. The message was clear. Reduce the deficit by
either spending cuts or revenue increases (on both), or tight monetary policy would remain.
Since President Reagan was firmly entrenched with a deficit policy of only spending
cuts and no revenue increases, and the budgets for spending cuts he submitted to Congress
were tagged ahead of time as "dead on arrival," this put tremendous pressure on the
Congress. As a result, Congress had to deal with the looming deficits and Federal Reserve
pressure essentially without the leadership from the administration or the support of the
Treasury Department on revenue-raising bills.

Revenue-Raising Bills for Deficit Reduction (1982, 1984, 1987, 1988, 1989)

In 1982, with the pressure to deal with the deficits and a budget that was "dead on
arrival," the Congress was put into a quandary at the outset. The chairman of the Ways and
Means Committee, Dan Rostenkowski, made a political decision that he, on behalf of the
Democrats, would not initiate a tax bill in the House until President Reagan agreed to lead
or support the process. When President Reagan did not budge, Chairman Rostenkowski
stood firm as well.
In the Senate, with a new Republican majority feeling the pressure to provide
leadership, the chairman of the Finance Committee, Bob Dole, recognized that revenues
clearly had to be a part of any program to deal with the deficit. He therefore initiated a
tax bill in the Senate to raise revenues to deal with the deficit. For the first time, then, a
major revenue bill was initiated in the Senate without a counterpart coming from the
House. Thus the House’s sole role in the 1982 revenue bill process occurred in the
conference.

The result was a revenue-driven tax bill without any significant tax policy analysis from
the Treasury or the House staff. This was a prescription for complexity. Before the ink
was even dry on ERTA, many revisions were made as new revenue tighteners were added
to the law, thereby bringing in the first wave of time-pressured, revenue-driven, complex tax
bills.
During 1983 and 1984 Congress repeated this process. Even with the full participation
of the House and some assistance from Treasury, DEFRA became a time-pressured,
revenue-driven complex tax bill. The 1987,1988, and 1989 bills also generally followed this
pattern.
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1985 Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Budget Act

The 1984 presidential campaign of President Reagan essentially ignored the deficit.
The President kept pushing spending cuts as the principal means for deficit reduction, but
Congress recognized that the time was now ripe for initiating a new budget discipline. This
resulted in the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation in 1985. It was meant to compel
Congress to meet predetermined targets in order to balance the budget by 1991. (Congress
subsequently delayed the balanced budget deadline until 1993.) It was anticipated by most
Members of Congress that this would require both revenue increases and spending cuts, but
it was left to the congressional budget process to determine how to meet the annual target
deficit levels.

TRA’86
The budgetary theme of the TRA ’86 was revenue neutrality, while the tax policy
themes were low rates and a broad base. At the outset, simplification was a primary policy
theme; however, during the process the political need for low rates resulted in the pressures
to broaden the base substantially. This resulted in much lower rates than anyone ever
anticipated, but at the same time, it brought with it many pressing decisions that were
driven by revenue rather than by tax policy considerations in order to fund the rate cuts.
The President participated significantly in the legislative process. Each time tax reform
faltered, he used his personal persuasion to push the program through Congress. With the
President’s support, both House and Senate roadblocks were pushed aside. Tax reform
began to have a "life of its own." Many policy decisions were made that pushed tax reform
ahead while sacrificing equity and simplicity to maintain revenue neutrality and lower rates.

STAFF AND LOBBYISTS:
ROLES AND EFFECT ON COMPLEXITY

Effects of Process Changes on Tax-Writing Committees

In the 1970s a number of changes occurred in the tax-writing committees (particularly
the Ways and Means Committee) that had a significant effect on the process, and thus the
outcome, of tax legislation. Several of these changes, combined with a dramatic increase
in tax legislative activity, led to the significant increase in the role and responsibility of
congressional staff and the participation of taxpayer representatives. It also contributed to
the increase of complexity in the tax system.
Ways and Means Democrats--Loss of Committee on Committees' Role

In 1974 there were a number of reforms in the committee process, particularly in the
House of Representatives. Up to that time, one of the major roles of the Democrats on
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the Ways and Means Committee, which contributed to its being considered the most
powerful committee in the House, was that of the Committee on Committees. This meant
that the fifteen Democrats on the House Ways and Means Committee made committee
assignments for new Democratic members as well as for those members who wanted to
transfer from one committee to another. The practical effect was to give the chairman of
the Ways and Means Committee significant power in dealing with other committee
chairmen and all House Democrats. To assure that the leadership would retain control of
the process, the membership on the Ways and Means Democratic side was generally limited
to members who had seniority and were not vulnerable in their re-election bids, which also
tended to make them less vulnerable to pressures from outside interests.
In 1974, the House Democrats moved the function of the Committee on Committees
from the Ways and Means Committee to a separate committee under the House
Democratic leadership. This change profoundly affected the role and power of the Ways
and Means Committee within the House leadership and ultimately in the legislative process.
Expansion of Tax-Writing Committees

House
Also in 1974, the House Democratic leadership expanded the Ways and Means
Committee from twenty-five to thirty-seven (now thirty-six) members. By creating a supermajority of Democrats, with twenty-five Democrats to twelve Republicans (a ratio of two
to one, plus one), the Democrats hoped to assure themselves of control of the panel. The
Republicans bitterly attacked these ratios as not representative of the House makeup of
Democrats and Republicans.
This change turned the mood of the committee from a generally congenial one between
Democrats and Republicans to one of strong, often bitter, partisanship. Prior to this
change, the Committee had made most of its decisions by consensus and the chairman tried
to accommodate the concerns of all members without partisan differences.
With several departures from the committee at that time, this expansion added a
significant number of new members to the committee and, for the first time, generally
opened the committee seats to more junior members, many of whom did not have safe
seats and as a result were more vulnerable to outside pressures with regard to tax
legislation.

Senate

In the Senate, the Finance Committee increased from seventeen to twenty members
(adding one new member in 1975 and two additional members in 1979), which means that
one-fifth of the Senate has members on the Finance Committee. Since there has
traditionally been more of a tendency to provide senatorial courtesy on issues of concern
to particular senators, this meant that there were more opportunities now for pressures from
outside interests to receive favorable consideration.
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Subcommittees

Prior to 1974, neither the Ways and Means Committee nor the Finance Committee
had subcommittees. This meant that all legislation was considered in the full committee.
House
When the House required committees to establish subcommittees, this meant a
significant change for the Ways and Means Committee. The Ways and Means Committee
created its subcommittees with legislative jurisdiction to report to the full committee. This
meant that the subcommittees had to develop staffs to deal with that legislation, thus
beginning a substantial increase in the number of staff on the full committee and on its
subcommittees.

Although jurisdiction over tax matters was retained in the full committee, the Ways
and Means Committee created a subcommittee to which the chairman from time to time
refers "select revenue measures." This subcommittee has performed a number of different
legislative functions, but in 1988 it embarked on the task of simplification when it
considered the chairman’s recommendation with respect to the corporate minimum tax.

Senate
On the Senate side, subcommittees were created by the Senate Finance Committee
but were not invested with legislative jurisdiction. The full committee retained all
legislative jurisdiction. As a result, the subcommittees essentially held hearings and were
staffed by the full committee staff.
Because of the increased amount of legislation that had started to develop in the
House and because more issues were being considered by the newly formed subcommittees,
members began to designate and hire specific tax legislative assistants. Whereas in the past
the members by and large reviewed tax measures themselves, now the increased legislative
workload meant they were relying more heavily on their tax aides to keep them informed.
It also should be noted that as the tax proposals became more complicated, broad policy
considerations gave way to more technical issues and the members needed more assistance
to deal with these technical matters. In the past, the technical and policy-related review
function had largely been carried out by the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation. The
expanding workload and expanded committee staff contributed to less consistency and thus
more complexity.
Hearings

A basic change in the tax legislative process has been the status and scope of hearings
on tax provisions. From what had traditionally been extensive hearings in the Ways and
Means Committee on proposed legislation (probably to an extreme in many cases), the
Committee now has very limited hearings. In some instances, the proceedings appear to
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be perfunctory (in order to say hearings have been held), rather than designed to obtain
information or views from those who may be affected by the proposed legislation.
Hearings in the Senate Finance Committee in the past were essentially based on a
House bill. The House would have passed tax legislation before the Senate began any
consideration of it. This allowed affected taxpayers the opportunity to see House statutory
language and the committee report. As a result, the Senate Finance Committee received
informed and detailed views, criticisms, and recommendations (and stronger lobbying
pressures) on the specifics of the House-passed bill, as well as views and recommendations
on other proposals.

Today, many hearings in the Ways and Means and Finance committees are limited in
scope and length and may be held on relatively short notice. Some witnesses conclude that
they do not receive a fair opportunity to present their views, particularly if few members
attend or seem to be paying attention. This leads to the conclusion that if affected
taxpayers want to present their case effectively, they must meet directly with members and
staff.
One important effect of the change in the hearings process is that it has shortened the
timing for committee consideration and action. A lengthy hearings process for each bill
afforded the staff more time to prepare background and relevant information for the
members, who then could focus more thoroughly on the effects of certain proposals. A
speed-up of the process increases pressure to act more quickly, with less information and
less constructive input from interested taxpayers. This limited role for hearings has had an
impact on complexity because less time is available for understanding the issues or
developing simpler approaches.

Markup Sessions

Traditionally, markup sessions, the committee decision-making part of the process,
were closed to the public. Only a few committee staff and Treasury officials were permitted
in the room; member staffs were not allowed to attend. There were all kinds of perceptions
as to what went on behind the closed doors. Although there were accommodations for
member concerns, the members generally focused on tax policy issues, particularly in the
absence of time or revenue pressures.

The 1974 House reforms opened the Ways and Means markup process to the public
(including lobbyists) unless the Committee votes to close the session. Under the Senate
rules, the Finance Committee generally cannot vote to hold a closed session. In recent
years, however, many decisions by the Finance Committee on tax bill provisions have been
made in closed committee "caucuses," followed by formal votes in open markup sessions.
Some observers of the legislative process argue that going from what traditionally had
been closed markup sessions to open sessions has had an adverse effect on the process,
rather than introducing "sunshine" into it. During open sessions, it is argued that members
react to the presence of lobbyists and the press in the room. That is, because they want to
make a favorable impression on the press and others, they may feel forced to take strong
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stands on constituent issues or, more important, may be reticent to ask questions that could
suggest a lack of knowledge and understanding of issues. In closed sessions, members may
feel freer to take tax policy considerations into account or to ask for information on
proposals being pushed by interest groups. Also, expansion of the committees and-particularly in the Ways and Means Committee--the addition of so many new members
without seniority and safe seats affects the decision-making process.
Although many markup sessions in recent years have been formally or effectively closed
to the public, the process has changed so much--particularly with time pressures--and the
tax law has become so complex that it has been very difficult for the members to get more
deeply involved in policy considerations. As the focus has changed to the amount of
revenue to be derived rather than tax policy objectives, the rules on open markup sessions
may no longer contribute significantly to greater complexity in the system.
Treasury Department’s Role in the Legislative Process

The role of the Treasury Department and the administration in the tax legislative
process also has changed significantly over the years.
Prior to the 1970s, when the administration proposed tax legislation, the Treasury
Department would submit statutory drafts and, often, technical explanations with the
proposals. This meant that much time and effort had been devoted by the Treasury
Department to analyzing and refining the proposals prior to their submission. One
advantage to having statutory draft language was that it compelled the proponents of a
proposal to place the proposal in its legislative context and address related policy issues that
had been flushed out in the drafting process. Thus, the policy and economic effects of the
proposals had generally been more fully studied.

During the course of hearings, witnesses could comment on the full impact of the
proposals, having been able to review proposed draft language and the technical
explanations. Congressional staff also could prepare better, since so much prior analysis
had been devoted to the proposals. This is one reason why there were no technical
corrections bills until after the Treasury Department stopped preparing legislative drafts.

In the 1980s, another significant change occurred. Because the administration opposed
revenue increases, the Treasury Department often played a lesser role in the revenue-raising
legislative processes. Policy suffered and complexity increased with this resource and
expertise on the sidelines during the consideration of many revenue bills. Again, this
development alone did not cause complexity, but it was a contributing factor.
Role of Congressional Staffs

It should be noted at the outset that major policy decisions on tax legislation are made
by the elected members of Congress. The staff do not vote, and their role is not to decide
whether rates are to be cut or investment or other incentive credits are to be enacted,
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modified, or repealed or an alternative minimum tax is to be enacted, etc. Rather, staff
serve to provide technical assistance to the members. At the same time, because the nature
of the legislative process has changed significantly, the role of the congressional staff has
become more prominent. In addition, since the staff make technical recommendations and
draft the statutory language and the committee reports, they do exert influence in the
process.

Let’s analyze the role of the staff and briefly set forth their traditional roles.
Traditional Roles

Prior to the mid-1970s there were relatively few congressional tax staffers (most of
whom were on the Joint Committee staff); as a result, the members themselves devoted
attention to specific tax proposals. Because today’s time pressures did not exist at that
time, the members had the opportunity to become more involved themselves in tax policy
issues. Members were able to rely more on the analysis of the Treasury staff and the Joint
Committee staff.
Tax-Writing Committee Staffs

The Ways and Means and Finance committees had small tax staffs; their role in the
legislative process prior to the mid-1970s was somewhat limited. The Ways and Means
Committee had two or three staff members who had tax backgrounds on the majority side
and one or two on the minority side. These tax staffers generally did not actively
participate in the legislative process other than to provide information to the members
during hearings and assist them with questions they had during markup sessions. The staff
also was responsible for responding to tax correspondence forwarded to the committee. In
addition, the staffers attended the sessions in which the committee’s decisions were formally
drafted and reviewed the committee report, particularly those portions in which the
members had a special interest.
On the Senate side, the Finance Committee did not have a minority staff until the
mid-1970s. There were two or three majority staff who performed essentially the same
roles as the Ways and Means tax staff.
Joint Committee on Taxation Staff

The major staff role during the tax legislative process was carried out by the staff of the
Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT). This nonpartisan staff serves as the technical advisers
to both tax-writing committees, as well as to individual members, and participates during
the entire course of the tax legislative process, both in the House and the Senate, as well
as the Conference Committee. The JCT staff prepares summaries of administration and
other tax proposals, background materials to help members prepare for the hearings, and
explanations and analyses, along with recommendations (or options), in documents used in
markup sessions.
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In markup sessions, the JCT staff has the principal responsibility of assisting the
members in the decision-making process. At the same time, the Treasury staff traditionally
was usually an active participant in advancing the administration’s proposals and giving its
views on alternatives or new proposals advanced by committee members. As previously
noted, the Treasury staff's role was severely restricted during much of the 1980s.

When the committee finishes its conceptual decision making, the JCT staff participates
in the formal drafting sessions conducted by the House or Senate Legislative Counsel’s
office, during which the committee’s decisions are translated into legislative language. At
the same time, the staff is drafting the committee’s report to accompany the
committee-approved bill, which is formally submitted to the House or the Senate for
consideration and ultimate passage.
In conference, the JCT staff prepares a document outlining the differences between
the two Houses’ versions and participates actively in the conference process, during which
the senior members of the two tax-writing committees have to work out their differences.

Member Staffs
Prior to the mid 1970s, Ways and Means Committee members generally did not have
tax legislative assistants. As a result, the members participated in the hearings and markup
sessions essentially doing much of their own preparation with the support of the committee
and JCT staffs. As tax legislation began being considered more frequently, Finance
Committee members acted sooner than Ways and Means members in designating personal
staff to be responsible for tax issues. Since most senators serve on several major
committees, they have less time for Finance Committee business. Unlike the Senate, Ways
and Means members generally do not serve on other major committees and, therefore,
delayed adding tax legislative assistants to their personal staffs for a couple of years.
Increase in Tax Staff
In the mid-1970’s, the tax-writing committees and their members began increasing
their staffs. The committee staffs became more directly involved in legislative matters.
On the House side, the committee established subcommittees, and the subcommittees
started developing their own staffs. As a result of these changes, the Ways and Means
staff began to grow. Since 1974 the number of staff has more than tripled.

The subcommittees of the Senate Finance Committee do not have legislative
jurisdiction and essentially only hold hearings. As a result, the subcommittees tend not to
have staff; usually, the chairman of that subcommittee uses his own staff along with the
committee staff to deal with the hearings and related matters. However, the full committee
staff began to increase, and each member added at least one tax legislative assistant. In
some cases, members use additional staffs in their office to support the tax legislative
responsibilities because the increased amount of tax work over the years is more than the
committee’s staff and their tax legislative assistants can cover.
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As the process began to change--with the decreased importance of hearings and the
change to open markup sessions-the role of the congressional staff began to increase. On
the House side, one major change that had a significant effect was the addition of many
new Ways and Means members. More than one-third of the members were new when the
committee was expanded in 1974. Between 1974 and 1978 alone, over two-thirds of the
members of the committee were new. These new members generally did not have a
previous knowledge of the tax system and thus had to rely more on the staff.
Because of the needs of the new members, openness of the decision-making process,
and less reliance on extensive hearings, the staff became more visible. As the staffers
continued to increase and became more visible, the perception and reality of staff influence
increased.

On the Senate side, the openness of the process had a major effect on the role of the
staff. Since the Senate traditionally worked from the House bill and the JCT staff was
familiar with the bill’s provisions, the relevant background, and the Ways and Means
Committee’s deliberations, the JCT staffs role and knowledge made them more visible
during Senate consideration.
Effect of 1980 Congressional Elections
Following the 1980 congressional elections, there were new chairmen of the tax-writing
committees and major staff changes. First, almost completely new majority staffs, with
strong technical capabilities, were put together for each committee. Also, as a result of
having a new Republican president and a new Republican Senate, partisanship began to
develop in general and particularly on tax issues, starting with ERTA. As a result, the
chairmen relied on the committee staffs to a greater extent for partisan alternatives and
relied less on the traditional use of the nonpartisan JCT staff.

The JCT staffs role, however, was still important because of its institutional knowledge
and the general respect for its technical competency and nonpartisanship. In addition, the
need for revenue estimates became increasingly more important; this role continued to be
exclusively in the domain of the JCT staff for the tax-writing committees.

The continued pressure to raise revenues because of the budget deficits in the 1980s
also had a significant impact on the role of the congressional staffs. Revenue acts began
to come year after year; even when there was no revenue act during a year, there usually
was a major tax bill considered, since some bills took two years to be enacted.
The multitude of new provisions and complexity of the legislation during the 1980s
started taking its toll on the process. Members had previously been used to focusing on
major policy questions, but now there were fewer such issues. Legislative proposals were
revenue-driven and therefore more detailed; highly technical aspects of the tax laws began
to be considered by the committees. Thus, greater burdens fell on the staffs to make
recommendations and take a lead on policy, particularly because the administration’s
opposition to revenue raising meant that the Treasury staffs ability to participate was
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curtailed. This is one reason why, at the final stages of consideration of a bill, either in the
committee and particularly in the conference, decisions were based on listings with revenue
numbers rather than policy descriptions. Since the revenue need has become the principal
driving force in the decision-making process and the level of detail can be extremely
complicated, the members have frequently found it very difficult to analyze fully the details
of provisions.

Relationships With Treasury Staff
Historically, there had been a close working relationship between the staffs of the JCT
and the Treasury Department; in the past, however, the Treasury had little direct contact
with the staffs of the Ways and Means and Finance Committees. Treasury’s role was to
initiate recommendations and to advocate its tax policy positions; the JCT staff gave
technical advice to Congress (including alternatives to Treasury proposals) without taking
stands for or against positions. The JCT staff does make recommendations to the chairmen
and often submits suggestions to the committee for consideration, but in the formal markup
sessions, the traditional role of that staff has not been that of advocate.
In the 1980s, these relationships shifted. As each tax-writing committee developed its
own tax staff and with Republican control of the Senate, the role of the Treasury
Department changed. Treasury’s posture was also affected by the partisanship that
developed in both Houses. This put pressure on Treasury to work more closely with the
Republican Senate Finance Committee, or so it was commonly perceived. The working
relationship with the JCT staff was no longer the same because of the emergence of more
active tax-writing committee staffs. Although the relationship between the Treasury and
JCT staffs was still good and there was still coordination on technical matters, the broader
policy initiatives were diffused to a great extent and, for the first time, being considered by
the committees’ tax staffs.
Another significant factor that affected the Treasury Department was the
administration’s posture on tax legislation. When President Reagan indicated that he
would neither propose nor support any measures that raised revenues, this limited the role
of the Treasury Department in the initiation of tax matters as well as in the general
legislative process. As a result, the chairmen and the committee members looked less to
the Treasury Department for guidance, which put more pressure on the committee staffs.

As indicated previously, the role of the tax-writing committees’ staffs has grown
significantly, primarily as a result of partisanship and the reduced role of the Treasury
Department in revenue-raising matters. Whereas the JCT staff used to have the close
working relationship with the chairmen, the committee’s staffs have now assumed that
function to coordinate tax bills before their respective committees. The JCT’s role is still
crucial, but primarily for technical support (because of the staffs expertise and institutional
knowledge) and revenue analysis.
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Role of Members' Staffs

The role of the members’ personal staffs (legislative assistants) has increased
significantly. As revenue-driven tax legislation is being considered more frequently, with
all areas potentially on the list for base broadening, the technical complexity has required
most members to rely more heavily on their staffs. As a result, the legislative assistants
have become heavily involved in the process. Businesses that would be affected by
proposed changes, and their lobbyists, find it necessary to meet with the member’s staff as
well as with the member. In many cases, a legislative assistant takes the pressure off the
member from the outside world, but adds another layer of involvement into the legislative
process.
Legislative assistants have been given responsibilities for attending hearings, particularly
if the member cannot be present, and keeping the member informed of developments at
all stages of the process. In some cases, close relationships have developed between some
legislative assistants and outside interests, particularly with regard to an issue his or her
member supports.

Role of the Chairman's Mark
In the past, the tax-writing committees, particularly the Ways and Means Committee,
generally developed legislation by consensus, with few formal votes. In the Finance
Committee, where more frequent votes were taken, the final count was held open so that
absent Senators could vote; thus results on particular items could be reversed up to the final
vote by the committee approving the bill. For drafting purposes, the members made
tentative conceptual decisions. The language of a bill was drafted in the Legislative
Counsel’s office and then brought back to the committee for final consideration, this time
on the legislative language. As staff read through the bill, they pointed out to members the
specifics of drafting decisions that had been made. The committee, of course, did not study
the language word for word, but rather had the opportunity to review their decisions as the
staff outlined the bill. In addition, this process afforded the staff the opportunity to present
issues to the committee that may have arisen during the drafting sessions.

On a number of occasions in the 1980s, the chairman presented a "chairman’s mark"
for consideration by the committee at the outset of the markup sessions. The mark consists
of the Chairman’s recommendations and is generally developed by the majority staff. Thus,
the initial decision making is done by the staff, in consultation with the chairman, before
the committee meets on the bill. This process, in effect, requires members to make
proposals formally to add, delete, or modify provisions in the chairman’s mark. This
procedure greatly adds to the influence of the majority staff.
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Role in Revenue Estimators
In the Past
When proposals were initiated by Treasury, they were usually accompanied by revenue
estimates so that the committee knew the general magnitude of each provision and the
overall revenue gain or losses from Treasury proposals. Because the legislation was not
revenue-sensitive, the committee rarely focused on revenue effects until after the first round
of decisions. Since most pre-1980 tax legislation involved tax reductions (essentially
returning the "inflation tax," or "bracket creep," back into the economy), the committee
made its decisions without specific revenue estimates. After the decisions, the JCT staff
determined how much revenue was raised (as in the 1969 and 1976 tax reform bills) or was
available for distribution.

Revenue estimates were made by the JCT staff in consultation with the Treasury
Department. Since revenue consequences were rarely the controlling issues, there was
little concern about revenue estimating until the middle 1970s, when issues such as capital
gain rate reductions focused on the question of "static" versus "dynamic" estimates.
Today

In the 1980s, revenue became central to the process; the fate of many proposals
depended on how much revenue they would raise, rather than on tax policy or complexity.
During consideration of the TRA ’86, the committees determined tentative rate schedules
and then made the tax reform decisions to raise the revenue; this put tremendous pressure
on the revenue effects of the decisions. The revenue consequences of the deficit reduction
bills seem more crucial than the policy changes.
Outlook

In 1986, there were about 500 revenue estimates requested by committee members; in
1989, there were more than twice that many. Since the proposed changes have been very
technical, added burdens have been placed on the estimators. Thus, the sheer numbers of
revenue estimates, the short time for their completion, and the complexity of the provisions
suggest that this part of the process is getting dangerously close to the saturation point.

Statutory Language
The statutory language of the committee’s decisions is drafted in the House and Senate
Legislative Counsel’s offices, which are nonpartisan drafting services for the congressional
committees. Each has the responsibility for translating its committee’s conceptual decisions
into statutory language and is assisted by the committee staffs and the Treasury
Department.
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In the past, the legislative process was very conducive to the formulation of statutory
language. Treasury submitted drafts in advance, and the committees’ markup process was
not constrained by time pressures, which allowed more time to draft. But more important,
the policies reflected by the Committees’ decisions were more basic and did not require the
complicated statutory language that has been required over the past several years.
Today, as the decisions become more and more complicated and greater pressure is
applied to the process, allowing less drafting time, the statutory language has become
enormously complex. Although some argue that regulations-type provisions are being
drafted into statutory language, the problem is more that the legislation reflects, in many
cases, the uneven levels at which the committee decisions are made. When the provisions
are further fine-tuned for revenue purposes, these types of detailed technical policy
decisions are the result.

The basic problem is that in the end the drafting is subordinated to the necessity of
reaching revenue targets, and does not necessarily reflect sound tax policy. In fact, there
have been instances in drafting sessions when the question was whether to draft a provision
based on the committee decision or on the revenue estimate given the committee, if there
was a difference.
Staff Role as a Result of Tax Complexity

With more staff, a reduced Treasury role, an increased role for committee staffsalong with a modified JCT staff role, revenue-driven tax bills, tight time schedules, and
growing complexity--the entire process has changed radically.

The drive to generate additional revenues has become so intense that it has required
repeated reviews of the tax laws to make progressively more technical and limited changes
at levels that the committees have never previously considered. These have included the
types of changes that before were either done in drafting sessions to carry out the
committee’s broader policy decisions or, in some cases, made administratively in the
regulatory process. As the proposals have become more complex, and the pressures for
revenue have increased, it has become easier for members to focus primarily on the
revenue that is to be generated. This has resulted in more decision making at the staff
level because of the technical nature of these proposals.
Role of Taxpayer Representatives

The term taxpayer representative includes a broad range of advocates, but generally
means lobbyists who represent special interests before Congress and the administration.
Although by far the most visible lobbyists generally represent business interests, these are
not the only groups that represent special interests and contribute to the complexity of the
tax system.
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In theory, the congressional tax-writing committees and the administration are
expected to focus on social and equity issues that affect individual taxpayers. There are
influential organizations (or so-called public interest groups), such as the American
Association of Retired Persons that speak on behalf of individuals.
In addition, smaller businesses such as sole proprietorships, partnerships, and
subchapter S corporations are represented by groups like the National Federation of
Independent Businessmen. Medium-sized and fast-growing firms are represented by
groups like the American Business Conference, while the country’s largest companies
are represented by organizations like the Business Roundtable. General business groups
that serve a wide range of business interests include the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and
the National Association of Manufacturers.

Trade associations have become increasingly important in recent years as companies
with similar business lines seek to band together to represent their members on broad
industry issues. Associations are most effective when the industry is united on a given
issue. However, because of the broad diversification that has taken place among U.S.
businesses, it has become increasingly difficult in recent years for trade associations to
represent their entire membership on other than the most basic items of concern to a
particular industry. Frequently, these lobbying efforts involve grass roots campaigns that
seek to bring pressure to bear on one or more members of Congress because of
significant constituent concerns.
Treasury's Role in the Lobbying Process

Even those who are lobbied become lobbyists on occasion. For example, when the
Treasury Department puts forth a tax proposal (such as the tax reform initiative of the
mid-1980s or the capital gains reduction urged by President Bush in 1989) the Treasury
Department lobbies members of Congress to support their positions. In addition, Treasury
generally participates in markup sessions in the House and Senate tax-writing committees
and in conference sessions, actively taking positions for or against various proposals.
Individual members of Congress also lobby each other for votes that will help their
constituents, and will seek to influence Treasury’s implementation of tax laws through
regulations if the Members believe Treasury is incorrectly or unfairly interpreting a
legislative change that will adversely affect a constituent.

In the Past

Prior to the 1980s, Congress focused on major areas of the tax system over a lengthy
period of time before making changes to existing law. Congress indicated far in advance
the areas it planned to study, allowing businesses to present their arguments and
modifications on particular proposals at the appropriate point in the process.
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Many companies believed that direct lobbying was not appropriate for them, and
therefore, they were less visibly involved in the lobbying process. In many instances these
companies relied on trade associations and other groups-generally, high-visibility
lobbyists--that were active in Washington to lobby their issues. For many companies it was
generally not consistent with their corporate philosophy to engage in lobbying-type activities
under their own name.
Thus, major trade associations-particularly in such areas as real estate, financial
services, and oil and gas-took the lead in attempting to influence the legislative process,
particularly in the major tax reform bills of 1969 and 1976.

In the 1980s

With the changes that occurred in the early 1980s businesses realized that they could
have a more immediate impact on tax law changes. At the same time, businesses and
business groups found themselves scrambling to protect not only the gains they had realized
in ERTA but also other provisions in the Code that had been enacted to encourage specific
economic activities.
Business began to see that it was necessary to deal directly with Congress, or to form
coalitions to deal with Congress, to defeat proposals that arose in 1982 and that were likely
to be raised in future legislation as well. An increasing number of corporations realized
that they had to become more active in Washington--either individually or through trade
associations or ad hoc coalitions-to protect their interests and to make sure that members
and their staffs were fully aware of the impact a particular tax law change would have on
business constituents. In addition, many companies began hiring lobbyists to represent their
interests in Washington, not only on current issues but on issues that might arise in the
future.

The process no longer included an announced listing of proposals to be considered in
a lengthy hearing and markup process. Thus business had to be prepared in advance to
anticipate proposals that would adversely affect their operations.

Many business advocates generally represent a particular company directly. They may
include the tax directors, controllers, or vice presidents of finance and, if the issue is
significant enough, may even include the chief executive officers of large companies. In
addition, many of the nation’s largest businesses maintain Washington offices, whose
government representative staffs deal directly with Congress and the administration on a
wide range of issues—including taxes.
Furthermore, businesses will frequently hire firms established to represent business
interests before the administration or Congress. These lobbying firms have both technical
expertise and contacts or personal relationships with members of Congress, which gives
them the opportunity to affect proposed legislation or regulations as they work their way
through the system.
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Businesses also have used temporary coalitions made up of representatives of diverse
industries that have similar tax problems, to seek the best treatment before Congress and
the administration. In this way they share costs and have a broader constituency to
accomplish their objectives. These coalitions will often hire lobbyists who work jointly with
company representatives to represent their interests.

Thus lobbyists may work directly for a business or may be members of trade
associations or law, accounting, or consulting firms with special expertise in particular
subject areas and with access to members of Congress and the congressional and
administration staffs.
Access to Members and the Influence Of PACs

In most cases, the important advantage a lobbyist brings to business is access to key
policymakers and the ability to present the special circumstances of a business as legislative
or regulatory changes occur. In fact, many lobbyists are former members or key staffers of
Congress or the administration.
The amount of access a lobbyist commands has been aided in part by changes in the
1970s that allowed companies to form political action committees (PACs), which collect
political contributions from those who work for the company. PAC members may ear
mark their contributions for particular candidates, but generally allow the PAC to determine
which members of Congress will receive contributions. Although federal law generally
limits PAC contributions to $10,000 per member for a two-year cycle, the corporate PAC
has become a substantial campaign financial source for members.
In addition, honoraria for speeches and papers provides members of Congress with
outside sources of income. (In 1989 the House acted to ban, and the Senate to limit,
further honoraria members may accept.)
Thus, PACs that can afford to make political contributions and companies that will
pay honoraria to members may, in effect, gain limited access to members because of their
support. This is not to say that members are swayed as a result, but they are more likely
to listen to the arguments the contributors bring to them. It is unlikely that a member who
opposes the view of a particular lobbying group will change his or her position because of
a campaign contribution or payment of honoraria, but members who have not made up
their minds are more likely to listen to the arguments their supporters bring to them.

Activity of Business Lobbyists

With the rapid pace of tax legislation over the past several years, business
representatives had to anticipate potential attacks on issues of concern to them. Since
business representatives were unable to reach the congressional tax writers through the
hearing process, members and staffs had to be educated on how provisions applied to
businesses. This meant business lobbyists had to get to know the members and staffs and
set up individual meetings to explain their particular views on various tax proposals.
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Because these issues have become more and more complex, members have turned over
greater responsibilities to both personal and committee staffs. Therefore, a major dialogue
has taken place, and continues to take place, involving lobbyists, the staffs of the members,
and committee staffs. The role of the hearing process has been replaced by a deluge of
meetings with members and staff to make sure that the taxpayers’ cases are fully
understood.
Effect of Complexity

Lobbyists have had to choose between (1) either arguing against any change in current
law altogether and taking the risk of losing that argument or recognizing that some
modifications are likely and (2) finding a way to minimize the negative effects on
their business activities.

When the second option is pursued, as it is more and more frequently in this era of tax
legislation driven by revenue needs, it has had the effect of increasing complexity to an even
greater extent. Business representatives seek to fine-tune the Code to provide special rules
for an increasingly narrow group of taxpayers. In addition, the proliferation of special
transition rules and phase-ins (or phase-outs) of particular provisions of law has obviously
added substantial complexity-albeit at the request of lobbyists--to the administration of the
tax law.
PROPOSALS: NEED TO MODIFY THE PROCESS

Simplification-Can We Develop a Constituency?

Two things must happen for meaningful simplification to occur. First, a constituency
for tax simplification must be developed. Second, the tax legislative process must be
changed.

As discussed previously, it is unlikely that a constituency of an influential group of
individual taxpayers will ever insist on simplification because most are not affected by the
complexity. In addition, the higher-income individuals who are affected not only are not
likely to complain publicly but usually have sophisticated advisers completing their tax
returns and providing investment advice. Moreover, in many cases the higher-income
individuals benefit from some of the more complex provisions.
The business community, in general, will also find it difficult to support simplification
publicly. Larger businesses tend to focus tax legislative support or opposition to proposals
that are expected to have a bottom-line effect on investment activity. Complexity in the law
is a problem for many larger businesses, but it is the stepchild in tax policy and planning.
When an issue presents both bottom-line concern and serious problems of administration
because of complexity, larger businesses can be an effective voice for simplification. The
package of changes to the corporate minimum tax in the Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989
is a good example of a coordinated effort to correct some of these problems.
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Small businesses are usually the most effective in successfully advocating repeal of
complex tax rules. The recent repeal of section 89, which generated significant interest by
small business, is a good example of what this group can accomplish. Nevertheless, even
small business groups are not likely to make simplification a high priority.
Because groups outside the technical side of the process are not likely to promote
simplification, the constituency will have to come largely from within. Three major groups
will have to lead this charge: professional tax advisers, who deal more directly with the
system in advising clients; the Treasury Department, which, from its position as regulator
and collector, is closest to the system; and Congress, which must be willing to participate
and take a lead role.
The next section suggests some ways to stimulate an interest in Congress and to
encourage the use of the collegial process among professional tax groups. The role of the
Treasury Department is generally outside the scope of this paper, although suggestions for
its role in the legislative process are made where appropriate, since Treasury’s participation
in simplification would be a big contribution to any potential success.
Possible Process Changes to Foster Simplification

There are no easy prescriptions for achieving a simpler tax system, even assuming a
constituency for simplification could be developed. Although much concern about
complexity in the Tax Code has been voiced, the revenue and timing constraints imposed
on the tax legislative process-a direct result of the deficit reduction and reconciliation
process--have actually led to greater complexity. Therefore, to promote simplification,
significant revisions must be made to the budget and tax legislative processes.
With no effective public constituency for simplification, the burden falls on Congress
to initiate major changes in the process if the goal of simplifying the tax system is to be
achieved. If appropriately implemented, these changes could enhance the budget process
as well as the tax legislative process and lead to the initiation of tax simplification projects
supported by the tax-writing committees.

To develop a momentum leading to meaningful simplification, the following
components of the problem must be explored:

1.

The federal budget process. The pressure for revenue-driven tax bills must be
eliminated or at least reduced substantially.

2.

Increased congressional support. In spite of the absence of a large, vocal public
constituency for tax simplification, Congress will have to take the lead.

3.

The legislative process. The present time-pressured process will have to be
slowed and procedures that will make simplification possible will have to be
implemented.
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I do not want to pretend that the following suggestions will be easy to implement;
they will not. In fact, some may be politically difficult, if not impossible. But if simplification
is to be achieved, bold proposals must be made and discussed now so that, over time,
intellectual and legislative momentum can be generated and the present direction of
increased complexity in tax legislation reversed.

Budget Process
Because forecasted federal budget deficits are high relative to the annual
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings target levels for deficit reduction, there will continue to be strong
pressures on the entire budget process. Reconciliation of deficits to the Gramm-RudmanHollings requirements has been the outlet for this pressure, with sequestration as the
threatened deficit reduction alternative.
Prior to Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, Congress and the president could always decide
simply to do nothing. But now, because of the constant threat of sequestration, that option
is no longer available, and lawmakers are under extreme pressure every year to do
something. When combined with the political realities of the budget debate, this means
that there is constant pressure to change the Tax Code to produce additional revenues.
Over the past decade, the administration’s budgets have generally been treated as
"dead on arrival" largely because the deficit reduction proposals were viewed by Congress
as politically unrealistic. To the extent the budgets have included some revenue increase
proposals, they were minor and essentially have involved excise taxes or trust fund fees.
This simply was not acceptable to a Congress that was being asked to make large and
sometimes unprecedented changes in spending. President Bush’s first budget, however, did
include about $5 billion in revenues; the centerpiece of that, however, was a reduction in
the capital gains tax rate to 15 percent, which could have generated revenue for deficit
reduction in the short term, but in the out years potential revenue costs were controversial.

President Bush, like his predecessor, has strongly opposed raising revenues as a means
of reducing the deficit. Nonetheless, during the 1980s--and what would appear to be
foreseeable for the 1990s--each time there has been a deficit reduction bill, revenue
increases have been a large part of the overall deficit reduction. This is because revenue
increases in the form of "base broadeners," "loophole closers," user fees, or tax changes of
limited applicability have not been perceived by the general public as tax increases.
Moreover, they have taken the pressure off making larger spending cuts that would face
widespread opposition or affect particular political constituencies.
Once the deficit targets have been set in the congressional budget process, it has
generally been assumed that a portion of the needed deficit reduction would be derived
from increased revenues. The amount allocated to revenues has generally been about 50
percent of the total need, with the remaining 50 percent consisting of spending cuts.
However, as the numbers were refined, the amount that actually was allocated to the
revenue portion of deficit reduction has generally been less, particularly in recent years.
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The pressures of deficit reduction, combined with the short time periods during which
reconciliation bills have been produced, have strained the tax legislative process
significantly. This has resulted in revenue-driven tax bills that have increased the
complexity of the tax system enormously. It would appear that this is quite likely to
continue in the future, unless changes are made in the budget process.
The following suggestions might be controversial and, in some respects, might not be
attainable because of the political dynamics involved. However, it would appear that
several of the proposals would not only enhance the budget process, but would clearly
benefit tax policy and possibly reduce the complexity in the tax system resulting from
revenue-driven tax bills. The following discussion outlines these recommendations and
provides a commentary on their implementation and practicality.

Deficit Surcharge
The congressional budget process should be revised to require that, to the extent
revenues are included in any reconciliation deficit reduction instruction, an across-the-board
surcharge be imposed automatically and without further congressional action. This is not
a recommendation that taxes be increased; rather, it is a proposal for a procedure for
implementing whatever tax increase Congress determines is required to meet its deficit
reduction instruction. The purpose of this procedure would be to prevent complex,
revenue-driven tax legislation from being enacted hurriedly to satisfy the budget process.

This would have two major effects. First, the revenue portion of any deficit reduction
bill would be simpler. The amount of the "deficit surcharge" would be set and the rates
adjusted to meet the current revenue goal only. For example, if $5 billion of additional
revenues were required over a two-year period for a deficit reduction reconciliation
package, the across-the-board surcharge on individual and corporate income tax liabilities
would be about 0.5 percent. (A two-year period is specified in this example because a focus
on only the first-year effect of a surcharge would exaggerate the size of the surcharge rate
because of the transition in implementation and collection.)
The value of a surcharge is that it could be temporary and could be reduced or
eliminated if additional spending cuts are achieved or if additional revenues are raised
from other sources (outside of the budget process). This would eliminate the need for the
tax-writing committees to produce major tax bills on an annual basis solely to comply with
deficit reduction requirements.
The second major benefit of this proposal is that it would put the pressure where many
believe it needs to be: on spending. Because there is generally little or no visibility for the
revenue components of most deficit reduction bills, much of the political pressure for
spending cuts is removed. If the President and members of Congress want to reduce the
deficit through spending cuts rather than revenue increases, there would be more pressure
actually to make the spending cuts. In contrast, in recent years the revenue portion of
reconciliation accounted for a substantial part of the overall deficit package. Because the
revenue components have not attracted widespread attention or controversy, pressure to
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make greater spending cuts has been relieved, with the result that enormous complexity has
been added to the tax system.
A deficit surcharge would have greater political visibility and, therefore, produce
pressures for a smaller surcharge. This would mean a more serious effort to find additional
spending reductions.

Reduction of Deficit Surcharge. The deficit surcharge could be eliminated or reduced for
the current year or in subsequent years as additional spending cuts are made or other
revenue is generated (outside of the budget process).

Tax Reform Bills. If Congress wanted to generate revenue by considering tax reform and
using the proceeds to reduce the deficit surcharge, this clearly could be done. The objective
is to remove this type of legislation from the budget process, in order to eliminate the
pressures for revenue-driven decisions and to promote a full tax policy analysis. As a result,
by having a deficit surcharge, tax reform and other substantive provisions could be dealt
with separately, so that the tax-writing committees would not be under the pressure from
the budget committees. Revenues generated after careful consideration of tax bills in a
more traditional process of analyzing tax legislation that could be dedicated to reducing the
deficit or deficit surcharge would be a bonus.
Other Revenue Sources. Many believe that the probable need for significant future deficit
reductions, particularly if social security is taken out of the budget process, could require
a major new revenue source at some time in the not too distant future. Since substantial
income tax rate changes appear to be precluded for political reasons, many forecast that
some version of a broad-based consumption tax will be the next major source to fill this
revenue need. This could take the form of a value-added tax, a business transfer tax, or
something similar.
A major new revenue source would not only deal with the deficit and eliminate the
"deficit surcharge" but would also provide the revenues that could be used to implement
substantial simplification in the income tax system. Since many people believe that
simplification cannot be achieved without some use of revenues to offset revenue losses
that could result from the repeal or modification of complicated provisions, a significant
benefit of a new revenue source could be to provide funding for simplification purposes
as well as the deficit.
Political Realities. Although this proposal may be viewed as helpful from a budget process
and tax policy perspective, I have no illusions that it will be easy to achieve, if at all. It will
clearly require something that has been in short supply on the budget recently: political
boldness. It probably could be accomplished only if there was a "summit" between Congress
and the administration, as well as a bipartisan agreement about revisions in the budget
process. It would, however, create enormous additional tensions between the White House
and Congress and possibly between Republicans and Democrats. Therefore, it would test
whether there is truly an interest in looking to the long-term potential for real deficit
reduction while at the same time it would make revenues a less important factor and reduce
complexity in the system.
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Suspend or Cut Back on Indexing

Although there are certainly arguments for full indexing, it has been an important
reason that much of the complex tax legislation of the 1980s has been enacted. This is
because inflation now generates smaller increases in tax receipts so that other revenues
must be found for deficit reduction. This annually occurring revenue increase was also
frequently used in the past to make corrective changes in the tax system. Because it no
longer exists, those changes are more difficult to enact.

If indexing were either suspended or cut back until the deficit was lowered, it could
contribute to the revenue portion of deficit reduction. Since indexing only applies to
individuals, some may insist that consideration also be given to some means of collecting
a proportionate amount of revenue from the corporate sector.
Several proposals have been advanced to cover the budget deficits--at least, in part-with an indexing adjustment cutback, such as "CPI-2”, which means that those programs with
built-in cost-of-living adjustments (including the Tax Code) would not be fully indexed, but
indexed only to the extent of CPI growth less two percentage points. This would result in
a budgetary cutback on both spending and tax increases. However, because of political
realities, some fine-tuning and other adjustments would probably need to be made for the
proper balancing.

Two-Year Budget Cycle
It is finally time to consider a two-year budget seriously. A two-year budget would
reduce the pressure not only on the tax system but also on all other congressional activities-especially budgeting, authorizing, and appropriating. It also would allow Congress to focus
more clearly on the effects of the legislation rather than on deadlines for the annual budget
process. The present system is not good for any of the spending and taxing programs
because less and less attention is paid to policy and more and more to the budgetary
implications of the changes. And we all know that in the rush to meet the annual
deadlines, even the deficit implications are often inaccurate or simply wrong.
Increased Congressional Support-A Simplification Constituency

The need for congressional support for tax simplification is crucial. With no obvious
public demand for tax simplification, Congress will have to take the initiative and make
some major changes in the process if it is going to happen. Why would Congress do this?
The annual budget exercise on tax bills is taking its toll on both the private sector and the
Internal Revenue Service. Complexity breeds a contempt for the system and the members.
Tax compliance suffers. Investment decisions are hamstrung. The Service’s job of auditing
returns becomes overly burdensome. The specter of many tax years open in the audit
process with proposed deficiencies will become more haunting. From a financial viewpoint,
both the government and taxpayers will suffer increased inefficiencies. Congress’ failure to
respond could seriously undermine the "voluntary" compliance system.
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If appropriately implemented, the needed procedural changes would not only simplify
the system and thus evoke some much needed gratitude from affected taxpayers
(particularly tax advisers) and good editorial support from newspapers, but would also
enhance the budget and tax legislative processes. In the highly political world of
Washington, the importance of this should not be minimized.
Joint Committee on Taxation

The effort in Congress could be led by the JCT, with support from various professional
organizations of attorneys, accountants, and others, in a collegial process.
When the JCT was created in 1926, its primary role was the oversight of the Internal
Revenue Service in the administration of the tax laws. This function was carried out
basically by reviewing certain refunds approved by the Internal Revenue Service. Over
time, as the needs for revenues increased, there was more demand for staff work to deal
with the technical aspects of tax legislation. As a result, the role of the JCT became
primarily one of the providing technical tax staff to both the House Ways and Means
Committee and the Senate Finance Committee.

Committee Role. Paragraph (2) of section 8022 of the Internal Revenue Code provides
that one of the duties of the JCT shall be the following:
(2) SIMPLIFICATION OF LAW -

(A) INVESTIGATION OF METHODS - To investigate measures and
methods for the simplification of such [Federal System of Internal Revenue
Taxes] taxes, particularly the income tax; and

(B) PUBLICATION OF PROPOSALS -- To publish from time to time,
for public examination and analysis, proposed measures and methods for the
simplification of such taxes.
In view of this statutory responsibility, the JCT, as a committee, should be the forum
in which simplification projects are initiated. The members of the JCT who are appointed
by the chairman and vice chairman could develop the constituency within the Congress to
get them enacted. Since the committee is composed of the chairmen and ranking members
of both the Ways and Means and Finance committees, the leadership of these committees
would be in the right position to promote tax simplification in a nonpartisan, collegial
environment.
Committee procedure. If the JCT were to assume the responsibility for establishing a
congressional constituency for tax simplification, appropriate procedures could be developed
for it to carry out this responsibility. For example, the committee could meet at the
beginning of each session of Congress to review possible simplification projects
recommended by the staff and Treasury. The chairman and vice chairman may wish to
appoint a task force of committee members to review recommendations. A format could
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be developed for each proposal, including the reason for the provision, the nature of the
complexity, and proposals for simplifying it that are consistent with other tax policy
objectives. Revenue effects would not be considered until after the initial draft
recommendations were made for the committee’s review.

The JCT could issue a report on each project, which would then be referred to the
tax-writing committees for legislative consideration under the regular process.
The JCT could be expected to meet several times a year to review the status of the
projects.
Staff and Treasury Role. The JCT staff would be responsible for leading the simplification
projects, in coordination with the staffs of the two tax-writing committees. In addition, the
Treasury Department should be an active participant in the staff work and, along with the
Internal Revenue Service, could be responsible for identifying areas for consideration and
initiating much of the background and analysis.

Outside Professional Role (Collegial Process)

This proposal anticipates that the Tax Section of the American Bar Association (ABA)
and the Tax Division of the American Institute for Certified Public Accountants (AICPA),
along with other interested professional groups, would participate in the process in a
manner similar to what had been initiated in the 1970s: the collegial process for tax
simplification. This coordinated effort among the professional groups and the congressional
staffs has worked very effectively, particularly on two projects: subchapter S and installment
sales.
Simplification Constituency
If a version of these suggestions were to be seriously considered by the JCT, a
constituency for tax simplification could develop from the top down. In this type of
environment, we could begin to make steady progress toward meaningful simplification of
the tax laws.

Tax Legislative Process

The changes in the tax legislative process necessitated by the political and deadline
pressures of the budget process have added to the complexity of the tax system. If it were
possible and practical to return to a more deliberative process for the consideration of tax
legislative matters, it could well be that simplification concerns would be given more
attention by members of Congress and staff.
In any event, certain measures could be implemented in the tax legislative process to
ensure concern about, and a focus on, simplification. Several suggestions in this regard
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relate to the roles of the following policy players in the process:
congressional tax staffs, and (3) a simplification task force.

(1) Treasury, (2)

In addition, modifications to aspects of the tax legislative process itself should be
considered in order to focus seriously on complexity.
Treasury

The tax-writing committees could request the Treasury Department to present to them
any concerns it has about the complexity of a provision under consideration. If the
Treasury knew that the committees were going to request such a statement, it no doubt
would give more attention to these concerns and the committees’ awareness of the relevant
points would be heightened.
Congressional Tax Staff

To further enhance the information the committees receive about complexity issues,
the staff could be directed to present its recommendations for the simplification of any
proposal under consideration. These presentations should be made both in the written
materials prepared for the committees’ use in their sessions, as well as in the oral
presentations by staff with respect to each proposal during the markup sessions. Once
again, the more the members of Congress hear about complexity, the more their awareness
will be raised to consider simplification as an objective in their decisions.
A Simplification Task Force

In addition to the Treasury’s and staffs roles in raising concerns for complexity in
proposals during the process, members themselves should have a similar responsibility.
One recommendation, for example, would be for each chairman and ranking members
to name a small task force of members with the sole responsibility of raising or reviewing
the complexity issues of each matter considered by the JCT. The chairman of the task
force could be a member of the JCT. The chairman of the task force would assign a
member of the committee to be responsible for addressing complexity concerns about a
proposal during hearings and in markup sessions. The task force would not have a separate
staff but rather would use the committee staff. The task force would not have any
legislative authority. Its sole responsibility would be to ensure that the committee focuses
on the complexity of every proposal at both hearings and markup sessions. With the
Treasury, staff, and witnesses aware that this would be an expected part of the process, they
would be prepared to deal with these concerns and respond accordingly.
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Simplification Concerns in the Process
One major factor causing complexity in tax legislation in this decade has been the
limited time in the tax legislative process. This has occurred primarily because of the
pressure for revenue-driven tax bills as part of the budget process.
One way to alleviate this problem is to deal with the budget process, and several
proposals that do this on the revenue side were addressed previously.
As far as the regular tax legislative process is concerned, more attention could be
devoted to the complexities of implementing and administering new tax legislation if the
process slowed and if it incorporated some of the foregoing suggestions for the Treasury,
staff, and a simplification task force. There are other proposals for the legislative process
itself that should also be considered.

Hearings. More time could be devoted to the hearings, and they could be structured in a
way that would be more meaningful to the members. This does not mean that there should
be months of hearings, as was the case in the distant past, but rather, that a more
constructive hearing format could be devised that would focus on complexity as one of the
main aspects of the presentations before the JCT.

Since invited witnesses often present useful testimony, the hearings format could center
around such witnesses, in addition to the others who request to testify. Two types of
testimony from the invited witnesses would be desirable-one that focused on the substance
of the proposals, and the other on the complexity of the measures.
One panel of invited witnesses on each major proposal could include representatives
of professional associations, such as from the ABA Tax Section and the AICPA Tax
Division, to focus mainly on the complexity aspects of the proposal. These witnesses should
not have a vested interest in the proposals, so that the members can be given a relatively
unbiased view of complexity concerns that should be taken into account in their
deliberations.
It may also be appropriate for the committee generally to limit the number of panels
and witnesses at hearings to allow members more time to discuss issues, particularly with
invited witnesses. In today’s environment, with a time clock limiting their presentation,
most witnesses feel their testimony is useless and are testifying only to provide
representation for their respective interests. In addition, members, as well as staffs,
probably don’t believe that they receive much from the hearings provide much, other than
some opportunity for affected taxpayers to be heard.

If hearings could be more constructive on any particular subject by having fewer
witnesses or longer hearing schedules-with at least one panel of invited witnesses focusing
on complexity-it might well be that the hearings would prove to be more useful for the
members.
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MarkUp Sessions. Because of the sizes of the committees today and the speed with which
they are being asked to make their decisions, it is difficult to deal with this part of the
process. Preoccupation with raising revenues results in tax policy not being given a full
hearing.

If there were a voice raising concerns about complexity with respect to a proposal in
the markup sessions, there would be a greater likelihood that it would get some attention.
If the chairman or members of the simplification task force had the responsibility for raising
the question on each provision, the members would know that it would be coming and there
would be some discussion.

This, of course, does not mean that on each issue simplification concerns would rule
the day, but rather that awareness would be heightened. Thus, with the Treasury,
congressional staff, and members raising the concern, it is more likely that momentum for
simplification would develop within Congress.
Drafting Statutory Language. If the tax-writing committees were given more time, they
would have more opportunity to learn about the implications of the statutory language
that taxpayers, practitioners, and the government would have to interpret and understand.
In the past, when the staffs had less pressure and more time to devote to legislative
drafting, the quality of the drafts was far better.

Over the last fifteen years, significant technical corrections bills have followed each
of the major tax acts because there was not sufficient time to be more thorough in the
original drafting process. Lengthy technical corrections bills add enormous complexity to
the system because of the need to take into account two provisions that are intended to
reflect the same legislative intent. In some cases, a pure technical correction blends very
easily; in other cases, the additional language changes the interpretation slightly which adds
to the complexity.
Every effort should be made to allow more time for statutory drafting by the staff in
all phases of the process, including the House, the Senate, and especially the conference.
Finishing a conference in the middle of the night with drafts on the entire bill, which is due
for final passage on the next day, strains the abilities of the staff. While it accommodates
the political expediency of meeting certain deadlines, the tax laws suffer greatly.

In another regard, questions continue to arise as to what extent the statutory language
should incorporate operating rules for the particular provisions. Some say that the rules
are in many cases too technical in the statute and that more should be left to the
regulations. Others say that we need more bright lines in the statute and that leaving too
much to the regulations results in excessive uncertainty until the regulations or rulings are
issued. There is no easy answer to this dilemma. But it is the complexity of the
decision-making process and the speed with which the drafting is done--not necessarily how
much or how little is left to the regulations process, in many of the cases-that is primarily
responsible for mistakes and complexity in the language.
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Those who advocate leaving more to the regulations find it difficult to answer the
concern that, many times, regulations are not issued for several years after the act is passed
and that there is uncertainty for a long period of time about what the statute really means.
In addition, when the regulations do come out, they are often voluminous and complicated,
which does not help the process.
Dealing with the concerns about statutory language will require more attention being
devoted in committee to the full implications of the decisions. Easy-to-understand decisions
will lead to simpler statutory language.
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THE ROLE OF CONGRESSIONAL STAFF AND TAXPAYER
REPRESENTATIVES IN THE TAX LEGISLATIVE PROCESS

ROBERT N. MATTSON
*

INTRODUCTION

Taxpayer representatives and congressional tax-writing staff should be able to work
together in various ways to ensure drafting of clear and workable statutory language that
reflects congressional intent.
Taxpayer representatives understand that the Hill’s
professional tax staff has some very tough choices to make. Unquestionably, there are
arbitrage opportunities, inequities, and distortions in a tax code as complicated as ours.
The bright people who are employed as staff by the tax-writing committees of Congress
and who have to deal with these concerns need a more open process to obtain information
about the wider impacts of the provisions that close off unintended opportunities but also
restrict legitimate business activities.
If we are ever to reach the goal of simplifying the U.S. tax system, it will be necessary
to reverse the trend that Bob Shapiro describes as the "emergence of the more proactive
tax-writing committee staffs." Shapiro comments that "all of these staffers with all their
input certainly contributed to the complexity." It will take some time to adopt the "bold
proposals" put forth by Shapiro. However, there is a need for a more immediate response
to complexity in our Tax Code because of its increasingly negative impact on our economy
and the competitiveness of our businesses.
*Robert N. Mattson is Assistant Treasurer of International Business Machines Corporation.
He has also held the positions of IBM Director of Taxes, Corporate Tax Counsel and
Director of Tax Planning and Development. Before joining IBM Mr. Mattson had private
experience as a tax lawyer and in a large public accounting firm. He is also an Assistant
Professor of Taxation at Pace University. Mr. Mattson is an attorney and certified public
accountant in the State of New York. He is a member of the American Bar Association
Section of Taxation and the Business Roundtable Tax Coordinating Committee. He is
currently Chairman of the Tax Committee of the Financial Executives Institute, and on the
Board of Directors of the American Council for Capital Formation Center for Policy
Research and the National Tax Association-Tax Institute of America. Mr. Mattson received
a B.S. from the University of Pennsylvania (Wharton School), a LL.B and LL.M from New
York University School of Law, and worked toward a Ph.D in International Economics at
New York University.
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Focus for an Immediate Response

One of the major causes of income tax complexity is excessive statutory language,
which has this unfortunate consequence: The statutory language that is most troublesome
to a practitioner is often found in sub-subsections of the Code, which are written to correct
perceived abuses or constructed as restrictive rules.1 This restrictive draftsmanship results
in both transactional and compliance complexity. This is what McLure refers to as
"derivative backstop" legislation?
While basic backstop rules (the alternative minimum tax, passive activity loss, and interest
expense limitations) may be countenanced as tradeoffs among competing objectives, in a
mixed income-consumption tax system like ours, McLure makes clear that derivative-type
backstop measures are inappropriate in the Code. "Virtually every knowledgeable observer
would probably agree that the various backstop provisions are exactly that; they are not
required for accurate income measurement, they are not transition rules, they certainly do
not provide tax expenditures, and they are not just the result of unintended incoherence."

Simplification along the lines of Chairman Rostenkowski’s 1989 alternative minimum
tax proposal is worth pursuing, and the competing costs associated with such structural
changes should be worked out. However, it is not my purpose here to deal with these
basic rules.3

Rather what is the first order of importance in relieving complexity is the need to
refrain from overly detailed language designed to close perceived "loopholes," which is
better left to administrative regulation and rulings.
My role today is to comment on Bob Shapiro’s thoughtful paper, "Complexity in the
Tax Legislative Process." Shapiro doubts that less statutory language can be achieved
because of the "pressure for more, not less, statutory certainty." I find this position at odds
with my thesis, which is that more intricate language in the statute leads to greater
uncertainty, especially when involving transaction and compliance issues better left to more
complete administrative proceedings. Also, if we wait, as Shapiro says, until there is "a
vocal constituency for simplification," the job will never be done. It is universally agreed
that there is a need, an urgent and compelling need, for relieving the burden of complexity
in the Tax Code, and it is time to get on with the job.

The staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, after TRA ’86, did not wait for a "vocal
constituency" before putting forth its description of possible options to increase revenues,
which was released on June 26,1987 (291 pages). A similar list of simplification provisions
is long overdue.
Besides excessive statutory language, the frequency of tax legislative changes and the
influence of revenue estimation adds immeasurably to complexity. Also, attitudes about
corporate ethics seem to have spilled over into the tax legislative process and result in
further transactional and compliance complexity. I am especially concerned that an
antibusiness bias may have affected consideration of legislative decisions and has added to
complexity.
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Deterioration in the relationship between large corporate taxpayers and Internal
Revenue Service agents may be traced to a few multinationals’ actions during the 1960s
and 1970s regarding "questionable payments"4 to foreign officials to obtain business abroad.
Corporations deducted those payments, which led to the infamous eleven questions (April
1976) and special investigations by the IRS. Suspicions of wrongdoing have never been
erased, and they affect dealings between the IRS and large corporate taxpayers to this day.
Adversary roles have been exacerbated, and audits have never returned to the period of
reasonable relationships that they previously experienced.
More recently the IRS has focused its audit resources (as tax shelter cases are winding
down) on large corporate taxpayers as a source of additional revenue, recognizing that
recent complex and uncertain tax law leaves a vast opportunity to increase corporate taxes.5
Similar perceptions began to influence the tax legislative process during the early 1980s.

Shapiro says that as tax legislative hearings took on a less important role and there
was a change to open sessions, the role of congressional staff began to increase. On the
other hand, McLure suggests that open sessions of the congressional tax-writing committees
"reduced somewhat the influence of the Treasury Department and the staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation." I agree with Shapiro, since drafting of tax legislation is never an
open process.6 "Derivative backstop" legislation is written with little or no chance for
taxpayer representative comment, and it can be substantially amended in closed sessions of
the conference. This is where mistrust of corporate taxpayers has placed an even heavier
burden on statutory language. Complexity upon complexity is heaped onto the Internal
Revenue Code as a multitude of "derivative" rules find their way into far-reaching statutory
language.
One need only read a recent article in the Journal of American Bar Association,
Section of Taxation, which "presents in microcosm a picture of what has gone wrong with
the tax legislation system . . . The lack of hearings as part of the budget reconciliation
process, combined with the inaccessibility of Treasury and Congressional staff personnel,
made it impossible to carry out a dialogue to develop a solution to the staff's concerns.
This is one of the major problems that needs to be addressed. Shapiro rightly points out
that the member hearing process has deteriorated. The perception is that statements of
taxpayer representatives "are just filed away" and that, if you really want to get your
message across, you have to meet directly with members and staff.

Shapiro sees "the role of the hearing process has been replaced by a deluge of meetings
with staffs to make sure that their cases are fully understood." But limited access to staff
has prevented a full and fair understanding of the intricate sublevel provisions aimed at
specific transactions to be understood in terms of their wider impact. Often, taxpayer
representatives are not even aware of the detailed provisions until after seeing the final
language—way too late to have an impact. Taxpayer representatives are forced in brief
meetings to accept complexity to gain modification of adverse provisions because of staff
reluctance to eliminate language affecting transaction and compliance complexity, which
should be left to administrative handling. If we could soften current attitudes that need
rethinking, more rationality would prevail.
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FREQUENCY OF CHANGES AND REVENUE ESTIMATES

No matter how complex or simple the language, the frequency of change by itself adds
an exponential order of complexity and uncertainty in economic decision making. Repeal,
revision, extension, and reinstatement are the terms of chaos in tax legislation.

While sometimes, common sense prevails and reversals of legislative complexity occur,
champions in Congress are elicited and further more intricate complexity in statutory
language is written into the statute, leading to ’’guerrilla warfare tactics”. Even when
cheered as the right thing to do, elimination of complexity is seen as the greed of taxpayer
representatives.
When the statutory language is replete with narrow, restrictive "derivative backstop"
language, it inevitably leads to technical correction. Taxpayer representatives are equally
responsible for the extent of technical corrections, since sometimes a technical corrections
bill is the only opportunity for revisions necessary to move a business-motivated transaction
forward. In the 1980s there were a dozen significant income tax bills enacted that made
sweeping changes affecting every sector of the population and the U.S. economic landscape.
And nearly every tax bill contains technical corrections of earlier bills.
In addition, the influence of revenue estimation has distorted the legislative process,
so that the numbers, in effect, dictate the policy. The activities and methods of revenue
estimators are still relatively secret, but their accountability is increasingly questioned and
their influence remains undisputed. "It is the revenue estimators that determine which
proposals will be given serious consideration, and all legislative strategies are shaped in part
by the estimates. For every bill that is passed, hundreds of bills are introduced for which
members would like revenue estimates.

Shapiro suggests that the intricate sublevel targeted legislative provisions can be scored
by microrevenue estimates and therefore the budget deficit compels derivative backstop
legislation. It has become more and more evident that feedback effects, as well as the static
effects, cannot be even closely estimated. Estimating these derivative provisions misleads
the members and causes needless complexity. Does any reasonable person really believe
an estimator can score the effect of a microprovision like section 404A(d)(l)(A)(i) in
footnote 1, or section 514(c)(9)(B)(vi) in footnote 7 of this paper?
Comments from staff members attribute the sometimes questionable results of revenue
estimates to two factors: the lack of time and the unavailability of accurate information
within that narrowly defined time frame. It is time that the underlying economic
assumptions, including feedback effects, of revenue estimates are shared with taxpayer
representatives. Revenue estimates should become what they were intended to be, a policy
tool, and members of Congress would be better served if they understood the difficulty and
error factor in revenue estimation and that the process was open to public scrutiny.
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COMPLIANCE COMPLEXITY

One way to measure the effectiveness of the legislative process is to examine the
administration of the rules by the Internal Revenue Service and the price of compliance
by U.S. taxpayers.
Since 1986, large corporations have experienced an increased burden and cost of data
collection, increased computer and software costs to satisfy intricate requirements, and the
need for increased tax compliance personnel. Also, there is a significant increase in the
degree of frustration regarding tax return preparation time, in the lack of sufficient
guidance, and in overall complexity. Taxpayer assessment of the burdens and administrative
costs of complying with recent legislation has served as a "mirror" to the increased personnel
needs and other administrative costs now being experienced by the Internal Revenue
Service in its enforcement and regulatory responsibility under TRA ’86.

As reported in the Wall Street Journal, Neil Wissing, Vice President of Taxes of
Weyerhaeuser Company, speaking before the Commissioner’s Advisory Group concerning
the compliance impact of TRA ’86 on his company’s U.S. corporation income tax return,
stated that his staff of forty needed 75 percent more time than before to complete the
return and spent 50 percent more time analyzing changes in the tax law for which IRS was
unable to give guidance.
IBM does business in over 120 countries throughout the world. The increased burden
in worldwide data collection and the complexity of the recent rules relating to foreignsource income in the 1986 Tax Code has been extreme. Additional data requirements have
placed enormous burdens on IBM’s foreign country financial people. In the United States,
IBM has been forced to increase the number of its professional tax staff devoted to
compliance by approximately 44 percent since 1986. IBM is not unusual in this increased
burden and cost, which can only have placed a competitive disadvantage on United Statesowned businesses at a time when it can least be afforded.
Some of the more troublesome compliance issues that all U.S. multinational businesses
have faced include the proven unworkable employee benefit tests, the enormously expanded
labyrinth of foreign-source income restrictions, and the inventory cost rules which are not
in accordance with acceptable accounting guidelines. The following examples demonstrate
the needless complexity in the Code and are measures far beyond what was needed to
correct perceived abuses.
Nondiscrimination Tests Applicable to Employer-Provided Medical and Other Benefit Plans

The most discredited piece of tax legislation in memory is section 89. Senator Dole
noted in response to a storm of negative public criticism that the "compliance costs are
now estimated to exceed even the substantial tax revenue raised by section 89 itself."10
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Section 89 was an attempt by Congress to ensure that employer-provided welfare
benefits are extended to lower-salaried workers on a basis comparable to those provided
for highly compensated employees. No one disputed this socially desirable objective, but
the means chosen to achieve it was an administrative nightmare and could have had the
opposite effect. Section 89 provided complex participation tests that employee benefit plans
had to meet to qualify for tax benefits.

The tests were so complicated and the required record keeping so burdensome that the
rules were made unadministrable, and the cost of compliance alone was estimated to be
billions of dollars per year.
Many smaller companies were unable to cope with the costs and complexities of the
tests and were discouraged from offering benefits at all. Larger companies would have lost
flexibility in their plans and might have had to cut back on existing benefits or refrain from
offering new ones. IBM had expended nearly 1,000 man-hours complying with the test data
requirements by the time it ended the effort pending repeal of the sections. It is important
in this context to understand that IBM provides the same benefit plans to all of its regular
employees without exception and without preference for higher-salaried employees.
Passive Foreign Investment Company

Congress was concerned about the incentive for U.S. investors to make investments
abroad and obtain a substantial tax advantage vis-a-vis investors in domestic investment
companies.

To remedy this situation, a complicated set of rules was enacted by which shareholders
in a passive foreign investment company (PFIC) would be subject to current taxation on
such investments. The problem with this legislation is that it defined a PFIC very broadly
to mean any foreign corporation if 75 percent or more of its gross income is passive income
or 50 percent or more of its assets are assets that produce passive income.
Unfortunately, the statutory language failed to limit the impact of this provision to its
intended purpose. It was so broadly drafted that it included active controlled foreign
corporations (CFCs), usually 100-percent-owned subsidiaries of United States multinationals.
The CFC’s passive types of income result from normal business activity unrelated to
investment company investments. These normal activities include accumulating necessary
operating capital (1) to run the business or build additional competitive capacity, or (2) as
a result of local country laws requiring specific funding of programs such as retirement
plans.
PFIC requirements were first to be met in 1988 with the filing of the 1987
corporation income tax return. On February 26, 1988, IRS Notice 88-22 and temporary
regulations were issued, including a requirement that a qualified electing fund (QEF)
election was to be filed by March 14, 1988.
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The election was required for each foreign subsidiary and had to be signed by its
officers under penalties of perjury. Ten days later, Notice 88-31 was issued modifying the
QEF election to allow the U.S. parent company officers to sign the election, with a
follow-up ratification by the foreign entity by December 15. However, eight days before
the required ratification, Notice 88-125 advised taxpayers that any QEF election filed as
of that date was nullified that is, "would have no legal effect". This procedural mess is but
one example of the total confusion the statute has brought about at the IRS.

De Minimis Rules

Another of the "lesser of’ rules in the Code is found in section 954(b)(3)(A). Under
pre-1986 law, if less than 10 percent of a foreign subsidiary’s gross income was passive-type
(subpart F) income, it was not subject to accelerated tax treatment.

The de minimis exception was changed to the "lesser of’ 5 percent or $1 million dollars.
The $1 million threshold is so low that it affects the compliance costs of all United States
multinationals. Every single foreign operation must now be analyzed to determine the
amount of separate basket income.

Since 1986, in the foreign-source income area, taxpayers have uniformly observed the
exhaustion of intellectual and other resources to comply with the new rules. Major
accounting firms have been at a loss to develop adequate computer software programs
that provide their clients with a compliance tool to meet the new foreign "basket" and
"allocation" requirements.
No matter how resourceful and genuinely desirous of complying, large multinationals
using their best efforts have serious concerns about the accuracy of their tax liabilities,
whether underpaid or overpaid. Problems of great magnitude are anticipated when Internal
Revenue Service agents begin their audits of post-1986 tax years. Well-intentioned critics
of the legislative process are asking whether the income tax, especially the corporate income
tax, in the United States has been made unworkable and should be abandoned.

CONCLUSIONS AND A PLEA TO RETURN TO A RATIONAL PROCESS

It should be evident from my comments that I am in agreement with McLure’s "more
radical proposal" for a solution. Clearly, elected members of Congress have neither the
time nor expertise to deal with "derivative income definition rules, derivative tax
expenditure rules, derivative backstop rules, or technical changes needed to bring coherence
to the law."
What has occurred is a growing legislative staff assumption of the proper role of
administrators at the Treasury and IRS. Congressional staff are writing transactional and
compliance regulations into statutory language without appropriate taxpayer representative
hearings or an open process. When regulations arise at Treasury, they are first proposed;
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then, comments by taxpayer representatives are received, followed by hearings and then
final regulations. I fully agree with McLure’s position that between the staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation and the Treasury Department, "it seems clear that Treasury (in
conjunction with the IRS) is the appropriate choice" to deal with complex business or
perceived tax-motivated transactions.

It is difficult to make specific recommendations about a process that needs more
fundamental change, and Shapiro has done an outstanding job in addressing these in his
"bold proposals." He has made his proposals in the context of widely agreed-upon reasons
for complexity: income definitional problems, incentives and basic backstop provisions. But
much of the complexity I have described is found in arcane language dealing with
derivative issues that should be eliminated from the Tax Code. Even if we stumble on
finding ways to simplify the more basic rules that Shapiro addresses, I believe much
progress can be achieved in removing the "deadwood" (voluminous, derivative) rules from
statutory language. In this vein I offer some less radical thoughts that would provide
immediate improvement to the problem of complexity.

1.

First and foremost, avoid the seemingly expedient rate increase approach to
simplification. Rate increases or surtaxes make transactions uneconomical, result in
competitive losses for United States-owned businesses, and most unfortunate, lead to
further complexity as the need for incentives and exceptions filters into the Tax Code
to avoid these consequences. I part company with both Shapiro and McLure on this
point. To require simplification to be directly tied into a revenue-raising bill has the
result of being "ground ruled" into complexity. Simplification then becomes merely a
stalking-horse for a tax increase. As a purely deficit reduction measure, Shapiro’s
proposal for an indexing adjustment of both spending programs and the Tax Code
(CPI-2) would not result in the complexity that his "deficit surcharge" would entail.

2.

Open up the revenue estimation process to public accountability. It is my perception
that this has already begun and it should be continued and expanded. Revenue
estimators call taxpayers more often today to determine the static effects of proposals
and from time to time have shared revenue estimate information in private meetings.
Nevertheless, the revenue guessing at microlevel sections has not seemed to improve
and should be eliminated.

3.

Provide regular on-the-record meetings between the Joint Committee staff and taxpayer
representatives (such as the Tax Executive Institute or Financial Executive Institute).
A round of kickoff meetings aimed at obtaining a comprehensive list of options for
simplification of the Code should be the first agenda item for such meetings. In this
I am in agreement with Shapiro that a simplification project should be initiated by the
Joint Committee staff with the support of taxpayer representatives and professional
groups in a collegial process.

4.

Develop a legislative process in which the tax-writing committee staff present an
analysis of the proposed provision’s administrability and its impact on the
competitiveness of United States-owned businesses worldwide. This may require an
on-site IRS liaison representative working with the Joint Committee staff.
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5.

Reexamine the need for "lesser of" rules in the Code. (A LEXIS search showed that
the phrase "lesser of is used 111 times in 87 separate Code sections "or, if lesser" in
five sections, and "whichever is the lesser" in three sections.) Also, reduce excessive
statutory language by a disciplined approach toward eliminating sub-subsections in the
Code. In doing this, distinguish between a basic backstop provision and a derivative
one that deals solely with transactional and compliance issues, and institute a system
to avoid legislating the latter.

6.

Adopt a multiyear tax legislative process. Instead of a new bill every year, legislation
should be written in year 1 with effective dates postponed until years 2 and 3. In that
way, more sunshine can be applied to tax law rather than the immediate
implementation of flawed provisions. This will also allow an orderly technical
correction process before rather than after the provisions’ effective date. Consultation
between staff and taxpayer representatives will likewise benefit from a multiyear
process. Shapiro’s proposal for a two-year budget cycle is a complementary proposal.

7.

Begin consideration of a major restructuring of the 1986 Tax Code toward a lowerrate-of-cash-flow, consumption-based tax system adopting expensing of intangible and
tangible capital assets, eliminating interest from the tax base and leverage issues from
statutory provisions, and integrating corporate and individual taxes. It is important that
this study not interfere with the immediate consideration of a list of tax simplification
proposals.

Again, I fear that I am in agreement with McLure’s model on this last
recommendation.11 Taxing consumption rather than saving may significantly improve our
nation’s economic position.12
In conclusion, much of the excessive statutory language to regulate transactions and
compliance is unnecessary, flawed, very restrictive, and so complex as to border on the
unadministrable. It is time to cut back on the administration of tax law in the form of
legislative language and end the production of thousand-plus-page tax bills year after year.
Otherwise, tax compliance in the United States will be unalterably eroded and the
competitiveness of U.S. business will be seriously injured. At stake is nothing less than
the overall integrity of the U.S. income tax system.
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ENDNOTES

1 Section 404A(d)(l)(A)(i), which is a "lesser of rule, results in the loss of a full
deduction because of a potential abuse of another section that has since been eliminated
from the Code. "This additional limitation is imposed in response to the possibilities for
distortion of a taxpayer’s indirect foreign tax credit which are presented by the present
annual system for determining the amount of the foreign taxes paid by a subsidiary which
are attributable to dividends paid to its U.S. shareholders ... This potential for distortion
might be eliminated if the indirect credit were computed with reference to the subsidiaries’
accumulated foreign taxes and undistributed accumulated profits for all years . . . The
impact of this limitation is that such as excess is permanently lost." (Emphasis added.) S.
Rep. No. 1039, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1980). When, in 1986, the rules were changed as
suggested to pooling earnings and taxes, there was no remedy provided.
2 Charles E. McLure, "The Budget Process and Tax Simplification/Complication,"
AICPA/ABA Invitational Conference on Reduction of Income Tax Complexity (January
1990.)

3 It is worth noting that the Tax Executives Institute (TEI) endorsed Chairman
Rostenkowski’s alternative minimum tax simplification in a letter dated August 31, 1989,
to all members of the House and Senate tax-writing committees. TEI urged that the
provision be included in the 1989 budget reconciliation legislation. "We especially approve
of the deletion of references to the book income treatment of certain items (the so-called
book income backstop)."
4 "There has been a steady stream ... of the best names in American business,
including a substantial number from Fortune 500 list, to Washington to confess their
misdeeds of illegal political contributions, improper payments to foreign government
officials and other unlawful payments... Understandably, the public and government have
developed a cynical attitude toward the morals and standards of behavior of American
business ... it was the view of the Section of Taxation, American Bar Association,
management that the deficiencies of a relative few, although they number approximately
200 and are giants in the business community, do not warrant the assumption that large
numbers of additional taxpayers have been similarly callous or careless in the discharge of
their responsibilities under our internal revenue laws. Indeed, not even the Securities and
Exchange Commission, which has the responsibility for overseeing the filings under the
securities laws of more than 9,000 corporations, has reached such a jaundiced evaluation
of the corporate community."
Shervin P. Simmons, "The Eleven Questions-An
Extraordinary New Audit Technique," The Tax Lawyer (Fall 1976).

5 Although conceding that it includes "a good amount of water," IRS Acting Chief
Counsel asserted that large-case audits have $37 billion outstanding, of which the
government only recovers between 11 percent and 25 percent. Because of this, he sees the
need for devoting more IRS resources to large-case audits. Tax Notes 30 (Oct. 1989) 538.
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6 "...much of the real drafting process occurred behind closed doors during the dead of
night . . . the various tax staffs of the House Ways and Means Committee, the Joint Tax
Committee and the Senate Finance Committee, as well as the staff of the Treasury Tax
Legislative Counsel, while virtually invisible to the general public, nevertheless played key
roles in the drafting process, since theirs was the task of actually putting the statute into
words (a responsibility that carried with it considerable discretionary power in terms of the
technical details of the legislation). In fact, from the perspective of the tax lawyer, the staffs
were the key to the legislative process, in many instances determining the final language of
the legislation." Eustice et al. "The Tax Reform Act of 1986" (New York: Warren, Gorham
& Lamont 1987) sec. 1.04.

7 Section 514 (part III, chapter F, "Taxation of Business Income of Certain Exempt
Organizations: Unrelated Debt-Financed Income") has five subsections, fourteen
sub-subsections, twenty-seven sub-sub-subsections and twenty-six sub-sub-sub-subsections.
One of these, Section 514(c)(9)(B)(vi), has three further divisions and is followed by a
further qualification in two additional sentences. As predictable this unfathomable rule
elicited a law review article of almost forty pages critical of the legislative history of this
arcane provision. "One comes away from this history with several disturbing observations.
First, the tax legislative process has deteriorated to a point where it is difficult to obtain
balanced consideration of a technical provision that has serious economic consequences."
A.A. Feder and J. Scharfstein, "Leveraged Investments--A Lesson in How the Legislative
Process Should Not Work" The Tax Lawyer (Fall 1988).

8 Congressman Gradison used this phrase in chastising the National Employee Benefits
Institute for lobbying for repeal of section 89 nondiscrimination rules applicable to
employer-provided fringe benefit plans. The congressman was followed by a Treasury
official, who commented that section 89 repeal will only lead to more complex rules under
section 106. Tax Notes (25 Sept. 1989) 1458.
9 R. Bennett, "Revenue Estimating in the Sunshine," Tax Notes, 11 Sept. 1989, 1285.
See also J. Teuber "The Suspicion That Results From the Revenue Estimator’s Evolving
Role Is Not Easily Overcome," Tax Notes, 8 Dec. 1986, 882, and "Revenue Estimators Play
a New Role As Numbers Dictate Policy," Tax Notes 24 (Nov. 1986) 698.

10 Tax Notes 27 (June 1988) 1584.
11 Robert N. Mattson, "Comments on Henry J. Aaron’s Lessons for Tax Reform’,"
University of Michigan (Nov. 1989) publication forthcoming.

12 "The United States never has been able to finance business capital spending
(investment) with personal savings alone. Business savings in the form of retained earnings
and depreciation always have contributed much more than personal savings. Thus, as
corporate taxes are increased, sharply draining retained earnings, it is more difficult to
finance business investment." Financial Executives Institute, "Proposals for Future Directions
in Tax Policy" (October 5, 1988.)
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"Recent tax legislation (TRA ’86) has increased corporate federal income taxes sharply,
and they are expected to continue rising even more sharply during the next few years. This
dramatic shift in the tax burden from the individual to the corporate sector has been due,
in part, to a widely held perception that corporations were not paying their fair share of the
burden." Gillian M. Spooner and Emil M. Sunley, The Corporate Tax Burden in the United
States (Financial Executive Research Foundation: 1988). The author of this paper was
chairman of the FEI Committee on Taxation during the preparation of these two reports.
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COMMENT ON "COMPLEXITY IN THE TAX
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS"

RONALD A. PEARLMAN
*

I think it probably would be disloyal for me if I don’t at least begin with some note
of realism, which I will characterize as a dose of reality, and end with some note of
optimism.

There is no dispute, believe it or not, among members of Congress and among the
staffs on Capitol Hill that the volume of tax legislation particularly over the past fifteen
years is not only substantial, but indeed overwhelming. We live with the same Internal
Revenue Code you do; we are confronted with it daily, and it is as overwhelming to us as
it is to you.
Having said that, I think it is unrealistic to think the tax legislative activity that we
have seen is going to subside. First, the federal government needs revenue. If it doesn’t
need it for deficit reduction, I think we will see it needs it for new programs that are
supported both by the President and the Congress and, indeed, by the American people.
Second, there is a continuing interest-we see it every day~in enacting new tax
incentives in the Internal Revenue Code. Capital gains obviously is a well publicized one,
but also what about enterprise zones, which will be topical this year; child and dependent

*Ronald A. Pearlman is Chief of Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation. In his
present capacity, he heads a staff of seventy-two (including accountants, economists, and
lawyers) that provides technical tax legislative support to the House Ways and Means
Committee and the Senate Finance Committee. In addition, the staff of the Joint
Committee provides the revenue estimates of tax legislative proposals used by the Congress
in considering tax legislation. Previously, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax
Policy, and following nomination by President Reagan and confirmation by the Senate, he
served with the U.S. Treasury Department from July 1983 through December 1985, as
Assistant Secretary for Tax policy.
Prior to his current position and his tenure at the
Treasury Department, Mr. Pearlman practiced law in St. Louis and served as an Adjunct
Professor of Law at the Washington University School of Law. In the late 1960s, he served
with the Office of the Chief Counsel of the Internal Revenue Service in Washington, D.C.

Mr. Pearlman has been active in the American Bar Association’s Section of Taxation,
and at the time of his appointment to the staff of the Joint Committee, he served as a
member of the council of the section. In addition, he served as a member of the Federal
Income Tax Project Advisory Group of the American Law Institute, the BNA Tax
Management U.S. Income Advisory Board, and the advisory council of the Tax Foundation.
Mr. Pearlman graduated from Northwestern University School of Law, and he received an
LL.M. in Taxation from Georgetown University Law Center.
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care tax credit incentives; broadening the availability of tax-exempt bonds, and health and
retirement policy tax incentives?

Third, we are in an activist period of tax legislation. The private sector wants Congress
to enact tax legislation. Let me give you some data. It is fairly mechanical data, but it may
give you some illustration of what that means.
In 1983 the Joint Committee staff received from members of Congress 150 formal
requests for revenue estimates. Those are revenue estimates on member-initiated legislative
proposals. Some were to increase revenue, but by and large, those proposals have negative
revenue effects and were supported — and many times, initiated — by taxpayers or tax
practitioners.

In 1985 the number was 348, and in 1986 the number was 474. So, during the height
of tax reform, roughly 400 formal requests a year. In 1988 we received 900 requests, or
nearly two times what was received in each of the years ’85 and ’86. And in 1989, I
frustratingly report to you that we receive 1,290 requests, and we see no reason to think
that the volume of requests will go down in the future.
Not a week passes that we don’t hear about a legislative response to a ruling, regulation
or court decision that is viewed as inappropriate by a taxpayer.

Further, I think it is unrealistic to think that the answer to the government’s revenue
needs will be merely to increase tax rates. Politically, members of Congress are not going
to regularly vote for tax rate increases. And I would submit to you that from a policy
standpoint there is absolutely nothing wrong with continuing to try to accurately measure
income in an income tax system and that it should be an ongoing process. There is some
inevitable complexity that results, but to say to the high-effective-rate taxpayer, whether it
be an individual or a business, "Well, it is simpler to raise your tax rate and ignore the
lower-effective-rate taxpayer," is, in my opinion, simply not supportable, either politically
or from a policy standpoint.

Now, having said that, complexity in the tax law obviously should be a concern to
people in the tax legislative process, and I hope you will accept my representation that it
is. That is not to mean it is most of the time representative of what we do; all too often,
the staffs, members of Congress, and the private sector don’t put simplification of a tax
legislative proposal at the top of the agenda, and that should come as no surprise to you.
Why? Sometimes there is a policy reason, sometimes it is pure politics, sometimes it is just
time.
We have had some successes. In 1988 we enacted a minor provision that permitted
parents to include children’s income on parents’ returns. Our projection is that will reduce
the number of childrens’ returns filed with the Internal Revenue Service by as many as
400,000-a very substantial reduction in complexity for taxpayers affected by that provision.

I think the alternative minimum tax change in 1989 was a major simplification of the
AMT, but I have to tell you candidly that if instead of losing $400 million in fiscal year
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1990 that change had raised $400 million in fiscal 1990, it would not have seen the light of
day. I give both Chairman Rostenkowski and Chairman Bentsen credit for being willing,
in a painful year budgetwise, to take a $400 million revenue hit in the interest of trying to
bring some simplification to the alternative minimum tax.
We did some specific things in designing proposals in 1989 intended to try to reduce
the intrusiveness of provisions on specific taxpayers. The high-yield debt provision now
contained in section 163 was designed to minimize its impact on everyday transactions.
The change in the tax treatment of securities under section 351 is, in my opinion, a major
simplification. And finally, if you look at the net operating loss carryback, excess interest
rule of section 172(b), not only is there a de minimis rule, but there is also a number of
other features designed to limit its application in relatively insignificant transactions.
For the future, the challenge to reduce complexity requires a significant effort. Existing
law clearly is complex, and we have undertaken a series of projects designed to try to
address some of those complexities. It would be wonderful to set time aside, as Bob has
suggested, and enumerate 290 simplification projects. I have to tell you the staffs on the
Hill, not only the Joint Committee staff also but member staffs, and tax-writing committee
staffs, are simply overwhelmed. But I think it is possible to identify discrete projects. My
own personal priorities are the personal interest expense deduction and the foreign
provisions. I think they are both in need of some serious attention.

I have to be very candid and say that you can simplify the personal interest expense
deduction very easily by throwing all interest expense in one basket and making it all
deductible and paying for across-the-board deductibility by reducing the percentage of
deductibility. And I recognize that the first time I suggest to members of Congress that the
home mortgage interest deduction be reduced by three or four or five percentage points to
pay for what could be a major simplification of the individual tax system I suspect there
would be strong opposition expressed.
The ABA and the AICPA submitted to us some specific suggestions designed to
simplify both the individual and corporate income tax provisions. I think those suggestions
were very constructive, and we have indicated that in several instances we intend to take
a careful look at those suggestions during the year.
I think it is important to keep the process discrete. Only a limited amount of effort
can be devoted to simplification projects in any one year, but I think there is a prospect of
making some headway.
The real difficulty for us is in the tax legislative process. How do we identify, become
sensitive to, and respond to the complexity that develops as new tax legislative proposals
evolve? It is a very, very difficult process. Part of the problem is that we don’t have time
to stop and think about complexity. Part of it is that the design of the provisions is really
not in our control very often. Sometimes we get very little outside input. It has always
been particularly frustrating to me that we don’t get more input even when provisions are
out in the public view for some period of time.
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Having said that, we do address complexity issues verbally; we talk about the level of
complexity; we have made efforts to communicate with the Internal Revenue Service and
Treasury and bring them into the process.
I think it is unfair and unfortunate to assert that the complexity of the tax law is
something that is not considered important by people on the Hill involved in the tax
legislative process. If we appear at times defensive, maybe it is because we are accused
of being insensitive; and if at times we appear totally cynical, maybe at times there is some
justification.
I can speak for the Joint Committee staff, but I think I can also speak for the other tax
staffs on the Hill. This is a subject that is of genuine interest to us and one on which we
are happy to work with our colleagues within the government, outside professional
organizations, and others to try to make some progress on this challenging issue.
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ELIMINATING COMPLEXITY FOR INDIVIDUAL TAXPAYERS:
A REVENUE LOSER WITHOUT A CONSTITUENCY?

DEBORAH H. SCHENK
*

INTRODUCTION

There is no disagreement about the complexity of the Internal Revenue Code.
There is less consensus on how, whether, and at what cost to fix it. This article primarily
addresses the first question; that is, it offers discrete suggestions for simplifying the federal
tax law as it applies to individuals. The other two questions are so fundamental, however,
that depending on the answers, it may be nonproductive to even consider the first. While
the answers to the questions-whether to simplify and at what cost-are far from clear, the
obstacles they present are apparent.

Lack of Constituency

The issue of whether to simplify arises because it is increasingly apparent that the
simplification cause may have no constituency. Although taxpayers universally bemoan the
complexity of the law, there is no evidence of grass roots support for meaningful
simplification.1 Specifically, taxpayers appear to tolerate significant complexity in order to
eliminate marginal horizontal inequity. More importantly, taxpayers generally are unwilling
to sacrifice tax benefits to achieve simplicity.

The legislative and executive branches also seem to be unmoved even by complexity
affecting large numbers of taxpayers. Although individual taxpayers are a significant
constituent block, they are largely unrepresented. Unlike the timber or real estate
industries, the "average American taxpayer" has no lobby.2
Perhaps Congress is
unconcerned because there is no potential revenue gain: A benefit unused due to its
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complexity does not increase the budget deficit. Or perhaps Congress is unconcerned
because it also believes that, even with a lobby, the majority of Americans would have no
interest in simplicity.

It is possible that this view is overly pessimistic, perhaps even uninformed. There
is evidence, for example, that abolition of some benefits in the name of simplicity has been
accepted without a hue and cry. Consider the streamlining of itemized deductions through
the elimination of certain deductions and the curtailing of others.3 This observation would
lead to the adoption of an accretion approach-that is, to dismantle complexity by attacking
piecemeal those provisions likely to have the least ingrained support, rather than attempting
massive reform involving sacred cows.4 It is also likely that taxpayers do not understand
the trade-offs involved. Elimination of a tax expenditure is generally viewed as an
individual detriment, rather than a systemic benefit. Perhaps taxpayers can be educated to
focus on structural gains such as elimination of complexity.
Assuming arguendo, however, that taxpayers, and thus their elected representatives,
have no interest in simplification, is there any reason to pursue it as a goal? Although
reasonable people can disagree, I argue yes. The pursuit of simplification is a good
example of the group benefit theory; individuals may be willing to support a particular
action where the group benefit exceeds the individual detriment. A good analogy is to a
household chore like taking out the garbage. Although an individual personally might not
prefer garbage removal to television watching, he might be willing to impose such a rule
on the entire family rather than permit the garbage to pile up. The issue is whether
taxpayers view or can be persuaded to view Code complexity as garbage piling up.5 To
carry the analogy one step further, frequently there must be a group leader, like the parent
in the family scenario, who can explain or even impose a rule with group benefits. That
leadership role has not been claimed by either Congress or the executive. It is conceivably
a role for tax professionals.6

Revenue

The second major issue to confront before considering discrete simplification
proposals is revenue neutrality. Congress is currently operating under a self-imposed
restraint which prevents passage of tax legislation which results in a revenue loss.
Legislation must either be revenue neutral or must be matched by legislation offsetting any
revenue loss. This constraint raises thorny issues in connection with simplification for
individual taxpayers. There are four possible approaches which are appraised below.

Revenue neutrality can be achieved by cutting the pie into more pieces.
Most of the potential simplification for low income taxpayers comes from reform of
provisions that can be described in the aggregate as providing a support allowance.7 The
dependency exemption, the earned income credit, the child care credit, and the standard
deduction are used primarily to insure that a minimum amount of income, needed for
support, is not subject to tax. To some limited degree, the refundable earned income credit
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provides an income subsidy. To the extent these rules are simplified so that either more
taxpayers are eligible for benefits or more taxpayers are able to file a return, revenue will
be lost.
This form of simplification easily can be made revenue neutral, but at a significant
cost. The amount now budgeted for support allowances through tax benefits can be
allocated among more taxpayers. This can be done mechanically by decreasing the amount
of the exemption, earned income credit, or standard deduction. While this approach
increases simplicity and revenue, it has a detrimental effect on equity. A decrease in the
support allowance provisions will bring taxpayers below the poverty line back into the tax
system. That is difficult to justify theoretically. One of the clear achievements of the 1986
act was to remove those below poverty level from the tax rolls on the theory that they had
no ability to pay taxes. A basic tenet of our income tax system is that the level of taxation
should be based on ability to pay. The trade-off is clear: As revenue increases, horizontal
equity decreases.

Revenue neutrality can be achieved by not serving pie to everyone
Another approach is to pick up revenue by not providing support allowances to all
taxpayers. This strategy has already been used: The earned income credit is available only
to low-income taxpayers, and the exemption is not available to high-income taxpayers. The
only two remaining options are to limit the standard deduction and to provide a lower
eliminated for the exemption. Theoretically the exemption could be phased out for all
taxpayers not at the poverty line. This would decrease progressivity, however, and provide
a substantial cliff effect. Alternatively, the exemption could be gradually phased-out at
levels lower than those currently used. Limiting the standard deduction is more complex.
Since itemized deductions are an alternative to the standard deduction, presumably many
taxpayers who lost the standard deduction would itemize, resulting in more recordkeeping
and complex returns. It is not clear that the trade-off is warranted.

Revenue neutrality can be achieved by offering a smaller pie to others
To some extent this approach is nothing more than a defense of this paper. That
is, revenue loss on the proposed simplification for individuals discussed herein might be
paid for by revenue gains in areas not within the scope of the paper. As noted below, there
are ways to raise revenue from individual taxpayers, but none are wholly acceptable. This
approach suggests that simplicity in one area not be considered in isolation. The revenue
to pay for simplification of the earned income credit or the domestic relations rules may
need to be found in business or corporate provisions.

The right to a slice of pie is not based on the ability to understand the code.
This approach acknowledges that the cure for complexity and inequity is not free.
To some extent, particularly in the low income area, complexity results in taxpayers not
taking benefits to which they are currently entitled because the eligibility rules are too
complex.8 Alternatively, benefits are foregone when the rules do not carry out theory or
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policy, thus cutting off some taxpayers who theoretically are entitled to a benefit.9
Simplifying qualification standards so that taxpayers may claim the benefits to which they
are entitled may result in a revenue loss. This is not revenue to which the government can
rightfully lay claim or call foul when lost. Under this approach the cost of curing
complexity would not be subject to the usual revenue constraint. It is a peculiar position
for Congress and those who speak for it to assert that the costs of reforming a complex law
that is neither understood or complied with cannot be borne. Non-inevitable complexity
should be addressed as a mistake, and analogizing to the tax benefit rule, any revenue
benefit procured through a mistake should be foregone when the error is corrected.
The remainder of the paper lays out a course of action. The second part discusses
issues pertaining to low-income taxpayers. The third part discusses domestic-relations tax
issues, specifically child support and the "kiddie tax." The fourth part discusses
recordkeeping, the most difficult problem for middle income taxpayers. Each section
presumes that simplification is warranted. It also presumes that one of the above four
approaches to the revenue issue is satisfactory. If one presumes to the contrary, turning the
page is an exercise in futility.
LOW-INCOME TAXPAYER ISSUES

Exegesis of The Problem

All low-income taxpayers must determine filing status, the number of exemptions,
and the standard deduction. Most also must calculate the earned income credit, and many
must determine marital status and the child-care credit. Each of these benefits
unfortunately has its own complex qualifying and recordkeeping requirements. For many
taxpayers, the tax return and instructions present a bewildering morass of rules which
cannot be easily mastered. One consequence is that many low-income taxpayers either turn
to professional preparers or fail to comply with the law. In the vast majority of cases, this
noncompliance injures the taxpayer rather than the fisc: The taxpayer is usually entitled
to a refund due to over-withholding or the earned income credit. Benefits which Congress
enacted to provide assistance to low-income taxpayers go unused because the accompanying
rules are shrouded in such complexity that the intended beneficiaries are unable to employ
them.

This portion of the article is premised on the belief that there are large systemic
benefits to be reaped from the simplifying those provisions which affect the majority of
taxpayers. It takes three tacks. First, it adopts the accretion approach, suggesting
piecemeal simplification to various sections affecting low-income taxpayers. Second, it
weighs radical reform. Third, it also recommends that, to the extent complexity is
incurable,10 assistance be provided to taxpayers to enable them to undertake their duty to
comply.

I-M-4

Thrust of the Proposals

The primary thesis of this section of the article is that low-income taxpayers should
be expected to comprehend the fewest possible concepts, and thus, to the extent possible,
definitions and qualifying thresholds should be uniform. The major steps in this process are
to choose a concept, tailor it to be as simple as possible, and apply it uniformly to
provisions affecting low-income taxpayers.
The proposal utilizes the dependency exemption as the polestar of the system. In
a simplified form, it would be used to determine eligibility where the existence of a
qualifying individual is required. Unless absolutely necessary, all other definitions of
qualifying individuals and eligibility would be eliminated.11 This would contribute to
simplification on two levels. First, a taxpayer without exemptions would have the simplest
possible return to file.12 Second, all other low-income taxpayers would have much less
difficulty calculating their tax liability. They would start by determining if they were entitled
to a deduction for a dependent; once that question was answered in the affirmative, several
other results would automatically follow.

If the dependency exemption is to be the cornerstone of the tax system for the lowincome taxpayer, it must be as simple as possible without sacrificing horizontal equity.13
The next section discusses proposed simplification of the dependency exemption. The
following sections track the exemption as the qualifying threshold for marital status, filing
status, the earned income credit and the child care credit, and propose further simplifying
refinements. The final section considers two more radical proposals which would tolerate
some inequity in exchange for significant simplification.
Specific Proposals

Dependency Exemption
The Problem.14 Use of the dependency exemption as the qualification standard for
benefits is somewhat stymied by its extraordinary complexity. The degree of complexity is
troubling because of the widespread use of the exemption by low- and middle-income
taxpayers: Approximately 50% of all returns filed take a dependency exemption.15 It is
also difficult for the Service to administer because the many factual issues require an
allocation of manpower disproportionate to the revenue raised. These factual issues require
a level of recordkeeping which is problematic for taxpayers who are generally unaccustomed
to keeping records. There is ample evidence that compliance is a problem.

Simplification of the exemption should be a high priority even if it is not used as the
basic qualifying test for benefits. Taken together with the standard deduction, the
dependency exemption is a major element of our tax structure. The combination sets the
income threshold for the imposition of taxes and has a significant effect on revenue. Under
the current, relatively flat bracket structure, these twin deductions preserve the-ability-to
pay principle. Furthermore, since the proposal uses the exemption to support other
significant tax benefits, such as filing status, the child care credit, and the earned income
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credit, increasing the equity and simplicity of eligibility requirements for these benefits
ensures that they are not awarded in a discriminatory and irrational manner.
Under current law, a taxpayer is entitled to a deduction for each dependent,
provided the dependent’s gross income for the taxable year does not exceed the amount of
the deduction.16 A dependent must either (1) be a relative of the taxpayer or (2) have as
his principal place of abode the home of the taxpayer and be a member of the taxpayer’s
household for the taxable year.17 In addition the dependent must be either a citizen or
resident of the United States or a resident of a contiguous country18 and cannot file a joint
return.19 Finally, the taxpayer must provide more than one-half of the dependent’s
support.20 Alternatively, the taxpayer may join with others who provide support in signing
a multiple support agreement allocating the exemption to a qualifying taxpayer.21
Until 1986, the law permitted a potential double exemption: a parent and child who
were under the age of 19 or a full-time student could each take a deduction for the child.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 eliminated this possibility by providing that if an individual
was allowable as a dependent on the return of another, he was not entitled to his own
personal exemption.22
Proposal. The important legacy of the 1986 Act is that only one exemption per
taxpayer is permitted. Much additional simplification is possible now that Congress has
made the political and policy decision to permit a single exemption per taxpayer. Specific
suggestions follow.23
(1) Simplification of the Support Test. The theoretical underpinning of the
dependency exemption is horizontal equity. Two taxpayers with the same amount of income
are not similarly situated-and thus should not pay equal taxes-if only one supports a
dependent. As a result, a support test is a necessary eligibility requirement for a deduction
based on ability to pay. The current rule allocates the exemption to the person providing
more than half the support. Where only one person provides support, the rule is easy to
apply. Low-income taxpayers are often supported, however, by two or more persons. In
that situation, the current rule is difficult to apply.

The proposal calls for an objective minimum amount of support. Where two or
more taxpayers provide the minimum amount of support, alternative rules are proposed.
There are four tiers which may be viewed as a sieve. The vast majority of taxpayers will
use the first simple rule. The other three rules, which are also simpler than current law,
apply only where the first rule does not work. They are:

(i) A taxpayer is permitted to take an exemption if he provides as support not less
than the indexed amount of the exemption (’’exemption amount”),24 unless a multiple
support agreement is in effect.25 There would be, however, no minimum amount of support
required to be provided by a parent so long as no other person provides the exemption
amount.26(ii)
*

(ii) Where two or more taxpayers each provide the exemption amount of support,27
the taxpayer with whom the dependent resides28 would take the exemption.29
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(iii) Where two or more taxpayers each provide the exemption amount of support
and neither lives with the dependent or both live with the dependent, the taxpayer who
provides the most support would be entitled to the exemption.

Thus, generally the taxpayer who provides the exemption amount in support for
another is entitled to a deduction for that amount. The only exception is for parents, who
almost always have a legal obligation to support children. The parent exception applies
only when no other taxpayer qualifies; to apply the exception more broadly invites tax
arbitrage. Where the parents do not file a joint return and each may seek to take an
exemption, a variety of rules apply.31

Consider the following examples, all of which assume the exemption amount is
$2000:

(a) A and B are married and file a joint return. They have one child; C. So long
as no one else pays more than $2000 for the support of C, A and B may take a deduction
for C irrespective of the amount of support provided.32

(b) Same as a except that C’s grandmother provides $2500 of support, and A and
B together provide $1000. The grandmother is entitled to the exemption.
(c) Bl and B2 are brothers who provide the total support for their mother. Bl
provides $4000 and B2 provides $2500.

Since the mother resides with B2, she is entitled to the exemption for the mother. If the
mother resided with neither, B1 would be entitled to the exemption since he provided the
most support.

The last example suggests that taxpayers may desire to allocate the dependency
exemption themselves. Since only one exemption may be taken for each individual, such
self-ordering should not be objectionable.33 Under the proposal, the multiple support
provisions would be amended so that taxpayers who, in the aggregate, provide the
exemption amount of support are permitted to sign an agreement allocating the exemption
to one of them. A necessary constraint to prevent tax arbitrage34 is a requirement that the
taxpayer who takes the exemption provide a minimum amount of support.35 This minimum
should be a fixed number.36
The proposal does not limit the items to be taken into account in calculating support.
The difficulty in agreeing what constitutes support is not worth the marginal simplicity
achieved. The Service is also better served by some flexibility.
(2) Elimination of the relationship test. The proposal would eliminate the
relationship test as part of the definition of a dependent. This test only contributes to
complexity and is not necessary to avoid abuse. There is no tax incentive to contribute
support since taxpayers (other than parents) must contribute at least the exemption amount
in support.
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(3) Elimination of the gross income test. The proposal would put no limit on the
amount of a dependent’s gross income.37 If the rationale behind the dependency exemption
is to exempt a minimum level of support for each person from the income tax, it is
appropriate for the supporting taxpayer to take the exemption so long as no one else is
permitted to do so. With the express limitation of one exemption for each individual, there
is no longer a need for an income limitation. The government should be indifferent as to
who supports an individual. For example, if a parent earns $30,000 and the child earns
$10,000, it should be irrelevant whether the parent contributes the $6000 needed for support
and the child banks a similar amount, or vice versa.

(4) Repeal of the joint-return test. Abolishing the gross-income test would permit the
corollary elimination of the current rule that a taxpayer is not entitled to an exemption if
the dependent and the dependent’s spouse file a joint return.

Presumably this test was adopted to avoid difficult tracing questions necessary to
determine if the dependent exceeds the current income limitation. If there is no limitation
on gross income, the source of the income is irrelevant, thereby eliminating the need for
the test.
Marital Status and Filing Status

The Problem. Under current law, taxpayers who are single or married filing jointly
or separately can easily determine filing status. A taxpayers who is a surviving spouse or
head of household must have a qualifying individual. Complexity in connection with marital
status is largely a problem of the abandoned spouse. A taxpayer may be married for state
law purposes and single for federal purposes.38 Under current law an individual who is
otherwise considered married (because he is not officially divorced or separated) may be
single for tax purposes provided he is "abandoned"39 and there is a qualifying individual.
Qualifying as an abandoned spouse40 and to some extent as a head of the household is a
peculiarly low-income taxpayer problem.

Under current law, an abandoned spouse is one who maintains as his home a
household for more than one-half the taxable year which is the principal place of abode of
a qualifying child.41 A qualifying child for this purpose is a son, daughter, stepson, or
stepdaughter for whom the taxpayer is entitled to a dependency exemption.42 Adoption or
use of a multiple-support agreement is permitted. A head of the household is one who
maintains as his home for more than one-half the taxable year a household which is the
principal place of abode of either an unmarried child, a married child for whom a
dependency exemption is allowable, or any other related dependent.43 A child may be
adopted 44 but a multiple-support agreement may not be used.45 A surviving spouse is a
taxpayer whose spouse died in one of the two preceding taxable years and who maintains
a household for the entire year for a dependent child. 6 Adoption or use of a multiple
support agreement is permitted. It is not difficult to comprehend why low-income taxpayers
find these provisions complex, but it is difficult to ascertain any unifying principle.
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Proposal. The proposal is that the only requirement to qualify as an abandoned
spouse is that the taxpayer be separated from her spouse for the final six months of the
year. To qualify for head of household or surviving spouse status, one must have a
dependent as a qualifying individual.47 Each status is discussed below:
(1) Abandoned Spouse. A federal tax definition of an abandoned spouse is
presumably offered as a solution for the low-income taxpayer unable to afford a divorce or
separation agreement. Once the decision has been made to offer this extra-legal status,
there is no acceptable rationale for the imposition of the requirement of a qualifying
individual.48 Section 7703(b) could be simplified if it provided that the only prerequisite
for a taxpayer to be considered unmarried as of the end of the taxable year is that during
the last six months49 of the taxable year, such individual’s spouse is not a member of such
household.50 A husband and wife living apart are no longer an economic unit pooling
resources and thus should no longer be considered a taxable unit. This reality is recognized
in the case of a divorced couple, regardless of whether they have children. To increase
both equity and simplicity, the separated couple should be treated identically.51

This would eliminate two of the most inequitable situations under current law. One
is the case of the low-income couple who separate with only one child. The mother, for
example, who resides with the child, is considered unmarried. The father, who has no
dependent, is married and thus his status is married filing separately. Even more egregious
is the low-income couple who split up without children. Forever unable to afford a divorce,
they are forever married filing separately.52
Assuming, however, that this simple rule is not politically possible,53 the alternative
is to provide that the qualifying individual be any dependent whether or not s/he resides
with the taxpayer. There appears to be no reason why the individual must have a child to
establish a state of ’’unmarriage.”54 Using dependent as the prerequisite would also conform
to the notion of a uniform qualifying individual. The next best simplification is to eliminate
the requirement that the dependent child live with the taxpayer. The final and least
acceptable alternative is to leave section 7703(b) as it is and conform sections 2(a) and (b)
dealing with filing status.

(2) Surviving Spouse. The suggested simplification for the surviving-spouse filing
status is identical to that proposed for the abandoned-spouse provision: Eliminate the
requirement of a qualifying individual. So long as the taxpayer’s spouse has died within the
preceding two taxable years, the taxpayer would be eligible for surviving spouse status. Put
more simply, the benefits of a joint return would be continued for two years after the death
of a spouse. Assuming that the existence of the status is good tax policy, why should it
matter whether a spouse has left a dependent child?55

The second-best simplification alternative is to broaden the definition of the
qualifying individual to include any dependent. Although this would apply in rare cases to
someone other than a child, it would promote uniformity. A third and less beneficial
proposal would be to abolish the requirement that the child live with the taxpayer in a
household maintained by the taxpayer. As a practical matter, this requirement probably
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effects virtually no taxpayers, but it does add unnecessary language to the Code, return, and
instructions.

The least acceptable, but still helpful, simplification is to conform the surviving
spouse rules to those for the abandoned-spouse and head-of-the-household statuses. This
could be done by requiring that the dependent child live with the taxpayer for only one-half,
rather than the entire, taxable year.

(3) Head of household. A qualifying individual is a necessary prerequisite for this
filing status in order to distinguish it from the single status. The proposal is to impose a
single requirement: that the taxpayer support a dependent. The dependent need not reside
with the taxpayer for any portion of the year, although most dependents would do so,56 and
the taxpayer would not need to maintain a household. The proposal would, however,
tighten current rules (and possibly raise revenue) in that currently an unmarried child of
the taxpayer can qualify the parent for head of the household, even if not a dependent.57
If, however, we presume that the theoretical basis for this filing status requires the
taxpayer to maintain a household, the section could be simplified by retaining the
requirement that the taxpayer maintain household for one-half the year, but requiring the
qualifying individual to be a dependent.58 The current exception for parents could be
retained.

The greatest simplification, however, would be repeal of the head-of-household filing
status. If the earned-income and child-care credit were keyed to the existence of a
dependent, rather than marital status, as suggested below, there is little current need for
the additional filing status. The only remaining advantage to the status is the level at which
rate brackets change. The 28% rate kicks in at $17,850 for a single taxpayer and at $23,900
for a head of household.59 If the exemption, standard deduction, and earned-income credit
could be combined to provide a true support allowance based on dependents,60 there would
be no reason for varying rate schedules.

Earned Income Credit

The Problem. Under current law, a low-income taxpayer with a qualifying individual
is entitled to a refundable tax credit of up to 14% of his earned income for the taxable
year.61 The definition of qualifying individual is linked to filing status. Married couples
filing a joint return are eligible for the credit if there is a child for whom the couple is
entitled to a dependency exemption.62 Furthermore, the child must have the same principal
place of abode in the United States as the parents for more than one-half the taxable
year.63 If the taxpayer is a surviving spouse, the child must live all year in the United States
with the parent who must have maintained a household for him. A head of household,
however, may take the credit so long as an unmarried child or descendant lives with the
taxpayer for more than one-half the taxable year in a household maintained by the taxpayer.
Alternatively, a married child or descendant qualifies, provided the taxpayer can take a
dependency exemption for that person.65 This multiplicity of definitions perhaps explains
the high error rate for the credit66 and the appalling number of eligible taxpayers who fail
to claim the credit.67
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Proposal. There is some evidence that the earned-income credit was originally
designed to offset the social security taxes paid by low-income wage earners. It has come,
however, to serve a broader function, i.e., not only to keep families below the poverty level
out of the tax system, but also to provide a subsidy. In some respects, this continues its
original purpose in that it removes the burden of social security (or even other employment
taxes, state and local income taxes, or sales taxes). However, neither the amount of the
credit nor the qualifying requirements bear much relationship to these tax burdens. And
if the credit is meant to be a negative income tax, these requirements are irrational.
Varying the amount of the credit with family size is rational, since the poverty level
fluctuates as well,68 but the methodology used to determine family size should be the same
regardless of marital status.69 It is not clear why marital status is relevant other than to
indicate that, for example, the household may have at least two members rather than one.
A single low-income taxpayer may fall below the poverty line due to employment taxes just
as easily as a married couple.70
I propose to grant an earned income credit to any low-income taxpayer, regardless
of marital status, with the credit increasing in size with the number of the taxpayer’s
dependents.71 The amount of the credit would need to be restructured so as to award the
credit to single taxpayers as well as taxpayers who are married filing separately.72 The
credit would continue to be tied to income levels even though it varied with family size.
For example, a single taxpayer might be entitled to a credit of 12% of income; a taxpayer
with a dependent might be entitled to 12.5% and one with two dependents might be
entitled to 13%. These amounts could be tabularized. Since both the income and the
number of dependents could be determined from the face of the return, the Service could
ascertain both whether the taxpayer was entitled to a credit and the appropriate amount.
The Service could also provide a refund in those cases where the taxpayer failed to take
the credit.

The proposal could entail an increased administrative burden from the additional
taxpayers who might file a return in order to obtain the credit.73 This burden could be
shifted to the employer through expanded use of the advanced-earned-income-credit, 74
although a return probably would have to be filed in any event.75 It should be recognized,
however, that if the tax system is to be used to provide income subsidies, additional tax
returns are an inevitable consequence. Any potential revenue loss could be avoided by
taking the current credit expenditure and splitting it among more taxpayers.76 Alternatively,
Congress can take notice that the current system irrationally allocates the ’’subsidy" in a
discriminatory way,77 and that curing the inequity and complexity will not be free.
The earned-income credit could be simplified even more dramatically if even less
fine tuning could be tolerated. The simplest way to benefit low-income families would be
to fold the earned-income credit into the exemption by expanding it. This could be
accomplished by providing an additional phase-out at a low-income level or by varying the
amount of the exemption with the amount of income. Such a proposal appears to be
impossible unless only earned income is taken into account.78 That would be manageable
if the taxpayer were entitled to a credit as percentage of wages.79 The credit could be
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based on tables which take into account the number of dependents, much like the current
withholding tables. Taxpayers who worked for more than one employer might be required
to file a return if their total wages exceeded the ceiling.
Child Care Credit

The Problem. A taxpayer who pays child-care expenses to enable him/her to work80
is entitled to a credit equal to a percentage of the expenses. As with the other sections
already discussed, the taxpayer is required to have a qualifying individual, generally a
dependent under the age of 13.81 This is a workable definition, and as noted above, if
other sections were amended, such a rule would provide uniformity for low-income
taxpayers. There are two other requirements which do not correspond to the exemption
rules (either as currently written or as proposed) which appear to serve little function other
than to add complexity. First, the taxpayer claiming the credit must maintain a household
which includes a qualifying individual.82 Second, for an abandoned spouse to claim the
credit, s/he must maintain a household for a qualifying individual for more than one-half
the taxable year.83 This definition does not correspond to the usual rule for abandoned
spouses.84
Proposal. I propose to permit a credit for expenses paid for any qualifying dependent
regardless of whether the dependent lives with the taxpayer.85 Thus an individual would
no longer need to meet the "maintaining household" test and the definition of abandoned
spouse could be eliminated for purposes of the child-care credit. Although this would
simplify the section as well as the corresponding forms, it would not significantly expand the
number of taxpayers eligible to claim the credit and thus should not be a revenue loss.
How many taxpayers would claim a child-care credit for a dependent with whom they
neither reside nor for whom they maintain the household? Two examples come to mind.
One is the taxpayer on welfare, whose household expenses are covered by government
grants, but who pays her own child care expenses to enable her to work. It seems equitable
to extend the credit to the few taxpayers in this category, particularly since it simplifies the
provision for all others.86 The second example is the non custodial spouse who pays for
child-care expenses.87

More Radical Proposals

Support Allowance

The Problem. Together with the exemption, the standard deduction serves two
purposes. First, it defines the taxpaying universe by setting the level of taxable income at
which a return must be filed. Second, it exempts from taxation a minimum amount of
income, presumably a subsistence level needed for support. Because no evidence of any
expenditures is necessary to take advantage of the standard deduction, taxpayers are neither
required to keep records nor to understand the various itemized deductions.88

If the exemption and the standard deduction serve basically the same function, it is
reasonable to inquire as to the need for separate deductions. One possibility is to enable
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taxpayers to deduct both exemptions and itemized deductions. Another possibility is that
multiple deductions create the illusion of additional benefits. Neither is convincing.

The relationship of the earned-income credit to a support allowance depends on the
policy behind the credit. If it is an income subsidy or is used to take the poor off the tax
rolls, it can be treated as part of a support allowance. If it is to compensate for social
security taxes, that is more difficult.
Proposal. Suppose, however, that each taxpayer was entitled to a single "support
allowance" that increased with the number of dependents and varied with marital status.
Ignoring itemized deductions and the earned-income credit momentarily for the sake of
explication, each taxpayer would deduct from gross income one amount taken from a
table.89 Keeping constant the current amounts of standard deduction and exemptions, the
table would look something like the following:

Number of Exemptions90

Filing Status 1

2

4

3

5

Married

NA

$9000

$11,000

$13,000

$15,000

HofH

$6400

$8400

$10,400

$12,400

$14,400

Single

$5000

$7000

$9000

$11,000

$13,000

MFS

$4500

$6500

$8500

$10,500

$12,500

The columns could start with zero exemptions, which would have to be provided to
cover the taxpayer who is not entitled to a personal exemption because another claims him
as a dependent, and for the taxpayer whose separated spouse itemizes deductions.91 The
table could also be adjusted to take into account the additional deductions attributable to
age or blindness.92

The simplest way to incorporate itemized deductions is to provide that a taxpayer
who itemizes takes the greater of the total of his itemized deductions or the amount in the
table. At first blush this appears to be quite draconian by, in effect, eliminating the use of
the exemptions for a taxpayer who itemizes. But the effect may not be so harsh. First,
high-income taxpayers, who almost certainly itemize, already are denied the benefits of an
exemption. Second, it is not clear what theory supports an exemption for a taxpayer who
itemizes if the itemized deductions are a substitute for a support allowance. However, as
the scope of the deductions has narrowed, itemized deductions may in fact no longer be a
substitute for a support allowance. If so, the first line on a Schedule A could permit
taxpayers to deduct a support allowance of a fixed amount.
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Incorporation of the earned income credit is more complex but would overall
contribute to simplification. If the earned-income credit is merely an additional subsidy for
low-income taxpayers, it can be folded into the support allowance. Thus the amounts shown
in the table above could be increased in such a way as to convert the credit into an
allowance. Doing so would require extension of the credit amounts to all taxpayers
regardless of marital status and an increase in the amount based on the number of
dependents. There is one obstacle. The credit is currently linked to income and thus is
phased out at upper income levels. There are two possible solutions. One is to have a
fixed support allowance for all taxpayers regardless of income level. The other is to phase
out the support allowance at certain levels. That is already done for the exemption and the
earned-income credit, albeit at radically different income levels. There is no compelling
reason, however, why a single support allowance could not be phased out at one rather low
income level.
A single support allowance would engender significant simplification. Combined with
the broadest of the above proposals and uniform use of the dependency exemption, the
brave new world would look like this: Taxpayers would deduct a support allowance from
adjusted gross income. The allowance would be based on the number of exemptions and
marital status. The head of the household marital status would be eliminated, since there
would be no need to distinguish between single taxpayers and head of household, other
than rate bracket differential which is not worth the complexity. The earned-income credit
would be eliminated. The surviving-spouse status would be simplified so that any unmarried
widow(er) whose spouse died in the preceding two years would be eligible. A taxpayer
would be unmarried if the spouse did not live with him/her for the last six months of the
taxable year.

Limiting the Dependency Exemption to Children
A second radical proposal is to totally restructure the exemption so that it is either
taken by the taxpayer or by the taxpayer’s parent, but no one else. There are a number of
possible alternatives as to how to allocate the exemption. One possibility is to arbitrarily
assign it to the parent until the child reaches a given age, for example eighteen. After that
point, the child takes the exemption if he files a return, or it is lost. Alternatively, the child
and the parents could choose among themselves who is entitled to the election. In the case
of divorced or separated parents, the custodial parent would obtain the exemption unless
the parents agreed otherwise.93
If there is only one exemption per person and only the child or the parent could take
the exemption, there would be no need for the gross income test, the joint return test, the
relationship test and most importantly the support test. Similarly there would be no role
for multiple support agreements.

Taken in conjunction with the proposed support allowance, this rule would
substantially simplify the return. For example, the return could ask for the names and
social security numbers of any children under the age of 18 (or whatever age is chosen) and
the taxpayer’s marital status. Armed with that information, the taxpayer would subtract the
support allowance (taken from a table) and calculate tax. The Service would also be able
I-M-14

to tell from the face of the return the correct amount of the taxpayer’s taxable income and
tax.
Two clear advantages flow from these proposals. One is simplification; the other is
increased revenue. Who is disadvantaged? Taxpayers who currently support dependents
who are not children: mothers, brothers, grandchildren and the like. These taxpayers would
have a decreased support allowance.94 Examination of this proposal provides a good test
for how strongly one feels about simplification. Consider this example: If only a child
could be a dependent, a taxpayer who supports an elderly mother would be more heavily
taxed95 than a taxpayer who supports a young child. That results in horizontal inequity,
since the taxpayer who supports the mother does not have more ability to pay taxes than
the taxpayer with the child. The question is how much inequity the system will tolerate in
the name of simplification.
An Old Idea-Simplification for the Preparer

Suppose the above proposals were enacted. Would all low-income taxpayers be able
to file accurate returns without professional assistance? The answer sadly, but inevitably,
is no 96 Implementing a tax system so simple that almost all taxpayers could comply without
assistance would involve enormous tradeoffs that Congress would be unwilling to
embrace.97 First, it appears that we are not yet ready to wholly abandon vertical equity.
Thus progressive tax rates and provisions affecting ability to pay, such as the earned income
and child care credits, are likely to remain. Second, horizontal equity will assuredly
continue to be a hallmark of our tax system which means, for example, that in-kind benefits
must be valued and taxed as well as cash wages. Third, Congress shows little appetite for
ending the use of the tax system to enforce or encourage compliance with national
objectives.98 Finally, the tax return is often used for purposes unrelated to collection of the
income tax, such as the Presidential Election Campaign Fund checkoff and the excess FICA
tax refund.99
Uniform self-preparation of tax returns is a laudable, but ultimately unachievable,
goal.100 This is a proposition difficult for public officials to accept,101 and it is not clear that
the public, if it understood the issue, would accept.102 Yet to continue to set this as a goal
only exacerbates the problem. While every effort should be made to encourage Congress
to enact measures to simplify the tax law, and to encourage the Service to simplify
returns,103 that should not blind us to other avenues of simplification.

One such avenue to explore is taxpayer assistance.104 Discussion of simplification
need not be limited to amendments to the code and regulations. It can also involve limiting
the
complexity of compliance.105 This can be done by assuring that there exists a competent
cadre of preparers and practitioners who understand the law, can advise the low-income
taxpayer, and can prepare the return for a reasonable fee. The following issues should be
explored:
(1) Should tax return preparation assistance be provided by the government or
private sector?
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How many instances are there where the law is not clear and thus the tax treatment
of an item is debatable? In those cases, the Service is likely to take a position favorable
to the government; the private sector will favor the taxpayer.

(2) If the government is to provide assistance, can Congress be persuaded to
allocate additional funding?
(3) What steps can be taken to improve the quality of telephone and branch office
assistance?
(a) Can waiting time be decreased?

(b) Can the accuracy of advice be increased?

(4) What steps can be taken to encourage taxpayers to use government assistance?
(5) If the private sector is the answer, how can this assistance be encouraged?
(a) Is federal subsidy of tax preparation feasible?

(b) Is a federal tax credit feasible?
(c) Is expansion of the VITA or AARP programs an option?

(6) What steps can be taken to improve the quality of private-sector return
preparation?
(a) What is the feasibility of better enforcement of current standards?

(b) What is the feasibility of penalties?
(c) What is the feasibility of providing better training?

(7) What steps can be taken to increase the size of the pool of commercial or pro
bono preparers?
DOMESTIC-RELATIONS TAX ISSUES

Kiddie Tax

The Problem

As part of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, Congress enacted the so-called kiddie tax to
combat income deflection by a parent to a minor child. Apparently convinced that case law

I-M-16

dealing with intrafamily transfers of income-producing property was not sufficient to curb
abuse,106 Congress amended the rate schedules to provide that a child’s unearned income
is taxed at the parent’s top marginal tax rate. The statute applies only to a child who at the
end of his taxable year is under the age of fourteen and has one living parent.107 The child
files his own tax return. In most cases he will not be entitled to a personal exemption,108
and his standard deduction will be limited to the greater of $500 or his earned income.109
As a practical matter, since most children under the age of fourteen will not have earned
income, the usual rule is that the first $500 of unearned income is not subject to tax. The
next $500 is not subject to the kiddie tax and thus is generally taxed at the 15% rate.110
Current law provides that a parent may elect to include the unearned income
attributable solely to interest and dividends on the parent’s tax return provided it exceeds
$500 and is less than $5000.111
While it is possible to argue that any complexity of the kiddie tax should not be of
major concern because it applies primarily to wealthy taxpayers112 who can afford
sophisticated tax advice,113 it seems clear that the rules also impinge on taxpayers who,
while not destitute, clearly cannot readily afford such advice.114

What are the sources of complexity?115 They may be broken down into the following
categories:
Interaction With the Parent’s Return. Because the child’s tax rate is computed with
reference to the parent’s return, a number of problems are associated with this integration
such as the graduated rate schedule for trusts, the minimum tax, and the rate-bracket
phaseouts. Furthermore, if the parent’s return is audited and adjustments are made, the
child’s return must also be audited and adjusted.
Continued Desire for Income Deflection. It is certainly true that the kiddie tax
contributes to overall simplicity in that fewer taxpayers should be involved in the effort to
transfer income producing property to minors.116 Nevertheless, because the rules do not
apply to children over age fourteen or to property not producing current income, tax
planning continues.

Additional Tax Returns. Children with only unearned income (presumably most of
those subject to the kiddie tax) are now forced to file a tax return. Although arguably, in
most cases, there should be little opportunity to avoid this obligation due to information
reporting,117 it is not clear whether in fact these returns are being filed.118
Proposal
Others have proposed changes which leave the basic structure intact: rate bracket
compression119 and rate bracket assignment.120 Although worthy of consideration, both
proposals offer more, rather than less, complexity.121 I suggest we explore more fundamental
changes. In summary, they would expand the individuals covered and would make the
election mandatory.
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They are:
(a) Apply the kiddie tax to any dependent child of the taxpayer.

(b) Tax the unearned income of any such dependent on the return of the parent.122
(c) Treat the unearned income of any dependent used for his support as funds
provided by the parent rather than the child.
These three suggestions are discussed below.
Extending the kiddie tax to all dependent children can be seen on one level merely as
extension of my basic notion of uniformity, i.e., to the extent possible, a uniform definition
of qualifying individuals should be used.123 On another level, it can be justified in isolation
as simplifying the kiddie tax.124

Taxpayers would be far less interested in transferring property to older children (for
example, between the ages of fourteen and nineteen) because tax-motivated income
deflection would not be possible. Theoretically it is difficult to justify the limited
application of the kiddie tax. The problem of income deflection does not end at age
thirteen. Why should a fourteen year-old child be able to enjoy a 15% tax bracket on
$17,850 of taxable income when a thirteen year-old child is taxed at 28%?125 Obviously,
this cannot be carried to an extreme, since Congress has decided that a single adult
taxpayer is entitled to that differential. The obvious place to draw the line is with the
natural assignees of deflected income. This would include a child who continues to enjoy
the support of the parent and by definition is not earning enough gross income to generate
his own high marginal rates.126

My second suggestion-to tax the dependent’s unearned income on the parent’s
return-is much more radical, although not novel.127 Essentially, I would combine the
dependent’s unearned income with the parent’s income in an undifferentiated manner on
the parent’s return. The dependent would file a tax return only if he had sufficient earned
income and if so, that earned income would be subject to his own rates-i.e., he could
produce $17,850 of earned income subject to the 15% rate regardless of the amount of
unearned income reported on the parent’s return.128 If the child had insufficient earned
income, no additional return would be filed. This aspect of the proposal would eliminate
the several million kiddie tax returns currently filed.
Such a proposal can be justified on a number of grounds. In the usual case, there
is a joint pooling and budgeting of all income in the family unit. Thus the entire economic
unit should be considered in judging ability to pay.129 Even if there is no actual pooling of
family resources, aggregation can be justified in that the child’s use of his income to meet
his own consumption or savings needs relieves the family of that burden and thus increases
their power to consume.130 If the justification for the progressive rate structure131 is the
reduction of economic inequality, the economic power of the family unit is the appropriate
measure, since each member’s income enhances the family’s power to consume. 2
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A corollary of the proposal is that any unearned income used for the child’s support
must be treated as coming from the parent. A simple example shows why: Assume Parent
transfers $250,000 in trust for Child. The trust income of $2500 is used solely for the child’s
support. The parent spends an additional $1000 for the child’s support. Under either
current law or the proposed simplification of the dependency exemption, the child would
not be the dependent of the parent,133 and thus the child’s unearned income would not be
taxed at the parent’s rates. Thus the unearned income must be treated as parental support.
Since the parent is taxed on the income, this is appropriate.

Issues
A number of divergences from current law and potential problems come to mind and
are discussed below:

Differences in the Parent’s Tax Base. The current rules provide that any item on
the parent’s tax return is not affected by the child’s unearned income. Since I propose
taxing the child’s income on the parent’s return, I would treat the child’s unearned income
as the parent’s for all purposes. Thus the income would be taken into account, for example,
for purposes of computing limits on the charitable contributions deduction, the medical
deduction, or miscellaneous itemized deductions.

The child’s investment income could be used to offset the parent’s investment
interest expense.134 This decision is warranted on policy grounds as well. If the kiddie tax
is justified as a means of avoiding income deflection, the assumption must be that the
property--and the income produced by it-remains in the control of the parent regardless
of documentation indicating otherwise. If so, there is no reason for the parent to treat the
income differently from any other. If the income is reported on the child’s return and not
amalgamated with other income, it is in fact treated dissimilarly.

Property Transferred by Nonparent. The additional complexity and the opportunities
for gaming the system are such that we cannot base the tax on the source of the child’s
income-producing property. Can we justify subjecting the parent to tax on income produced
by property transferred to the child from, for example, a grandparent?135 Currently the tax
paid by the child is based on the parent’s rate regardless of source, presumably because
parents probably enjoy practical control over such property.136 If this reasoning is accepted,
the source of the property is irrelevant. By way of analogy, the income of spouses is
currently aggregated, admittedly only with consent, even though neither spouse may have
legal control over the income of the other.
More difficult, at least politically, is the income produced by assets purchased with
the child’s earnings (the interest on the savings account funded from a paper route). While
initially a decision to tax the parent on this income may seem harsh and groundless, it
acquires appeal on further reflection. This income is also likely to be part of the economic
resources over which the parent has control. Even in the case of the twenty-year-old
college student who deposits earnings in a bank account, the family unit has made a
decision to spend the parent’s, rather than the child’s, earnings on support.137 This decision
has already been reached under the current kiddie tax rules, apparently without major
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revolt.138 One suspects that we are not dealing with a large number of taxpayers with a
significant amount of unearned income from job-related assets.
Divorced or Separated Parents. The issue is which parent must include the income.
One possibility to keep the current rule: in the case of divorced or unmarried parents, the
custodial parent139 and in the case of married individuals filing separately, the individual
with the greater taxable income.140 Alternatively, the obligation to report the child’s income
could follow the dependency exemption, with perhaps a self-ordering exception if the
parents desired to allocate it to the parent without the exemption. This should be easy to
apply to the proposal since the kiddie tax would expand to cover all dependent children.

Use of Offset. Under current law, the tax at the parent’s rate is levied on the
unearned income generally offset by $1OOO.141 There are two possibilities as to how to deal
with the offset if the income is taxed to the parent. One, obviously, is to ignore it. That
is, the full amount of the dependent’s earned income is taxed to the parent, and the child
reports his unearned income decreased by the standard deduction. There seems to be no
theoretical reason to exclude the first $1000 of the child’s unearned income.142 It appears
that the exclusion was provided for administrative reasons, that is, to avoid many extra
returns with small income of unearned income. That reason would not apply if the amounts
were reported on the parent’s return,143 since the return would be filed in any event.144 If
one believed that the removal of the $1000 offset is politically unsalable, an alternative is
to provide an equal exemption on the parent’s return. This could be done by excluding
some amount of unearned income for each child.145 If an exemption is retained, there is
one practical problem, but it is no worse than under current law: There would continue
to be an incentive for a parent to transfer property producing unearned income to take
advantage of the exemption which would not be available if the parent retained the
property.
Confidentiality. Practitioners have expressed concern that under current rules,
parents may have to reveal their financial status or tax information. However, tenuous an
argument this may be, it is virtually eliminated if the income were reported on the parent’s
return.146 The reverse problem should not exist: Disclosing the child’s income to a parent
during a period when the parent is probably legally required to support the child and, in
any event, is providing at least half the support, is not unreasonable. The parent already
has a legal obligation to prepare and sign a federal income tax return for a minor child.
Simplification should also be achieved because there would be far fewer cases in which
financial information would need to be transferred. Finally, if the parent must report the
income, it is less likely the underlying property will be transferred to a dependent in the
first place.148

Earned Income. The dependent child would continue to report his earned income
on his own return.149 While a theoretical argument can be made that the entire income of
the family unit should be pooled,150 we do not appear to be ready for such a drastic step.151
In any event no major complexity appears to result from requiring the dependent to report
his own earned income.
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Tax Liability. Under current law the tax liability remains the child’s; under the
proposal it would shift to the parent. This is probably not an important distinction.152

Non-taxable Transfers. One corollary of this proposal is that intra-family sales should
be treated as non-taxable gifts since the parent will continue to be taxed on the income.
That is, no gain or loss would be recognized at the time of the transfer, and the child would
take the parent’s basis in the transferred asset. If the child sold the asset while he was still
a dependent, the gain or loss would be taxed to the parent; if the asset was sold when the
child was no longer a dependent, the gain would be taxed to the child. Alternatively, any
gain accruing at the time of the transfer could be taxed to the parent upon the child’s
departure from the family unit. Another approach is to simply ignore the transfers until the
child is no longer a dependent-i.e., the parent is still treated as owning the property. At
the time the child leaves the unit, "ownership" would pass with the child taking the parent’s
adjusted basis.
Child Support

The Problem
At the urging of the ABA Tax Section153 and others, Congress in 1984 extensively
modified the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code dealing with alimony, property
settlements, and child support. The Tax Reform Act of 1984154 changed the prior rule that
a transfer of appreciated property as part of a property settlement triggered gain to the
transferor.155 Section 1041 now provides that no gain or loss is recognized on an
interspousal transfer or a transfer pursuant to a divorce and the transferee takes the
transferor’s basis. While some criticism has been leveled against this provision,156 it is
generally thought to be a workable improvement which contributed to simplicity in that it
made planning significantly easier and more certain.157 Section 71 was also materially
altered so as to make the differentiation of nondeductible property settlements and
deductible alimony simpler and less subject to abuse. Under present law, alimony is any
cash payment made pursuant to a written divorce or separation agreement so long as there
is no liability to make the payment after the death of the payee spouse, and the payee and
payor spouses are not members of the same household at the time such payment is made.158
Alternatively, the couple may "self-order" their affairs by providing in the agreement that
the payments are not to be considered alimony.159 Payments conforming to this federal
definition of alimony, regardless of how they are labeled under state law, are includible by
the recipient160 and deductible by the payor.161 This portion of the 1984 amendments has
not been subject to criticism on the grounds of complexity and has been generally
supported.162
In order to avoid disguising what is essentially a property settlement as deductible
alimony, complex rules were adopted providing for recapture of deductions where there is
front-loading of alimony payments.163 While these rules do provide certainty, in that they
are mechanical and, if applied correctly, can free a taxpayer from doubt as to the
deductibility of the payments, they also are particularly difficult to comprehend. While tax
lawyers who on a regular basis handle sophisticated tax planning in divorces where
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significant assets are involved have little problem following the intricacies of the recapture
rules, general practitioners and tax lawyers who do not do a significant number of divorces
apparently find the recapture rules extraordinarily complex.164

Unlike alimony, payments for child support are not includible by the recipient nor
deductible by the payor.165 Prior to 1984, payments were presumed to be alimony unless
specifically designated as child support in the written agreement under the so-called Lester
rule.166 This proviso produced a significant amount of litigation over whether specific
language was precise enough. As part of domestic-relations reform, Congress reversed the
Lester rule, treating as child support any amounts specified in an agreement which will be
reduced either on the happening of a contingency relating to a child167 or at a time which
can clearly be associated with a contingency relating to a child.168 Rather than curing
complexity, this amendment merely reversed it. One must still use exact language to
produce child support, and such a requirement produces a trap for the unsophisticated and
unwary.169
The continuing differentiation between child support and alimony has created several
other problems. While none may be severe by itself, taken together they make advising an
unsophisticated and middle-income client on a divorce a difficult process. First, the
dependency exemption rules were amended in a salutary way to allow the parents to choose
which is entitled to the exemption. In the absence of specification in the agreement, the
custodial parent170 is entitled to the deduction.171

Typically, the exemption is awarded to the spouse with the higher income, often the
noncustodial parent. Thus, the noncustodial parent often pays for the child’s support
(through nondeductible support payments) and takes a dependency-exemption deduction.
In cases where the custodial parent retains the exemption, problems can arise since it is the
other parent making payments for the child. It was for this reason, hat Section 213 was
amended to provide that the child is to be considered the dependent of either parent for
purposes of deducting medical expenses. Thus, even though the custodial parent takes the
dependency exemption, the noncustodial parent can deduct the payments made for the
child’s medical expenses. However, no such provision was made for either the earnedincome credit or the child-care credit. It seems fairly clear that the noncustodial parent
will in most cases be unable to take the earned income credit. To be eligible, a taxpayer
must be either married with a child for whom the dependency exemption is taken or a
head of household which requires that the child live with the parent for half of the year.172
In order to deduct child care expenses, the payor must be able to take a dependency
exemption for the qualifying individual.173 Thus if the noncustodial parent pays for child
care, but has not been awarded the exemption, the child care expenses will not be
creditable. If the custodial parent pays for child care, but has released the exemption to
the noncustodial parent, the exemption also will be lost.
Proposal

Both the problems with child support and the exemption/credit discongruities can
be eliminated if, for federal tax purposes, child support and alimony were no longer
differentiated.174 I propose that any cash payment to a former spouse be treated as alimony
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unless the parties agree in writing to the contrary.174 Thus, what is now labeled as child
support would be includible/deductible as alimony. This eliminates the Lester problem
altogether by avoiding any need to use specific language to distinguish child support from
alimony. It also makes child support clearly subject to self-ordering176: the spouses can
choose whether to use the deductible/includible or the nondeductible/nontaxable
mechanism.177

The problems with the credits would also be solved. In most cases, the exemption
should follow the taxable child support. That is, if the recipient is paying taxes on the
earnings used to support the child, the recipient would ordinarily keep the exemption. S/he
would then usually qualify as head of the household (or married) and be able to take the
earned-income credit. Similarly, s/he would presumably use the taxable funds to pay for
child care, and having kept the exemption, would be entitled to the child-care credit. In
the reverse situation, where the parties decide to have the earner pay taxes on the funds
used for child support, the custodial parent would ordinarily relinquish the exemption.178
This solves one problem for the noncustodial parent but not the other-i.e., for both credits,
the taxpayer is required to live with the dependent. In the case of divorced parents, this
is unwarranted. In the absence of major revision of these credits as suggested above, I
would amend sections 32 and section 21 to provide that the parent with the exemption is
entitled to the earned-income or child-care credit so long as the child lives with a parent
(either custodial or noncustodial). In summary, in keeping with the spirit of the above
suggestions with regard to low-income taxpayers179, the credits would generally follow the
exemption and the exemption would generally be allocated to the spouse who pays taxes
on the funds used for child support.18
Issues
A number of divergences from current law and potential problems come to mind and
are discussed below:

Theoretical Justification. The Treasury Department and others have stated that
alimony is deductible because the marital relationship has terminated and thus the payment
is no longer personal. In contrast, child support is a personal expense and therefore is not
deductible.
This is wholly implausible. Most tax theorists believe that alimony is
deductible as a surrogate for not taxing the earner on funds transferred for the benefit of
the recipient spouse who is subject to tax. Thus it is a mechanism to shift the tax and to
avoid double taxation of the same funds. If the spouses had remained married, funds used
for their support would have been taxed once (usually on a joint return). Although the
marital relationship ends, the economic relationship does not, and thus the taxation of the
earnings should not change.

If one accepts the theoretical justification for the inclusion and deduction of alimony,
it is appropriate to ask whether there is a bona fide reason to treat child support
differently.182 One argument often raised to support nondeductibility of child support
payments is that it would give divorced couples an advantage over married couples who are
not permitted a deduction.183 This argument is flawed. The funds used by a married
couple to support their children are subject to tax once.184 The deductible/includible
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device185 permits the same economic result after the marriage ends. The earner/payor
would receive a deduction which cancels the tax, but the recipient would pay taxes on the
funds. Thus the economic unit continues to pay one tax.

The other objection to self-ordering is that the possibility for tax savings through
shifting income to a lower-bracket recipient might create a revenue loss. If the couple
remained married and their incomes were combined, the 15% rate advantage would
disappear. However, since income shifting is already permitted for alimony, there is not
likely to be additional revenue loss: To the extent permitted by state law, taxpayers
presumably already use self-ordering to take advantage of the 15% bracket.
On another level, however, one can ask whether it is appropriate to tax the recipient
spouse on funds either used for the child or actually transferred to the child.186 Although
this concern has political appeal, it appears that we have long since crossed that bridge.
Under current law, earnings used to support dependent children are taxed to the married
parents and under either Lester or current law, nonspecific payments are taxed to the
recipient divorced spouse. Furthermore, the deduction of child support would not be new.
Under either Lester or current law, a divorced parent can deduct payments used to support
children by simply failing to label them correctly.187 The fact that the funds are actually
used to support a child is irrelevant.
Practical Changes. Making child support, as well as alimony, deductible, would, in
fact, change the tenor of the negotiations between divorcing spouses. No longer would
there be a tax incentive for the recipient spouse to request child support as opposed to
alimony and the payor spouse to do the reverse. Although, perhaps, ideally tax
consequences should play no role in dividing the family wealth and providing for future
support, the current system does affect the amount and perhaps the timing of payments.
If all payments were subject to one rule, the spouses can decide which spouse should bear
the tax on earnings used to support the parents and children.188 The payment of the tax,
in effect, becomes an obligation like any other that must be balanced in the negotiations.
Presumably taxpayers will take that into account in much the same way they have accounted
for the present treatment of alimony.189
Gifts. If child support were to become deductible, one might question whether the
payor parent could deduct what would otherwise be a nondeductible gift to the child. This
appears to be a concern without substance, however. First, the section limits deductions
to cash payments. Thus any in-kind transfer (the bicycle, the radio, etc.) would be outside
the rule. Second, the payments must be made pursuant to the decree or written separation
agreement. The payor is unlikely to make additional cash payments solely to obtain a tax
deduction,190 and furthermore since the recipient must include the amounts in gross income,
s/he is likely to require that they be made pursuant to the agreement. A provision modeled
on current law191 could be included such that any cash payment made by a former spouse
is presumed to be pursuant to the decree unless it exceeds the amount specified in the
instrument.
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MIDDLE INCOME TAXPAYERS-RECORDKEEPING

The Issue

An inquiry into why a middle-income taxpayer who is not operating a business or
investing in tax shelters should find the tax law complicated almost always yields the same
response: recordkeeping.
The refusal of taxpayers to engage in the process of
understanding and complying with complex rules affecting simple, everyday transactions is
an alarming trend.192 They do a rudimentary cost-benefit analysis and determine it is not
worth the time and the money to comply. Playing the audit lottery, they predict that it is
cheaper and more efficient to comply if, and only if, they are part of the 1% of taxpayers
who are caught. Tax professionals make similar determinations. Tax return preparation
which incorporates detailed recordkeeping and regulations interpretation cannot be priced
at a level attractive to consumers. Often, the cost of compliance is higher than the taxes
involved. To save time, deductions are estimated, recordkeeping is ignored, or all expenses
are presumed to be deductible.193
A further examination of the phenomenon finds it rooted in the personal/business
distinction. The immense difficulty this poses for the tax system has been well-documented
elsewhere.194 While Congress has made some notable efforts to eliminate controversies
caused by the distinction, 5 it has created problems when it was unwilling to declare that
specific expenses were presumed to be nondeductible consumption.196 Recently Congress
or Treasury has adopted ever more complicated techniques to distinguish personal from
business or investment expenses. Fine-tuning is the order of the day.

It is time to ask whether we have thrown out the baby with bath water. If
regulations are complex enough to cover every conceivable transaction, but no one complies
with them, what have we accomplished? While it may be argued that, in some cases, the
objectionable transactions will simply cease,197 that is not true with mixed personal/business
transactions. It is likely that they continue unabated because, in part, taxpayers will incur
the specific expense regardless of the tax consequences. Worse, noncompliance with
complex recordkeeping requirements breeds noncompliance in other areas.

The discussion which follows considers a number of problem areas where a radically
different approach is warranted. In particular, it focuses on those situations where a
middle-income taxpayer would be required to use a professional preparer or, alternatively,
would simply ignore the provisions in order to self-prepare. In general, I recommend
consideration of either elimination of the deductions, arbitrary amounts for the deductions,
or other safe harbors. Obviously, this approach both sacrifices equity and permits
noncompliance to shape the system. Both consequences are objectionable. Nevertheless
when complexity generates noncompliance, equity must be sacrificed.198
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Specific Problems

Rental Units
The Problem. Current law permits a taxpayer to deduct the ordinary and necessary
expenses of a business or investment activity such as leasing property.199 Where a taxpayer
leases a portion of his residence, he must include the rental receipts in income and is
permitted to deduct the associated expenses. Although some expenses, such as repairs, may
be allocable solely to the rental unit, most must be allocated between the residence and the
rental unit. Records of the expenses as well as the method of allocation must be
maintained.

In general, besides the need to keep detailed records, the issues creating the most
difficulty for middle-income taxpayers are depreciation and repair versus capitalization.
As repairs are immediately deductible as opposed to capital expenditures which are subject
to depreciation over time, there is a strong incentive to allocate expenses to the rental unit
and preferably treat them as repairs. There is no bright line for homeowners to follow, and
taxpayers may be unable to understand or accept the distinction.200 Depreciation of a rental
unit is particularly complex. This is due to three factors, other than the innate complexity
of depreciation. One is the need to allocate depreciation-some of the annual depreciation
is allocable to personal use and thus is not deductible. The second factor is the rapidly
changing law-taxpayers with pre-1981 rental units with recently added fixtures may be using
three depreciation systems. The third factor is state law-as discussed below, state law often
does not correspond to federal law, and with depreciation, that may mean two entirely
separate sets of calculations for a single asset.201 The use of section 179202partially alleviates
the first two concerns in that the tension between a deductible and capitalized expense
disappears and future changes in the depreciation rules are ignored. However, it often
precipitates the application of the passive-loss rules, since the large first-year deduction may
create a loss, and it creates a serious problem in states that do not recognize its use.203

Possible Solutions. One possibility which would promote simplicity in the case of the
rental unit is to permit the taxpayer to deduct an arbitrary amount as a surrogate for the
actual expenses. The figure could be a percentage of the rentals, for example 80%,204which
would eliminate the application of the passive loss rules.205 In exchange for the fixed
deduction, the taxpayer would forgo all deductions attributable to actual
expenses-depreciation, repairs, insurance, utilities, etc.-but would not need to maintain
any records. 7 Such an option could be elective, so that the taxpayer could deduct the
actual expenses (presumably where there was a loss) at a cost of maintaining records and
filing a more complicated return.
Another alternative to deal specifically with the repair/capitalization problem is to
expand section 179 to cover personalty so that separate depreciation need not be calculated
for refrigerators, ranges, boilers, and the like. To prevent a revenue loss, the tradeoff could
be an immediate deduction limited to, for example, 80% rather than 100% of basis.208 The
remaining basis could be deducted when the asset is removed from service.
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Vacation Homes and Home Offices
The Problem. Similar recordkeeping issues arise in connection with home offices
and vacation homes, but there are additional complications. In order to avoid deductions
in the case of sham business offices, Congress enacted stringent and complicated limiting
rules. The business office must be used exclusively on a regular basis as either the principal
place of business for a trade or business, a place of business which is used by patients,
clients, or customers meeting with the taxpayer in the normal course of business, or a
separate structure.209 These definitions have given rise to some fairly bizarre case law as
taxpayers attempt to push the outer edges.210 In addition, there is a complex calculation
designed to limit the deductions to the income produced by the business. 1

For purposes of the vacation-home rules, a taxpayer must first determine if he uses
the home as a residence: He does if it is used for personal purposes for the greater of 14
or 10% of the number of days it is rented. If so, then all deductions which would otherwise
be allowed as business deductions are denied, although the rental income is included.212
If the unit is not used as a residence,213 the expenses are deductible. If the unit is rented
for less than fifteen days, both the income and the deductions are ignored.214
There are a number of possible approaches to simplifying the business-office and
vacation-home rules, one quite Draconian, one more favorable to taxpayers. The Draconian
solution is to deny any home-office or vacation-home deduction215 if the taxpayer uses the
home as a residence for even a single day. This would eliminate the notch effect for
vacation homes.216 One slightly less stringent possibility is to conform the home-office
rules to the vacation-home rules--i.e., if the taxpayer uses the dwelling as a residence for
two weeks or more, all home-office deductions are lost. The result should be that in the
vast majority of cases, the home-office deduction would disappear. Either suggestion results
in some inequity for the taxpayer with a genuine business use for the residence. For
example, it would work a potential hardship on doctors, hair dressers, and others whose
principal place of business is located at the home. Presumably, they would shift to a rental
location. The taxpayer who uses a ski chalet for 15 days and rents it for the remaining 350
days is similarly disadvantaged. The answer for the vacation home is to ignore the income
as well since there is not likely to be a significant amount of profit involved. This would
not work for the home-office if it is the principal place of business, since most of the
taxpayer’s income would go untaxed.

Automobile Deductions
Because the personal use of an automobile is not deductible, but business use is, a
determination must be made of the percentage of time or miles a car is used for each
purpose. The infamous log rules issued by the Service were in response to what the IRS
perceived to be abuse in allocations. They were sharply criticized by taxpayers, small
business, and accountants as being time-consuming and inefficient with little valuable return.

One way to solve this recordkeeping problem is to eliminate any deduction for
automobile expenses in connection with a car used for personal expenses. Although this
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would promote simplicity, it is somewhat inequitable in that the costs of genuine business
use would not offset income produced by the use of the car. It is also inefficient in that it
would encourage taxpayers in such a situation to acquire two automobiles.

Once again the answer may lie in a percentage rule or safe harbor. It would be
difficult to use a percentage of income since not all of the income derived from the business
may be attributable to the car.217 Alternatively, one might take a small percentage of
annual mileage. For example, assuming the taxpayer can show a business use of the car,
he would be entitled to deduct the costs associated with 10% of the annual mileage without
producing records.
The taxpayer would be permitted to show actual mileage provided
he complied with the log rules. Thus, taxpayers could elect out of complicated
recordkeeping at the possible cost of the loss of a deduction.219
Interest Allocation

Other recordkeeping requirements pale, however, in comparison to the interest
allocation rules. When Congress, in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, essentially adopted a
basket approach to interest, the need to characterize interest became essential. Whereas
the characterization of interest may not be fungible, the funds used to pay interest are, and
therein lies the rub. The proposed regulations adopt a tracing approach requiring massive
recordkeeping involving almost every expenditure made by a taxpayer. The rules have been
subject to unlimited and unceasing criticism, and it is widely believed that both taxpayers
and tax professionals are ignoring them.
Issues. It is difficult to discuss the personal interest rules in a vacuum because the
combination of the statute and the proposed Treasury regulations relegate all interest
(except home mortgage interest) to the basket approach and the tracing rules. Thus the
difficulty of proposing any rule for personal interest is that first one must distinguish
personal interest from investment or passive interest.

Until this tension is resolved, it seems unlikely that much simplification can be
accomplished. But a number of minor changes can be considered:

Minor Changes.
Eliminate the home interest deduction for any residence other than the principal
residence. Although some complexity could be eliminated by repeal of any personal-interest
deduction, that does not seem likely. There appears to be little justification, however, for
the deduction on the second home.220 In addition to limiting complexity, such an
amendment would raise revenue.
Eliminate the deduction for interest on home equity indebtedness. There also appears
to be no justification for the retention of this form of personal interest. Since the use of
the proceeds is irrelevant, it benefits homeowners who are able to borrow for personal
consumption at the expense of those who have no home equity and thus must pay for
consumption with current income. Furthermore, present law creates incentives to convert
home equity indebtedness into acquisition indebtedness by purchasing a new home.
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Assuming acquisition of a home is a transaction Congress wants to use the tax system to
encourage, there is no reason to provide a benefit to those who build up equity rather than
to those just entering the market or those who pay only interest.

Link the limit on the home-mortgage deduction to interest paid rather than amount of
indebtedness.22' No matter which standard is chosen, inequity results. Under current law,
those who live in areas of soaring real estate prices are able to deduct interest on a debt
used to acquire a somewhat modest home whereas that amount of debt would support
purchase of a mansion in other areas. Conversely, using interest paid as the limit will favor
taxpayers able to borrow at low interest rates. Nevertheless, the simplicity gained from the
interest paid standard outweighs the inequity. Complex recordkeeping and calculations
could be eliminated by using interest paid, a figure readily available to taxpayers.

Consider the use ofpresumptions. Much simplicity might be gained by making certain
assumptions about interest regardless of actual facts. For example, we might presume that
any interest expense (other than home acquisition indebtedness) less than or equal to
investment income was investment expense. No tracing or security interest need be shown.
Thus, that amount of interest would be deductible. Alternatively we could presume that
the first $5000 (or any other number) of interest paid by a taxpayer was personal interest
and nondeductible. Whether one assumption is preferable to another depends on whether
one believes the rule that personal consumption should be taxed takes priority over the rule
that there should be no tax when a borrower acquires investment assets because there is
no net economic income.

Simplifying the AMT
The Problem. An entirely different sort of recordkeeping problem is created by the
alternative minimum tax. Generally, the AMT provisions are designed to take away some
of the advantage of certain tax benefits. That is accomplished by adding back to taxable
income at least a portion of the tax benefits and imposing a minimum rate of tax. In many
cases, that requires taxpayers generally to calculate taxable income twice and specifically
to make two calculations for certain transactions.

Proposal. The obvious simplification is to abandon the AMT and attack preferences
directly.

State Law
Our federalist system which permits state and local authorities as well as the federal
government to impose taxes results in much additional complexity. This complexity takes
two forms. First, the failure to coordinate taxes results in duplicative recordkeeping and
filing burdens on taxpayers.222 Taxpayers must essentially file identical information twice
or sometimes even three times.
Second, and perhaps more burdensome, is the complexity which results when the
state and local law diverges from federal law. For example, taxpayers may be required to
keep two sets of books.223 There may also be conflicting planning goals depending on
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whether one followed the state or federal law.224 Society’s mobility, as well as the ability
to produce income simultaneously in more than one taxing jurisdiction, gives rise to another
set of complex problems. The taxpayer who moves from one state to another or the
multistate business can be subject to two taxes on the same income, and complex allocation
or credit provisions apply.225 These problems are not limited to wealthy taxpayers. Low
or average-income taxpayers may also face them. For example, a laborer who works in
one state and resides in another is almost always subject to two taxing jurisdictions, as is
a taxpayer who moves to a new state during the taxable year.

The obvious answer to the first two issues is piggybacking, which uses the federal tax
as the starting point. States, anxious to preserve their sovereignty and power to levy a tax
in the manner they choose, have not rushed to piggyback. Thus other approaches on the
federal level must be explored. One is to encourage states to adopt provisions identical to
federal law.226 Another is to use federal adjusted gross or taxable income as the initial
point for determining state taxes. Neither of these suggestions, however, will solve the
problem of state exclusions, deductions, or credits that have no counterpart in federal law.
In these situations, the state has decided to provide an incentive either for some state-sited
activity or because its public policy position differs from the federal government.
The purpose of this section is not to offer more concrete suggestions. Unless broad
federal incentives are provided, simplification will have to occur at the state level. That
necessitates a state-by-state evaluation of complexity and proposed simplification tailored
to individual state provisions.
The purpose of this concluding section is, however, to issue a cautionary note. The
focus of this paper and in fact, the entire conference, is federal tax law. Obviously federal
tax law is complex as it is applied to individuals and efforts at simplification should be
applauded. For many taxpayers, however, simplification of the federal law and return would
provide only limited relief if not accompanied by state simplification. Thus even if we reach
consensus on how to repair the Internal Revenue Code, there are many codes left needing
attention.
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NOTES
1 Consider the statement by Ronald A. Pearlman, chief of staff, Joint Committee on
Taxation, that he believes there is neither a private nor a public constituency for
simplification of the tax code, despite the current outcry that tax laws and regulations have
become too complicated and burdensome, even for lawyers. BNA Daily Tax Report G-7,
8 (September 26, 1989).

2 Ironically, their only lobby may be the Internal Revenue Service, which will register
a complaint when a provision affecting large numbers of taxpayers is unadministrable.
3 The former deductions for gasoline and state sales taxes have been repealed and the
medical and casualty deductions have been curtailed by the imposition of steep thresholds.
This reform was accompanied by a corresponding increase in the standard deduction, which
may explain its acceptance. But the elimination of recordkeeping, calculations and the like
may have also made the changes palatable.
4 Even a sacred cow may be slaughtered. The 1986 Tax Reform Act (with subsequent
amendments) limited the deduction for the home mortgage deduction, previously thought
to be untouchable.

5 Are the passive-loss regulations, the vacation-home rules, or the earned-income credit
limitations analogous to day-old garbage?

6 Tax professionals have been extraordinarily successful in urging, in the name of
simplification, changes in installment sale rules, subchapter S, divorce provisions, and
accounting rules. Perhaps tax professionals could unite to work for simplification for the
majority in the same manner that we have worked for simplification for the minority.
1 Other provisions, such as marital status, the kiddie tax, and the domestic relations
rules, address the question of who is the proper taxpayer. Any revenue loss would be
attributable to rate-bracket arbitrage. The easy, although politically undesirable, way to
pick up revenue, when discussing income shifting, is to adjust the rate brackets.

8 The earned income credit, which is a good example of this, is discussed in notes 61-79
and accompanying text.
9 The dependency exemption, which is a perfect example of this, is discussed in notes
14-37 and accompanying text.
10 This paper offers no solutions to the following causes of complexity affecting low
income taxpayers: multiple W-2 forms due to second or even third jobs, in-kind fringe
benefits, multi-state tax issues affecting interstate commuters, and interaction with welfare
benefits. This type of complexity is inevitable. Taxpayers also perceive the tax law to be
complex in ways that have nothing to do with the substantive law. They may have had
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difficult or unpleasant experiences in handling a deficiency notice, replacing a missing W-2,
or obtaining a social security number.
11 As explained in detail below, it is not possible to eliminate other qualifications since
certain benefits, such as the child care credit, are premised on specific expenditures. For
example, not every parent with a dependent will have incurred child care expenses.
12 A single taxpayer is already permitted to file a highly simplified Form 1040E2.
Although a significant number of taxpayers using this form also use a preparer, it is unlikely
that the concept behind the 1040EZ or the form itself can be made simpler. A taxpayer
merely completes name, address, social security number, and wages and takes the standard
deduction and taxes from a table. The taxpayer also can request that the Service complete
the form.
13 Because it will be used to determine marital status, which in turn is used to
determine the standard deduction and thus the progressivity of the system, it impacts
vertical equity as well.
14 Almost all of the following material is taken from a 1986 report by the American Bar
Association Tax Section Task Force on the Dependency Exemption (1986). This task force,
which I chaired, proposed a legislative recommendation to simplify the dependency
exemption and to provide for a uniform definition of child. Legislative Recommendation
1986-1 was ultimately adopted by the ABA Tax Section on February 1, 1986, and by the
ABA House of Delegates on August 9, 1986. See also, Schenk, ’’Simplifying Dependency
Exemptions: A Proposal for Reform," Tax Law 35:855 (1982); Thuronyi, Simplification for
the Average Taxpayer, Tax Notes (July 11, 1988). 186.

15 This figure is somewhat misleading as an indicator of the number of taxpayers who
are exposed to these rules. The dependency exemption is used to determine whether a
return must be filed. Thus, many taxpayers not required to file a return must also
comprehend the eligibility rules.
16 I.R.C.S 151(c) (1) (A).

17I.R.C.S 152 (a) (9). A person is not considered a member of the taxpayer’s household
if the relationship with the taxpayer violates local law.
18 I.R.C.S 152(b) (3).
19 I.R.C.S 151(c) (2).

20 I.R.C. 152(a).
21 I.R.C. 152(c).

22 I.R.C. 151(d) (2).
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23 With the exception of the elimination of the gross-income and the joint-return tests,
these proposals are the subject of ABA Tax Section Legislative Recommendation 1986-1,
discussed in note 14. Those two tests were not officially recommended because they follow
directly from the elimination of the double exemption. The task force making the
recommendation believed that issue should be resolved by Congress.
24 The number chosen prevents possible tax arbitrage due to the elimination of the
relationship test, discussed below. Because a taxpayer must contribute at least the amount
of the deduction, there is no possibility of using the tax system to profit by providing the
minimum amount of support for another.

Most taxpayers would be able to use this fixed-amount objective standard. It is easier
to determine than the current "more than one-half of the support" test.
26 Although this exception adds complexity in terms of verbiage, it makes the exemption
much simpler to use. It also assures horizontal equity because, otherwise, there would be
some very low-income parents who would lose an exemption if the $1,000 minimum support
requirement were imposed. For example, a father with an income of $6000 who provides
support of only $800 for each of his four children would have an exemption for each of the
children and would not pay taxes on his income. Clearly, such an individual has no ability
to pay taxes. Admittedly, the father receives at least a $2000 deduction for an $800 outlay.
While the perfect solution is to give the father a deduction equal to the amount paid, the
administrative difficulty is not worth the small additional equity. Since the exemption is not
refundable, such a taxpayer cannot be said to be arbitraging the system if he receives four
exemptions. He is merely removed from the taxpayer universe.
07

A rule splitting the exemption based on the amount contributed would be the most
equitable, but would be completely unworkable.

28 Residence is defined as living with the taxpayer for more than one-half the taxable
year. As discussed below, this is consistent with other residency requirements.
29 This alternative residency rule is easy for taxpayers to apply and still achieve
equitable results. Since housing is the single largest item of support, it is equitable that the
taxpayer
providing housing receive the exemption.

30 This rule is preferable, in these unusual circumstances, to the "more than one-half
of the support" rule because it obviates the need for a multiple support agreement if no one
provides more than half the support.
31 If the parents were separated during the first half of the year, I.R.C. § 152(e) applies.
That section would have to be amended to conform to the support rules, i.e., tying support
to the exemption amount. If the parents separate during the second half of the year, I.R.C.
§ 152(e) is inapplicable and the rule covering two taxpayers providing the exemption amount
applies: the parent who provides the most support gets the exemption.
I-M-33

32 Note that the alternative provider of support could be the government.
33 This self-ordering is patterned on the rules of I.R.C. § 152(e) for divorced parents.

34 This is the so-called orphanage problem. An orphanage, which provides a substantial
amount of support for the dependent, might sell for $100 its willingness to sign a multiple
support agreement in favor of a taxpayer providing little support.
35 The ABA Tax Section recommendation (see note 14) required one-half of the
exemption amount in support, the number which prevented tax arbitrage in the 50%
bracket. Setting this number is no longer so simple because of the current rate structure.

36 Current law requires the person taking the exemption to provide at least 10% of the
dependent’s total support. Switching to a set figure promotes simplification, although some
taxpayers who currently take advantage of a multiple support agreement might no longer
be able to do so.

37 Under current law, a dependent may not have more than the exemption amount in
gross income. I.R.C. § 151(c)(1)(A).
38 Even more bizarre, one spouse may be considered married for federal purposes and
the purported spouse considered single.

39 The taxpayer’s spouse may not be a member of the household during the last six
months of the taxable year. I.R.C. § 7703(b)
40 A taxpayer usually wants to acquire this status because it means that she may use the
single or head-of-household filing status rather than the less beneficial married-filingseparately status.
41 I.R.C. 7703(b)(1).
42 Id.

43 I.R.C. §2(b)(l).

44 I.R.C. § 2(b)(2)(A).
45 I.R.C. §2(b)(3)(B)(ii).

46 I.R.C. §2(a).

47 As I discuss below, I believe that two of these provisions could be simplified even
further by elimination of the qualifying individual, although I hold out little hope for these
suggestions.
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48 Historically, the abandoned spouse provisions originated in the Tax Reform Act of
1969 as the quid quo pro for an additional allowance granted to low-income families below
the poverty level. Legislative history indicates that the allowances for a married couple
with dependents were less than those for the same number of individuals living separately
and thus there was an incentive to separate in order to increase the amount of the
additional allowances. See U.S. Congress, House No. 91-413, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 204-205
(1969). The 1969 Act recognized a family abandoned by a spouse as a separate household
for purposes of the additional allowance. Even assuming the requirement had some logic
in 1969, it no longer does.

49 The six-month period is obviously arbitrary and merely tracks current law. Some
cutoff is needed, however, to prevent "happily married" taxpayers from filing as singles.
Some small complexity would remain in determining whether spouses are actually living
apart for the requisite time. However, this is true under current law.
50 This proposal was also floated at the Conference on Simplification for Low-Income
Taxpayers sponsored by the ABA Tax Section in 1981. See also Thuronyi, note 14 at p.
185 which supports a similar rule.

51 An alternative simplification is to repeal the abandoned-spouse rule effectively
requiring a divorce or legal separation. This would, however, create an inequity for lowincome taxpayers unable to afford a legal dissolution of the marriage.
52 Perhaps they are married only in the eyes of the statute. One suspects that many such
couples engage in self-help and file as single taxpayers.
53 Since there is no theoretical justification for current law, the only objection must be
loss of revenue.

54 What other kinds of dependents are possible-mother, a brother, perhaps? The worst
-case scenario (from the point of view of political acceptance) would be if the dependent
is a friend with whom the taxpayer lives and supports. This example highlights the
absurdity of requiring a qualifying individual for abandoned-spouse status.

55 The only possible argument is that the widow(er) is in more difficult financial straits
because of the need to support the dependent child. The weakness of the argument is
illustrated by comparing, for example, the wealthy widower with a child or the impoverished
elderly widow whose children have left home.

56 This simplification would make the nomenclature of this filing status somewhat
ridiculous.
57 I.R.C. §2.

58 I.R.C. §2(b)(3)(B)(i) would be unnecessary, as the proposed definition of dependent
would eliminate the relationship test. I.R.C. § 2(b)(3)(B)(ii) would also be superfluous, since
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any dependents, including those qualifying under a multiple support agreement, would
suffice. I.R.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) would be unnecessary as well.

59 I.R.C. §l(b) and (c).
60 See text accompanying notes 88-92.
61 I.R.C. §32. The earned-income credit is discussed in detail in Forman, ’’Expanding
the Earned Income Credit to Help the Working Poor,” 16 Fla. State L. Rev. 41 (1987). The
author proposes a number of changes in the credit which he asserts would transform it into
an effective antipoverty program. None of the proposals are aimed specifically at
simplification, and several might make it more complex.

62 I.R.C. §32(c)(l)(A)(i)(1988).
63 I.R.C. §32(c)(1)(B).
64 This follows from the definition of surviving spouse, rather than the earned-income
rules. I.R.C. §2(a) and §32(c)(l)(A)(ii).
65I.R.C. §2(b)(l)(A)(i) and 32(c)(l)(A)(iii).

66 See Swingen and Long, "Mathematical and Clerical Errors During the 1987 Filing
Season,” Tax Notes (May 9, 1988).
67 If the taxpayer files a tax return, the error can usually be corrected if the necessary
information appears on the face of the return. Currently, information is not complete for
all eligible taxpayers, and since the earned income credit is refundable, a taxpayer may not
need to otherwise file a return. These taxpayers are outside the system unless they choose
to apply for an advanced earned-income credit. However, in 1984, for example, only 10,000
families claimed an advance credit. See U.S. Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of
Income-Individual Income Tax Returns/1984, 18-35 (Table 1.4).

68 See Thuronyi, note 14 at 192.
69 Currently, different tests are used for a married couple and a head of household.
70 The earned-income credit currently creates a reverse marriage penalty in that the
married couple’s tax burden increases dramatically upon divorce or separation. If the
taxpayers file separately or divorce with only one parent having custody of a child, the
credit may disappear.
71 This is in keeping with my general thesis to use the dependency exemption whenever
possible to determine benefits for low-income taxpayers.

72 These taxpayers are not currently entitled to the credit.
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73 Presumably these would be taxpayers who have too little income to currently file a
return, but would file if the eligibility rules for the refundable credit were eased.
74 Currently an individual who is entitled to the credit may elect to have his employer
pay the advanced credit with his wages. I.R.C. §3507.

75 If the taxpayer receives advanced credit payments, he is required to file a tax return
in order to settle his account. I.R.C. 6012(a) (7).

76 There is also a small potential revenue gain. Some taxpayers currently eligible for
the credit would lose at least a portion. For example, a head of household who resides with
a child not eligible for the dependency exemption would be entitled to a credit, but it would
not increase in size.
77 Why for example, should a low-income taxpayer living with a grandchild for seven
months be entitled to a subsidy, whereas a low-income widow living with her child for seven
months should not?

78 Obviously the earned-income credit would not be limited to low-income taxpayers if
a taxpayer with $100,000 of gross wages and $90,000 of tax-shelter deductions were entitled
to a credit based on his taxable income of $10,000. Professor Thuronyi proposes, for
example, that the credit be based solely on wages and the numbers of dependents. It could
be incorporated into the withholding tables and in effect administered by the employer. See
Thuronyi, note 14 at 192. As he acknowledges, however, some inequities would result, a
price he believes is worth the simplicity. For example, a taxpayer with low wages, but high
unearned income, would be entitled to a credit as would a part-time worker whose spouse
has high income.
79 If only wages were used to determine the credit, a taxpayer with low wages and high
unearned income would be able to obtain an unwarranted credit. How many taxpayers are
there in that situation? Is there a sufficient number to warrant the additional complexity?
80 This purpose is statutorily carried out by limiting the credit to earned income.

81I.R.C. § 21(b)(1). Other qualifying individuals are a dependent or spouse who is
physically or mentally incapable of caring for him/herself.
82I.R.C. §21(a)(l).
83I.R.C. § 21(e)(4).
84 See I.R.C. 7703, which is discussed above at text accompanying notes 38-54.
85 A more radical, and simpler, approach would be to eliminate the child-care credit.
This can be justified on the grounds that the credit inappropriately provides a deduction for
personal-consumption expenses. If, however, one believes that child care expenses are
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business related, then a credit may be supported. This issue is discussed in The President's
Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth, and Simplicity (1985), 19-21.

86 There are certain to be very few taxpayers covered by this suggestion, because in
order to take the child care credit, the parent must be claiming the dependency exemption.
Nevertheless, the proposal simplifies the credit for everyone by eliminating a requirement
that must be understood.
87 Id.

88 Major simplification was achieved in 1986, when Congress raised the level of the
standard deduction, thus increasing both the number of taxpayers not required to file a
return and the number not itemizing deductions.
89 This process could be simplified even further by incorporating the support deduction
into the tax tables. A taxpayer would look up his gross income in a table, which
incorporated the deduction, to determine his taxes. At one time, when the standard
deduction was replaced by the zero bracket amount, the Service prepared forms in this
manner. They were apparently unsuccessful because taxpayers believed they were being
denied the customary deduction. Obviously, education may need to be part of a
simplification effort.

90 Obviously, the table could be extended to include whatever number of exemptions
the Service chose.
91 Assuming the exemption continues to be phased out for high-income taxpayers, that
can continue to be done through the tax calculation.

92 I.R.C. § 63(f). The process would be simplified by the elimination of these
adjustments. Although the additional deduction attributable to old age has a possible
justification, it is much too broad in its current application, since it applies to high-income
as well as low-income taxpayers. There appears to be no reason to single out blindness for
specialized tax treatment. Nevertheless it is highly unlikely that Congress would ever have
the political courage to eliminate these benefits.
93 This is the current rule.
94 If the qualifying rules for the abandoned spouse, surviving spouse, and head of
household statuses were adopted so that they were not linked to the existence of a
dependent, the decreased support allowance would be the only cause for concern.
95 She would be more heavily taxed because her support allowance would be smaller,
since she had no dependent.

96 See Thuronyi, note 14 at p. 183, which generally appears to disagree.
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97 A simple flat tax on gross wages, such as the social security tax, might accomplish this
purpose, but there is no rush to use such a highly regressive tax as a primary source of
revenue.
98 The recent bandwagon to use the tax system to solve national child care problems
is a prime example of this.

99 All of these obstacles are spelled out in detail in Schenk, "Simplification for the
Average Taxpayer," Federal Income Tax Simplification, ed. Gustafson, (1980), 116-124.
100 Much of this section of the article is taken from Schenk, note 99.
101 See New York Times, editorial (April 5, 1977), 32: "[A] taxpayer with a high school
education ought to be able to do his own return." Two former Commissioners of the IRS
have made similar statements: "In our opinion it is wrong that the average American
citizen who has a modest wage or salary and doesn’t have large deductions to be itemized
should have to pay anybody because it is so simple for him to do it himself." (Johnnie M.
Walters, quoted in the New York Times, [March 18, 1973], 23.) Testifying, Donald
Alexander agreed that the effect of simplification was that the average wage earner did not
need to employ the services of a preparer. (U.S. Congress, Hearings Before the Subcomm,
on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. [1975]).

102 While there is a fair amount of evidence that taxpayers wish they could prepare
their own returns, there is also evidence that taxpayers are unwilling to exchange benefits
for simplicity. While theorists tend to view the question as the degree of complexity we are
willing to accept in exchange for increased equity, most taxpayers view the question as the
degree of complexity they are willing to accept in exchange for decreased taxes. See
Schenk, note 99 at 126.
103 The Service should also be encouraged to simplify IRS publications, tax-form
instructions, and tax-form design.
104 A significant number of low-income taxpayers already use preparers. A recent study
showed that 25% of clients who use tax-preparer services had pre-tax incomes of less than
$15,876. Smith, Stalans and Coyne, "A Taxonomy of Paid Preparers for Individual Tax
Returns: A Preliminary Analysis of the Tax Practitioner Survey," Paper prepared for the
IRS Research Conference on the Role of Tax Practitioners in the Tax System (Washington,
D.C., November 1987).
105 As I have argued before, one is not likely to start down this road unless one accepts
two propositions. First, many taxpayers cannot prepare their own returns. Second, this is
not a national disgrace. See Schenk, note 99 at 130. Unless one is comfortable with those
assertions, one is not apt to devote a significant amount of attention to taxpayer assistance.

106 See e.g. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
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107 I.R.C. § 1(i)(2).

108 I.R.C. §151(f)(2). An individual who is allowable as a dependent to another
taxpayer is not permitted a deduction for a personal exemption. This is true even if the
parent is not able to use the deduction or if the deduction is denied because the parent’s
income is greater than the 15% bracket phaseout amount. I.R.C. §l(g).

109 I.R.C. § 63(c)(5). Where the dependency exemption is allowable to another taxpayer,
the individual’s standard deduction is limited.
110 I.R.C. §l(i).

111 I.R.C. § 1(i)(7). It is not clear how many taxpayers have taken advantage of this
provision which appears to eliminate much complexity. If it has not been used extensively
that may be due to ignorance, a disinterest in simplification, or resulting complications on
the parent’s return. For example, the additional income may effect the 2% floor on
miscellaneous deductions, the alternative minimum tax, and various phaseout provisions
such as the rental real estate exception to the passive loss rules. The use of the election
is also limited by the restriction of income to interest and dividends. Income from a mutual
fund or a capital gain would prevent use of the election.

112 Clearly, some of the complexity is limited to wealthy taxpayers. See Schmolka, "The
Kiddie Tax Under the Tax Reform Act of 1986: A Need for Reform While the Ink is Still
Wet,” Rev. Tax’n Indiv. 11 (1987) :99, which discusses complexity due to the interaction of
the tax with the trust and alternative minimum tax provisions.
113 See Thuronyi, The Kiddie Tax: A Reply to Professor Schmolka, Tax L. Rev. 43
(1988) :589 and 598, where the author suggests that one might be more concerned about
a provision that imposes a substantial compliance burden on the poor than a provision that
involves compliance costs for wealthy taxpayers only.
114 For example, a dependent child with $500 of earnings and $25 of interest income
is required to file a return and pay tax on the $25. This represents approximately a $300
bank account.
115 Both Professors Schmolka and Thuronyi, the leading commentators on the kiddie
tax, agree that the rules are complex. Schmolka, note 112 at 117 ("a solution that...in
complexity and difficulty of administration is grossly excessive."); Thuronyi, note 113 at 603
("The kiddie tax undeniably involves some complexity"). See also Swingen and Long, "A
Look Back at the 1988 Filing Season," Tax Notes (December 19, 1988) :1343 and 1347, in
which the authors report on the results of a survey in which taxpayers reported that the
kiddie tax was one of the most significant causes of increased complexity in the 1988 filing
season.
116 It is reasonable to assume that since there is no longer any tax benefit to
transferring property producing more than $1000 of annual income, parents are much less
likely to make such a transfer to a minor.
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117 One would assume that most of the unearned income is either interest or dividends
reported on a Form 1099 and subject to matching by the Service.

118 See Schmolka, note 112 at 110 n. 25 which suggests that the complexities may result
in some taxpayers ignoring the rules.
119 Professor Schmolka proposes that the rules of I.R.C. §l(e) applicable to trusts and
estate apply to the kiddie tax. This is referred to as rate-bracket compression because the
amount of income subject to the first level of tax is quite small. Only the first $5000 of
income is subject to the 15% rate for trusts as compared to the first $17,850 for a single
taxpayer. He argues that this would eliminate much of the complexity. Schmolka, note 112
at 117. See also Baetz, "The Indefensible Kiddie Tax," Trusts & Estates (April, 1987) :27.

120 Professor Thuronyi proposes that a parent be allowed to assign unused rate brackets
to children at the parent’s election. He gives the following example: A parent filing a joint
return for 1988 with taxable income of $51,900 would have an unused rate-bracket amount
of $20,000, i.e., the amount remaining to be taxed at a 28% rate before the 33% rate kicks
in at $71,900. This unused rate bracket could be assigned to a child, and to the extent of
this amount, the child would be taxed at the lower rate. He further proposes that this
amount could be allocated among children. Thuronyi, note 113 at 595.
121 Rate-bracket compression using the current rate for trusts would result in additional
complexity in that taxpayers would devise ways to transfer property to children so as to take
advantage of the rate-bracket ride. To the extent they do so, we would return to the
uncertainties produced by case law, particularly in the murky area where personal service
and property income collide. However, as Professor Thuronyi suggests, some of these
problems can be avoided with a more severe form of bracket compression, i.e., a de minimis
amount taxed at the bottom rate. Rate-bracket assignment appears to be quite complex on
its face. Furthermore, the possibility that this assignment could be divided among a number
of children raises administrative problems.

122 Professor Schmolka refers to this solution as a "particularly Draconian maneuver,"
although he does not specify why. Critics will undoubtedly assert that it is obvious.
123 See text accompanying note 11.
124 See Schmolka, note 112 at 118; Baetz, note 119 at 29.
125 This is a tax saving of $2,320 for the fourteen-year old.
126

According to Professor Thuronyi, this was not the reason age fourteen was chosen.
He asserts that the assumption was that children above age fourteen might have substantial
earned income, and more complicated financial situations, and might have left home, thus
not justifying their inclusion in the family unit. See Thuronyi, note 113 at 599. According
to Treasury II, age fourteen was chosen because that is the age at which children may work
in certain employment under the Fair Labor Standards Act. See Treasury II at p. 87.
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Whatever the reason age fourteen was originally chosen, use of the dependency threshold
seems to blunt those arguments. First, if the parent is providing the child’s support, it does
not seem unwarranted to include him in the family unit. Second, a dependent cannot earn
more than $2000 (at current levels) unless he is a full-time student. If he earns $17,850 he
is no longer a candidate for income deflection. As discussed below, I would tax the earned
income of the full-time student dependent at the student’s own rates. That leaves only the
question of whether the unearned income of the student dependent is properly within the
family unit. I answer this question in the affirmative.
127 Most tax theorists would determine tax liability based on total family income
regardless of the distribution of the income among the family. See e.g. Bittker, "Federal
Income Taxation and the Family," Stan. L. Rev. (1975) :1389 and 1392, and McMahon,
"Expanding the Taxable Unit: The Aggregation of the Income of Children and Parents,"
NYU L. Rev. 56 (1981) :60. A mandatory filing unit of husband, wife, and minor children
was proposed in U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform (1977), 103104. See also the following which discuss the issue: H. Groves, Federal Tax Treatment of
the Family (1963), 70; Bruton, "The Taxation of Family Income," Yale L.J. 41 (1932):1172
and 1192; Surrey, "Family Income and Federal Taxation," Taxes 24 (1946):980 and 986;
Thorson, "An Analysis of the Sources of Continued Controversy Over the Tax Treatment
of Family Income," Natl. Tax J. 18 (1965):113 and 117-118; R. Goode, The Individual
Income Tax (1976), 231-234. The kiddie tax is a bow in the direction of taxing the family
as a unit. The assumption is that the parent either contributed the income-producing
property to the child or exercises control over it.

128 Taxing the child’s earned income at the bottom bracket is possible under current
law. It is true that this proposal theoretically offers income shifting in the opposite
direction
from the current kiddie tax. That is, if the child is in a higher bracket than the parent due
to his own earned income, the unearned income will be shifted towards the parent’s lower
bracket. However, the universe of such families - parents in a 15% bracket supporting a
child in a 28% bracket - must be exceedingly small. In any event, there is much less likely
to be income shifting in that direction than there currently is.
129 See U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, "The Tax Treatment of Family Income," reprinted in
Hearings on Community Property and Family Partnerships Before the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), 844 and 862.

130 See, e.g., "Commission to Revise the Tax Structure," Reforming the Federal Tax
Structure 19 (1973) (a commission sponsored by the Fund for Public Policy Research); 3
Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation 3 (the Canadian Carter Commission).
(1966):131.
131 Which is, after all, the source of this issue.

132 See Blueprints, note 127 at 103; McMahon, note 127 at 86.
133 The child would not be a dependent because the child would have spent more for
her support than the parent did.
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134 I would also attribute any directly connected expenses of the unearned income to
the parent.

135 Originally the Treasury Department recommended that only income from property
received from parents be subject to the tax. U.S. Treasury Dep’t, The President's Tax
Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth, and Simplicity (1985), 84-85.
136 See McMahon, note 127 at 90-91.
137 Remember that aggregation would occur only if the child is a dependent, which
requires the parent to be providing support.
138 The earnings on the child’s wages are already subject to the higher rates, although
the parent does not assume liability for the taxes.

139 I.R.C. § l(i)(5)(A). To determine whether the parents are married, the rules of
I.R.C. §7703 apply.

140 I.R.C. § l(i)(5)(B).
141 Technically the child is taxed at the parent’s rates on net unearned income, which
is unearned income minus the sum of the current standard deduction amount plus the
greater of that amount or directly connected itemized deductions. The current standard
deduction for a dependent is $500. I.R.C. §63(c)(5)(A).

142 Since the child must be a dependent of the parent, it need not be excluded as an
amount necessary for support.
143 As a rule of convenience one could provide that the income need not be accounted
for if it is too small to be included on a 1099.
144 One could conceive of a situation where the parent would not otherwise file a tax
return except for the child’s earned income, but such a case would be too rare to base any
decision on it. In any event, far few extra returns would be filed than under current law.
145 It is not clear what the number should be. The $1,000 is the amount currently
excluded from the kiddie tax; it is not exempt since it will be taxed to the child to the
extent it exceeds the standard deduction. Furthermore, the child is permitted to use a
standard deduction to offset earned income.

146 There would continue to be some confidentiality concern in the case of divorced or
separated parents. This problem could also be eliminated if the obligation to report the
child’s income followed the dependency exemption. See text accompanying notes 139-140.
147 Treas. Reg. §1.6012-1 (a)(4); Rev. Rul. 82-206, 1986-2 C.B. 356.
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148 There still may be, however, estate-planning incentives to transfer the property.
149 See I.R.C. §73, which provides, "Amounts received in respect of the services of a
child shall be included in his gross income and not in the gross income of the parent, even
though such amounts are not received by the child."
150 See Bittker, note 127; McIntyre and Oldham, "Taxation of the Family in a
Comprehensive and Simplified Income Tax, Harv. L. Rev. 90 (1977): 1573.
151 This is apparently a more radical idea currently than it once was. Prior to the
addition of section 73 (previously section 22[m]) in 1944, a child’s earned income was
taxable to the parents if they had the right to the income under state law. Income from
property was taxable to the minor child. Treas. Reg. 103, section 19.51-3 (1941).

152 It should be noted also that since the rule would apply only to dependents, matching
from 1099s could be accomplished since the child’s TIN would be on the face of the
parent’s return.
153 See O’Connell, "The Domestic Relations Tax Reform Act: How We Got It and
What We Can Do about It," Fam. L. Q. (1985):474, which describes the role of the ABA
Tax Section and the AICPA in the 1984 reform of the domestic-relations provisions.
154 P.L. No. 98-369 (1984).
155 United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
156 See, e.g., "Hjorth, Divorce, Taxes, and the 1984 Tax Reform Act: An Inadequate
Response to an Old Problem," U. Wash. L. Rev. 61 (1986): 151, and Lepow, "Tax Policy for
Lovers and Cynics: How Divorce Settlement Became the Last Tax Shelter in America,"
Notre Dame L. Rev. 62 (1986):32.
157 See, e.g., Asimov, "An Assault on Tax-Free Divorce: Carryover Basis and
Assignment of Income," Tax L. Rev. 44 (1989):65.

158 I.R.C. §71(b)(l).

159 I.R.C. §71(b)(l)(B).

160 I.R.C. § 71(a).
161 I.R.C. §215. Alimony is an above-the-line deduction rather than an itemized
deduction. I.R.C. §62(a)(10).

162 See, e.g., Malman, "Unfinished Reform: The Tax Consequences of Divorce," NYU
L. Rev. 61 (1986):3.

163 I.R.C. §71(f).
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164

This information was gleaned from conversations with members of the Committee
on Domestic Relations Tax Problems of the ABA Tax Section. One could argue that only
those competent enough to handle the complexity of Section 71(f) should be advising clients
on a divorce. However, the vast majority of taxpayers are unable to afford such
sophisticated legal advice on a "simple” divorce, yet the calculation of alimony and the tax
consequences flowing from its payment are present in almost every divorce.

165 I.R.C. §71(c).
166 Commissioner v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299 (1961).

167 I.R.C. § 71(c)(2)(A). Examples include attaining a specified age, marrying, dying, or
leaving school.
168 I.R.C. §71(c)(2)(B).
169 The temporary regulations attempt to cure the complexity created by this subjective
test. They provide that in only two situations will reductions in payments occurring on a
contingency be treated as being "clearly associated" with a child. An alimony agreement
which uses either situation is presumed to fix child support. In all other cases, support
payment reductions will not be clearly associated with a contingency relating to a child,
unless the reductions are expressly related to a payor’s child. Temp. Treas. Reg. §1.71-IT,
Q and A 18. The two safe harbors are not easy to understand.
170 The statute technically provides that the exemption goes to the parent "having
custody for a greater portion of the calendar year." I.R.C. § 152(e)(1) (flush language). This
has proven to be something of a problem in jurisdictions permitting joint custody.
Obviously, this can be solved by parental agreement as to the deduction.
171

I.R.C. § 152(e). In order to switch the exemption from the custodial parent, that
parent must sign a written declaration agreeing that s/he will not claim the exemption for
the taxable year. This decision can be made annually or can be a one-time change
incorporated into the decree.
172 I.R.C. 532(c).
173 I.R.C. 521(b)(1)(A).
17A

It should be borne in mind that the characterization of alimony/child support on the
state level does not need to control for federal purposes. There may be compelling reasons
why a state would choose to treat alimony and child support differently. As discussed
below, there do not appear to be compelling reasons why this should be so for federal tax
purposes. Furthermore, this proposal eliminates serious problems when a state court orders
unallocated family-support payments. The House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association has, at the request of the Section of Family Law, approved a resolution
supporting legislation to include family-support payments in gross income and to provide
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for a deduction for the payor unless the parties elect otherwise. Support fixed solely as
child support would not be family support. See BNA Daily Tax Report G-l (August 11,
1989).

175 Specifically I.R.C. § 71(c) would be eliminated. The result would be that I.R.C.
§ 71(b) would cover any cash payment received by a spouse pursuant to a written divorce
or separation agreement. I.R.C. § 71(b)(1)(D) would probably need to be amended in some
fashion on the assumption that the payor spouse might be required by state law to continue
child-support payments during the child’s minority even if the payee spouse was deceased.

176 Self-ordering is limited to the extent that the provisions of the Child Support
Enforcement Act apply.
177 Obviously, an alternative proposal is for the fall-back rule to be that neither child
support nor alimony would be includible or deductible.
I have chosen the
deductible/includible formulation for two reasons. First, it conforms more closely to
current law, and practitioners are accustomed to that approach. Resisting change is itself
a form of simplification. Second, a stronger case can be made for taxing the spouse who
consumes the income than can be made for taxing it all to the transferor.

178 The report of the Child Care Credit Task Force of the ABA Tax Section
(September 18, 1989) recommended that the child care credit be unlinked from the
dependency exemption and apparently recommends that the parent paying for child care
be entitled to the credit. As discussed in text, I favor keeping the dependency requirement
as part of an overall approach, and also because it would eliminate disputes as to which
parent paid for child care.
179 See Part II.
180 Of course, under self-ordering, the parents could elect to award the exemption to
the spouse not bearing the burden of the taxes.

181 Letter quoted in Tax Notes (February 11, 1985). See also, Moran, "Welcome to the
Funhouse: The Incredible Maze of Modern Divorce Taxation," Harv. J. Leg. 26 (1989):227
and 134.

182 Agreement that they should not be treated differently is found in Dodge, The Logic
of Tax (1989):118.
183 This was apparently the argument of the Treasury Department during the
negotiations over the 1984 Domestic Relations Reform bill. See O’Connell, note 153 at
p.488.

184 The funds are subject to tax by the earner. They are not again taxed when received
by the child or the other parent.
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185 It should be noted that electing to make the payments nontaxable and nondeductible
accomplishes the same thing. In the interest of simplicity, I will refer to only the former
scheme.
186

One would suppose that if this rule were adopted, most recipient parents who were
subject to tax would specify in the decree that the funds be delivered to the recipient or
to a specified payee (e.g., a school).

187 See O’Connell, note 153 at pp. 480-481. The ABA Domestic Relations Task Force
supported retaining Lester as the way to reach this result.

188 The effect of giving a payor a deduction for funds transferred to the recipient is to
tax the recipient rather than the payor on the original receipts. Generally, this seems
appropriate, since it is the payee who enjoys the benefits of the funds. If, however, the
parties desire the payor to pay the taxes, despite the fact that he does not use the receipts,
they are free to do so.
189 Obviously, a transition rule will need to be incorporated due to the many
outstanding agreements which were negotiated on the premise that child support was not
includible/deductible. The simplest form of transition rule is that which provides that the
new rule applies only to agreements executed after the effective date of the amendment.

190 At a 28% bracket, the payor will have an out-of-pocket cost of 72 cents of each
dollar, ignoring the time value of money.

191 I.R.C. §71(c) (3).
192 It is a truism that modem economic life is complex, and tax provisions treating the
consequences must be complex. One wonders whether the reverse is true: Tax provisions
have made relatively noncomplex transactions very complicated.

193 Numerous professionals involved with tax preparation for accounting firms have
expressed these views to me. For obvious reasons, they request anonymity.
194 See, e.g., Halperin, "Business Deductions for Personal Living Expenses: A Uniform
Approach to an Unsolved Problem," U. Penn. L. Rev. 122 (1974):859.
195 See, e.g., I.R.C. §67 which imposes a 2% floor on employee business expenses.
While this rule may be validly criticized for creating inequity between taxpayers whose
expenses are reimbursed and those whose expenses are not, it vastly simplified the law.
The statute effectively presumes that the majority of employee business expenses have a
predominantly personal consumption element and therefore should not be deductible. The
floor is high enough that most taxpayers no longer keep records. It also should serve to
eliminate litigation in the area, although perhaps it will shift to employer-reimbursed
expenses.
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196 The most obvious example is the home mortgage interest deduction. Others include
expenses in connection with a home office, a vacation home, or an automobile.
197 This is probably true with the passive loss rules (I.R.C. §469) where tax-shelter
activity may have ceased despite the fact that most tax professionals cannot comprehend the
regulations interpreting the section.

198 It is possible that some of the noncompliance is simply a reaction by taxpayers to
being stripped of a deduction to which they believed, perhaps erroneously, they were
entitled. The business automobile rules probably fall into that category: the objection to
the extensive recordkeeping requirements may reflect anger that personal automobile
expenses were no longer deductible under the cover of business use.
199 I.R.C. 162 and 212.

200 For example, if a taxpayer adds a roof at the cost of $8100 and it is capitalized, he
has 27.5 (actually 28) years of recordkeeping which will entitle him to a $300 a year
deduction. If he, however, deducts the roof as a repair, he is entitled to an immediate
$8100 deduction, and his recordkeeping essentially ends.

201 New York, e.g., never adopted ACRS. A taxpayer who uses ACRS on the federal
return must calculate New York depreciation in a different manner and make several
almost incomprehensible adjustments on the state return. If the taxpayer is subject to the
AMT, three sets of books may have to be maintained.
202 Section 179 permits a taxpayer in a trade or business to deduct, in the year of
acquisition, the cost of a tangible personal asset which would otherwise be capitalized.
203 For example, a landlord in New York is not permitted to use section 179 and must
depreciate the asset using the state depreciation methods. That results in continuing
depreciation deductions (and disparities with the federal return) long after the deduction
has been taken on the federal return.

204 This number should obviously represent a reasonable approximation of expenses, but
I do not have data which would permit me to determine that figure. Whatever number is
chosen, it should be revenue neutral.
205 Although technically the rules would still apply, the limitation of the deductions to
80% of the income would prevent a passive loss, the primary focus of the rules.
206 Some adjustment would need to be made to the taxpayer’s basis in the residence.

207 There is an obvious analogy in the standard deduction.
208 The number should be whatever percent of basis produces an aggregate deduction
equal to the current deduction attributable to depreciation over the recovery period.
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209 I.R.C. §280A(c) (1).
210 See, for example, Green v. Commissioner, 707 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983), where the
court reversed a tax court decision which permitted the taxpayer to deduct the cost of a
home office used exclusively for telephone calls to clients because the room was not used
by clients; and Drucker v. Commissioner, 715 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1983), where the court,
reversing a tax court decision, denied a deduction for a home office for musicians with the
Metropolitan Opera, on the grounds that their principal place of business was that of their
employer, i.e., Lincoln Center. Congress has also been eager to legislate with regard to
other possible evasion devices. See, for example, § I.R.C. 262(b), which provides that the
charge for local service for the first telephone line to a taxpayer’s residence is a
nondeductible personal expense.

211 I.R.C. §280A(c)(5). There is also a carryover provision.
212 For example, expenses for repairs, depreciation, fuel, insurance, etc.

213 For example, the taxpayer rents the unit for 120 days and uses it for personal
purposes for two days.
214 I.R.C. §280(g).

215 Those deductions otherwise allowable, such as interest and taxes would continue to
be deductible.
216 The notch effect is due to the fourteen-day rule. If a taxpayer, for example, uses
the vacation home for thirteen days, all deductions are available. If the home is used for
one extra day, no deductions are available.

217 For example, a taxpayer who uses the car for deliveries may appropriately trace all
income to the car. A taxpayer who, however, occasionally uses the car to visit clients may
have a significant amount of income unconnected to the use of the car.
218 For example, if the allowance were 20 cents a mile and the taxpayer drove 20,000
miles in a given year, we would presume 2000 miles were for business and permit a $400
deduction.
219 Undoubtedly, few taxpayers would benefit if, for example, their actual mileage was
only 5% of the total but they were permitted to deduct expenses based on 10%. This
distortion seems a small price to pay for simplicity and compliance. Furthermore, it should
be offset by the large number of taxpayers who deduct expenses for mileage exceeding
actual business use.

220 Presumably, the provision was included to cover the taxpayer who does not own
principal residence (i.e., a renter), but incurs debt to purchase a second residence. The
rules are not limited to that situation, however.
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221 See Committee on Tax Structure and Simplification, Report on the Nonbusiness
Interest Expense Deduction, American Bar Association Tax Section (1989).
222 Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde, The Report of the United States to the International Fiscal
Association on the Costs of Tax Administration and Compliance (1989).

223 This would occur, for example, where state depreciation methods differ from federal
methods.
224 This would occur, for example, where a state failed to adopt a version of Subchapter

S.
Allocation problems arise, for example, when a taxpayer lives in one jurisdiction and
has investments in another. State law cannot always track federal law. Consider the case
of a taxpayer who swaps Blackacre in state A for Whiteacre in state B in a like-kind
exchange. He subsequently disposes of Whiteacre in a taxable sale while a resident of state
C. See Smith and Hellerstein, "State Taxation of Federally-Deferred Income: The
Interstate Dimension," Tax Rev. 44 (1989):5.

226 For example, in New York, low-income taxpayers are entitled to a real property tax
credit; its complexity far exceeds that of any federal credit. Hawaii has several distinct
credits which an individual taxpayer might use.
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DEATH AND TAXES:
ONE IS SIMPLE, ONE IS NOT

BETTY R. JACKSON
*

A good tax system should be fair, intelligible, and create the appropriate incentives.
The obvious problem is that there is almost always some inherent conflict in trying to
meet these objectives. Thus, the task of designing and managing a tax system is
characterized by compromise. We are here today because an impressive array of tax
talent representing different backgrounds and perspectives argues persuasively that the
compromise has failed. The result of this failure is that the tax system is diverting
substantial resources away from productive activity and may crumble under the weight of
its own complexity. This is not a new cry-the first voices began reaching a crescendo
about twenty years ago--but it may be the first time that a critical mass capable of
dissecting, analyzing, and putting the problem back together has been assembled.

Professor Schenk has provided an excellent analysis of areas of the tax law in need
of revision to achieve reduced complexity for the individual taxpayer.
Her
recommendations are heavily laced (appropriately) with consideration of factors such as
political feasibility and revenue realities. I would like to supplement her paper by making
several additions of varying degrees of breadth and political palatability. Many of these
suggestions reflect the ideas of several other people discussed in meetings or the AICPA
Tax Division’s Subcommittee on Simplification, of which I am a member. However, these
comments reflect only my opinions and should not be construed in any way to reflect
official positions of the AICPA Tax Division’s Subcommittee on Simplification or the
AICPA.
*Betty R. Jackson is an associate professor of Accounting at the University of
Colorado. She teaches partnership and corporate tax at the graduate and undergraduate
levels. She received a B.B.A. in Accounting from Southern Methodist University (1970),
an M.P.A. in Taxation, and a Ph.D from the University of Texas at Austin (1978 and 1982,
respectively). Professor Jackson is a certified public accountant and practiced public
accounting for five years with national accounting firms. She is a member of several
professional organizations, including the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants and the Americans Taxation Association (ATA). She serves as a trustee of
the ATA and as an editorial board member of the Journal of the ATA and Advances in
Taxation. Published articles authored by Professor Jackson appear in the Accounting
Review, Journal of Taxation, the Journal of Accountancy, Tax Notes, the Journal of the
American Taxation Association, and several other professional journals. Her research
interests focus on entity taxation, compliance issues, and tax policy issues. Professor
Jackson served on the 1987 Advisory Group to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and
currently serves on the AICPA Tax Simplification Committee.
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PHASE-OUT PROVISIONS

Phase-out provisions have been introduced at a quickening pace in recent tax bills.
The intent is to avoid the so-called cliff effect (i.e., the loss of a tax deduction when
income goes over the cliff) in the interest of promoting fairness. The intention is noble,
but my casual observation of student response leads me to believe that the prevailing view
is that these provisions are extremely unfair. When queried about their tendency to
continue to view these provisions as unfair despite lengthy discussion about the reasons
for the phase-out provisions, senior accounting students at the University of Colorado
explain this feeling of unfairness in terms of (1) the fact that taxpayers are given a benefit
that is then taken away and (2) that taxpayers with very high levels of income face a lower
marginal rate of tax than those with lower levels of income. They understand the purpose
and intent of the mechanics of the calculation, but their emotional reaction does not
correspond to their intellectual one. It is my contention that if intelligent, relatively
financially sophisticated senior accounting students perceive the phase-outs not only to be
unduly complicated, but also unfair, the average taxpayer would be even more likely to
have that view. If that is true, it is essential that we reexamine the use of phase-outs.

The psychology literature provides some insight as to why these provisions may
be viewed as more unfair than alternative structures and suggests that other, much simpler
ways of accomplishing the same objectives may be viewed as fairer.
Psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky argue that people perceive
outcomes according to the way a situation is framed. They carried out multiple
experiments in various contexts to demonstrate the power of framing on the decision
process. They have tested this framing effect in various contexts. One example they
tested follows:1
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian
disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to
combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific
estimates of the consequences of the programs are as follows:

If program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.
If program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 600
people will be saved and a two-thirds probability that no people will
be saved.
In this scenario, in which the decision was framed in terms
of lives gained, 72 percent chose program A. The
reference point was that 600 people would die.

The framing was then reversed to present the options in
the alternative of lives lost (i.e., the reference point was a
state in which no one dies).
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If program C is adopted, 400 people will die.

If program D is adopted, there is a one-third probability that nobody
will die and a two-thirds probability that 600 people will die.
Although these two alternatives present exactly the same objective probabilities
of life and death as the first set of options, 78 percent chose program D. Even when
people are presented with both sets of choices and confronted with their own
inconsistency in choice, they tend to prefer their original choices. This example
demonstrates the power of the framing effect in decision-making.

This research indicates that gains and losses are interpreted in light of their
variation from some reference point. Losses have been shown to be felt more keenly
than gains. That is, a decision framed as a loss is viewed as more distasteful than the
same decision framed as a gain.
If we examine the framing induced through the structure of the tax law, we can
begin to gain intuition as to why the perception of unfairness described earlier may occur.
Taxpayers perceive that the tax system imposes no tax on the first $X of income (because
of personal and dependency exemptions), a low rate of tax on the next $X of income, and
a higher rate of tax on income thereafter. That understanding of how the tax system
works establishes their reference point for the calculation of their tax obligations. That
is, the tax benefit given on lower levels of income is viewed as an endowment2 that is
bestowed on every taxpayer. The bubble rate of 33 percent, presented as a mechanism
to recapture the tax benefits on lower levels of income, is viewed as unfair because of the
instinctive reluctance to part with assets framed as a tax endowment.
On the other hand, taxpayers are much more likely to view the imposition of the
33 percent rate as a permanent step up to a higher marginal rate of tax as fair. In this
structure (the historical structure of tax rates), all taxpayers are perceived to face the
same benefits and detriments under the tax law. No one is viewed as having lost
anything; taxpayers simply face a higher tax rate as their ability to pay increases.

Designing an alternative structure to increase perceptions of fairness and decrease
complexity for phase-outs of IRA and passive rental loss deductions is a more difficult
problem than tax rates, especially when the interactions among provisions are considered.
Again, however, we can use our knowledge of framing to recognize that taxpayers subject
to the phase-outs frame the law as having given a benefit that it then gradually takes
away--often in ways that these taxpayers only vaguely comprehend. They are much more
likely to view a system of credits for these benefits as more palatable because the
endowment would be viewed as being given only under a limited set of circumstances.
Even the presentation of the benefit on the form shows a credit as a direct reduction in
tax liability. That is, it will be viewed as a benefit available under certain circumstances,
rather than as a benefit given and then taken away.
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Designing the system of credits and tables to reflect available credits would be a
complex process for the IRS, but application by individual taxpayers could be made
relatively simple and straightforward, far more so than the current system.
Phase-outs create incredible planning complexity for tax rates, IRA availability,
and use of passive rental losses. The complexity is focused on the middle-income taxpayer
who is already burdened with other complexities discussed by Professor Schenk. The
clustering of the impact of these provisions creates perhaps even stronger incentives than
existed before the Tax Reform Act of 1986 to shift income to other family members or
entities, creating additional complexity in the system as taxpayers try to avoid complexity
and to minimize a tax burden perceived to be unfair.

The trade-off between complexity and fairness is always difficult to resolve. The
phase-out example provides graphic evidence that when that trade-off is being evaluated
in the legislative process, much more attention should be paid to the psychological impact
of changes in tax structures to ensure that taxpayer perceptions will correspond to the
assumptions made by lawmakers.
ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX (AMT) FOR INDIVIDUAL TAXPAYERS

The AMT was instituted when it became apparent that tax preferences were being
used to excess, but there was an unwillingness to attack specific preferences directly.
Rather, an alternative tax system was devised to calculate taxable income without the
benefit of many tax preferences. In recent years, many specific preferences have been
attacked frontally (e.g., change to straight-line methods of depreciation) and laterally (e.g.,
the passive loss rules). The changes should require us to rethink our schizophrenia about
what taxable income is or should be.
The spring 1989 Statistics of Income Bulletin presents preliminary 1987 and final
1986 data for AMT on individual tax returns. These data show a dramatic decrease in the
numbers of taxpayers affected (114,000 in 1987 versus 609,000 in 1986) and dollars
collected ($1.2 B in 1987 compared to $6.7 B in 1986) after the ’86 act. One can only
guess at what the data will show for 1988 and 1989, but further significant decreases must
be anticipated as the TRA 1986 phase-outs are completed. It is obvious that repeal of
AMT would cause some revenue loss at the end of that time period, but it would seem
to be more rational to analyze the specific preferences that are generating the remaining
AMT liabilities and make decisions on the preference accorded each provision than to
maintain a dual tax system.
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FAMILY/INDIVIDUAL ISSUES

Family Tax Returns

Professor Schenk’s suggestion for a family tax return is excellent but may not go
far enough. Why not require a family tax return that includes every person for whom a
dependency exemption is claimed? The ability to claim a dependency exemption implies
a single economic unit. The tax law should reflect this economic reality.
Medical Reimbursement Accounts

The provision under section 150(b) is a classic example of giving the taxpayer a
benefit but accompanying it by so many pitfalls and administrative burdens that the
taxpayer feels unfairly treated. This benefit could be given so much more efficiently (far
less record-keeping and no administrative burden for the employer) and fairly (availability
to all taxpayers, not just those whose employers establish medical reimbursement
accounts) by simply allowing a deduction of up to a fixed dollar amount for AGI. What
possible purpose other than minimization of revenue losses (because taxpayers will be
overly conservative) is served by making the contributions nonrefundable? Taxpayers
perceive this provision as very complex because of their own record-keeping burden and
the difficulty of predicting medical expenses for the coming year with any accuracy.
Power of Attorney Authorization

A procedural simplification would be achieved by placing a box near the signature
box that would provide the opportunity to give the preparer or other person power of
attorney. This could provide simplification for all taxpayers, but it would be particularly
important for individual taxpayers.

BUSINESS RETURNS

Depreciation

Depreciation creates complexity in the system for several reasons. First, the rules
change frequently, requiring different sets of records for assets of different types and ages.
Second, the flood of different rules for different purposes (e.g. book, tax, state tax, AMT,
E&P) requires repetition of this process. Third, each asset must effectively be accounted
for separately for purposes of calculating gain and loss.
The most significant proposal for change would be to conform the rules for at
least some of these purposes and stem the tide of constant change of rules. Crying uncle
on that approach for the short-term, a proposal that would at least make the
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record-keeping requirements less onerous is the Open-Ended Account System. In a
nutshell, the system establishes an account for each recovery period for personal property.
The appropriate percentage is applied to the end-of-year balance and gains, and losses on
individual assets are not recognized. Instead, the account is reduced by proceeds received
on asset dispositions and increased by asset expenditures (or by half of the expenditure
in year 1 if a half-year convention is used). If the account is reduced below zero by
disposition proceeds, ordinary income is recognized. When one considers the increased
record-keeping requirements faced for purposes of AMT and ACE depreciation, the
contribution to reduction of complexity becomes readily apparent.
Mixed-Use Property

Difficulties with allocations in the case of mixed-used properties create
unrealistic-and apparently frequently unheeded--record-keeping requirements. Where
there are substantial personal and business motives for purchasing mixed-use assets (e.g.,
autos), the problems of establishing enforceable and reasonable rules are reflected in the
difficulty drafters such as Professor Schenk and the AICPA Tax Division’s Subcommittee
have faced. This area requires a head-on tangle with the trade-offs required between
fairness and administrability. I have had no better luck than others with this struggle and
can offer no significant improvements at this point.

However, if we bite off a different part of this problem, I think we can develop
more administrable guidelines and achieve a tolerable degree of fairness. Some types of
mixed-use property don’t have the same equality of motive for personal and business use
as can be demonstrated for automobiles. For example, it is difficult to demonstrate that
substantial value accrues to individuals through the nonbusiness use of personal
computers. Therefore, in the case in which significant business use for a personal
computer can be demonstrated (e.g., the company’s books are computerized and/or the
company’s business communications are done with the aid of a word-processing program)
what has the government lost if the taxpayer uses the word-processing program for
personal communication or allows his child to play a game on the PC? The government
is in a very weak position in terms of proof in this area. There are more productive areas
for battle than this one.
In contrast, photographic equipment has significant personal value relative to its
business value in most cases. That is, the equipment is integral to the business of a
professional photographer, but only an enhancement to a real-estate agent or plastic
surgeon’s business. The equipment itself should be considered personal use equipment
in those cases, and only direct costs (i.e., the cost of film) plus a relatively low flat amount
at the point of purchase (e.g., $200) would be deductible in cases in which the equipment
is not integral to the taxpayer’s business.
To state this as a general rule, where the property is essential or integral to the
taxpayer’s business and there is no equivalently strong personal use motive (as there
would always be assumed to be for a car), the property should be treated as 100 percent
business property. Where the opposite is the case, the property should be treated as 100
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percent personal-use property with no deductions allowed except to the extent incremental
costs are incurred. In the case in which the taxpayer would have approximately similarly
strong motivations to purchase the property for both business and pleasure (as we assume
for a car), we must face the task of improving the administrability of allocations of the
related expenses.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS

In my comments, I have made several micro-level suggestions as to various aspects
of the law that could be made more comprehensible. I have also addressed some
structural characteristics of the law that merit thought. What I have not discussed is what
I consider to be the single most important contributor to tax complexity: the process. It
is imperative that we take an initiative to hammer home the point that the law making
process that has evolved dooms us to a tax law that looks like a Christmas tree decorated
by children. Some individual pieces are beautifully crafted and hung with great care.
Others are not as pretty but are there because they were the best anyone could come up
with and a spot needed filling. The most striking thing is that when we step back and
view the whole tree, it is not a pleasing sight. We can almost visualize the battles that
took place in establishing each child’s turf.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 accomplished a major task in rectifying many of the
structural problems of the law and integrating the individual parts. These changes (e.g.,
capital gains, corporate rate structure versus individual rate structure, the flat rate
structure) have had significant influence on reducing structural complexity. However,
reliance on this sort of a correction is somewhat like waiting for a periodic earthquake to
adjust for stresses building up on various fronts over long periods of time. Such major
upheaval may correct the immediate problem, but it causes disruption in unpredictable
ways. We must find a way of rationalizing the process by which the tax law is made if we
are ever to solve the problem of excessive complexity that has brought us together for this
conference.

I-N-7

ENDNOTES

1Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky, "Choices, Values, and Frames," American
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COMMENT ON " ELIMINATING COMPLEXITY FOR INDIVIDUAL
TAXPAYERS: A REVENUE LOSER WITHOUT A CONSTITUENCY?'’

STEVEN D. KITTRELL
*

Not having the benefit of being an academic, my comments are not principally
addressing the specific discussion that I hope will take place on the proposals that Debby
Schenk has put forward. I would like to make a couple of comments on the process of
individual tax reform and then suggest aspects of the specific proposals that I think are
important.
The first comment relates to Debby’s title, which implies there is a lack of a
constituency for individual taxpayer reforms. I think if you look at the history of tax reform
in the last seven or eight years, you will find that the AICPA and the ABA have been the
only even moderately effective voice for simplification in the areas of individual tax reform,
and that includes the Domestic Relations Tax Reform Act and some other projects.

But one thing that shouldn’t be overlooked when we are talking about the lack of
a constituency is that we also don’t have, as Ken Gideon put it at lunch, a "gored ox out
there bellowing." If we can get the attention of the policymakers in the Treasury and the
legislative process, there will not be a great dissenting voice to what we would propose.
Now I want to put that observation in the context of one of the reform processes
that I was involved with, the domestic relations tax reform project. That project started
as a joint effort of the two organizations sponsoring this conference. We spent a number
of years, and untold hundreds of hours, putting together what we thought was a theoretically
correct and practical way of handling all aspects of domestic relations taxation. Once that
was done, it took about two years to get the attention of the people in Congress to get the
proposal into the legislative pipeline, and that is when the problem started.

*Steven D. Kittrell is with the law firm of Golden, Freda & Schraub, P.C., in
Washington, D.C. The principal focus of his practice is employee benefits. He is the
author of several publications and a frequent lecturer about divorce-related employee
benefits issues. Mr. Kittrell is admitted in the District of Columbia, the U.S. Supreme
Court, and the U.S. Tax Court. He is a member of the American Bar Association Section
of Taxation and has served as Chair of the Committee on Domestic Relations Tax Problems
(1984-86). He was a Legislative Assistant to Senator Bob Dole (R-Kan.) from 1976-78.

Mr. Kittrell received a B.A. from Baylor University (1974) and a J.D. from George
Washington University Law School (1978). He has a Masters in Taxation from Georgetown
University School of Law (1981).
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At every step of the process-starting with Ways and Means Committee hearings, the
Ways and Means markup, then over to the Senate side, all the way through conference-you could see that the size and complexity of the proposal was increased each time there
was further consideration. It was simply a matter of trying to solve every conceivable abuse
or every conceivable unfair situation with a more technical and more specific rule.
Regardless of what you might think about the ability of IBM or some other companies to
handle those kinds of complexities, it is clearly not reasonable to expect either the normal
divorcing individual or their divorce lawyer to understand these technical rules or to be
able to apply them correctly.
The result has been that what could have been a substantial reform has only been
a minor reform, and a lot of work is left to be done. I should mention that the process
of trying to solve every problem with a more technical rule was not a government
representative’s problem only; it was shared equally by those of us from the private sector
who felt that a particular proposal was going to be unfair to a certain segment of our
clients.

Just as an example, take the alimony recapture rules. The idea is that you want to
prevent front-loaded alimony payments. The classic example is that it is wrong for an
individual who is getting divorced to pay a $1 million to his wife on the date of the divorce
and deduct that payment. However, it is okay if he wants to pay $330,000 for the first three
years and deduct those payments, but it is wrong to do it the first year.

Now ask yourself, why is a single payment wrong? The only theoretical justification
that was ever put forward was that it was a disguised property settlement and that, by
spreading it out, you got rid of the disguised property settlement. And we had hours of
debate about what is or is not a property settlement.
The point I am trying to make is that once the process got off on the track of
needing some way to prevent disguised property settlements, there was never an opportunity
in the process for discussion about why that is a bad thing to have happen.

So the theories that Debby has put forward in her article about a conceptual
framework for addressing these individual tax issues are as important as the work that goes
into something like the subchapter C reform project. You need to have a theoretical
underpinning, and if that underpinning is that we are going to accept some gaming by
taxpayers and some unfairness in certain situations, then I think you could come out with
a workable set of rules. Otherwise, you are going to end up with inevitably complex laws.
The idea that I would like to put forward to help toward that concept of a
theoretical model for dealing with these individual tax issues is this: Wherever possible, the
expectations of individual taxpayers ought to be followed as to what the right results should
be. An example that illustrates the point is the deductibility and includability of alimony.

If you go up to almost any person on the street and you say, "You are going to pay
your wife alimony. Should it be deductible and should she have to pay tax on it?" the
answer is going to be "Yes."
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It is just as theoretically reasonable to have the general rule be that alimony should
be nondeductible and nonincludable. From a tax policy and economic basis, you can simply
adjust the amounts that are being paid and get to the same net economic result, but the
point is that taxpayers are more likely to follow the system if you have a rule that fits in
with their expectations of what ought to be the result.
That concept follows through into other areas. For example, the "kiddie tax."
Debby’s proposal is basically, as she said, to make the aggregation of the child’s income on
the parents’ return mandatory. That to me is more reasonable and more the expectation
of the parent-child relationship than to have a child filing a separate return on individual
income. Therefore, I think it would make a lot of sense to adopt that kind of a mandatory
rule.

The analysis would support the proposal that Debby has made with respect to the
dependency exemption. Basically, her proposal operates on simplifying the support tests.
It sets up a screening process where you try to catch as many taxpayers as you can within
the first level of the screen, which is if an individual provides more than half of the support
for a person (or if there is no other person providing support), then you don’t care how
much support was provided. For example, there would be a presumption that the parent
is entitled to the dependency exemption if no other person provides support greater than
the exemption amount. If two or more people provide that basic amount of support, her
test would be that whomever the dependent resides with would be the one who takes the
dependency exemption. Again, that would correspond with the expectation of your normal
taxpayer.
In a situation where two or more people provide that basic amount of support, and
neither or both live with the child, only then do you go to what is now the current-law test
of who provided the most support. By screening at the different levels, not only is it
simpler for the vast majority of people but you also have met the reasonable expectations
of those individuals.

The final point I’d like to make relates to the proposals about child support. The
morass of current child support tax rules is a direct effect of the efforts to eliminate any
perceived bad tax results. The ABA-AICPA proposal that originally was put forward in this
area dealt with including child support in the private ordering system. Individuals who are
divorcing would have made the first level of the determination of who is going to be taxed
on payments that pass between former husband and former wife. If the parties can agree
or if a court can make an order about who ought to be taxed, private ordering would be
the simplest rule. Child support would have been treated just like any other cash payment
in that analysis. The perceptions of the potential for abuse were such that the simple
approach didn’t happen. There are very complicated rules for determining which pieces of
payments are child support and which are not.
The resolution of this kind of dilemma should not be increasingly technical solutions.
There should be some forms of objective criteria that can be used to determine the tax
result. For example, the Child Support Enforcement Act that has been enacted at the
federal level compels every state to have child support guidelines in place. Those guidelines
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must be used in virtually every court order. Certainly, every court order involving our
"level 1" and "level 2" taxpayers is going to have a number that says this amount is child
support. While I normally don’t like relying on state law for resolving tax issues, it would
certainly be a simple system to provide that if the judge has said that a payment is child
support, then the payment is child support for the federal tax system. I think people would
expect that result. That is not always the case under the current rules.
I’ll sum up by saying that I think Debby’s proposals are certainly a good point to
start from, but unless this group and those of us who are interested in it are willing to
spend the effort, nothing is ever going to happen in the area of individual taxpayers.
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AT-RISK AND PASSIVE ACTIVITY LIMITATIONS:
SHOULD COMPLEXITY BE REDUCED?

STANLEY A. KOPPELMAN
*

The at-risk limitations of Code section 465 and the passive activity loss limitations
of section 469 are directed at the perceived problems of tax shelters. Both provisions are
detailed and complex. The at-risk rules, first enacted in 1976, have been amended on
several occasions. The present rules represent the evolution of a detailed statute and
regulations, complemented by numerous revenue rulings and court decisions. The passive
activity loss ("PAL") limitations, enacted in 1986, are now accompanied by two lengthy sets
of regulations dealing with most of the major interpretive issues raised by the statute.2 It
should come as no surprise that these rules have been criticized for their complexity.3 The
PAL limitations have contributed significantly to the elimination of tax shelters and the
complexities that tax shelters created. Yet the complexities of the PAL limitations
themselves invite consideration of simpler (and fairer) alternative ways to eliminate tax
shelters.
In this paper, I will first discuss the general question of simplification. Because there
is no generally accepted definition of complexity with regard to taxation,4 it is important to
clarify what the terms "complexity" and "simplification’ entail. I will indicate why it is
important to consider planning or transactional complexity as well as compliance complexity
in evaluating the complexity of tax rules.

I will then turn to the specific problem of tax shelters. I will indicate why the PAL
rules, when transactional complexity is considered, have actually simplified the tax laws by
effectively eliminating tax shelters. Nevertheless, because the PAL rules themselves are
conceptually flawed and highly complex, I will consider alternative methods for dealing with
the tax shelter problem. After considering these alternatives, I will address possible changes
that could be made to the passive activity loss rules assuming these rules continue to be the
method of dealing with tax shelters.
*Stanley A. Koppelman is a Professor of Law at Boston University School of Law where
he teaches courses on individual and partnership taxation. He received his J.D. from the
University of Pennsylvania Law School where he served as an articles editor of the law
review. He was an associate and then partner in the Philadelphia law firm of Wolf, Block,
Schorr & Solis-Cohen. He has served as Assistant to the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue and Deputy Tax Legislative Counsel of the Treasury Department. He was also
an Associate Professor of Law at the Washington College of Law at American University
and has taught in the Internal Revenue Service Continuing Professional Education Program.
Professor Koppelman has written extensively on topics of Federal taxation including articles
published in the Tax Law Review and the National Tax Journal and a casebook on Federal
income taxation which he co-authored with Professors Surrey, McDaniel, and Ault.
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COMPLEXITY OF THE TAX LAWS: IN GENERAL

Existing Literature

The existing literature on the complexity of the tax laws is instructive for what it does
and does not discuss. Significant attention is paid to the causes of complexity.5 Attention
is also paid to the consequences of complexity.6 Criticism is sometimes also directed at the
promulgation of lengthy regulations7 and the various components of the political process
that have produced our complex tax system.
Of greater significance are the topics which are all too infrequently addressed.
Discussions of complexity rarely attempt to define what complexity means.8 The implication
is that we all know a simple rule when we see it, so there is no need to map out what
precisely Congress ought to do or how Treasury regulations ought to be written. Also
implicit in these discussions is the idea that shorter rules are better than lengthy ones and
rules with fewer categories are better than requiring the analysis of many factors. Although
criticism is often directed at the political process, concrete recommendations for
simplification are rarely provided to legislators wishing to achieve a less complex system.10
It is thus far from obvious how to define and evaluate the complexity of the tax system or
how to reduce or eliminate complexity which has been identified.
The literature on tax simplification often suggests that significant simplification could
be achieved if only more attention were paid to the problem. While this may be true with
regard to certain tax expenditures, this analysis of simplicity is itself far too simple. It is not
obvious what contours a "simplified” income tax should take.11 It may just be that any
respectable version of an income tax is not very simple.12 Put another way, simplicity is not
the only relevant value in designing tax rules. A complex rule often is the result of the
failure to accept a simpler rule which is considered less fair or efficient.14 It may well be
difficult to achieve the goals of an income tax without a certain amount of complexity.
Types of Complexity

Complexity has both a compliance and a planning component. Tax rules are
complex to the extent that they make compliance with these rules difficult.15 From the
taxpayer’s perspective (or from the perspective of the taxpayer’s tax return preparer), rules
are complex to the extent they make difficult the accurate completion of tax returns or
other required forms. Included in compliance complexity are rules requiring the
maintenance of logs or other contemporaneous taxpayer records in order to justify a
deduction or other tax benefit. From the Government’s perspective, rules contribute to
compliance complexity to the extent they make difficult the job of enforcing the tax law.
Planning complexity refers to the costs associated with structuring transactions to
achieve favorable tax results and evaluating the tax consequences of potential transactions.
Thus, rules which result in differential tax rates for difficult types of investment income
contribute to planning complexity by increasing the need to carefully examine tax
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consequences in evaluating investment options.16 Especially with regard to high income
taxpayers, planning complexity, sometimes referred to as transactional complexity,17 is
potentially of far greater significance than compliance complexity. It is one this to face the
inconvenience (usually through higher return preparation fees) of return preparation; it is
quite another to have to factor tax consequences into business and investment decisions on
a continuing basis in order to make informed decisions.
The complexity resulting from lengthy and complicated rules has been identified as
a separate type of complexity. Although this categorization is analytically helpful, it should
be noted that there is nothing inherently complex about a lengthy or complicated rule apart
from its effect upon structuring transactions or complying with the tax laws. Indeed, the
focus upon the complexity of rules other than in the context of planning or compliance
tends to obfuscate the identification of what it means for a rule to be complex.
The error of focusing upon the length of a rule as a test of its complexity is a natural
one for lawyers and accountants to make, When the elimination of preferential rates for
capital gains was proposed as part of the package that ultimately became the Tax Reform
Act of 1986,1 confess that my first reaction was to evaluate the simplification gains of this
proposal in terms of the number of Code provisions slated for elimination. But the real
measure of simplification is the extent to which the planning and compliance burdens of
preferential rates were reduced. Although the elimination of preferential rates did indeed
make the tax law simpler, it was not because a number of Code provisions were
eliminated.19 One can imagine tax provisions the repeal of which actually complicates the
tax laws. For example, the repeal of the capital loss limitations could result in a more
complex tax system. Although rule complexity would be reduced, transactional complexity
might be increased as taxpayers and their advisers plan ways to offset ordinary income with
capital losses. As I will discuss later, the repeal of the passive activity loss rules could have
this complicating effect.
Optimal Rule Precision

Before examining the question of complexity in the context of certain anti-tax shelter
rules, it may be helpful to approach the question of rule more generically. Wit regard to
any legislative or regulatory problem, the question arises as to the optimal degree of
precision any rule should have. It may be helpful first to address the question of precision
outside the context of taxation.
Consider, for example, the question of regulating airline pilots.20 A policymaker
charged with the responsibility of developing certification criteria for commercial aircraft
pilots may be faced with the job of specifying the circumstances under which a certified
pilot should be required to retire. Suppose that the general policy objective is to have
pilots retire when the social cost of allowing them to continue, as determined by the risk
of accidents and their consequences, exceeds the social benefit, represented by the costs
avoided by not having to find and train a replacement.21
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Three possible formulations of certification criteria are:
1.
2.
3.

No person may pilot a commercial airplane after his sixtieth birthday.
No person may pilot a commercial airplane if he poses an unreasonable risk
to an accident.
No person may pilot a commercial airplane if he falls within one of the
following categories. (There follow tables displaying all combinations of
valued for numerous variables, including years and level of experience, hours
of air time logged, age, height, weight, blood pressure, heart rate, eyesight,
and other vital signs, that would disqualify a pilot from further eligibility to
pilot aircraft.)22

A number of observations regarding complexity are suggested by this example. First,
Rule 1 is the simplest rule in several respects. It is "transparent" in that its meaning is
clear. Few interpretive problems arise in defining what is meant by age 60.23 Rule 1 is also
"accessible" in that it can be applied to specific fact patterns without difficulty.

Rule 1 is not, however, without its problems. Transparency and accessibility each
has its price. Rule 1 is undoubtedly arbitrary in the way it determines which pilots must
retire. Under this rule, some pilots who do not in fact present a significant risk of accident
are forced to retire while other pilots who may suffer from age-related problems affecting
their fitness to fly are allowed to maintain their license. In this regard, Rule 1 may not be
"congruent" with the policy sought to be achieved by the rule.24 The tax literature
sometimes describes this situation as a tradeoff between simplicity on the one hand and
equity and efficiency on the other.
Rule 2 and 3 illustrate that the complexity of a provision is not necessarily
determined by its length. Although Rule 2 is much shorter than Rule 3, it is not necessarily
simpler (either in the sense of transparency or accessibility). The definition of "reasonable"
may ultimately incorporate the kinds of variables explicitly contained in Rule 3. Under this
circumstance, Rule 3’s explicitness is an advantage; it is more transparent that Rule 2.

The focus upon optimal precision thus introduces several useful concepts. First, what
is generally referred to in the tax literature as simplicity can be broken down into the
distinct components of transparency and accessibility. Although lengthy rules may in some
cases be less accessible than shorter rules (Rule 1 is more accessible than Rule 3 although
Rule 2 is not necessarily more accessible than the longer rule 3), They may yield concrete
answers more readily than opaque standards such as "unreasonable risk."
Tax rules and regulations tend to be some combination of Rules 2 and 3. Tax rules
often attempt to provide objective standards providing answers to many common fact
patters. A more amorphous "facts and circumstances" test is often reserved for other cases.
This basic approach, although not necessarily its execution, is reasonable. The definition
of the "material participation" standard in the PAL regulations is one example of this
approach. These Regulations provide six objective tests for determining whether a taxpayer
materially participates in an activity.25 The Regulations also provide a seventh "facts and
circumstances" test.26
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Second, simplicity is but one value to be considered. Achieving simplicity often
requires substantial concessions regarding other values such as equity and efficiency. The
arbitrariness of Rule 1 may be neither equitable nor efficient.
TAX SHELTERS

Both PALs and at-risk rules are responses to the phenomenon of tax shelters. A tax
shelter is an investment in which a significant portion of the investor’s return consists of tax
benefits that not only offset any tax liability that might otherwise arise from the investment
but also "shelter” other income of investor, usually from the investor’s business or
professional activities. The components of the tax shelter - deferral, leverage, and the (pre1986) conversion of ordinary income into capital gains - and how they work have been well
documented.27

Tax shelters may be divided into two categories: "regular" tax shelters and "abusive"
tax shelters and "abusive" tax shelters. Regular tax shelters are comprised mainly of legal
tax benefits; abusive shelters involve the sheltering of unrelated income through tax benefits
beyond those intended by law and generally have little or no economic reality.28 This
distinction is relevant for contrasting the purposes of PALs and the at-risk rules. The atrisk rules were largely a response to abusive tax shelters involving the overvaluation of
depreciable property through nonrecourse debt. PALs, on the other hand, were created to
defeat the sheltering of virtually all tax shelters, whether regular or abusive.

While abusive shelters are universally condemned, there is no consensus or whether
regular shelters should be eliminated. Regular shelters involve the combination of deferral
achieved through the use of tax provisions that do not accurately measure economic income
and leverage which generates deductible interest. This combination is generally referred
to as "tax arbitrage."29
Some believe that tax shelters represent a threat to the integrity of our tax system.
Tax shelters are asserted to be both inefficient in that they cause a misallocation of
resources and inequitable because tax shelter benefits are derived mostly by high-income
taxpayers.30 Their perception as inequitable has the potential of reducing compliance by
those not able to invest in tax shelters.31
Others maintain that as long as the deferral is accomplished through provisions
which Congress explicitly intended as a subsidy, there is no reason to place limitations on
shelter portion of the transaction.32 The notion that tax shelters are a windfall for the rich
is said to be illusory as long as the tax benefits are capitalized in the price of the shelter.33
Moreover, any inefficiencies arising from misallocations of resources are defended on the
grounds that Congress specifically determined that the tax-favored activity should be
subsidized.
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Whatever the merits of the equity and efficiency analyses, tax shelters have been a
major contributor to the complexity of the tax system. Planning or transactional complexity
involving tax shelters prior to the advent of PALs was enormous.34 Tax shelters usually
involved a complex structure designed to minimize the tax benefits offered to investors. A
substantial industry arose to structure and market tax shelters. Compliance complexity was
also tremendous for both taxpayers and the Internal Revenue Service alike.
APPROACHES TO TAX SHELTERS

Current Law

Current law incorporates a variety of approaches to tax shelters. Various penalty
provisions are designed to deter the promotion of and investment in abusive tax shelters.
Audit mechanisms (such as for the audits of certain partnerships) have been implemented
in order to streamline the audit process.

Of the substantive provisions directed at tax shelters, the at-risk rules and PALs are
the most prominent. The at-risk rules limit the deductibility of losses from an activity to
the amount the taxpayer has at risk with respect to that activity. Tax losses deemed
financed by nonrecourse indebtedness are thus deductible only against income from that
activity. Although initially applicable only to a handful of activities, the at-risk rules are
now broad in scope and apply to most activities.

PALs represent the broadest attack ever launched against tax shelters. They have
virtually shut down the tax shelter activity in this country. Under these rules, losses from
passive activities may only be used to offset income from passive activities. The possibility
of generating tax losses from a passive activity to shelter trade or business or professional
income is foreclosed inmost cases.35 Limited exceptions apply to losses from rental real
estate,36 working interests in oil and gas properties 37and low-income housing.38

The at-risk and PAL rules are not the only substantive provisions directed at tax
shelters. Provisions such as the alternative minimum tax 39 and the investment interest
limitations40 are also aimed at limiting the ability of taxpayers to shelter income.

The 1986 Act: Reduced Complexity

Criticizing the current anti-tax shelter rules for their complexity has become standard
fare.41 While much of this criticism is well-founded, it should be placed in proper context.
Notwithstanding the length and detail of PALs, they represent, in my opinion, a net
simplification of the tax system. The success of these rules in eliminating complex tax
shelter investments has simplified the investment decisions for most high-income taxpayers.
Although the rules themselves are unquestionably complex, this complexity does not affect,
other than transitionally, many investors who have curtailed investing in tax shelters. As
old tax shelters are disposed of, the rules will apply to an increasingly small number of
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taxpayers. To be sure, some taxpayers will face increased complexity as a result of these
rules. Nevertheless, I suspect that the increased complexity for those taxpayers who will
contend with the PA1 requirements is more than offset by the reduced complexity to the
substantially larger number of taxpayers who will benefit from simplified investment
decisions as a result of these rules.
This is not to say that the current rules are the best we can do. Various alternatives
are discussed in the remainder of this paper. But it does indicate that curtailing tax shelters
represents a major move in the direction of simplification and that any change not result
in the resurgence of the tax shelter industry.
Alternative Approaches - "Pure" Tax Bases

Broaden the Income Tax Base
One alternative is to eliminate the provisions giving rise to the deferral and the
consequent tax arbitrage directly rather putting a lid on the tax benefits only in certain
cases. The broadening of the tax base would be accompanied by the repeal of section 469.
I endorse these proposals. That tax preferences are acceptable to shelter income from
passive activities but not from portfolio investments or human capital is difficult to justify
as a matter of pure theory.43

If Congress were willing to adopt such an approach, it is likely that tax shelters
would remain suppresses without limitations on passive activity losses. Even though all
deviations from the measurement of economic income would not be eliminated, the
reduction in marginal rates accomplished by the 1986 Act has substantially reduced the
value of tax losses. Further base broadening would also make it easier for Congress to
prevent increasing marginal rates. Base broadening would thus contribute to preventing the
return of shelters in the absence of specific limitations in two distinct ways.45

Consumption Taxation
Some have suggested that the best way to reduce complexity is to adopt a
consumption-type personal income tax.48 A cash-flow consumption tax is asserted to remove
many of the complex issues raised by an income tax or a hybrid tax system. The lack of
experience with a consumption tax makes it difficult to predict whether there would indeed
be gains in simplicity.47 A consumption tax would introduce new complexities although its
overall effect is difficult to assess.
Even if a cash-flow consumption tax would be simpler to administer than the income
tax or hybrid alternatives, it is not clear such an approach would be desirable. They may
be good reasons for choosing income as a base for personal taxation rather than
consumption despite any possible gains in simplicity.48
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Hybrid Approaches

Whatever the merits of a move to achieve a pure income tax or consumption tax, it
is unlikely that Congress would be willing to adopt either approach. Congress has been of
two minds regarding tax preferences. On the one hand, the idea of using the tax system to
implement social programs and achieve economic objectives has proven resilient. The
reduction in tax preferences achieved in the 1986 Act was the result of a change in
rethinking on the part of tax policymakers regarding the economic wisdom of providing tax
preferences for certain forms of capital rather than a disenchantment with using the tax
system to achieve economic goals. The recent debate on reinstituting reduced rates for
capital gains indicates just how volatile that thinking can be.

On the other hand, Congress has been concerned by reports of high-income taxpayers
paying little or no tax. Although this phenomenon is directly linked to existence of tax
preferences, Congress has chosen to deal with this problem by implementing separate
limitations rather than by repealing tax preferences. Given this state of affairs, it is
reasonable to ask what alternatives are available if Congress maintains its desire to continue
tax preferences but curb tax shelters.
Repeal the PAL Limitations

The criticisms of the PAL limitations on grounds of both equity and complexity
suggest that the outright repeal of these limitations might be appropriate. One might
bolster the case for repealing the PAL limitations by pointing to the many changes initiated
in 1986 that reduce the prospects for tax shelters even in the absence of specific limitations.
It thus might be argued that tax shelters would not reemerge even without specific
limitations (and without additional base broadening) because the depreciation allowances,
investment credits, marginal tax rates repeal of the PAL rules without substituting other tax
shelter limitations should expressly oppose the reintroduction of preferential tax rates for
capital gains and other preferences that would increase arbitrage opportunities.
Limitations on Artificial Losses
One alternative to the existing PAL rules is the adoption of a limitation on artificial
accounting losses (LAL).52 The LAL proposal resembles the PAL rules in that certain tax
losses from an activity are temporarily suspended. Under LAL, these losses would be
deducted against income within that "basket” or from future taxable income from that
activity or related activities. Artificial losses would be deductible upon disposition of the
investment if not used to offset income. The LA approach differs form the PAL rules in
that only artificial accounting losses are suspended. An artificial accounting loss is "that
portion of any loss, attributable to an activity or related activities, which would disappear
if the taxpayer had no accelerated deductions in the current year.53

LAL rules are preferable to PAL rules because they do not require the suspension
of real economic losses.54 The idea of the LAL proposal is to isolate the portion of a loss
which is "artificial," thus allowing the deduction of "real" losses. Although the LAL proposal
as originally formulated was not comprehensive in identifying artificial losses, the proposal
could be modified to correct this problem.
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Although the LAL rules are potentially more equitable than the PAL rules because
LAL would distinguish real from artificial losses, they would not necessarily promote tax
simplification. Distinguishing real from artificial losses would introduce a new significant
distinction that would be anything but simple.55 What portion of existing depreciation
deductions is artificial? Even if a table were established making this determination,
calculations would be necessary to establish what portion of the nominal tax loss before
application of LAL could be deducted.

Some of the complexities of the PAL rules would also arise under LAL. For
example, LAL also is predicated upon a basket approach; artificial losses may only be offset
against income within that basket. As originally proposed, LAL was directed activities in
six specific areas: real estate, farming, oil and gas, equipment leasing, movies, and sports
franchises.56 All real estate activities were to comprise a single basket; losses from one
project would be used to offset income from other real estate projects. Similarly, all
farming activities could be netted. On the other hand, projects falling within any of the four
other areas would comprise a separate basket so that losses could only offset income from
that project prior to disposition. What becomes apparent from this description is that the
difficulties involved with defining an activity under the PAL rules also are present under
an LAL approach.
One major advantage of the LAL approach is that is would not require a
determination of whether a taxpayer materially participates. This eliminates that tension
felt under PAL between a narrow or broad definition of an activity. Also, limiting only
artificial losses, a narrow definition of an activity would seem justified.
LAL thus presents another realistic alternative to PAL. LAL is fairer because it only
limits artificial tax losses. LAL is not, however, a simple idea to implement although it is
not necessarily any more complex than the PAL rules.

Repeal At-Risk Rules; Retain PALs
Even if tax shelter limitations are desirable and/or politically inevitable, the question
arises as to whether we need as many tax shelter limitations as we currently have. If atrisk rules and PALs (not to mention a variety of other limitations) are both designed to
limit tax shelter activity, do we need to maintain both sets of limitations?

It is important to note that the at-risk rules serve two separate functions. They are,
to be a sure, a limitation on abusive tax shelters. They are designed to prevent the
overvaluation tax shelter that became prevalent in the 1970’s. By limiting the deductibility
of losses attributable to nonrecourse debt in most circumstances, the at-risk seek to prevent
the deduction of paper losses that are not likely to be borne by the taxpayer.
But the at-risk rules can also be viewed as a correct income measurement rule.
Consider the following example.57 Assume A purchases a building $1,000,000 financed by
$200,000 of A's own funds plus a $800,000 nonrecourse debt. The building has a remaining
useful life of 10 years and its value is expected to decrease by $100,000 per year over this
ten-year period. After the first year, the building is worth $900,000. A should be entitled

I-P-9

to a $100,000 depreciation deduction representing the decline in value of the building. If
the building were sold for $900,000, A would repay the debt (assuming it is still $800,000)
and keep $100,000. The same result should obtain for year two.

In year three, the decline in value from $800,000 to $700,000 will not be borne by
A because the debt is nonrecourse. A’s maximum economic loss from the investment is
$200,000 (the sum of A’s cash investment ($200,000) and any mortgage amortization
(assumed here to be zero)). A has already deducted an aggregate of $2000,000 in years one
and two. A should thus not be entitled to a further depreciation deduction in year three.
Disallowing any further deduction (except to the extent the mortgage is amortized) is
consistent with the theory of at risk.
The question nevertheless remains whether the at-risk rules could be eliminated in
the name of simplification. On the one hand, one layer of rules would be eliminated which
might reduce compliance complexity (and rule complexity) for those engaged in investments
producing tax losses attributable to nonrecourse financing. Eliminating the at-risk rules
might, however, increase transactional complexity for taxpayers with passive activity income
by providing an avenue for artificially generating losses to offset that income. Although
existing rules do not allow the overvaluation of property, at-risk rules simplify the
enforcement of these rules. It is difficult to say whether the repeal of the at-risk rules
would result in any net simplification of the tax system. Absent any clearly defined gain in
simplicity, I favor retention of these rules because they are consistent with the principle of
income taxation that a taxpayer should not be entitled to a deduction of a cost that he is
not obligate to bear.
SIMPLIFYING PALS

If the current overall structure remains intact and PALs continue as the major way
of limiting tax shelters, the question arises as to whether the PAL rules can be simplified.
The existing PAL rules are lengthy and complex. The IRS forms and instructions contain
six worksheets often requiring many calculations and allocations.58 Some proposals for
simplification have been suggested. This section will evaluate some of these proposals and
suggest other changes that might be considered.
Defining ’'Activity"

The proposed and temporary regulations issued last May principally deal with the
definition of an "activity." Income and loss from activities in which a taxpayer materially
participates are netted in applying the PAL limitations. There is a tension involved in how
broadly or narrowly an activity is defined. If defined narrowly so that small units are
treated as separate activities, taxpayers may be able to avoid material participation with
regard to income-producing units thereby qualifying such income as passive activity income
available to offset passive activity losses. If defined broadly, so that small units are
aggregated, taxpayers may be able to aggregate participation for loss-producing units in
order to avoid the PAL limitations for these loss units.
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The basic approach of the regulations is to provide a broad definition of an activity.
The regulations reflect the Treasury’s principal concern of preventing taxpayers from
offsetting passive losses with income-producing units.59 Undertakings - the fundamental unit
of economic endeavor - are aggregated in a variety of circumstances to produce a single
"activity’’.60 Loss-producing units which are aggregated will not be available to offset PALs
if material participation is achieved.

The "activity" regulations have been criticized on a number of grounds. The major
criticisms are that the broad definition of an activity achieved through mandatory
aggregation and integration rules is extremely complex and inconsistent with idea of an
activity underlying section 469.61
To address these criticisms, the ABA Task Force on Passive Losses has
recommended that the regulations be amended to create a rebuttable presumption that an
undertaking constitutes an activity.62 Taxpayers taking a position on their tax returns
contrary to this rebuttable presumption would be required to indicate this fact on the
return. The proposal is described as "far less complex"63 than the approach taken in the
regulations which consists of "more than 100 typed pages"64and requires taxpayers to engage
in a "multitude of steps"65 to determine what constitutes the taxpayers’ activities.66 The
existing rules are "too complex to understand or obey."67

The major feature of the Task Force Proposal is the rebuttable presumption.68 It is
far from clear, however, whether the cause of simplicity would indeed be advanced by the
adoption of the Task Force proposal. There are at least two respects in which this proposal
contains complexities of its own. First, if an undertaking is not necessarily coterminous with
an activity, creating only a rebuttable presumption, against allowing taxpayers or the
government to aggregate undertakings may be overcome. The test of whether the
enterprise is "an integrated and interrelated economic unit"69is shorter but not necessarily
simpler. The situation is analogous to the airline pilot example.70 Just as the test of
"unreasonable risk" in determining when an airline pilot should retire is no simpler than the
lengthier but more precise alternative, here, too, the shorter, less precise test is not
necessarily simpler. If the test is one on "integrated and related economic unit," rules are
needed to implement this test. It is hard to understand the simplicity advantages of
developing these rules through cases and revenue rulings rather than by regulation. Neither
simplicity nor certainty is likely to be served if these rules are developed on a case-bycase basis.
Second, while allowing taxpayers aggregate undertakings on the basis of the facts and
circumstances contained in Reg. § 1.469-4T(g) will be applauded as providing flexibility, the
decision whether to attempt to aggregate undertakings may not be simple. Alternative
calculations under all available alternatives and the planning implications of each are the
likely result of making this option available.
I find the idea of allowing either the taxpayer or the Internal Revenue Service to
rebut the presumption to be somewhat disingenuous. From the taxpayer’s perspective, the
presumption apparently could be relied upon as a reporting position to claim that income
producing units are passive and thus may offset passive losses. On the other hand,
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taxpayers could claim under amorphous aggregation standards that loss units should be
aggregated with other units where material participation is present thus allowing the loss
to be deducted. Although the taxpayers in this latter case would have to disclose this
position on their return, only a small percentage of these returns could realistically be
audited.

The rules could be shortened and somewhat simplified if an undertaking were
conclusively established as the definition of an activity.71 The ABA Task Force rejects this
approach as unfair. Although this conclusion is far from obvious,72 my major criticism of
the Task Force is with its claim that a flexible approach is simpler than the approach taken
in the regulations.
Simplicity and fairness are often in conflict. Whatever the merits of a broad or
narrow definition of an activity, an approach should be determined which is conclusive in
the vast majority of circumstances. It is only in this way that any meaningful simplification
can be achieved.
Material Participation

Passive activity losses and passive activity income generally arise only if the taxpayer
does not materially participate in the activity.73 The regulations provide that a taxpayer
materially participates in an activity if one of seven tests is satisfied.74 The basic test
provides that the taxpayer materially participates if more than 500 hours is devoted to the
activity during the taxable year.75 Moreover, the regulation recharacterize passive activity
income as nonpassive income if the taxpayer "significantly participates."76 Significant
participation is achieved through participation of more than 100 hours during the taxable
year.77
The relatively modest thresholds for qualification under the material participation
tests appear consistent with the policy of limiting taxpayers’ ability to generate passive
activity income which can offset passive activity losses. The low threshold has the effect
of characterizing income (and losses) from activities as active.

The material participation regulations have been criticized as inconsistent with
Congressional intent. The regulations are said to be inconsistent with Congressional intent
both because of the low threshhold79and because the tests are mostly quantitative rather
than based upon all the facts and circumstances.80 One critic has asserted that "the
fundamental rule for material participation should be the facts and circumstances approach
that Congress envisioned."81
A facts and circumstances test would be counterproductive to tax simplification. For
the reasons stated earlier, such a test creates uncertainty that ultimately will be resolved
over time through rulings and cases. A quantitative test should be retained even if it
requires statutory modification.82
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The Netting Approach

A Source of Complexity
Part of the problem with defining an "activity", as discussed above, is concern that
taxpayers will be able to generate unrelated passive income to offset their PALs. The PAL
rules are based on a netting approach under which passive activity losses may be deducted
only against passive activity income. The netting approach include in one basket all passive
activities of the taxpayer. Thus, the losses from one investment qualifying as a passive
activity may be used to offset the income from other unrelated passive activities. Passive
activity losses may not be used to offset portfolio income or wage income other than upon
disposition of the investment in the passive activity. Much complexity can result from this
type of netting. The complexity may arise from several factors.
First, taxpayers with passive activity losses in excess of passive activity income have
an incentive to generate passive activity income from other investments. To the extent that
taxpayers are permitted to generate passive activity income that can offset losses, the netting
structure produces transactional complexity. The investment decisions of taxpayers with net
passive losses are complicated by the potential tax savings that may be achieved by investing
in activities producing passive activity income.
The netting rules themselves have been further complicated by statutory and
regulatory provisions designed to prevent taxpayers from generating passive activity income
in at least some circumstances. Thus, the subsequently enacted publicly-traded partnership
rules were created to prevent taxpayers with unallowed passive activity losses from
generating passive activity income from investments in publicly-traded partnerships.83 The
significant participation rules also have been structured to deter taxpayers structuring
endeavors generating income to qualify as passive activities.84
Conversely, because the passive activity basket is kept small in order to make it
difficult for taxpayers to characterize income as passive activity income, taxpayers more
readily can generate losses that do not qualify as passive activity losses.85 There are thus
inherent limitations in minimizing transactional complexity through a netting approach.
Whether the basket is large or small, there will always be planning possibilities.

Netting leads to other complexities as well. The application of the netting rules may
produce significant compliance complexity for some taxpayers. By generally placing all
investments qualifying as passive activities in one basket, losses may have to be allocated
among passive activities in some circumstances. Worksheets 4 through 6 to Form 8582 are
the product of the netting rule which allows the passive income from one activity to offset
the passive losses from other passive activities. These rules allocate the disallowed loss to
each passive activity showing an overall 1055.86

Limiting Netting to Income From That Activity
The complexities described above might be reduced by changing the netting
approach to permit losses from a passive activity (prior to disposition) to be deducted only
I-P-13

against income from that activity.87 If the definition of an activity were narrowed
significantly as well, taxpayers would no longer be able to structure their investments in
order to produce income from a separate activity that could be used to offset passive
activity losses.88 Moreover, allocations of disallowed losses among activities would no longer
be necessary. Furthermore, rules such as the publicly-traded partnership rules and
recharacterization rules89 designed to prevent the generation of passive activity income
would also become superfluous.

There are, however, several reasons why this alternative might not be desirable.
Some complexity might be created by disallowing some losses for longer periods of time
thus requiring taxpayers to maintain records for that longer period. Also, if an activity were
defined more narrowly as part of this approach, complexity might be increased by attempts
to manipulate the material participation requirement.
But the major reason why this proposal would be undesirable is that the passive
activity loss provisions limit the deductibility of real as well as artificial losses. Where the
suspended losses do not represent a current economic loss, the accurate measurement of
income would be served by this more restrictive netting rule. Thus, for example, assume
a taxpayer has investments in two passive activities, one showing taxable income of $10,000.
If the tax loss does not reflect an economic loss, then the two investments should result in
net income for tax purposes of $10,000; the $10,000 loss should not be deducted. If, on the
other hand, the $10,000 does represent an economic loss in full, then deductibility would
achieve a correct measurement of income.90 Unlike the LAL proposal, the passive activity
rules do not attempt to distinguish economic losses from losses that do not represent a
current economic loss. Preventing taxpayers from using passive income from other
economic units to offset passive losses might increase the unfairness of the PAL provisions.
It is thus difficult to evaluate the extent to which the more restrictive rule would improve
or distort the measurement of income. All in all, I would not advocate this approach
because of the potential reduction in fairness it might cause.
The Phase-In Rules and Rental Real Estate Losses

In looking at Form 8582, many of the computations on the Form (excluding the
computations on the worksheets which are discussed below) result form (1) distinguishing
passive activities acquired before October 23, 1986 from those acquired after this date; and
(2) distinguishing rental real estate activities with active participation from other passive
activities. The first distinction will continue to be relevant only through 1990 when the
phase-out of losses from activities acquired before October 26, 1986 is complete. If the
special $25,000 maximum allowance for certain rental real estate activities with active
participation were also eliminated, one could envision Form 8582 with a total of 5 or 6 lines
(lines 2d, 2e, 2f, 2h, plus a line or two for allowing the losses to the extent of the passive
income if the current netting rules remain (the equivalents of lines 18 and 19)).

The Form itself, of course, is only part of the story. The current instructions to
Form 8582 contain six worksheets (in addition to worksheets A and B dealing with publiclytraded partnerships). Many of the computations on these worksheets (other than the
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computations resulting from the netting rules as discussed above) would likewise be
eliminated if the two distinctions referred to above were eliminated. Worksheets 1 and 3
deal exclusively with rental real estate activities involving active participation; they would
not be necessary if the special allowances for these losses were eliminated. Half of
worksheet 2 involves the phase-in distinction and similarly would no longer be necessary if
this distinction were eliminated (or allowed to expire).

The allowances of losses involving pre-October 23,1986 losses and rental real estate
where the taxpayer actively participates also complicate the allocation rules of Worksheets
4, 5, and 6. Computing the unallowed loss to be allocated requires computing the allowed
loss and subtracting the latter from the total loss. More significantly, some of the more
common situations where the allocation of deductions within an activity may affect the
taxpayer’s liability involve rental real estate activities.91

Allocating Interest

Because the PAL rules establish a separate category for passive activity income and
loss, it may be necessary for a taxpayer to allocate interest expense between passive
activities and other activities.92 Section 469(1)(4) provides Treasury with the authority to
issue regulations providing for "the determination of the allocation of interest expense for
purposes of this section." Proposed and temporary regulations have been issued which
provide that this allocation is to be made by tracing loan proceeds according to the use.93
These rules are a potential Achilles’ heel of the basket approach. A tracing rule has
the potential for serious manipulation. Alternatives to a tracing approach also present
difficulties.94 It is possible that the complexities of borrowing money for the purpose of
increasing passive activity losses are sufficient to deter this behavior. For whatever reason,
the practitioners I have spoken with have not provided evidence that the interest allocation
rules have resulted in transactional complexity of this sort.
/

Working Interests

The existing PAL rules exclude working interests in oil and gas properties from the
definition of passive activity.95 To qualify, the working interest cannot be held through an
entity that limits the taxpayer’s liability96 although the taxpayer can be protected through an
indemnification or stop-loss arrangement.97 The exception for working interests is contrary
to the purposes of the PAL rules and inconsistent with the other portions of these rules.
Taxpayers should not be allowed to shelter other income with losses from working interests.
Transactional complexity would be reduced by repealing this exception.
Conclusion

The prospects for significant simplification of the PAL rules are not good. There
are inherent complexities in any approach which creates a basket where losses can only be
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netted against gains within that basket. If the basket is small, too much escapes. If the
basket is large, it becomes too easy to generate income to offset the losses. In either case,
significant transactional complexity results. Rules also must allocate interest expense
between the basket and other items. The PAL rules have the added problem of defining
material participation as part of the definition of the basket.
Proposals to eliminate the existing detailed rules and substitute facts and
circumstances tests would not simplify the rules. Shorter rules are not necessarily simpler.
Criteria are needed to provide answers to a myriad of facts and circumstances. Much
regulatory detail is responsive to taxpayers’ desire for certainty.

The existing rules are unquestionably complex. I wish there were a fair way to
provide significant simplification. For the reasons stated above, I do not see how this may
be accomplished within the context of the PAL concept.
CONCLUSION

The best prospect for simplification would be to maintain or expand the tax base so
that the PAL limitations could be repealed without providing a fertile climate for tax
shelters. Proposals such as the restoration of capital gains preferences or the indexation
of capital gains without the indexing debt are inconsistent with the repeal of PAL
limitations and may serve as a harbinger of future tax preferences.

The limitation on artificial accounting losses has potential as an alternative to the
PAL rules. LAL would not be simple but would offer the advantage of only limiting
artificial losses. Under a LAL approach, it would be possible to provide a narrow definition
of activity and limit the deductibility of artificial losses to income from other economic
units. Distinguishing real from artificial losses, however, would be a source of complexity.
It is difficult, in my opinion, to significantly simplify the PAL rules. Although
changes could be made to the rules regarding working interests and real estate loss
deductions for taxpayers who actively participate, much of the complexity of the PAL rules
results from difficulties inherent in the PAL concept. Significant simplicity could be
achieved only at the risk of increasing the inequities of the PAL limitations. Although the
rules could be significantly shortened, as proposed by the ABA Task Force, significant
complexity would remain.
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COMMENTS ON "AT-RISK AND PASSIVE ACTIVITY
LIMITATIONS - CAN COMPLEXITY BE REDUCED?"

SALLY M. JONES
*

THE CURRENT STATUS OF TAX COMPLEXITY

Given the current state of affairs, Professor Koppelman’s observation that "there is
no generally accepted definition of complexity with regards to taxation" seems pedantic.
Perhaps tax professionals cannot define the term or precisely distinguish between
compliance, rule, or transactional complexity. There is, however, a universal sentiment that
the federal income tax system has become unwieldy to the point of being unworkable.

Evidence of this sentiment is everywhere. James Eustice spoke for every tax
educator when he observed that "whole new courses in the Tax curriculum may well be
unteachable in a meaningful way, and I am omitting vast segments of the law that I can no
longer stand, understand, or certainly communicate to my increasingly befuddled students."1
What makes this observation particularly poignant is that Professor Eustice wrote it in 1976.
Practicing accountants and lawyers openly acknowledge that there are no longer any
tax generalists. A professional who desires to maintain a reasonable level of competency
must specialize in a narrow area of the law. Today’s myopic expert on the taxation of
corporate/shareholder transactions might be confident enough to claim mastery over the
126 pages of subchapter C. Just don’t expect him to comment on the other 6,354 pages in
the Internal Revenue Code. Members of large national or regional firms can draw upon
the selective expertise of their numerous colleagues or their national offices when dealing
with complicated client situations. However, small independent firms or sole practitioners
with no similar intelligence network are in desperate straits indeed.
*Sally M. Jones is a professor at the University of Texas at Austin, where she has
also been an assistant and associate Professor since 1978. She attended Rice University
(1965-68), received a B.B.A. from Augusta College (1970), an M.P.A. from the University
of Texas at Austin (1973), and a Ph.D in business administration from the University of
Houston (1978). Published articles authored by Professor Jones have appeared in Journal
of Partnership Taxation, The Journal of Taxation. The Tax Adviser. The Journal of the
American Taxation Association, and Taxation for Accountants.

Professor Jones is a certified public accountant and has been a tax specialist with the
firm of KPMG Peat Marwick. She is a member of the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants and has served on the AICPA’s Taxation of Corporations and
Shareholders Committee. She is also an active member of the Texas Society of CPAs, the
American Accounting Association, and the American Taxation Association. Professor Jones
has also served on the board of advisors for the Brigham Young University School of
Accountancy.
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Every student of the federal tax system acknowledges that much of its complexity is
a necessary by-product of congressional determination to make the system equitable. Each
sentence of statute added to make the law more fair in its application to a particular
situation increases the body of knowledge that tax professionals must master. A second
root cause of complexity is the use of the federal tax system as an instrument of fiscal
policy. Every statutory provision enacted in order to influence the social, financial, or
economic behavior of taxpayers requires an additional investment of intellectual resources
by those of us who must interpret and apply the provision.
Professor Koppelman summarizes these tradeoffs in his conclusion that a "complex
rule often is the result of the failure to accept a simpler rule which is considered less fair
or efficient. It well may be difficult to achieve the goals of an income tax without a certain
amount of complexity.” This traditional defense of complexity has its limits. At some point,
the cost of an incremental increase in complexity must surely outweigh the benefit of the
corresponding increase in either equity or efficiency. Perhaps if the human mind had
unlimited capacity for absorption of knowledge, this point of diminishing return might never
be reached. However, there seems to be a widespread belief that the current tax system
is on the downward slope of the complexity/benefit curve.
One symptom of the current malaise is that many statutory and regulatory rules are
either not applied at all or applied in an incorrect and inconsistent manner across taxpayers.
In such cases, the intended result of the particular rule--be it equity or efficiency--cannot
possibly be achieved, and may even be perverted. As another commentator has observed,
this chaotic state of uncertainty undermines the self-assessment system and rewards
"uninformed, adventuresome, and dishonest taxpayers and their tax advisors who are all too
willing to take advantage of the uncertainty and play the audit lottery.”2

REDUCING COMPLEXITY AT THE SOURCE

The Internal Revenue Code is replete with provisions that apply only to specialized
economic or financial activities, and each provision can be justified on some macroeconomic
basis. (The extractive industries need help in attracting investment capital; ergo, percentage
depletion will selectively decrease the tax burden and increase the rate of returns these
industries can offer potential investors.)
These provisions, generically described as tax preferences, are designed to induce a
particular behavioral response from taxpayers. Over the last twenty years, Congress has
developed a concern (some might say paranoia) that certain taxpayers are responding with
too much enthusiasm. By indulging in tax-favored activities, these taxpayers are perceived
as avoiding payment of their fair share of taxes. Congress has reacted to this perception
problem by enacting various limitations on the benefits that can be derived from tax
preferences in a given year by any one taxpayer. Thus, the tax laws can be viewed as a
carrot and stick system that tempts taxpayers to behave in a certain manner, then flogs them
for doing so.
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One approach to reducing the current level of complexity in the tax system is
suggested by the adage that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. Rather than
enacting a new tax preference and simultaneously weaving a complicated web of limitations
on its use, Congress should ignore the fiscal temptation to enact the preference in the first
place. If too many taxpayers seem to be bent on the exploitation of an existing preference,
Congress should seriously consider repealing the preference rather than concocting a series
of exceptions to its availability.

The Tax Reform Act of 1986 adopted this approach in its repeal of the investment
tax credit and its modification of the Accelerated Cost Recovery System. The Act’s
dramatic reduction in the progressive rate structure was equivalent to a reduction in the
value of virtually every remaining tax-preference item. These changes theoretically
eliminated a significant amount of incentive to invest in tax-favored activities. In this
improved tax environment, statutory provisions to limit abusive shelter opportunities
logically could be de-emphasized. Congress was apparently unpersuaded by this logic, and
enacted the section 469 passive activity loss limitations for good measure.
SIMPLIFICATION OF THE PASSIVE ACTIVITY LOSS LIMITATION

Section 469 clearly strikes at the heart of deferral-driven tax shelters. No longer will
taxpayers be motivated to invest in business activities that generate front-end losses in order
to deduct those losses against salary or investment income. Professor Koppelman may be
correct in asserting that "the success of these rules in squelching complex tax shelter
investments has simplified the investment decisions for many high-income taxpayers."
However, it is clear that section 469 and the accompanying Treasury regulations add a new
dimension of complexity to the tax system. If section 469 is to be accepted as a permanent
component of the system, what specific steps can be taken to simplify its structure and,
thereby, its application?

In its present form, section 469 provides for a netting process whereby losses from
one passive activity may be deducted against income or gains from other passive activities.
Theoretically, this netting process can be criticized as a half measure. Congress could more
completely reduce the shelter potential of passive activities by revising section 469 to
provide that losses generated by an activity are only deductible against income or gain from
that activity (the current rule for publicly traded partnerships). This tax treatment for losses
generated by passive activities roughly corresponds to the treatment of equity investments
in C corporations. Losses from the corporate business do not flow through as a deduction
to the investing shareholders. An economic loss on the investment is only deductible when
it is realized upon a taxable disposition of the shares.
While an activity specific loss limitation would be more restrictive than current law,
it would end the need for allocation of the net passive activity loss for a year to each
passive activity owned by the taxpayer. The procedure for deductibility of suspended losses
upon a taxable disposition of a passive activity would be simplified. Finally, the repeal of
the netting concept would eliminate the artificial tax incentive to invest in passive income
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generators (PIGs), the income from which currently has the unique ability to shelter passive
activity losses.

Repeal of the $25,000 exception for rental real-estate activities would obviously result
in a major simplification of section 469. The Senate Finance Committee Report on the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 defends this exception to the passive activity loss restrictions as
"appropriate in the case of certain moderate-income investors in rental real estate, who
otherwise might experience cash flow difficulties with respect to investments that in many
cases are designed to provide financial security, rather than to shelter a substantial amount
of other income."3 It is impossible to assess quantitatively whether the benefit of the rental
real-estate exception to the targeted taxpayer group outweighs the cost of its complexity.
However, it is certainly arguable that repeal of the exception would focus the attention of
moderate-income taxpayers on the pre-tax cash flow generated by real estate investments
and would ultimately result in investment decisions based upon economic rather than tax
considerations.
THE PASSIVE ACTIVITY REGULATIONS

Much of the complexity in the application of section 469 is attributable to the first
two sets of Treasury regulations. Another author has observed that "there are now roughly
560 pages of far-ranging and, some would argue, overly broad rules. To add insult to injury,
the PAL regulations aren’t even half complete yet. There are at least five more PAL
regulation installments expected. That’s a lot of effort devoted to the problem of abusive
tax shelters-a problem that many commentators believe is largely a historic one!"4

In drafting the section 469 regulations, the Treasury clearly is working on the
premise that more is better. For example, Temp. Reg. sec. 1.469-5T provides guidance as
to the meaning of the statutory term "material participation." The regulation provides that
an individual shall be treated as materially participating in an activity if based on all of the
facts and circumstances, the individual participates in the activity on a regular, continuous,
and substantial basis during the year. The regulation fails to specify which facts and
circumstances will be controlling--such specification is reserved for a future date. In
addition to this subjective description, the regulation goes on to provide six additional safe
harbor tests for material participation. These tests introduce two new terms-"significant
participation activity" and "personal service activity"-the definitions of which must be
mastered before the safe-harbor tests can be applied.
In its determination to provide detailed guidance to taxpayers, the Treasury seems
to have lost sight of the fact that having too much information can be as detrimental to
effective decision-making as too little information. Information must be manageable to be
useful, and no tax practitioner today would describe the section 469 regulations as
manageable in any sense of the word. The end result of the Treasury’s labors may be that
"many advisors, despairing of the increasing-length and complexity of the passive loss
regulations, will be tempted to ignore them or to apply them only generally."5
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Professor Koppelman points out that the Treasury faced conflicting objectives when
drafting the regulations that define the key term activity. Certainly, the definition should
be narrow enough to isolate all potential tax-sheltering loss activities. However, Treasury
also wanted a definition broad enough to limit a taxpayer’s ability to generate passive
income within his line of business. For example, consider a taxpayer who invests in a
Chicago restaurant business and materially participates in daily operations.6 The business
purchases a restaurant in St. Louis, and our taxpayer has no involvement at all in its
operations. A narrow definition would treat the St. Louis business as a separate activity,
so that losses generated by that business would be passive to the taxpayer. Conversely, if
the St. Louis restaurant were profitable, it would become a PIGs under the narrow
definition. If the definition of activity were broadened so that the two restaurants are
considered a single activity, the taxpayer would be deemed to materially participate in both
and have no possibility of passive activity income.
Congressional intent, as reflected in the Senate Finance Committee Report, was to
define a section 469 activity in a narrow manner.7 The regulations, with their aggregation
rules for commonly controlled entities, provide a surprisingly broad definition. This
confusing situation is a result of the current structure of section 469 that allows netting of
gains and losses from all passive activities. If the netting concept were replaced with an
activity-specific loss limitation, taxpayers would have no incentive to invest in PIGs. Thus,
the Treasury would no longer be whipsawed by the need to prevent passive income through
a broad definition of activity. (In the example, the identification of the St. Louis restaurant
as a separate, profitable activity in which the taxpayer did not materially participate would
be irrelevant in applying the passive activity loss limitation to other activities.) The
regulations could be based on the single objective, consistent with congressional intent, to
define activity in a narrow manner, and thus could be considerably simplified.
REPEAL OF THE AT-RISK RULES

In his paper, Professor Koppelman defends the section 465 at-risk limitation as a
correct income-measurement rule. He uses an example involving a taxpayer A with
$200,000 of equity in a $1,000,000 building subject to an $800,000 nonrecourse mortgage.
The building has a remaining useful life of ten years, and its value is expected to decrease
by $100,000 per year over this period. Professor Koppelman states that A should be
entitled to an annual $100,000 depreciation deduction representing the decline in value of
the building for years 1 and 2. "In year 3, the decline in value from $800,000 to $700,000
will not be borne by A because the debt is nonrecourse. A’s maximum economic loss from
the investment is $200,000 (the sum of A’s cash investment [$200,000] and any mortgage
amortization [assumed here to be zero]). A has already deducted an aggregate of $200,000
in years 1 and 2. A should thus not be entitled to a further deduction in year three.
Disallowing any further deduction (except to the extent the mortgage is amortized) is
consistent with the theory of at-risk."
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There are several problems with this interpretation of the at-risk rules. First, the
ACRS deduction allowed under section 168 is based on a cost recovery concept and is not
an attempt to track the decline in the economic value of the depreciable asset. In many
cases, the economic value of an asset is actually appreciating during the years during which
a section 168 deduction may be claimed. Thus, it is the allowance of an arbitrary costrecovery method that creates the benefit of a tax deduction before any economic loss
associated with an asset is accrued or realized.

Second, there is no possibility in Professor Koppelman’s example that the taxpayer’s
ownership of the asset will result in a net deductible loss in excess of $200,000. Even if the
taxpayer deducts $1,000,000 of depreciation over the ten-year life of the asset, sale or
exchange of the asset will trigger a minimum gain of $800,000 (i.e., the amount realized
upon disposition may never be less than the relief of the nonrecourse debt). No tax
planning technique (short of death) can eliminate this phantom gain from A’s future.
Consequently, the concern over a current deduction in excess of a taxpayer’s amount at-risk
must be recognized as a timing issue.
Because both the at-risk rules and the passive activity loss rules deal with the taxable
year in which a loss is deductible, redundancy in their application is unavoidable. Professor
Koppelman makes this point indirectly in his statement that "the at-risk rules were largely
a response to abusive tax shelters involving the overvaluation of depreciable property
through nonrecourse debt. PALs, on the other hand, were created to defeat the sheltering
of virtually all tax shelters, whether regular or abusive."

To illustrate the overlap in the two limitations, assume that an individual purchases
an interest in a passive activity for $300,000, using $50,000 of his own funds and financing
the balance with a $250,000 nonrecourse debt secured by the interest. In the first year, the
activity generates a $90,000 loss to the taxpayer. The at-risk rules would allow the taxpayer
to deduct only $50,000 of this loss, with the $40,000 excess carried forward into future years
until the taxpayer’s at-risk amount again becomes positive. However, the $50,000 deduction
now must run the gamut of section 469. If the taxpayer does not own any PIGs, the $50,000
loss will be disallowed and carried forward into future years until passive activity income
is generated. The end result of the application of both the at-risk rules and the passive
activity loss rules is that the full $90,000 loss is disallowed, but that the taxpayer has two
different loss carryforward accounts to track.

Assume that in year 2, the taxpayer abandons the activity. His relief of the $250,000
nonrecourse debt in excess of his $210,000 adjusted basis in the investment (original
$300,000 cost less $90,000 allocated loss) results in a $40,000 recognized gain. This gain
represents an amount at-risk, which allows him to deduct his $40,000 suspended section 465
loss. This loss spills over and becomes a current loss subject to the passive-activity loss
rules. However, the abandonment of the interest also triggers full deductibility of both
suspended and current losses under section 469(g) (1). Therefore, the end result is that the
taxpayer deducted no loss in year 1, and deducted a $90,000 loss against a $40,000 gain in
year 2, netting a $50,000 tax loss that exactly corresponds to his economic loss of $50,000.
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In this simplistic example, the same result would occur if the at-risk rules were
ignored; the passive activity loss rules would disallow any loss in year 1, and provide for a
$50,000 net loss deduction in year 2. The timing of the loss deduction would change if a
second passive activity generated $100,000 of income in year 1. In this case, $40,000 of the
$90,000 loss would be deductible against this income. In year 2, the $50,000 loss suspended
under the at-risk rules would become fully deductible, offsetting the $40,000 phantom gain
recognized upon abandonment of the interest and resulting in a $10,000 net loss for the
year. (Of course, this variation could not occur if the ability to net passive-activity gains
and losses were repealed.) The important lesson to be learned from the example is that
both the at-risk and the passive activity loss limitations deal exclusively with the timing of
deductions-not with either the fact or the amount of the deduction.

The redundancy problem is not limited to the interplay of sections 465 and 469.
Before these limitations are even considered, losses allocated to investors in partnerships
- the traditional tax shelter vehicle-are limited under section 704(d) to the tax basis in the
investor’s partnership interest.8 Section 752(a) provides that an allocated portion of
partnership debt may be included in each partner’s basis in his interest. Voluminous
temporary regulations under section 752, published on December 30,1988, provide guidance
as to the correct allocation of both recourse and nonrecourse partnership debt to the
appropriate partner. The raison d’etre of the allocation is to create sufficient basis against
which a partner may deduct his share of partnership losses. If basis is insufficient, the
amount of disallowed loss is carried forward into future years until sufficient basis is
created.
The section 752 regulations (monstrously complex in their own right) permit
partnership losses to be deducted currently against basis created by nonrecourse debt. The
theory underlying such permissiveness is that deductions attributable to nonrecourse debt
must be paid back penny for penny in the form of future gain recognition upon disposition
of the encumbered property. Thus, the partnership regulations reflect a tolerance regarding
the timing of loss recognition that is impossible to reconcile with the at-risk rules.
The limitations of sections 704(d), 465, and 469 can be viewed as a series of hurdles
that must be cleared before any amount of loss is currently deductible. Each hurdle affects
only the timing of the deduction, and yet each hurdle requires the application of a different
and intricate set of rules. This succession of hurdles can result in a single loss being divided
into three different carryforward amounts, each of which may be triggered at different dates
in the future.

History provides a final argument for the repeal of the at-risk rules. Section 465 was
first introduced as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976. One of the principal goals of this
major reform legislation was to discourage investment in abusive tax shelters. The House
Ways and Means Committee, with Treasury approval, favored the adoption of a limitation
on artificial losses (the LAL provision) as the major deterrent against shelters.9 This
provision would have disallowed a current deduction for certain accelerated (artificial)
deductions generated by an activity to the extent these deductions exceeded current
operating income from the same activity. The LAL provisions would have created a
bifurcated tax return in which artificial losses from tax shelters would have been segregated
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from salary and investment income. The disallowed losses would have carried forward until
such time as the activity generated income or was disposed of.

The Senate Finance Committee would not support the LAL concept, criticizing it for
contributing to the "trend toward greater complexity in the tax system" and for failing "to
distinguish between actual abuses of tax shelters...and the situations where tax incentives
provide important encouragement to economically worthwhile investments."10 As an
alternative to LAL, the Finance Committee proposed the at-risk rules, which were
ultimately included in the final version of the act.
The sense of deja vu experienced by many tax practitioners upon their first reading
of section 469 was attributable to the distinct similarity of the new passive activity loss
limitation to the old LAL provision. Ten years after the LAL concept was rejected for its
complexity and replaced with the at-risk rules, the more restrictive section 469 was enacted
as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. In the same piece of legislation, Congress
dramatically reduced the incentive to invest in tax-sheltering activities by cutting the highest
individual marginal rate to 33 percent (37 percentage points lower than the 1976 rates).
From a historical perspective, the logical next step is the repeal of the at-risk rules.
CONCLUSION

The reduction of complexity in the federal tax system should be recognized as a
legitimate congressional goal. Simplification of the passive activity rules could be achieved
by replacing the netting concept with an activity-specific loss limitation, and by repealing
the $25,000 exception for rental real-estate activities. Section 465 should be repealed; the
at-risk rules are an anachronism and have no current vitality.
Congress should reexamine the role of the Treasury in promulgating regulations.
The recent trend toward regulations that require hundreds of pages to interpret a single
Code section (or, as in the case of a Section 469 "activity," a single word) should somehow
be reversed. Until the Treasury is willing to curb its own excesses, tax simplification will be
impossible to achieve.
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COMMENT ON "AT-RISK AND PASSIVE ACTIVITY LIMITATIONS:
SHOULD COMPLEXITY BE REDUCED?"

STEFAN F. TUCKER
*

Good morning. I’m coming to you from a different perspective. I’m coming from
the perspective of a practitioner. Let me tell you, first and foremost, that I potentially have
a conflict in that my clients are entrepreneurs. They’re primarily in the real-estate industry.
I also am tax counsel to the National Realty Committee, and as such, I have testified in
front of the IRS on both sets of its regulations under the passive activity limitations. So
what you’re going to hear is in part attributable to my kind of practice and what I do.

In addition, I was the final reviewer on the ABA Tax Section task force on passive
activity limitations. So those comments, in part, reflect what I think.
Now, there is an advantage and there is a disadvantage to being the last speaker on
the panel. The disadvantage is that you stand the risk of being redundant. The advantage
is that you can summarize and comment upon what other people have said. Since I have
enough to say that I don’t think will be redundant, I’m going to treat this as being an
advantage.

The first thing I’d like to comment upon is Sally’s note that there are still
nonrecourse loans above the Red River. One, I’m not so sure that’s true, but two, it
reminds me of a very simple story of how you can tell the difference today between a
Houston developer and pigeon. The difference is that the pigeon can still make deposits
on a Mercedes.
*Stefan F. Tucker is a member of the firm of Tucker, Flyer, Sanger & Lewis, PC in
Washington, D.C. His focus is on business law, with an emphasis on federal income and
estate taxation and real estate. He was formerly a partner in the firm of Arent, Fox,
Kitner, Plotkin & Kahn. Mr. Tucker has also been an Attorney Advisor to the U.S. Tax
Court (1963-64).

Mr. Tucker is a professional lecturer in law at the George Washington University
National Law Center and has served as an adjunct professorial lecturer at Law at the
University of Miami Law Center. He is a member of the Board of Trustees for the
Massachusetts School of Law and a member of the Committee of Visitors at the University
of Michigan Law School, and holds other law school-related positions as well. He is a
member of the American Law Institute, the Council of the American Bar Association
Section of Taxation, and the American College of Real Estate Lawyers. Mr. Tucker
received a B.B.A. from the University of Michigan School of Business Administration (1960)
and a J.D. from the University of Michigan Law School.
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It was promised that I was going to give you a graphic example of what all this has
meant to date. What it has meant is what you see over on the far left side; those two red
volumes are 1,517 pages--written by an extremely intelligent person, who’s intelligent
enough no longer to practice in that particular area on one-Code section, 469. That is the
explanation of the passive activity limitations under the regulations and the Code to date-1,517 pages.

The three notebooks beside it contain the first set of regulations under section 752
in response to section 79 of the 1984 Tax Reform Act, and in the second and third, the two
sets of regulations under section 469, the first set of which, containing 271 pages, as you’ll
recall, dealt only with material participation and the ability to recharacterize what otherwise
might have been passive income into nonpassive income. The second set, containing 195
pages, deals with one word, the word "activity," and the technical corrections to everything
they messed up when they issued the first set of regulations on material participation and
recharacterization. The third set, we anticipate, will be on self-charged interest and
technical corrections to clear up the two sets of problems, one still resulting from the first
set and the second set, and the second resulting from the technical corrections done in the
second set to the first set, which needs further technical corrections.
Now, I’ve been in tax practice long enough, but I thought technical corrections were
done by Congress. We now have the IRS issuing its own technical corrections of its own
proposed and temporary regulations. This is a problem for those of us who are, in fact,
practitioners.
Now, will that set of regulations exist and last forever? Will it be, as Sally said, that
we ought to keep 469 and eliminate 465? Or, as Stan said, maybe keep them both but
clarify?

I would like to read to you a poem written over a hundred years ago by a man
named Shelley that was my favorite poem in high school, to think through, if we may, as
to what will last and what will not last over a period of time. It is titled "Ozymandias of
Egypt-”
I met a traveller from an antique land
Who said: Two vast and trunkless legs of stone
Stand in the desert. Near them on the sand,
Half sunk, a shatter’d visage lies, whose frown
And wrinkled lip and sneer of cold commend
Tell that its sculptor well those passions read
Which yet survive, stamp’d on these lifeless things,
The hand that mock’d them and the heart that fed;
And on the pedestal these words appear:
‘My name is Ozymandias, king of kings:
Look on my works, ye mighty and despair!
Nothing beside remains.’ Round the decay
Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare,
The lone and level sands stretch far away.
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And that’s what I think about the 469 regulation.
Now, let me go on. Herb Lerner rightly said that a number of lawyers and
accountants are leaving the tax practice because of the complexity of the tax law. You
know, it’s interesting. We heard that when the 1976 Reform Act came and people said they
ought to get out of estate planning. For an entrepreneurial practice like ours, estate
planning is an integral part of everything we do. We have gone from one estate planner
in the past five years to five estate planners. We don’t think everybody is getting out of
estate planning.

We don’t think everybody is going to get out of tax. What we are worried about,
what Herb implied, and I’m hearing more and more is that we’re going to end with
everybody in the tax law being like Raymond in Rain Man. Remember Raymond? He was
an autistic savant. He knew everything there was about numbers but nothing else about the
rest of the world. We’re going to end up with all our younger tax lawyers knowing
everything there is to know about 469 or knowing everything there is to know about 752.
And yet when we go down the declension, it’s not just 469. That’s the bottom of the
declension. We still have to go through basis and adjusted basis and 752 and 704(b) and
465 and at-risk, and then we get to 469. And yet people aren’t learning that. They’re
learning what’s 469. We have 466 pages of regulations to read, but we forget that’s only
one small part.
You know, I teach federal taxation of real estate transactions, and people say, "How
can you do this? 469 permeates everything." No, it doesn’t. It doesn’t permeate what’s the
choice of entity you’re going to use. It doesn’t permeate what’s the basis of property, nor
does it permeate like-kind exchange, involuntary conversions, and estate planning as such.
There’s a lot to do and a lot to think about that we’re losing sight of, and that we’re causing
particularly our younger people to lose sight of.

The basis for 469, if I could take you back, was in the blue book from the Joint
Committee. Congress concluded that it had become increasingly clear that taxpayers were
losing faith in the federal income tax system. This loss of confidence resulted in large part
from the interaction of two of the system’s principal features: first, its high marginal rates;
and second, as a consequence thereof, the opportunities it provided for taxpayers to offset
income from one source with tax shelter deductions and credits for another. That was
probably what started everything. Yet the primary source, the high tax rates, is gone. And
we have a number of other provisions that deal with tax shelters.
So let me start by saying that first, unlike Sally, I don’t care if you repeal 465 or not.
I thought that it applied to abusive tax shelters. From the perspective of those of us who
are practitioners in the day-to-day real world of real estate, 465 is okay if only you clarify
two things. One is: It says that except as provided in the regulations, no person can have
any liability with respect to the loan. But what if you took, subject to the loan from
somebody who is not in your direct chain of ownership at all? Why shouldn’t that be
outside, just as under 752 "subject to" was nonrecourse, so long as it wasn’t a partner who
was liable directly or indirectly?
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Secondly, the real problem is the fact that section 465 looks at commercially
reasonable financing, and it says, for some reason in the legislative history, that kicker
interest is, per se, not commercially reasonable. And yet every client today who is doing
real-estate transactions is entering into transactions that result in kickers being paid to the
lenders. Oh, sure, maybe it’s a partnership interest, but is that not a kicker with respect to
the loan, potentially? It’s very hard to tell if we’re dealing with substance over form directly
or indirectly.

So I’ll live with 465. I think it needs some clarification, and that clarification needs
to be statutory and legislative, rather than regulatory. But I’ll live with it.
But 469 we can’t live with. We simply cannot live with 469. We can live with it as
a Code section. We can live with it with a fairly simple straightforward set of regulations
to understand, even if that means we looked at the facts and circumstances and we put the
taxpayers to the test of standing up under court scrutiny and under audit scrutiny—because,
unlike what you read and what you hear, ladies and gentlemen, 469 is a trap for the wary,
not the unwary, quite clearly.

How would you like to have a client come into your office and say, "Here is my set
of facts. Is this passive income or is it active income or is it investment income?" You
respond at your hourly rate (which I’m sure for a lot of you is more than my hourly rate),
"I don’t know. I read the regulations. I know there are twenty-one building blocks before
I find out whether or not you have an activity." Not one, not two, not three, but twentyone building blocks we have. Undertaking? I thought an undertaking was something when
you buried somebody. We have undertaking, all right. We have activities. We have
enterprises. We have entities. We have operations. Yes, doctors give operations and
undertake their mistakes. Okay? We have to live with them day in and day out, and with
potential retroactive changes that result in penalties being attributed to our clients.

We have real problems unless the 469 regulations are, in fact, withdrawn and
reissued as simple and straightforward. Now, I realize that that’s going to bother some
people who have written extensive books, but look at the sale of the supplements. It does
not adversely impact them.

Everything you do in the passive activity area results in an unexpected surprise. The
only way I could really make you understand how unexpected is to share with you a very
short story. You have to imagine with me that both Stan and Ray have died and gone to
heaven at exactly the same moment. And Stan gets up to the gate first, and St. Peter says,
"Welcome. We’re really glad to have you here. We don’t very often get tax lawyers, but
we’re thrilled to have you here. And I have a reward because you’ve made it to heaven."
St. Peter goes over and opens a door and out walks this scrawly-haired, toothless hag,
and Stan says, "This is my reward for getting to heaven." And St. Peter says, "Do you
remember when you were four years old and you slugged the little girl next door?" And
Stan thinks back, and he says, "Yes." St. Peter says, "Remember when you were five years
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old and you stole a dollar from your father’s loose change?” And Stan thinks back, and he
says, "Yes." And St. Peter says, "Remember when you were six and you were walking to
school and you tripped the little boy?" Stan says, "Thank you. I’ll take my reward. I’ll
leave."
Away walks Stan. Ray comes to the gate. St. Peter says, "Welcome," and
immediately goes over and opens the same door, and there’s Bo Derek. And Ray is really
literally in heaven. Just then, St. Peter turns to Bo Derek and says, "Remember when you
were four years old..." That’s 469 of the regulations.
Let me give you an example. Your client builds a building. It’s up for twelve
months. They’re in the process of renting the building. They’ve gotten it 78 percent rented,
69 percent occupied. That’s better than anything in Tulsa, Oklahoma City, or Houston.
And somebody comes along to buy the property. Twelve months later, they sell the
property. They come in to you and say, "I have all these passive losses from this property.
I’m going to take all of this gain I made on the property." It’s going to be passive income.
I’m going to wipe out all of my passive losses from the property, and in addition, I’ll be able
to wipe out other passive losses during the year of sale."

No, not true. It’s recharacterized. If you don’t have the building completed, not
substantially completed, not mostly completed, but completed-now, "completed" implies 100
percent occupied, 100 percent shell and 100 percent tenant improvements in there--then you
have a recharacterization rule. That, by the way, was a liberalization from what was
previously a twenty-four month holding period. But, as we understand, completion can go
for thirty-four years, not twenty-four months.
The second one is holding land for future construction. I hold land for future
construction of an office building. Now I’m going to put up the office building. What was
my interest on the mortgage while I was holding the land? Was it passive loss that I can
apply against the income from the building? Was it investment loss? No. It’s a trade or
business. Holding for future use without having determined the future use is a separate
activity and, therefore, can be treated as a trade or business-strange, to say the least.
Thirdly, imagine you have four projects, one in Baltimore County, one in Fairfax
County in Northern Virginia, one in Wilmington, Delaware, and one in Charlotte, North
Carolina. All are operated out of one office in terms of receipts and expenditures, but all
four locations are separate, and they’re all separate home-building enterprises. And, in fact,
they’re in separate corporations to protect against liability.

The IRS says: "The fact that you put those projects in separate corporations to
protect against liability so that if the Wilmington project goes under, Charlotte, North
Carolina, is still protected, doesn’t mean anything. Those are four undertakings. But
because of common control, they’re one activity. Therefore, you look at it as a whole, wh-o-l-e, not as separate activities for your purposes." Strange. Unexpected surprises when
you read the regulations.
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Let me just note two other things and show you further the kinds of things that we’re
concerned about. One, you expected complexity when you dealt with consolidated returns
or foreign activities with multinationals. You even expected it with widely held C
corporations in many respects. But the parties that are dealing with those are sophisticated
clients, knowing they need sophisticated accountants and attorneys willing to pay for the
same.
Your day-to-day entrepreneurial client can’t afford to be faced with the same
complexity that results in a 1,517-page book on one Code section, and they’re going to have
to pay to deal with it. What you’re going to run into, what our clients fear is going to
happen~not to themselves but others-is you’re going to be back to the audit lottery. And
the reason you’re going to be back to the audit lottery is that the clients are saying: "We’d
rather pay later than pay you all this money right now to tell us you don’t know the answer."
And, moreover, what you think is the answer today can, by regulation, retroactively be
changed tomorrow so that whatever we did was wrong in the first place.
That in and of itself cries out for the repeal of 469 in one way or the other-either
the section itself or the regulations with simplification. Now, why would I have the nerve
to say, "Repeal 469"? You don’t need it. You don’t need 469. With the elimination of the
ITC, with ACRS going to twenty-seven-and-a-half and thirty-one-and-a-half years, with the
fact that the S&Ls and banks are now regulated as to each and every loan they make, so
they’re not making any more FWFs-everybody else uses acronyms, so do we: free
wheeling financings-since you have that, since you have the alternative minimum tax
applied, since you have the uniform capitalization rules under section 263(a), you don’t
need 469. We’ll leave you 465 if you clarify it. But none of us needs 469. Thank you.
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EMPLOYEE BENEFITS: STATUTORY SIMPLIFICATION

DAVID J. KAUTTER
*

THE CURRENT STATE OF PRACTICE

As much as any area of the Internal Revenue Code, the rules governing the taxation
of employee benefits have become increasingly intricate and complex over the past fifteen
years. This area of the law is now at a point where much of the advice being rendered on
the tax aspects of employee benefits is being rendered by specialists who work exclusively
in the employee benefits area and who are often unsure of the advice they are rendering.
Some employee benefit advisers believe that even focusing exclusively on the compensation
area is too overwhelming an assignment. These advisers have subdivided their employee
benefits tax groups into three subgroups which parallel the structure of the Internal
Revenue Code: qualified plans, fringe benefits, and nonqualified arrangements. Individuals
are expected to devote their careers to mastering the rules in one of these areas.

Clearly the most complicated of the three areas mentioned in the preceding paragraph
is the qualified retirement plan area. The fringe benefit rules, following the repeal of
section 89, are a distant second. The rules governing nonqualified arrangements (e.g.,
incentive and nonqualified stock options, property transfers under section 83) are the least
complex and do not seem to be creating much confusion at the moment. With the fringe
benefit rules and the rules for nonqualified arrangements not being very complex, or at least
not generating much uncertainty, this paper focuses primarily on simplification of the
qualified retirement plan tax rules and secondarily on rules governing the taxation of the
fringe benefits.
*David J. Kautter is director of the Washington National Tax Group of Arthur Young.
He joined the National Tax Group in 1974 and worked for Arthur Young until 1978. He
then spent over three years as Tax Legislative Counsel to Senator John C. Danforth, a
member of the Senate Finance Committee, from 1979 to 1982 and rejoined Arthur Young
in 1982. He has worked in the compensation and benefit areas since 1974, and has
published several articles on the taxation of compensation and benefits.

Mr. Kautter is a certified public accountant and a member of the Bar in the District
of Columbia. He is Chairman of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants’
(AICPA) Employee Benefits Committee and of the AICPA Task Force on the Taxation
of Distributions from Qualified Plans, and a member of the AICPA Tax Legislative Liaison
Committee. He is also an officer of the Federal Bar Association Section of Taxation and
a member of the American Bar Association. Mr. Kautter received a B.B.A. in Accounting
from the University of Notre Dame and a J.D. from Georgetown University.
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The question dealt with in this paper is whether the rules governing the taxation of
employee benefits must be as complicated, intricate, and detailed as they now are or
whether substantial simplification can be achieved while retaining most of the underlying
policy objectives of current law. In other words, should someone have to devote an entire
career to one of these three sub-areas in order to be assured of the advice they are
rendering?
CAUSES OF COMPLEXITY

There are two primary causes of the current complexity in the employee benefits tax
rules. The first can be characterized as "incremental overload," the relentless layering of
one set of changes upon another without the integration of these sets of changes into a
comprehensive statutory scheme. Part of the reason for the incremental overload is the
budget deficit and the yearly pressure on Congress to raise revenues. In order to avoid
outright tax rate increases, Congress chooses to close loopholes which results in fine-tuning
of laws that increases complexity. Because of the tremendous wealth invested in private
pension funds-over $2 trillion—it is likely that Congress will continue to seek revenues from
this area.

The second is the attempt by policy makers to write rules that are so comprehensive
and so specific that it is impossible for a taxpayer, even in the most remote circumstance,
to contravene statutory intent in the slightest. It should be noted that not all of the
complexity attributable to this second cause emanates from Congress. The Executive
Branch in its efforts to fine tune statutory language and fully implement the intent of
Congress has also contributed to the increasing complexity. Exhaustive regulations which
are virtually incapable of being fully understood, but with which taxpayers are expected to
comply immediately, have become more common. For example, regulations implementing
the rules of §401(a)(26), dealing with minimum participation in qualified plans, are so
broad in scope and intricate in detail that their full impact will take years of
implementation to comprehend. Yet taxpayers are expected to understand and implement
the rules almost immediately after their issuance. The current approach can be likened to
that of a fisherman who weaves his nets so tightly to prevent even the smallest fish from
slipping through the net that he is pulled overboard when the net is tossed into the water.
The consequences of these two forces are complexity, confusion, intentional and
unintentional noncompliance, and increasing costs to employers to provide the same level
of benefits to their employees.
We have reached this point gradually. In the early 1920s, the tax incentives for pension
plans in which the employer contribution is deductible as a current expense and the
employee does not recognize income until distributions are received were relatively
straightforward and created an environment for the growth of these types of plans. During
World War II and the Korean War, wage-price stabilization restricted increases in direct
compensation so that profits were directed to pensions and welfare benefits but the rules
remained relatively straightforward.
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Following that era, the growth of pensions and fringe benefits continued as unions
began to negotiate new and improved benefits, and increased competition required
non-union employers to provide benefits. By the early 1960s, employee benefits were
widespread within American corporations, but there was growing concern as to the security
of these benefits. President Kennedy appointed a pension commission, which recommended
measures for the protection of benefits and several unions (e.g., auto workers and steel
workers) actively pushed for pension protection legislation. While this legislation was
resisted initially by employers, events such as the NBC White Paper and Sunday
supplements publicized horror stories, which caused popular opinion to move toward
support for additional federal legislation and preemption.
Protection of workers was the original goal of the labor committees at this point in
time, and they proposed the basic participation, vesting, funding, benefit accrual,
anti-cutback, pension insurance, and fiduciary standards that we have today. At that time,
the tax committees were also concerned about the protection of employee benefits, and they
proposed rules similar to those being considered by the labor committees.

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which was signed
into law on September 2, 1974 by President Ford, is a good example of how our laws in the
employee benefits area used to be made. In that case, a bill was introduced for discussion
purposes, and hearings were held over several years and around the country. The labor
subcommittees involved made transcripts of hearings available and met to debate, amend,
and mark up the bill. The full labor committees then marked up the bill. Then a report
was filed by the full committee detailing the need and history with an opportunity for
minority and supplemental views. In addition, because the pension law had tax implications,
these proposals were subjected to similar scrutiny by both tax committees. Following that,
the bill was debated on the House and Senate floors. Finally, the House and Senate
versions went to the Conference Committee to reconcile differences. The ERISA
conference then extended over several months time. Although there has been criticism of
ERISA, especially its duplicative and overlapping provisions, neither the thoroughness or
completeness of the process, nor the comprehensive integrated nature of the statute can be
questioned.
The 1980s brought new dimensions to the process by which employee benefits laws are
written because of the search for revenue and the changing legislative process. In this
decade, the process has moved more toward tax-writing committees and away from labor
committees. Revenue raising has become the primary goal and worker protection, while still
considered, has taken a back seat. In short, recent employee benefits legislation usually
looks first at the federal revenue effects of a given concept and later, if at all, at the worker
protection aspects for proposed legislation. This also points up the fact that employee
benefit issues, and many others, are now addressed in omnibus bills or mega-bills. Examples
of these are budget reconciliation bills and continuing resolutions. Often, there are no
hearings held on specific proposals included in this type of legislation. The reconciliation
bills, or at least part of them, are often drafted after committee consideration. In some
cases the final bills will be as long as 1500 to 2000 pages. Many significant provisions
become lost and buried in the volume, and the bills are rushed to the floor with little time
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allowed for comment by the public, floor debate of many provisions, or any real opportunity
to alter or amend their content.

At the same time, the concept of the three-legged stool of private savings, Social
Security benefits, and employer-sponsored pensions appears to have been altered
dramatically. Many experts predict a crisis in the Social Security System following the
retirement of the baby boom generation from approximately the year 2025. A recent
survey of 491 pension actuaries found that 72% of those surveyed believe that no more
than 50% of the baby boomers, who will reach age 65 between the years 2010 and 2028,
will be economically able to retire by age 65. (Edelman Public Relations, Forecast 2000,
November 7, 1989). The private savings leg of the stool is suspect because few employees
seem to have the ability or the incentive to save in our current system. The weakening of
these two legs puts significant additional weight upon the third leg of employer-sponsored
pensions. This highlights the necessity of dealing with the current causes of complexity.
Failure to do so may well result in a substantially weakened private pension system.
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS AND SIMPLICITY

In the employee benefits area, as in other areas, a balance must be struck between
simplicity and equity. Equity usually comes in the form of nondiscrimination rules in the
employee benefits area. The size, shape, and scope of ’’undue complexity” are elusive and
relative concepts, but it is clear that, in reducing the complexity implicit in the rules
governing the taxation of employee benefits, some equity will be lost. The goal is to find
the right balance between inhibiting as much discrimination as possible while utilizing rules
that can be broadly understood and implemented. The difficulty in recommending changes
to reduce the complexity of the existing tax law rests in the fact that all provisions currently
in the Internal Revenue Code can be justified from a policy point of view.
This paper attempts to identify areas of the law where substantial simplification can
be achieved while retaining the underlying legislative policy behind a provision. In some
cases, reduction of complexity does not involve a reexamination of the tax policy underlying
the current rules. In others, a tax policy reexamination is required and may require
accepting, as a society, some incremental discrimination above that which is currently
allowed. It may also involve accepting less flexibility on the part of taxpayers in the design
and operation of tax-favored employee benefit arrangements. This may not be easy for some
to accept. The primary purpose of this paper, however, is not to dwell on the political
acceptability of various proposals, but to focus on what can be done to reduce the
complexity of the existing tax rules while retaining as much as possible of the underlying
legislative intent behind the current rules.

Similarly, the proposals in this paper do not involve a fundamental reexamination of
our nation’s retirement policies. Although it is often impossible to separate the underlying
policy from the complexity, when the two conflict, this paper attempts to recommend
changes driven by the goal of reducing complexity which retain as much of the current
underlying policy as possible.
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QUALIFIED PLANS

Introduction

This paper adopts the premise that qualified retirement plans should be designed to
provide income to individuals upon their retirement. Adopting this premise means
accepting a certain amount of complication as inherent in this area of the tax law.
Specifically, the process of setting aside funds during an individual’s working career to
provide replacement wages at retirement is inherently complicated.
The basic concepts currently in force in the qualified retirement plan area appear to
be sound, and this paper does not propose eliminating any of the following concepts: (1)
plan and trust, (2) participation requirements, (3) vesting requirements, (4) benefit accrual
requirements, and (5) distribution rules. The approach of this paper is to take each aspect
of these concepts and examine it to determine whether the additional equity brought to the
Internal Revenue Code is justified by the complexity implicit in the existing rule. The goal
has not been to introduce a new order into the qualified retirement planning area, but to
streamline the existing order in the belief that the basic concepts are sound and have
worked well. Similarly, the goal is to set forth proposals that will reduce complexity and that
can be implemented in the near-term without a massive reexamination of our nation’s
retirement policies.
General Proposals

Proposal: Conform the terminology used in the Internal Revenue Code (Code) to describe
qualified retirement plans with a single set of terms--Defined Contribution Plans
and Defined Benefit Plans.

Current Law

The Code currently uses two sets of terms to describe qualified retirement plans:
pre-ERISA terms and ERISA terms. The pre-ERISA terms are profit sharing plans,
pension plans, and stock bonus plans. The ERISA terms are defined contribution plans
and defined benefit plans. Every plan has a pre-ERISA and an ERISA name, and a
taxpayer must know both names for each plan in order to accurately apply the rules in the
Code to a particular plan. For example, most of the ERISA qualification sections, e.g.,
§415, refer to defined contribution and defined benefit plans. Many of the pre-ERISA
Code sections, e.g., §§402 and 404, refer to pension plans, stock bonus plans, and
profit-sharing plans.
In general, there are three types of defined contribution plans: profit-sharing plans,
stock bonus plans, and money purchase pension plans. TRA 86, however, eliminated the
requirement that contributions to a profit-sharing plan must be made from an employer’s
current or accumulated profits.1 This eliminates a major difference between profit-sharing
plans and other defined contribution plans. The remaining distinctions include the
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requirement that a money purchase pension plan have fixed annual contributions while a
profit-sharing plan may have fixed or discretionary annual contributions. A second
distinction exists with respect to when distributions may be made from each of these plans.
A third distinction is that the limitation for deductible contributions is generally 15% of
compensation for a profit-sharing or stock bonus plan and 25% of compensation for a
money purchase pension plan.

Finally, the primary distinguishing characteristic of a stock bonus plan is that the
participants of a stock bonus plan have a right to demand their distribution in employer
securities while participants in profit-sharing and money purchase pension plans are not
required to have that right.2
Proposal and Rationale

The Code should be structured around the ERISA terms-defined contribution and
defined benefit plans. The elimination of the profits requirement for a profit-sharing plan
leaves very little distinction between the types of defined contribution plans from a
definitional point of view. It is difficult to see what policy purpose is now served by using
two terms in the Code to describe each plan. While distinctions would continue to be
permitted between the types of defined contribution plans-for example, the employer could
still establish a plan calling for either fixed or discretionary contributions or one that
mandates distributions in employer stock-those distinctions would be meaningless in
applying the qualification, deduction, and distribution rules.
Reduction of Complexity Achieved

This proposal would allow taxpayers to use one set of terms to apply the qualification,
deduction and distribution rules. This proposal would also conform the terminology of the
Code to the terminology of Title I of ERISA (the rules administered by the Department
of Labor) facilitating the ability of taxpayers to understand both the non-tax and tax
consequences of their actions.
Specifically, §§401(a)(27) and 401(a)(23) would be repealed. The changes required
to §404 will be discussed later in the paper.

Proposal: Segregate leveraged ESOPs from the qualified requirements and treat them as
a separate financing vehicle.
Current Law

Various leveraged ESOP requirements can be found throughout the qualification and
other sections of the Code that deal with qualified retirement plans. For example,
§§ 401(a), 404,409,415, and 4975 all deal with leveraged ESOPs as well as with other
qualified plans.
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Proposal and Rationale
The leveraged ESOP requirements should be removed from the qualified plan rules
and collected in a separate subchapter of the Code. The rationale is that, in substance,
leveraged ESOPs have tended to be a financing vehicle rather than a retirement vehicle,
although they have attributes of both. There are a number of requirements that are unique
to leveraged ESOPs which appear throughout the qualified plan rules. Unless someone is
intimately familiar with all these rules and their location in the Code, the chance of their
overlooking a particular requirement is unnecessarily high. Isolating these rules from the
qualified plan rules would eliminate a source of complexity in the qualified plan rules,
recognize the unique nature of leveraged ESOPs, and collect all the related rules in one
subchapter.

It is not being proposed that the leveraged ESOP rules be repealed. What is being
proposed is that these requirements be collected separately in their own subchapter so that
someone need not be an ESOP expert in order to answer a question with respect to them.

Reduction of Complexity Achieved

When dealing with qualified retirement plans, the following sections would no longer
need to be considered: §§401(a)(28), 409, 404(a)(9), 404(k), 415(c)(6), 4975(e)(7), and
4975(d)(3). These sections would be collected in a separate subchapter of the Code.
Proposal: Eliminate, to the extent possible, the remaining statutory distinctions between
self-employed individuals and common-law employees.

Current Law:
Beginning with the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA),
distinctions between the qualified plan rules applicable to self-employed individuals and
those applicable to common law employees have slowly been eliminated. This has
significantly simplified the law. However, several distinctions remain between the rules
applicable to plans covering owner-employees (certain self-employed individuals) and other
participants. Under current law, owner-employees are subject to unique aggregation rules
(§ 401(d)) and cannot obtain loans from qualified plans under the same terms as
participants.3
Other areas which involve a distinction between owner-employees or self-employed
individuals and other participants are §§ 401(c)(1), 401(c)(2)(A), 403(a)(3), 404(a)(8),
404(e), 408(k)(7)(A), 415(bX3), 415(c)(3)(B), 416(i)(3), and 72(m)(6). Still other sections
limit contributions to earned income (§ 404(a)(8)(C)); preclude the use contributions made
to a qualified plan on behalf of a self-employed individual to purchase life, accident, health
or other insurance (§§404(a)(8)(C) and (e)); prohibit deductible contributions exceeding
earned income (§ 404(a)(8)(C)); permit disability of a self-employed person to qualify as a
triggering event for lump-sum distribution treatment (§§402(e)(4)(A)(iv) and 72(m)(6));
discuss the rules of annuity taxation (§ 403(a)(3)); and define compensation for purposes of
the annual additions limitations (§§415(b)(3) and 415(c)(3)(B)) or the deduction limitations
(§401(c)(2)(A)(v)).
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Proposal and Rationale

Those distinctions that remain after TEFRA can be divided into two groups: (1)
those designed to treat certain self-employed individuals differently from other plan
participants (the owner-employee rules), and (2) those necessary to make sure there is
equivalent treatment between self-employed individuals and other participants. Eliminating
the first set of distinctions would simplify the law without sacrificing any significant policy
goals. It is proposed that the flush language in § 4975(d) that prohibits loans from qualified
plans to participants who are owner-employees be repealed. The special aggregation rules
of § 401(d) should also be repealed.
These changes would eliminate an existing trap for the unwary as well as simplify the
Code. Retention of the second set of distinctions will ensure equivalent treatment between
self-employed individuals and other participants.

Reduction of Complexity Achieved

The flush language in § 4975(d) would be repealed. Also repealed would be
§§401(c)(3), 401(c)(5), 401(d), and 401(a)(10)(A). Section 416(i)(3) would be repealed as
part of an overall repeal of the top-heavy rules discussed below.
Proposal: Simplify the definition of highly compensated employee under §414(q)

Current Law
Under current law, a highly compensated employee is defined as any employee who
during the current or preceding yeara. Was a 5% owner;
b.

Received compensation from the employer in excess of $75,000;

c.

Received compensation from the employer in excess of $50,000 and was in the
top-paid group of employees for such year; or

d.

Was an officer and received compensation greater than 50% of the amount in
effect under § 415(b)(1)(A) for such year.4

A participant who is described in b, c, or d above (for the current plan year only),
shall not be a highly compensated employee unless he is among the 100 employees paid the
greatest compensation during the year.

Proposal and Rationale
One of the key concepts that permeates the entire qualified plan area is the
prevention of discrimination in favor of highly compensated employees. Under TRA 86,
the Code for the first time specifically set forth rules for determining who is in this group.
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However, the definition is difficult to work with, and a clear, simple definition would reduce
complexity. It is recommended that the Code define the highly compensated group as: (1)
5% owners with attribution (as defined in §318 of the Code), (2) those earning
compensation in excess of $75,000 (indexed for inflation), and (3) the three highest-paid
officers, if their compensation is less than the indexed standard. In addition, the highly
compensated group would be determined on the basis of the preceding plan or employer
year, not the current and preceding years as under current law.
Reduction of Complexity Achieved
The proposal would simplify plan administration and testing because the highly
compensated group would be easy to identify.

Proposal: Provide a uniform definition of compensation for purposes of the employee
benefit rules.
Current Law

Code §414(s), 414(q), 415 and 401(a)(17) all provide different definitions of
’’compensation." Because of the significance of this concept throughout the employee
benefits sections of the Code, it is important to have a simple, uniform definition.

Proposal and Rationale
A uniform definition of compensation should be established to simplify the task of
plan sponsors and administrators. The uniform definition should be tied to taxable
compensation with elective contributions under §125, 401(k), 408(k), 403(b), 457, and
501(c)(18) added back at the employer’s election on a uniform and nondiscriminatory basis.
For example, a calendar-year plan would simply use W-2 compensation including the
specified elective contributions if the employer elects. A fiscal year plan could either
determine taxable compensation on the fiscal-year basis or use W-2 compensation for the
calendar year which ends in the fiscal-year. This definition should be used for all purposes
of the employee benefit rules.5

Reduction of Complexity Achieved
A uniform, simplified standard for compensation which would reduce complexity in
plan design and administration, and eliminate the existing trap for the unwary.
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Plan Qualification Proposals

Proposal: Repeal the top-heavy rules.

Current Law

The top-heavy provisions, enacted as part of TEFRA, provide for accelerated vesting,
minimum benefit accrual, and a limit of $200,000 on the amount of compensation that can
be taken into account under a qualified plan. Congress concluded that in the case of plans
under which more than 60% of the benefits are focused on key employees, special rules
were needed to assure that the rank-and-file employees would receive the benefits that the
tax incentives were provided to encourage.6
TRA 86 significantly lessened the differences between top-heavy and non-top-heavy
plans by capping the amount of compensation taken into account at $200,000 for all
qualified plans and also accelerating vesting schedules for all qualified plans.7

The allowable vesting schedules are:
Cliff Vesting
Top-Heavy Other

Years of Service
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

0
0
100

0
0
0
0
100

Graduated
Vesting
Top-Heavy Other
0
20
40
60
80
100

0
0
20
40
60
80
100

A plan that is top-heavy also must provide a minimum defined benefit for non-key
employees equal to 2% multiplied by the number of years of service with the employer
(up to a maximum of 20%) times the individuals’ compensation. A non-key participant’s
compensation is determined over the period of consecutive years, not in excess of five,
that the participant’s compensation was the highest.8 In a defined contribution plan, a
minimum defined contribution amount of 3% of compensation, or the amount of the
actual percentage contribution made on behalf of key employees, if less, must be made on
behalf of non-key employees.9 Social Security contributions or other legally required
contributions cannot be taken into account for purposes of these benefit requirements.10

Non-top-heavy plans are not required to provide minimum benefit levels; however,
contributions may not be skewed in favor of the highly compensated (§ 401(a)(4)), and the
Social Security integration rules now require minimum benefit levels for integrated plans.
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Proposal and Rationale
The special rules of §416 should be repealed. While §416 served a purpose when it
was passed, one limitation imposed by §416 ($200,000 cap on compensation) now applies
to all plans, and another (faster vesting) is virtually the same for top-heavy and
non-top-heavy plans. The other significant difference between top-heavy and non-top-heavy
plans involves benefit accrual, and with recent changes in the permitted disparity rules in
TRA 86, this difference is significantly less than it was in 1982.

The regulations to be issued under § 401(a)(4) could provide further guidance if any
perceived gaps exist.
The top-heavy rules also contain their own definition of the employees in whose favor
discrimination is prohibited ("key employee"). Following TRA 86, most Code sections
affecting discrimination use the term "highly compensated employee." At a minimum, the
use of the term "key employee" should be eliminated and the TRA 86 definition of highly
compensated employee substituted.

In view of the fact that virtually all plans must include these provisions, and that the
incremental benefit of the top-heavy rules has been diminished by subsequent changes in
the Code, these provisions could be eliminated with little adverse impact on participants
and reduce complexity in the law and plan documents.
Reduction of Complexity Achieved

Repeal of 416 and 401(a)(10)(B) and the yearly testing that is required under the
provision.
Proposal: Reconsider §401(a)(26).

Current Law
Section 401(a)(26) provides that each plan, independently, must cover the lesser of 50
employees or 40% of the total employees of an employer (determined on a controlled and
aggregated group basis).

Proposal and Rationale

The §401(a)(26) minimum participation rules are aimed at preventing multiple plans
covering few employees from discriminating against nonhighly compensated employees.
Section 410(b) is also aimed at preventing discrimination against nonhighly compensated
employees, but may be applied on a group plan basis if such plans are comparable in
accordance with Rev. Rul. 81-202,1981-2 CB 93.
In enacting §401(a) (26), the legislative history indicates Congressional concern that
although plans that are aggregated are required to satisfy comparability requirements with
respect to the amount of contributions or benefits, such an arrangement may still
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discriminate in favor of the prohibited group. Differences in the rates at which benefits
are accrued (e.g., presence or absence of past service credit) and the selective use of
actuarial assumptions in valuing plan benefits may cause a plan that satisfies the
requirement of comparability with respect to the amount of contributions or benefits to
favor the highly paid. Similarly, in the case of plans that are comparable with respect to the
amount of contributions or benefits, discrimination favoring the highly paid may occur
because of disparate funding levels and benefit options that are not taken into account in
such a comparability analysis.11

Congress was concerned that because of the large number of these arrangements, the
inherent complexity of comparability analysis, and the difficulties in discovering all
differences in funding levels and benefit options, the IRS lacked sufficient resources to
monitor compliance with the nondiscrimination standards by small aggregated plans. Thus,
Congressional intent may be summarized as desiring to obtain both nondiscrimination and
simplicity.12
The regulations issued under §401(a)(26), by all standards, are anything but simple.
The Service has stated that it will soon issue a new revenue ruling which will expand
upon Rev. Rul. 81-202 and make it more difficult to discriminate using comparability of
plans in order to satisfy § 410(b). Eliminating one-person plans or highly specialized plans
that cover small numbers of employees is appealing in reducing the number of plans
maintained by a controlled group and in easing the audit burden of the Internal Revenue
Service. However, unless the regulations under §401(a)(26) can be redrafted in a manner
that reflects the straightforward manner of the statute, then §401(a)(26) should be repealed.

If the regulations can be properly drafted, the repeal of §401(a)(26) may not be
necessary. If the regulations cannot be re-drafted and if §401(a)(26) is repealed, then any
perceived problems with comparable plans should be dealt with directly by amending the
rules of Rev. Rul. 81-202. Section 410 should adequately cover the objective of preventing
plans from being discriminatory against the nonhighly compensated. If any gaps exist, the
forthcoming revenue ruling, final § 410(b) regulations, or additional pronouncements from
the Service could cover them. Alternatively, the percentage tests of § 410(b) could be
increased above 70% to minimize any abuses. This proposal is one which could result in
some incremental discrimination above that allowed by current law, but the reduction in
complexity achieved would be substantial.
Reduction of Complexity Achieved
The complexity resulting from §401(a)(26) and the regulations promulgated thereunder
would be eliminated.
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Proposal: Eliminate the ability to provide medical benefits to retirees from qualified plans.

Current Law
IRC § 401(h) allows certain medical benefits to be paid to retirees from qualified
retirement plans. Under the statute, a pension or annuity plan may provide for the
payment of benefits for sickness, accident, hospitalization, and medical expenses of retired
employees and their spouses and dependents, but only if the following six requirements are
met:

a.

The benefits are subordinate to the retirement benefits provided by the plan;

b.

A separate account is established and maintained for these benefits;

c.

The employer’s contributions to the separate account are reasonable and
ascertainable;

d.

The corpus or income of the separate account cannot be diverted to any purpose
other than providing these benefits;

e.

If all liabilities to provide these benefits under the plan are satisfied, any amount
remaining must, under the terms of the plan, be returned to the employer; and

f.

For each key employee, a separate account is established and maintained for
these benefits.

"Subordinate" has been defined in the regulations to mean that at all times the
aggregate contributions to provide such medical benefits (and any life insurance protection)
does not exceed 25% of the aggregate contributions, other than contributions to fund past
service liability.13
Proposal and Rationale
Qualified retirement plans should not be allowed to provide medical benefits for
retirees. Qualified retirement plans are plans of deferred compensation designed to replace
wages upon retirement, not plans designed to replace an employee’s entire compensation
arrangement. These accounts cause additional complication in plan documents, plan
administration, and plan design.

It is not being proposed that employers not be allowed to pre-fund any of their retiree
medical liability. Those who wish to pre-fund this obligation could do so on a tax-preferred
basis by utilizing a voluntary employee beneficiary association described in § 501(c)(9).

Reduction of Complexity Achieved
The elimination of §§ 401(h) and 415(1) and modification of § 404(e).
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Proposal: Eliminate 1.401-4(c)(2)(ii) concerning restriction of benefits which may be paid
to the 25 highest paid employees.

Current Law
Section 1.401-4(c)(2)(ii) requires that the employer contributions which are used for
the benefit of any employee who is among the twenty-five highest paid employees of the
employer be restricted if the plan is terminated within ten years of its establishment or the
benefit becomes payable within 10 years of the establishment of the plan.
Section 415 limits the amounts which may be paid from a defined benefit plan. After
TRA 86, the maximum benefit payable under §415 cannot accrue any faster than ratably
over ten years of plan participation.

Proposal and Rationale
Under §415, the benefits which may be paid to an employee are limited to no more
than $90,000 (indexed) or 100% of compensation actuarial reduced for early retirement.
In addition, §415 now sets forth the requirement that the maximum benefit payable may
only be accrued ratably over ten years of plan participation. This prevents a highly
compensated employee from receiving a large benefit shortly after a plan has been
established. This structure significantly diminishes the possibility of abuse at which
§1.401-4(c) is aimed. In addition, this regulation was adopted before ERISA, which
introduced the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation and minimum funding rules. Both
innovations have also helped to prevent the type of abuse which this regulation was
originally enacted to prevent. Finally, the new minimum funding rules under the Omnibus
Reconciliation Act of 1987 (OBRA) also help to ensure that plan participants and
beneficiaries are protected from the type of abuse at which this regulation is aimed.
Due to the diminished possibility of abuse, § 1.401-4(c) of the regulations should be
revoked. This is a situation where significant reduction in complexity could be achieved by
eliminating a largely redundant provision.14

Reduction of Complexity Achieved
Treasury regulation § 1.401-4(c) would be eliminated and, therefore, plan design would
be simplified.
Proposal: Expand §401(b) to set forth rules governing the amendment of qualified plans
after plan year end with non-qualification-type amendments.

Current Law
Section 401(b) provides the mechanism for retroactively correcting disqualifying
provisions contained in a plan document. There is no statutory or regulatory authority
concerning the time limit that can be imposed for making other amendments that do not
affect the plan’s qualification and that do not retroactively reduce an accrued benefit.
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Proposal and Rationale
Section 401(b) should be amended to include guidelines for amending qualified plans
in situations where the amendments do not affect plan qualification. This would clearly
detail the ability of plan sponsors to amend their plans during and after a particular year,
eliminate an area of controversy, and simplify plan administration. This could be done by
extending the rules of § 401(b) to amendments that do not affect a plan’s qualification.
Reduction of Complexity Achieved

Plan administrators and employers will know with certainty how to amend a plan in
other than a disqualifying situation, eliminating an area of unnecessary uncertainty.
Proposal: Simplify the distribution of qualified preretirement survivor annuity (QPSA)
notices.

Current Law:
Under current law, certain plans must provide each participant, within a certain period,
a written explanation with respect to the qualified preretirement survivor annuity option. The
period during which the notice must be given is defined in §417(a)(3)(B) (ii)(I) as the period
beginning with the first day of the plan year in which the participant attains age thirty-two and
ending with the close of the plan year preceding the plan year in which the participant attains
age thirty-five.

Proposal and Rationale
The QPSA notice should be required to be provided only to individuals within a
reasonable period after they become plan participants. There is little logic in providing
this notice only at the current age range, since most employees are sophisticated enough
to understand the notice at any age. This provision has simply resulted in an increased
compliance burden for plan sponsors without a commensurate return, either in
understanding on the part of the participants or in achieving effective disclosure.

Reduction of Complexity Achieved
This would result in the repeal of §417(a)(3)(B)(ii)(I).
Benefit Accrual Proposals

Proposal: Eliminate the actual deferral percentage test in cash or deferred arrangements.

Current Law:

Section 401(k)(3) provides that the amounts deferred by highly compensated
employees cannot exceed a multiple of the amounts deferred by nonhighly compensated
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employees. Specifically, the actual deferral percentage of the highly compensated
employees cannot be either more than 125% of the actual deferral percentage of the
nonhighly compensated employees or more than twice the actual deferral percentage of the
nonhighly compensated employees with a differential of no more than 2 percentage points.
The Service has issued regulations explaining bow to test employee elective deferrals
for discrimination. Employer contributions may in some circumstances be used to help
satisfy the actual deferral percentage test. In addition, certain matching contributions can
also be used to help satisfy the discrimination tests. If the employer cannot afford, or does
not wish, to make employer contributions to help satisfy the test, and the tests have not
been met by plan year end, the employer may recharacterize or distribute the excess
deferrals. Penalties leading up to plan disqualification are imposed if the excess 401(k)
deferrals are not distributed or recharacterized in a timely fashion. The Service has issued
notices and regulations explaining when, and to what extent, deferrals may be distributed
or recharacterized.

Proposal and Rationale

The actual deferral percentage test of §401(k) was enacted at a time when highly
compensated employees could elect to defer up to $30,000 annually under a §401(k) plan.
It is aimed at preventing a 401(k) plan from discriminating against lower-compensated
employees, and operates to supplant § 401(a)(4). The potential for discrimination in a
401(k) plan has been dramatically reduced by the lowering of the elective deferral limitation
in TRA 86 to $7,000 (indexed for cost of living). The performance of the actual deferral
percentage test is time consuming for a plan of any significant size, and many plan sponsors
have not accurately tested on a timely basis.
The §401(k) rules should be amended: (1) to require that all employees with a
requisite age and year(s) of service and not in excluded categories under § 410(b) be
permitted to make deferrals under an employer’s 401 (k) plan, and (2) the actual deferral
percentage test be repealed.16 The amount eligible for deferral could be reduced, for
example to $6,000, further minimizing the possibility of discrimination, and this amount
could be indexed for cost-of-living in tandem with the IRA limit of $2,000, which has
remained fixed since 1982.
Reduction of Complexity Achieved
Code §401(k)(3), §4979 and the regulations and notices promulgated thereunder
would be eliminated. Section 402(g)(1) would be modified to reflect a lower limit and the
§ 402(g)(5) adjustment for cost-of-living would remain in effect.
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Proposal: Expand the coverage rules for 401(k) plans to include employees of tax-exempt
organizations and eliminate the separate rules in § 403(b).

Current Law
A 401(k) plan is not treated as a qualified 401(k) plan if it is part of a plan
maintained by any tax-exempt organization or a state or local government or political
subdivision thereof. On the other hand, a separate provision (§403(b)) applies only to
certain tax-exempt and charitable organizations and allows employees of these organizations
to participate in arrangements which involve cash or deferred elections.

Proposal and Rationale
It is difficult to understand why tax-exempt organizations are prevented from making
salary deferrals available under §401(k) and yet can make salary deferral elections available
in an even more liberal fashion under § 403(b).
In addition, there appears to be no compelling policy justification for requiring
employees of tax-exempt organizations to participate in annuity contracts or custodial
accounts rather than in the investments available to employees of non-tax-exempt
organizations. Therefore, the complete elimination of § 403(h) can be accomplished. In an
age where self-directed accounts are very commonly available through any of the large,
national brokerage firms or other financial institutions, individual accounts are relatively
easy to establish, not very costly, and much more convenient for employees of tax-exempt
organizations than when § 403(b) was enacted.
In order to simplify the Code, tax-exempt organization employees should be treated
the same as all other employees for salary deferral purposes. Thus, employees of both
types of organizations should participate in identical plans, have the same salary deferral
amount as a ceiling, and have the same plan investment alternatives available to them.

Reduction of Complexity Achieved

This would have the effect of repealing § 403(h) and extending the 401(k) plan rules
to employees of tax-exempt organizations.
Proposal: Eliminate the ability of employees to make after-tax contributions to qualified
retirement plans.

Current Law
If a qualified retirement plan permits, employees may make voluntary after-tax
contributions to the plan. For plan years beginning after 1986, these voluntary after-tax
contributions count on a dollar-for-dollar basis against the limits of § 415(c). Additionally,
a qualified plan that allows after-tax employee contributions is subject to a
nondiscrimination test under §401(m) that is similar to the nondiscrimination test in
§401(k). The non-discrimination tests of §401(m) were enacted because of the fear that
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voluntary after-tax employee contributions are utilized primarily as a tax-deferred savings
vehicle for the highly compensated.
Proposal and Rationale

The ability of a qualified plan to accept voluntary after-tax employee contributions
should be eliminated and §401(m) should be repealed. The rationale is one that is
motivated solely by a desire for reducing complexity.
Allowing after-tax employee contributions to be made to qualified plans now requires
plan administrators to separately account for these amounts annually to ensure that the tests
of §401(m) are met. These amounts must be separately identified when distributed to
participants and involve a separate subset of rules in the distribution area to determine
what is taxable to a participant and what is a recovery of the participant’s basis. These rules
are complicated from both a technical and a plan administration perspective.

The elimination of voluntary after-tax contributions would not only reduce complexity
in the statute but would also reduce complexity in the administration of qualified plans.
Adoption of this proposal would not leave employees without tax-deferred investments
because Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) on a nondeductible basis under §408(o)
(which were not available until tax years beginning after 1986), tax-deferred annuities, and
other investment products, such as municipal bonds, are offered in this category. Further,
the existence and rapid acceptance nationally of pre-tax deferrals in 401(k) made the
after-tax contribution a less attractive alternative for employees.
If Congress decides that employees should be allowed to fund larger tax deferred
savings accounts for their retirement by using after-tax contributions, the existing rules for
IRA after-tax contributions could be amended to increase the allowable level of
contribution.
With §401(m) repealed, matching contributions would be subject to the
nondiscrimination principles in § 401(a)(4). The statute could provide that if matching
contributions are available at the same rate for all employees, the matching contributions
would be deemed to be nondiscriminatory.

Reduction of Complexity Achieved

The following Code sections governing plan qualification can be repealed if voluntary
after-tax employee contributions are eliminated:
§401(a)(19), 401(m), 411(c), and
411(d)(5). In addition to reducing complexity in the qualification area, the elimination of
voluntary after-tax employee contributions will reduce complexity in the area of distribution
planning and the taxation of distributions. For example, if voluntary after-tax employee
contributions are repealed, the portion of §72 which deals with the recovery of the
employee’s basis could be eliminated; § 402(a)(5)(B) could be repealed; and the second
sentence of § 402(a)(1) could be repealed. A transitional rule could be provided to facilitate
the distribution of existing voluntary after-tax contributions from qualified plans. For
example, participants could be allowed to transfer these amounts, with or without earnings,
to an IRA.
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Proposal: Eliminate the permitted disparity rules (Social Security integration rules) or
return to pre-87 integration.

Current Law

TRA 86 substantially amended the Social Security integration rules. For example,
in an integrated qualified plan, it is no longer possible to deny a participant a benefit
accrual or contribution just because the plan is integrated with Social Security.

The new rules permit a certain amount of disparity for defined contribution plans by
requiring that the excess contribution percentage (the contribution percentage with respect
to compensation above the integration level) may not exceed the base contribution
percentage (the contribution percentage with respect to compensation below the integration
level) by more than the lesser of:
a. The base contribution percentage or

b. The greater of

(1) 5.7% or
(2) The percentage equal to the §3111(a) tax rate attributable to old-age
insurance.16

This is the third set of defined contribution integration rules for plan sponsors within
the last six years. Further, the IRS issued Notice 89-70 which supplements the above rules
by reducing the permitted disparity for certain plans where the integration level is less than
the Social Security wage base.

Similarly, defined benefit plan integration rules require that, for non-offset plans, the
excess benefit percentage (computed in the same manner as defined contribution plans
except that it is for benefits attributable to employer contributions, not contributions)
cannot exceed the base benefit percentage by more than the maximum excess allowance,
benefits be based on average compensation, and any optional forms of benefit be provided
with respect to compensation below the integration level. The maximum excess allowance
is equal to 3/4% for benefits attributable to any year of service with the employer and, for
total benefits, is equal to 3/4% times years of service up to thirty-five years.17 The 3/4%
is further reduced, pursuant to Notice 89-70, for certain plans where the integration level
is less than covered compensation.

The recent regulations and the supplemental notice implementing the TRA 86 rules
have been widely criticized as being very complicated.
Proposal and Rationale
The concept of permitted disparity should be either altogether eliminated or returned
to its pre-TRA 86 status. A complete repeal of permitted disparity rules would reduce the
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complexity of the qualified plan area and would generally provide greater benefits to
employees in those plans currently using the permitted disparity rules. Repeal of the
disparity rules could, however, lead to termination of existing plans. Therefore, if complete
repeal is not desired, the pre-TRA 86 rules should be reinstated because of their relative
simplicity.
Reduction of Complexity Achieved

This proposal would repeal §§401(1), 401(a)(5), and 401(a)(15).
Proposal: Simplify the combined plan limitations of § 415(e) and repeal §4980A

Current Law
Where an employee of the same employer is covered by a defined benefit and a
defined contribution plan, §415(e) imposes a limitation that prevents an employee from
accruing the maximum benefits otherwise allowable under §415 under both the defined
contribution and the defined benefit plan. Section 415(e) requires a calculation of a
defined benefit fraction and a defined contribution fraction, the sum of which may not
exceed 1. These fractions are based on the benefits provided under the plan versus the
maximum benefits allowed by law. In some cases, these calculations require yearly
monitoring. In other cases, the § 415(e) result is not known until an employee terminates
employment or retires.

Section 4980A, enacted by TRA 86, places a 15% excise tax on certain distributions
that exceed $150,000 a year or lump-sum distributions that exceed $750,000 a year. These
rules diminish the value of large accumulations within qualified plans even though the
§ 415(e) limit may have been followed in the past.

Proposal and Rationale

Employees who are benefited by a defined benefit and defined contribution plan of
the same employer should be subject to either § 415(e) or §4980A but not both.
If § 415(e) is to be retained, then §4980A should be repealed. If § 415(e) is retained,
it should be revised to be based on a plan design approach rather than on an actual accrued
benefit approach. For example, if 100% of the defined benefit plan limit is being accrued
for an individual, then only 25% of the maximum defined contribution limit would be
provided for an individual under a defined contribution plan. (These percentages are used
for illustrative purposes only.) This would eliminate the need for the annual cumulative
calculation that is required under current law.
If, however, §4980A is maintained in the law, then §415(e) should be repealed and
the maximum benefit should be allowed to accrue in both defined benefit and defined
contribution plans.
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Reduction of Complexity Achieved

The simplification achieved is the repeal of either § 415(e) or §4980A.
Proposal: Simplify the coverage rules by repealing the second part of the average benefits
test.

Current Law
Section 410(b) provides two ratio tests and an average benefits test; one of these
three tests must be satisfied by a plan if it is to satisfy the coverage tests and qualify under
§ 401(a). The average benefits test is a two part test: (1) a fair cross-section test
comparable to pre-TRA 86 rules, and (2) the average benefit test which provides that the
average benefit for nonhighly compensated employees must be at least 70% of the average
benefit for highly compensated employees. A benefit percentage must be calculated for
each employee and all benefit percentages within the two groups then averaged. The
benefit percentage is the employer-provided benefit divided by compensation. Regulations
explaining average benefits have not been issued. Temporary regulations have been issued
that provide percentage safe harbors, based on coverage, for the fair-cross-section test part
of this test.

Prior to TRA 86, there were two ratio tests and a fair-cross-section test, but the
fair-cross-section test did not have an average benefits test. Guidance on the
fair-cross-section test was found primarily in revenue rulings. The fair-cross-section was
a subjective test with no safe harbors.

Proposal and Rationale

The average benefits test should be repealed. Section 410(b) is designed to test
coverage and not benefit accrual. There are other sections of the Code that deal with
nondiscrimination in benefit accrual, and that concept should not be tested with coverage.
This approach adds complexity and substantially overlaps with other requirements of the
law, such as § 401(a)(4).
Reduction of Complexity Achieved

The simplification achieved is the repeal of the average benefits test found in
§410(b)(2)(A)(ii).
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Deduction Proposals

Proposal: Apply § 404(a)(1) only to defined benefit plans.

Current Law
Section 404(a)(1) currently limits the amount deductible for contributions to pension
plans. Pension plans include defined benefit plans and money purchase pension plans, a
form of defined contribution plan.

Proposal and Rationale
Given the earlier proposal to classify all plans as either defined benefit or defined
contribution plans, § 404(a)(1) would only apply to defined benefit pension plans.
Reduction of Complexity Achieved

The reduction in complexity achieved would be the consistent treatment of money
purchase pension plans throughout the Code.
Proposal: Apply § 404(a)(3) to all defined contribution plans.

Current Law
Section 404(a)(3) limits the amount deductible for contributions to profit-sharing
plans and stock bonus plans.

Proposal and Rationale
Section 404(a)(3) should limit the deduction for all types of defined contribution plans
instead of for just profit-sharing and stock bonus plans. After this change, the deduction
limit for money purchase plans would be found in § 404(a)(3). A further simplification is
the coordination between the 15% ductibility limit in § 404(a)(3) and the 25% contribution
limit in § 415(c). The § 415(c) and § 404(a)(3) limits would be the same-for example, 25%
of compensation.

Reduction of Complexity Achieved

Again, one set of terms would be used consistently throughout the Code. This
proposal would also eliminate the necessity of maintaining two plans, a money purchase
pension plan and a profit-sharing plan to achieve the maximum level of contribution
allowable under law for defined contribution plans, while retaining maximum flexibility.
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Distribution Proposals

Proposal: Repeal five-year averaging for distributions from qualified retirement plans.

Current Law

An individual can receive his or her entire balance from a qualified plan in one year
and elect five-year averaging.18 Five-year averaging in certain situations lowers the tax that
would otherwise be paid if the entire distribution were to be included into income in one
year.
Proposal and Rationale
The proposal is that five-year averaging be repealed. Lump-sum distributions would
be included in income in the year received and taxed as ordinary income unless rolled
over into an IRA.
Congress has become increasingly concerned that retirement plan balances are being
used to fund expenditures unrelated to retirement, e.g., venture capital. Studies indicate
that lump-sum distributions are often depleted by the time an employee reaches retirement
age. Repeal of favorable tax treatment is intended to encourage using retirement funds to
pay for living expenses upon retirement. This would also simplify decision making for plan
participants at retirement by eliminating one of the current taxation alternatives. It is not
recommended that lump-sum distributions from plans be prohibited because of the
administrative convenience of paying an employee’s balance, especially smaller sums, upon
termination of employment. What would be eliminated would be preferential tax treatment
if the distribution were not rolled over into another qualified plan or IRA.

Reduction of Complexity Achieved

Repeal of five-year averaging would eliminate the following Code sections:
402(e)(1),(2),(3), 402(e)(4)(B),(C),(D)(G), (H),(M), and (O).
Proposal: Allow the rollover of any distribution from a qualified plan, other than required
minimum distributions.

Current Law
Section 402(a)(5)(D) allows for the rollover of partial distributions into IRAs. To
qualify as a partial distribution, the distribution must be at least 50% of the account balance
of the participant and must be payable because of death, separation from service, or
disability. This provision was enacted as part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984
(DEFRA). Prior to DEFRA, only total distributions could be rolled over. Congress
enacted this provision so that rollovers could still be allowed even though a participant
inadvertently received less than the total plan balance.19 It is not clear why a 50% threshold
was chosen, particularly since current law allows any portion of an otherwise qualifying
distribution to be rolled over even if it is less than 50% of the distribution.
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Proposal and Rationale

Any distribution from a qualified plan should be eligible to be rolled over into an
IRA except for distributions pursuant to § 401(a)(9). This would simplify distribution
planning and encourage retention of funds originally contributed to retirement plans for
retirement. It would also eliminate the disparity between the amount required to be
distributed to be eligible for a rollover and, at the option of the recipient, the lesser amount
that is permitted to be rolled over.
Reduction of Complexity Achieved
Section 402(a)(5)(D) would be repealed and the definition of a qualified total
distribution would no longer be necessary.

Proposal: Simplify the minimum distribution rules of § 401(a)(9).

Current Law
Section 401(a)(9) provides for the systematic distribution of qualified plan and IRA
benefits over an individual’s and beneficiary’s life expectancy beginning at age seventyand-one-half.

Proposal and Rationale

The minimum distribution rules are aimed at preventing plan participants from using
qualified retirement plans as estate planning devices. With the repeal of the estate tax
exclusion in DEFRA for qualified plan interests, a strong argument can be for the repeal
of § 401(a)(9). However, even after DEFRA, participants could still receive a significant
tax advantage by deferring the receipt of their benefits to a date in the distant future. Two
changes can be made to simplify § 401(a)(9) without compromising the purpose of the
provision. First, at death, distributions could be required to be paid over the life expectancy
of the beneficiary beginning at the decedent’s death. There would be no distinction
between situations where an individual dies before or after his required beginning date.
There would also be no distinction between types of beneficiaries as there is under current
law. Second, the calculation of life expectancy should not be recalculated. The only
method of determining life expectancy would be reducing the initial calculated life
expectancy by one each year. Both of these suggestions are intended to streamline
§ 401(a)(9) without altering the underlying concept. Finally, consideration should be given
to reducing the number of participants to whom this rule applies by limiting its application
to participants with accrued benefits in excess of a certain level.
Reduction of Complexity Achieved
Section 401(a)(9)(B) would be condensed from four rules for distributions upon death
to one rule. The regulations would be simplified concerning the calculation of life
expectancy.
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Proposal: Eliminate hardship withdrawals from 401(k) plans.

Current Law
Under current law, hardship withdrawals based on need can be made from cash or
deferred arrangements under §401(k). However, such distributions are subject to a 10%
additional income tax under §72(t) if the distribution is made prior to age 59-1/2, with
some exceptions.

Proposal and Rationale

The ability to receive a hardship withdrawal from a §401(k) should he eliminated.
An underlying premise of this paper is that qualified retirement plans should provide
replacement wages at retirement. Hardship withdrawals tend to undercut this purpose.
From a reduction-of-complexity point of view, the existing regulations can require a
significant amount of paperwork. Hardship withdrawals have been voluntarily eliminated
from many 401(k) plans since 1986 for two reasons: (1) enactment of the §72(t) excise tax
as part of TEA 86, and (2) the amount of paperwork required of an employer under the
regulations. Eliminating hardship withdrawals would simplify the law and would also help
to ensure that benefits are available for retirement purposes.20
One objection to the elimination of hardship withdrawals is that the elimination would
discourage participation among the rank and file. An alternative to elimination is
simplification of the regulations. For example, hardship distributions could be allowed for
a home purchase, education, or medical expenses. No other showing would be necessary.

Reduction of Complexity Achieved
The complicated plan amendments required as a result of the proposed and final
regulations on hardship withdrawals in 401(k) plans which were issued on August 8, 1988,
would no longer be needed, and the role of plan administrators in administering affected
401(k) plans both now and in future years would be simplified.
Controlled Group Proposals

Proposal:

Better define the terminology used in §§414(m) and 414(n) and repeal
§414(o).

Current Law
Section 414(m) provides rules which treat all employees of members of affiliated
service groups as employed by a single employer for certain qualified retirement plan
purposes. In general, there are two sets of rules in §414(m): affiliated service group rules
and management group rules. Section 414(n) provides similar rules concerning certain
leased employee arrangements. Section 414(o) provides a broad grant of regulatory
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authority for the IRS to deal with business arrangements which would allow for
circumvention of the qualified plan requirements.

Proposal and Rationale

The §414(m)-affiliated service group definitions under the Code and the regulations
are extremely complex. If Congress wishes to prevent the perceived abuse at which
§414(m)(2) was aimed, it appears that much of the complexity would have to remain.
However, it would be helpful if some of the terms used in the Code were more clearly
defined. The use of too many qualitative terms causes plan sponsors and their advisors to
spend extra time and effort in attempting to interpret them.
First, the definition under §414(m)(2)(A)(ii) could he changed to state that "if more
than 25% of the services performed by the A organization are for the first service
organization" instead of using the amorphous term of "regularly performed." Also, de
minimis ownership should be ignored under §414(m)(2)(A)(i), e.g., ownership of less than
1%. Under the B organization definition, the phrase "significant portion" should be defined
as 25% or more.

With respect to §414(m)(5), the "principal business" should be defined in the Code
as the business constituting 50% of gross revenues. In addition, firm management functions
should be defined as executive-type functions rather than permitting the regulations to
expand that definition to include professional services. Simply rendering professional
services for another organization should not cause the individual providing the service to
be aggregated with the recipient organization on that basis alone.
Section 414(n) is a fairly straightforward Code provision aimed at abusive situations
where employers do not employ their own employees, but rather lease employees from a
third organization. This provision should be clarified so that it does not cover independent
contractors where there is no third-party leasing organization involved. Also, it would be
helpful if the reference to § 144(a)(3) under §414(n)(6) were eliminated, as it makes
analysis under this Code provision extremely difficult. Finally, §414(o) should be eliminated
entirely, as it has made it virtually impossible for a sole proprietor and other small
businesses to determine eligibility for pension plan contributions when it is involved in any
way with any other entity. For example, an employee who is a 5% owner of a company and
who also works for another company must determine whether the two companies are
recipients under §1.414(n)-l(b)(2) and (b)(6), which in turn, requires an analysis under
§ § 414(b), (c), (m), and (o) and also under § 144(a)(3), and with respect to any organization
under §§ 414(b), (m), and (o) and § 144(a)(3) requires an analysis of whether there is
aggregation under §§267, 707(b) or members of controlled groups as defined in §1563,
substituting 50% for 80%. This analysis is beyond the ability of most sole proprietors (and
many practitioners), and would probably cost more in advisor’s fees than what many sole
proprietors would gain by taking the pension plan deduction.
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Reduction of Complexity Achieved
Making the statute more specific will assist plan sponsors and their advisors in
interpreting and applying these provisions.
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS OTHER THAN QUALIFIED PLANS

Benefit Proposals

Proposal: Repeal the death benefit exclusion of § 101.

Current Law
The maximum amount that may be excluded from gross income with respect to the
death of any employee may not exceed $5,000. An allocation of the exclusion is required
if multiple beneficiaries receive, in total, greater than $5,000.
Proposal and Rationale

The exclusion of death benefits from gross income in an amount of $5,000 should be
repealed. The utility of this provision is very limited, and it is recommended that it be
eliminated in the interest of reducing complexity. Employers could still make payments of
this nature upon death but they would not be excluded from income taxation.
Reduction of Complexity Achieved

This would result in the repeal of § 101(b).
Proposal: Repeal the tax-favored status of group legal services plans.

Current Law
Group legal services plans permit an exclusion with respect to an individual on an
annual basis of no more than $70.

Proposal and Rationale
The exclusion currently contained in 120 should be repealed. The growth of these
plans has not been widespread, and the current $70 limit is so small that the reduction of
complexity would seem to dictate repeal of this provision.
Reduction of Complexity Achieved
Section 120 would be repealed.
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Proposal: Provide the educational assistance exclusion on a permanent basis

Current Law

An employee can receive an exclusion from income for the first $5,250 of educational
assistance received pursuant to a qualifying educational assistance program under § 127. In
order to qualify, the plan had to meet certain nondiscrimination requirements.
Without § § 127, certain employer-provided educational expenses would be excludable
under §1.162-5 of the regulations. To qualify under the regulations, an employee’s expenses
must be job-related, which means that the expenses must either:

a.

Meet the express requirements of the individual’s employer or the requirements of
applicable law or regulations; or

b.

Maintain or improve the skills required by the individual’s employment or other trade
or business.

Proposal and Rationale

The rules contained in §127 are easier to understand and administer (for both
employers and the government) than the rules contained in the regulations. Although the
regulations limit qualifying expenses to employment-related expenses and are more targeted
than those of § 127, they have spawned much confusion and substantial litigation. In the
interest of simplicity, the rules of § 127 should be implemented on a permanent basis.
Reduction of Complexity Achieved
Permanent enactment of §127 would eliminate uncertainty among employers as to
tax-reporting rules regarding this area in the future. It would also simplify the substantive
rules in the area and eliminate a source of controversy between taxpayers and the IRS.

Proposal: Raise the §79 group-term life insurance exclusion or eliminate the exclusion
entirely.

Current Law
Section 79 excludes from gross income the cost of the first $50,000 of group-term life
insurance with certain exceptions. The exclusion is not available to sell-employed
individuals.

Proposal and Rationale

There appears to be no valid reason why group-term life insurance should be subject
to tax for employees above a certain level while group medical, dental, vision, accidental
death and dismemberment, and similar coverages are not taxed. The current low level of
exclusion requires employers frequently to impute income to employees for group-term life
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insurance. In view of these two considerations, the current exclusion level should be
increased or the exclusion should be repealed. An overall higher cap could be added such
as $200,000, which would be indexed, or the cap could be tied to a multiple of
compensation.
Reduction of Complexity Achieved
Increasing the $50,000 threshold would reduce the complexity implicit in this section
of the Code. Since close to half of all families receive some employer-provided group-term
life insurance, and given the lower rates generally available through group-term insurance,
the better approach may be to increase the $50,000 threshold.

Nondiscrimination Proposals

Proposal:

Establish a uniform set of design-based standards for nondiscrimination under
employer-provided health, welfare, and fringe benefit plans.

Current Law

The Code currently contains a confusing pattern of rules for nondiscrimination testing
in the fringe benefit area. With the repeal of §89, the rules now in effect reflect a
patchwork of varying nondiscrimination tests enacted over the years. Examples of these
tests can be found in §§79, 105(h), 120, 125, 127 and 129.
Proposal and Rationale

All the varying discrimination tests should be eliminated and a uniform three-pronged
test be instituted for each benefit. This test should be a design-based test as opposed to
a usage test. This would mean that the following three tests would be used for all health
and welfare plans:
a.

Eligibility Test
A plan must contain no discriminatory provision as to eligibility to participate
in the plan.

b.

Affordability
A plan would have to be affordable. In order to be considered affordable,
the cost to employees could not exceed 50% of the total cost of the plan.

c.

Benefits Test

The maximum tax-favored benefit that a highly compensated employee could
receive could be no more than 150% of the employer-provided benefit for
the nonhighly compensated.
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The following changes would also be made in adopting these rules:

(1)

Part-time employees should be defined to mean those with less than 1,000 hours
of service per year.

(2)

Independent contractors should be completely excluded from consideration
under these tests unless more than 1,000 hours were worked for an employer
in the preceding year.

Reduction of Complexity Achieved

This would help to eliminate confusion and uncertainty in this area in the future. By
making the test design-based instead of usage-based, employers can be assured that their
plan qualifies for preferential tax treatment without the complexity extensive usage testing
involves.
Proposal: Establish a uniform definition of the prohibited group for purposes of the healthand welfare-plan nondiscrimination rules.

Current Law
At least three different definitions of the prohibited group are used in the fringe
benefit area: key employees, highly compensated employees, and shareholders or owners,
each of whom owns more than 5% of the stock or of the capital or profit interest in the
employer.
Proposal and Rationale
The uniform definition of highly compensated employees as set forth in §414(q)
should be used for this purpose. This would allow the same definition to be used for
virtually all employee benefits purposes in the Code, greatly reducing the complexity in
this area of the law.

Reduction of Complexity Achieved

The repeal of §§ 125(b)(2), 127(b)(3), 129(d)(4), 129(d)(7), and 79(d)(3) would be a
direct result. Reducing the complexity of the testing rules would eliminate much of the
confusion surrounding this area of the law.
Administration

Proposal: Change the COBRA list of qualifying events to apply the thirty-six month period
to terminations and reduced hour.
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Current Law
Currently, the §4980B(b) penalties are levied upon the employer if the proper notices
and opportunity to elect, regarding health care continuation coverage, are not given to
employees who terminate service or work reduced hours (for any reason other than gross
misconduct). Two qualifying events cannot result in greater than thirty-six consecutive
months of required continuation coverage.

Proposal and Rationale
Section 4980B(f)(2)(B)(i)(I) should be amended to include employment termination
for any reason except gross misconduct within the thirty-six month category. The effort
here is to add a uniform three-year standard for all significant employee life events except
gross misconduct.

There appears to be little justification for the extended period to be denied to
terminating employees and their families, who may need the coverage just as much as
individuals in any of the other qualifying event categories.
Reduction of Complexity Achieved
Repeal of the general rule for terminations and reduced hours
4980B(f)(2)(B)(i)(I) and the special rule for multiple qualifying events under
§4980B(f)(2)(B)(i)(II).

under

SUMMARY

It is possible to substantially reduce the complexity in the rules governing the taxation
of employee benefits while still achieving virtually all of the policy objectives of current law.
The process of reducing complexity in the employee benefits area involves two steps. First,
the existing rules must be restructured into a comprehensive statute. This requires clarity
of purpose and entails the elimination of a number of provisions which are largely or
partially duplicative. Second, both the statutory and regulatory rules need to be amended
to focus on the general rules instead of the exceptions. In an effort to prevent the
contravention of legislative intent, the Congress, the Treasury Department, and the Internal
Revenue Service have crafted rules so complex that not even the most skillful practitioner,
Internal Revenue agent, or employee plans specialist can comprehend the full import of the
rules. Taking this second step means modifying or eliminating those rules whose
incremental contribution to equity is outweighed by their incremental contribution to
complexity. Even at a time of significant budget deficits, implementing these two steps does
not have to be difficult, since some changes will raise revenue while some will reduce
revenue. Unless the complexity of the employee benefit rules is reduced, the trend is likely
to be increasing noncompliance--not intentional but unintentional, brought about by
taxpayers’ inability to understand what is expected of them under the law-and a weakened
private pension system.
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COMMENT ON "EMPLOYEE BENEFITS:
STATUTORY SIMPLIFICATION"

HARRY J. CONAWAY
*

My intent this morning is really not to debate Dave Kautter about the points that
he has raised. I want to focus instead on some thoughts that I had about simplification in
the employee benefits area and then some thoughts I had about some specific proposals,
some of which Dave mentioned and some of which he didn’t. I’m sure some of these points
have been made in other parts of the conference, but I thought that they would be useful
to go through quickly here just for a few minutes.

It first struck me that one thing in the simplification debate that is rarely done is to
identify the level that we’re talking about, the level at which we desire simplification. Is
it the written law we’re talking about? Is it the regulations or implementation of the
regulations? Is it the practical effect on plan sponsors or the practical effect on individual
taxpayers? Is it plan design that we’re talking about, or is it plan administration that we’re
talking about?
We can all conjure up examples where a simple written law, such as taxing all real
economic income, may be overly difficult and complex in practice to apply. Obviously, a
complex law in terms of the words in the statute, the pages in the statute, may be relatively
simple in practice to apply and to design around. So I think one thing we need to do in
this debate is identify the level that we’re talking about, the level of simplification we’re
talking about.
A second point is to recognize, as I’m sure most of you do, that in many cases
simplification and fairness or flexibility are enemies. In the legislative process, arguments
are often made successfully for special rules, grandfathers, and other transition rules which

*Harry Conaway is a Principal of William M. Mercer, Inc. and heads up Mercer’s
recently formed Washington Resource Group (WRG). The WRG consists of six
professionals in Washington, D.C., and analyzes legislative and regulatory developments
relating to employers’ retirement, health welfare, and compensation programs. Prior to
joining Mercer, Harry was associate tax legislative counsel and an attorney-advisor for
nearly six years in the Office of Tax Policy of the U.S. Treasury Department. He
represented the Treasury and the administration on numerous employee benefit matters,
in both the legislative and regulatory context.
Mr. Conaway is a graduate of Trinity College of Connecticut (B.A.), holds an M.A.
from the University of Pennsylvania, and a J.D. from the George Washington University in
Washington, D.C. He is a member of the Employee Benefits Committee of the Tax Section
of the American Bar Association and of several other professional and employee benefit
associations. Mr. Conaway is a frequent speaker, panelist, and author on employee benefits.
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have significant fairness arguments in their favor. But there’s no doubt they complicate the
written law and, in many cases, make practice more difficult for plan sponsors and for
individual taxpayers.
Another area is that simple rules, across-the-board rules, may be arbitrary vis-a-vis
plan sponsors’ practices. More complex rules may fit more reasonably with sponsors’
existing practices and, therefore, may be less disruptive. Life is complex as we know it, and
much of the complexity that we’re talking about is the tension, the rubbing that occurs
between these laws and what employers are doing in practice. It takes complex rules to
properly fit complex designs and practices.
Another issue under this category, the fairness/flexibility category, is the horizontaland vertical-equity goals that are so often talked about in the tax policy arena. Simple rules
in many cases may fail to achieve these justifiable policy goals.

Also, it seems to me, it’s important to separate the simplification issue from the issue
of whether the rule should be tougher or looser. Many, both on the plan sponsor/taxpayer
side and on the Government side of an issue, often use simplification as a front for their
substantive law, policy preference. Simplification seems to be the second and the third
priority or argument on nearly everybody’s list, depending upon whether they favor or
oppose the rule at issue.
Another thing I think people should keep in mind is the importance of distinguishing
complexity at the margins in an area from mainstream complexity. We’re all aware of plan
sponsors who attempt to run at the edge of permissible practices, and the rules at the edge
tend, in many areas, to be more complex. In many areas, sponsors could decide to run their
plans less at the edge of the permissible law and more in the mainstream and essentially
elect out of much of the complexity that the laws would otherwise impose. So I think you
need to distinguish, when you talk about a rule, between complexity at the margin and
complexity in the mainstream.

We’ve all worked on plans-I was thinking, coming over here, of some of the plans
that I’ve worked on in private practice-where the first half of the plan is the current part
of the benefit formula, the eligibility rules, and the last half is the grandfather rules and
other special rules given the different categories of employees, perhaps justifiably, given the
plan sponsor’s employee benefit objectives. But, nonetheless, this increases complexity
significantly.
In the benefits area in particular, in assessing the complexity issue, as with any issue,
it’s important to step back and identify basic principles. In the benefits area, using the
debatable tax expenditure point, the estimated tax expenditure in the pension area is about
$50 billion a year; in the health area, it’s about $30 billion a year. And assuming
continuation of favorable tax treatment for employer-provided pensions and health benefits,
particularly in an era of budget deficits and where there seems to be a consensus about
trying to reduce the deficit, I think it’s reasonable to expect that Congress, any Congress
and any administration, would want to regulate the availability of the favorable tax
treatment. Congress and an administration would care about targeting the tax expenditures
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at the intended beneficiaries. This would be for revenue reasons, equity reasons, and a
whole variety of reasons I’ve already mentioned.
The multiple and not entirely consistent set of objectives in the employee benefits
area--that is, there are a set of labor objectives, there are a set of health objectives often,
a set of pension policy objectives, and a set of tax objectives—further contribute to the
complexity in the area. The attempt to balance these different policy objectives, I think,
results in necessarily, in many cases, but unfortunately complex rules, limiting the
availability of the favorable tax treatment.

I think, in addition, the legislative and the regulatory process significantly increase
the burden and complexity on plan sponsors. Many times there are short compliance
deadlines, not only for plan sponsors but also for the IRS in terms of giving guidance. This
only furthers the uncertainty and at least the feeling of complexity and burden on the
private-sector side.

I want to take, now, a couple of basic areas, some of which Dave mentioned, and
discuss them. The main one, it seems to me, has to do with the nondiscrimination rules.
Generally, it’s thought that there are two basic approaches to achieving nondiscrimination
policy objectives in the benefits area. One is what Dave ended up on, more of a design
based approach laying out the standards that a plan design must conform to, and if it does,
then it’s deemed to be nondiscriminatory, versus a more flexible approach, an approach that
says the employer doesn’t have to design its plan to satisfy the X, Y, and Z standards, but
what we’ll do is look at what is actually occurring under the employer’s plan and then we’ll
determine whether those results are themselves discriminatory or not discriminatory-realty
a design-based approach versus an annual testing approach.

In the top-heavy area, in section 416, and in the minimum participation area, section
401(a)(26), Dave proposed the repeal of section 416 and the reconsideration, at least, of
401(a)(26).
I think these are good examples of design-based approaches to
nondiscrimination. There’s no annual testing and retesting. It’s in most cases a matter of
the employer’s designing its plan to meet certain characteristics, and the likelihood-the
probability-of discrimination is reduced thereby. If the rules were more fully applied, it’s
very possible that other, more difficult nondiscrimination rules could be totally eliminated.
The 401(a)(4) approach, what is called the general nondiscrimination approach,
realty is more of an annual testing approach. That’s looking at what benefits are actually
provided under the plans, what contributions are actually provided under the plans. And
this is the approach that realty requires an actuary to get in and make actuarial
comparability determinations, to try to project salaries and other factors, both current
factors and possible future factors, and determine benefit rates so that a determination can
be made about whether the plans are actually providing discriminatory or nondiscriminatory
benefits. So these are the two basic approaches. Dave proposed the repeal of the design
based approaches here.

Then we turn to 401(k) and the 70-percent-average benefit test enacted in the ’86
act under section 410(b), the minimum-coverage rules. These are both examples of the
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latter type of approach, the annual testing, the actuarial comparability type of approach to
nondiscrimination. Dave, here, proposed to repeal both of these as well. So at least in
Dave’s proposal, we don’t have design-based tests, and we don’t have annual testing.

The point that I want to make here is that in considering the nondiscrimination
objective, assuming that there are to be nondiscrimination rules, and without getting into
how tough or easy they should be, there needs to be a consensus. First there should be an
explicit recognition of the nature of the different type of approaches, and then a discussion,
a debate, and hopefully an agreement about the type of approach that will achieve the
nondiscrimination and other objectives while minimizing the burden on plan sponsors, on
plan administrators, and assuring compliance with the standards.
Another proposal raised in Dave’s piece is to repeal the 415(e) combined plan limit
and to reconsider or repeal the 4980A excise tax on excess distributions. The 4980A excise
tax was originally a Treasury proposal, and certainly it’s my personal view that the tradeoff
of retaining 4980A and repealing 415(e) would be a sensible tradeoff. The excise tax on
the individual recipient is a fairer, more effective way to limit the availability-or the
receipt--of the tax preference.

However, from a simplification point of view, I think it’s important to note that even
though 415(e) requires the sponsors to undertake a very complex calculation, it’s a burden
that falls on plan sponsors. It’s not a burden that falls on individual taxpayers. 4980A is
a tax on individuals, and what that does, while achieving the same general policy purpose,
is put the burden clearly on the individual taxpayer. I think in assessing simplification,
again, identifying what we’re talking about and who we want to simplify for, you need to
factor in the question of whether burdens, to the extent that they’re necessary to assure
compliance with policy objectives, should be placed on plan sponsors or on individual
taxpayers.

On the section 402 distribution rules, there’s no doubt that the detail-the complexity-there is really an embarrassment. There have been many proposals floated that would
neither pick up nor lose revenue that could drastically simplify this area. I know the
Employee Benefits Committee, the Tax Section of the ABA, was considering such a
proposal a couple of years ago. I think there are a lot of things that can be done in that
area.
I think it’s important to review the balance between the labor and the tax rules.
Many labor-type rules are in the Tax Code and, thus, are associated with a tax
disqualification sanction where those rules might be more appropriately enforced solely by
a labor-law-type sanction, employee lawsuits, and the like. It could well be that this sort
of assessment and reallocation of rules between the labor and the tax side would further
simplification.
Finally, I want to close with a proposal, and this is something that, when I was at the
Treasury Department, we discussed sort of walking down the halls and at the end of
meetings, after pulling our hair out trying to think through some of the rules and what
regulations would be required. The proposal that we discussed is essentially as follows:
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Congress, Treasury, the Labor Department, and the private sector would join together to
design ten basic qualified plans, five maybe, fifteen maybe, any of which employers could
adopt, perhaps with some variations. And that would be it for qualified plans-the
flexibility, the ability to individually design programs for a variety of albeit justifiable
reasons, would be eliminated. The idea was that if the tax preference for retirement savings
is to be continued, and the qualification system simplified, one way to do it is essentially
to expand the IRS’s existing master- and prototype-type program-although this would
permit slightly more flexibility than the proposal I just discussed--and extend the masteror prototype-plan approach to the entire private sector retirement system. I present these
approaches for discussion purposes.
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COMMENT ON "EMPLOYEE BENEFITS: STATUTORY SIMPLIFICATION"

SUSAN P. SEROTA
*

Good morning. I think at the outset that we should recognize that the uniqueness
of the employee benefits area is not due solely to the Internal Revenue Code. After all,
the employee benefits plans, pension plans, profit-sharing plans, and other types of plans
are really governed by numerous laws, all of which plan sponsors have to basically comply
with. Indeed, we have a number of different agencies that we have to deal with and meet
their types of regulations. The laws, of course, are ERISA, the Code, labor laws, ADEA,
and securities laws. There may be others out there that I have not mentioned.
The second factor that we should take into account, I think, from the outset is the
fact that there are more than $2 trillion in plan assets, which is awfully difficult to ignore
as a source of potential revenue.
Thirdly, I think we should recognize that there are really two competing forces in
Congress and among the different agencies: the force of a national retirement policy versus
the amount and type of revenue subsidy that should be given to qualified plans. These
forces result in a constant tension up on the Hill, in the agencies, and in private practice
as we try to deal with these issues.

My employee benefits practice has developed tremendously over the years that I’ve
been in it. I started in what I called pension law--I called myself a tax lawyer then. I no
longer call myself a tax lawyer; now I call myself an employee benefits lawyer because I
don’t just deal with the Internal Revenue Code.

When I lecture to the summer associates who come to my law firm, or sometimes
even to the partners and other associates who come to listen to me because employee
benefits has proliferated through other areas of law, they want to know what issues they
*Susan P. Serota is a partner in the firm of Winthrop, Stimson, Putnum & Roberts
in New York City. She is the head of the ERISA and Employee Benefits Department. Ms.
Serota has been an adjunct professor at the Georgetown University Law Center and a
lecturer at the New York University School of Continuing Education.

Ms. Serota received a B.A. from the University of Michigan (1967) and a J.D. from
New York University School of Law (1971), where she was the Editor of the Second-Year
Writing Program Subsection on Tax. She has served as the Chair for the American Bar
Association Joint Committee on Employee Benefits, as the vice-chair of the ABA Section
of Taxation Committee on Employee Benefits, as a member of the Executive Committee
of the New York State Bar Association Tax Section, and as a member of the District of
Columbia Bar Association.
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have to be aware of. I tell them the story of the development of my practice. When I
started out, I had an office at the end of the hallway, and nobody came to talk to me
because nobody really cared. I mean, I was a specialist in tax law and pensions, I knew
what the qualification rules were, and I dealt with them, and everybody said, "Fine, Susan
will take care of it."

Then ERISA was passed, and all of a sudden there were specific liabilities that could
be imposed on corporations’ assets due to the funding of pension plans and the termination
of pension plans. And who were the first lawyers to find me? They were the creditors’rights lawyers in the firm. They suddenly started walking down to my office and saying,
"We have this loan agreement, and we want to make sure that our client, the lender, is
protected against this potential PBGC lien." And I told them, "Well, this is what you have
to do and this is what you have to worry about," and they’d go on their merry little way.
They’d say, "Okay, Susan took care of it."

Well, as time went on and as the economy developed and the acquisition and merger
area emerged, they said, "You know, pension plans not only are a liability, they’re also an
asset. And shouldn’t we really be either buying or selling this asset? And how do we deal
with all the issues that are involved with pension plans?" And so they’d come down to my
office, and we’d talk and we’d sit down and develop certain representations and warranties,
and then went on to talk about what you do with these plans once you’ve acquired them,
or what you are going to do with the plan once we’ve sold off the division or the subsidiary
that participated in this plan.
And they’d say, "Okay, Susan, and now her associates are taking care of all of this
for us, and everything’s just fine." Then all of a sudden ESOPs came into the forefront in
the area of acquisitions, mergers and lending and financing, and they said, "Oh, my God,
we don’t even know how to structure the deal. We’d better go down to Susan’s office and
talk to her before we can even start the deal." All of a sudden I realized that employee
benefits had made the day.

Seriously, this area has become so complex that I am now in the position of not only
saying that I don’t know the answer, I’m in the position of saying I don’t know when I’m
going to know the answer. It’s very difficult to practice in an area that is constantly
changing. It’s an area in which, as we mentioned earlier, there have been fourteen different
laws since 1974, numerous regulations both in proposed and final form that have been
issued. For example, the area of 401(a)(9), I think, has been revised and amended four
times in the last eight years.
This has been an area of constant change and constant complexity. It’s one that we
really have to turn to and deal with in some sort of systematic manner. It also seems to
me that simplification is a concept that is misconstrued, both by the congressional staff who
often thinks that simplification means giving employers too much discretion, and by the
private bar, who believe that simplification may often mean a loss of flexibility.
When we talk about complexity in the Internal Revenue Code, we are really talking
about an unacceptable degree of specificity and detail that comes from three sources, not
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perhaps two, as David mentioned. David mentioned, obviously, the sort of incremental
overload, the layering of tax laws and regulations one on top of the other, some of which
are left to atrophy throughout the Code and clutter it up. The other one, of course, is this
obsession, that he so termed, of chasing tax abuse and making sure that this is a perfect
system of providing pension equity. The result has been an explosion in the number of
rules and regulations that any particular plan needs to comply with.
But a third source of complexity in the Code is one that we practitioners are really
responsible for, and we have to take the credit for. That is that we want to permit plan
variability. We do not want standard plans, or at least our clients don’t want standard
plans. We don’t want the four or fourteen different variations that Harry and I and
someone else may possibly dream up, thinking that these are the perfect type of plans that
would solve all our problems. The problem is that most plan sponsors of substantial plans
really want to keep the type of arrangements they’ve had that they feel are providing good
retirement benefits for their employees.

The first source of complexity that David talked about is this layering effect. I think
David has presented, overall, ten good proposals to eliminate redundancy and improve the
organization and neatness of the Code, and without substantially changing any policy. I may
agree with some of his suggestions or disagree just in the level of where he’s going, but I
think, overall, he has made some good suggestions that we should all think about.
The second and third sources of complexity create somewhat of a dilemma for the
government and the private sector. On the one hand, the government needs to recognize
that much of the Tax Code’s complexity comes from efforts to force plans designed and
adopted to meet corporate needs to meet national social policy goals as well. Top-heavy
rules, the 401(k) and (m) tests, 401(a)(26), all are complex provisions intended to provide
higher benefits to lower compensated workers and prevent the highly compensated from
receiving too much. Eliminating or greatly simplifying these rules would do much to
simplify the Code but at the cost of pension equity.

This is the dilemma for the government. They have chosen to meet their own goals
by harnessing private plans and redirecting them from fully meeting the employer’s goals.
Employers have an interest in rewarding their most productive and longest-service
employees, while government has an interest in assuring that everyone receives equal
retirement benefits. This creates unnecessary tension between the government and
employers, resulting in inefficiency in meeting either goal. The government cannot fully
meet its own goals, or employer interests will be sacrificed and plans will be terminated.
We have seen this as legislation is enacted that requires more and more administration in
order to keep plans in compliance, and more and more small employers continue to
terminate plans.

The government must be willing to live with some degree of discrimination and
inequity in the distribution of tax benefits. If tax equity or if pension equity is too
important a goal to sacrifice, then the government has to provide the benefits itself or use,
perhaps, Harry’s suggestion of five, ten, or maybe fifteen different varieties, but those are
the only ones that you can have.
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The top-heavy rules are a perfect case in point. Most of the vesting and benefit
accrual requirements of the top-heavy rules applied to small plans in 1982 were later largely
duplicated by new vesting, and the permitted disparity rules applying to all plans after the
1986 Tax Reform Act. In fact, the top-heavy rules, even when they were first initiated in
1982, really applied to a very small fraction of plans, at least in my practice. I can’t say
about very many other practices. But I know that the only top-heavy plan I ever had to
work with was the one for my own law firm. The only reason I had to learn about topheavy rules was to be assured that for this one plan we didn’t fall out of compliance.
On the other hand, every single plan that we were responsible for had to contain all
of the 416 rules, and they never once went into effect. The only amendments that we were
required to make half the times were little amendments to meet 416 requirements by the
Internal Revenue Service in the determination letter process. This is just not an efficient
way of administrating a law.

The top-heavy rules should be repealed because they are largely duplicative. And,
in fact, the American Bar Association, at their annual meeting last August, resolved that
these rules should be repealed. And this is true even though the top-heavy rules would
eliminate a small minimum benefit that is required only for these type of plans. But the
amount of complexity required to differentiate and regulate top-heavy plans is hardly worth
the small increment of minimum benefit it yields for the relatively few workers it affects.
If Congress is that committed to minimum pension benefits, it can meet this objective more
efficiently by mandating a minimum pension accrual or simply raising taxes and increasing
Social Security benefits.
Another example is the minimum participation rules which were mentioned earlier
today, 401(a)(26), which generally require a plan to cover at least fifty participants or 40
percent of the work force. The original purpose of Section 401(a)(26) was to stop the
proliferation and continued existence of individual defined benefit plans, which we might
say were mostly being utilized by partners in law firms, accounting firms, and investment
banking houses. As David has stated, this is a statute that has run amok. It is posing large
employer plans as much problem as the permitted disparity provisions of 401(1). It should
be amended or repealed.

Let me give you two examples. We talked about the airline pilots earlier today.
Well, that happens to be one of the problems with one of my very large clients, who has
over 40,000 employees with respect to their retirement plan. They have only one retirement
income plan. It covers all of their employees. They don’t have one for hourly employees
and one for salaried employees and the concern worrying about which plan is which. They
have their one basic plan.
On the other hand, they have a lot of different benefits in that one basic plan. But
as you talk about the airline pilots, they for many years have believed that most airline
pilots--not in the commercial field but rather in the private area--have to or perhaps should
be retired at age sixty. They basically have applied the rule that applied to commercial
pilots to the private pilots.
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I asked them, well, how many pilots do you have? And they said they have twentysix pilots. I said, well, that’s nice, but you don’t have fifty. What is the problem? The
problem is in the plane that they have a normal retirement age, not a mandatory retirement
age, of age sixty in order to give them the full benefit at age sixty when they would
otherwise potentially retire.
Well, this isn’t going to meet the requirements of 401(a)(26). The problem is, of
course, that pilots earn a lot of money, even in private industry. Actually, their average
income in this case is probably just right below the level for being highly compensated in
this company. But if that’s the average, one of the special rules that was put into the
401(a)(26) rules just can’t apply because there won’t be enough pilots below that level to
make it work. So I don’t know what we’re going to do about our pilots. We have to be
concerned. Maybe we can fit into one of the regulatory exemptions. But we certainly can’t
fit into the one that’s currently there.

The other one is one that, I think, is more broadly a problem for large employers.
For example, this is a company that goes out and buys a number of companies. Typically
when it goes out and buys another company, it gives past service credit for vesting and
sometimes for benefit accrual, depending on what the former employer had provided.
Now, it turns out under the 401(a)(26) rules, each one of those different acquisition
groups is going to be considered to be a separate benefit structure, and each one of them
will have to be tested separately. This was not the intent of 401(a)(26). These are good
benefits that are being provided, and the decisions being made are to bring these people
up to the level of the benefits being provided for the employees of the overall corporation.
But it’s not only, as I said initially, the government, the Service, or the Congress who
is posing all of the problems. The private sector itself has to take some of this
responsibility. A good deal of the complexity in the system comes from efforts to
accommodate variability in the way plans are now designed. If the private sector wants
simple rules and plans, the easiest way to do this is to have a federal prototype plan, such
as Harry mentioned, that everyone has to adopt. If employers want to continue to maintain
some flexibility in the design of their own plan, then they should be prepared to accept the
complexity in the Tax Code needed to make this degree of flexibility.
Another example, of course, we could go into-and I won’t because of the intricacy
and the discussion already this morning-is pension integration. But, indeed, that’s one area
which has become so complex that plans that have been providing good benefits are having
difficulty meeting the new rules that most employers now are doing nothing. We are now
in the position of awaiting regulations that have yet to be issued to see whether or not,
under the section 401(a)(4) nondiscrimination rules, these plans can continue as they always
existed, or whether they have to change because they cannot meet the current permitted
disparity rules.

It is relatively simple to eliminate some of the clutter in the Tax Code, but this
would not have much effect on its complexity. The real complexity comes from a desire
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to do too much. Real simplification requires employers and the government to be willing
to live with less-less flexibility in plan design and less equity in benefit delivery.
In this context, I would set a priority on several proposals in David’s draft. First,
Congress should relax its efforts to require complete equity in pensions by repealing the
top-heavy rules; repealing either the combined 415(e) limits or the section 4980 excise tax
on excess distributions; repealing the 70-percent-average benefits test in 410(b); in addition,
the Service should revise the regulations for section 401(a)(26), or, if necessary, Congress
should amend the statute to greatly limit the application of the minimum participation rules
to separate benefit structures. In each of these cases, the increment in potential for abuse
or loss of benefits that would result in a change is small in comparison to the potential for
greatly reduced complexity in the Code.

Secondly, employers should accept, in the name of simplification, some constraints
on their freedom to design plans. The most important of these would be to permit
integration in a more simplified but restricted basis. Simplicity in employee benefits comes
at a tremendous price, and we should recognize that we may not want simplicity as a goal
in and of itself. As long as we prefer a system that uses private plans to achieve public
purposes, the tension between the conflicting aims of each always will result in statutory and
regulatory complexity.
In conclusion: The world might be better served if Congress and employers could
agree to sacrifice some of their objectives in the interest of a less complicated pension and
employee benefit system. Thank you.
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INCOME TAX COMPLEXITY: CAPITAL GAIN AND LOSS ISSUES

MARTIN D. GINSBURG
*

This is a paper of narrow compass. Here you encounter little, if anything, of
economic efficiency, stimulus to savings, fairness, equity horizontal or vertical, or much
about neutrality of any sort, and no handy summary of the capital gains arguments.1 The
topic narrowly addressed is the effect on income tax complexity of differential treatment for
capital gains and losses.
I have found this paper difficult to write. In part it is because pretty much all of the
modest amount I have to say on the subject I have already said,2 and it is bothersome,
although hardly unknown, to borrow from oneself. But the main problem is that we plumb
the depths of the obvious. Of course a special capital gain/loss taxing regime adds
significantly to the complexity of an income tax system.
Recall what evolved in our tax law, prior to the 1986 legislation, as the rules of the
capital gain/loss road.

First, the need for a sale or exchange, or for something treated as a sale or exchange.
Retirement of a debt instrument is considered an exchange, from the viewpoint of the
*Martin D. Ginsburg is Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center in
Washington, D.C. His professional corporation is counsel to the firm of Fried, Frank,
Harris, Shriver & Jacobson. Professor Ginsburg attended Cornell University, stood very low
in his class, and played on the golf team. He graduated magna cum laude from Harvard
Law School which, in those years, did not field a golf team. Professor Ginsburg entered
private practice in New York City in 1958. Although beloved by partners and clients, he
withdrew from full-time practice when appointed the Beekman Professor of Law at
Columbia Law School. He moved to Georgetown University in 1980 when his wife
obtained a good job in Washington. In the interim, Professor Ginsburg served as chairman
of the Tax Section of the New York State Bar Association, chairman of the Committee on
Taxation of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, chairman of the
Committee on Simplification of the American Bar Association Section of Taxation, member
of the Advisory Group to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and member of the
Advisory Group to the Tax Division of the Department of Justice. Since 1974, Professor
Ginsburg has acted as consultant to the American Law Institute’s Federal Income Tax
Project on the revision of the corporate and partnership tax laws; from 1984 to 1987 he was
a member of the ABA Tax Section who probably prefers never to be identified; endowed
a chair in taxation in his name at Georgetown (no one appears willing to occupy the
Ginsburg Chair, and it remains vacant). Professor Ginsburg is a fellow of the American
College of Tax Counsel, a frequent speaker at tax seminars (mainly in warm climates), and
the author of a ghastly number of articles on corporate and partnership taxation, business
acquisitions, and other stimulating things.
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holder,3 unless the issuer is a natural person, in which event it is not.4 Cancellation of a
lease, from the viewpoint of the compensated lessee, is treated as an exchange whether the
lessor is a natural person or an unnatural one.5

Second, the need for a capital asset,6 or for something which, while not a capital
asset, is treated as one or at least as giving rise to gain that is treated as capital gain? In
fact, since the Code’s capital asset definition is expansive, while some provisions deem to
be capital gain what otherwise would or might be ordinary income, others convert to
ordinary income what otherwise would or might have been capital gain.9
Finally, the need for a long-term holding period, more than six months or more than
one year or whatever, or the need for a provision that deems the relevant holding period
requirement satisfied whether or not, in fact, it is.10 Of course, there are provisions that
go the other way and announce the holding period requirement has not been met, although
the taxpayer has in fact held the property for the prescribed period.11

Over the decades, reams were written on the capital gain/loss taxing scheme and the
enormous increase in simplicity that surely would accrue if only we could eliminate the
special taxing regime. But none of us, I suspect, conceived that Congress would eliminate
the long-term capital gain rate preference but retain the whole horrible technical
structure--capital asset, section 1231(b) property, capital gain, capital loss, long-term,
short-term, and all those nefarious sale/exchange/cancellation distinctions. In other words,
Congress in 1986 found a way to eliminate the rate preference while preserving virtually all
the complicating features of the special capital gain/loss taxing scheme.
Why did Congress do this? For one thing, Congress was promising restoration of a
long-term capital gain rate preference incident to a feared increase in the top marginal tax
rate. Retaining in the 1986 Code all that definitional baggage thus struck a blow for
continuity; had it been removed, it would have had to be restored.12 But this explanation
does not foreclose another: Congress in 1986 comprehended the continuing need to curb
the tax utility of capital losses in a world in which both gain and loss recognition remains
elective. Extremely busy with other tax and non-tax things, Congress, it can be argued, kept
the historic structure in place as a familiar way to deal with what we all know to be the
goblin of our realization system, the cherry-picking problem. A taxpayer culling her
portfolio to trigger $100,000 of net capital loss may be an object of sympathy if her portfolio
retains no net appreciation, but she is nothing of the sort if she has selected bad from good
and her net unrealized appreciation, to be extreme, is in untold millions. In the first case
we should allow her full offset against ordinary income, but we do not13 for lack currently
of a satisfactory way to protect the revenue in the second case.

I propose to return in a few paragraphs to the cherry-picking problem and the tax
law’s capital loss limitation response, to consider whether a response better tailored to the
problem with an attendant reduction in the complexity of the system (as well as an
improvement in the perceived fairness of the system) might be formulated. But I did not
want to abandon the gain side of the capital gain/loss taxing regime merely because, for the
moment, Congress has abandoned the rate preference.
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If the definitional rules remain intractably complex, as they do and will so long as
the Code maintains the capital loss deduction limitation, is elimination of the capital gain
rate preference independently Simplifying? Explicitly, has the 1986 Act’s elimination of the
section 1202 deduction (and equivalent corporate tax rate change in section 1201) yielded
a discernible bounty in transactional simplification?
The Capital Gains Task Force of the ABA Section of Taxation, in a report prepared
in 1989, concluded that the 1986 elimination of the capital gain rate preference, and
consequent removal of the incentive to plan transactions to convert ordinary income into
capital gain, has resulted in significant transactional simplification even though there has
not been significant statutory simplification.14 My own experience, while limited to that
which is conveniently available to a poor schoolteacher, agrees with the Task Force’s
conclusion, and the experience of others I have asked seems in accord.15 At this Conference
I hope to broaden the base of testimony.
One of the asserted justifications for a long-term capital gain rate preference has
been that "most capital gains are fictitious in that they merely reflect an inflation."16 A
different approach would resolve the perceived income measurement problem through some
form of indexation, presumably the indexing of the basis of all or most long-held capital and
quasi-capital assets for inflation occurring after a designated date. Treasury I offered this
opportunity designating 1965. Representative Jenkins, in the Ways and Means Committee
last year, proposed January 1, 1992. Presumably those proponents did not view indexation
as significantly increasing the level of income tax complexity. Others, including Walter J.
Blum in 195717 and Edwin S. Cohen in 1989,18 have announced themselves of a quite
different persuasion. At the conference on January 12, I hope we will generate some light
and much heat.19

Finally, on the gain side, current law continues to offer the absolution of a zero tax
rate to the investor who dies clutching a qualifying asset. Under section 1014, the line is
not drawn between capital gain property and other property but rather between disqualified
over ripe assets (section 691IRD property and certain foreign investments) and everything
else (mainly but by no means exclusively capital gain property).20 On balance, the present
rules are fairly simple-a zero rate of tax on all income would produce a very simple tax
system--but it is common, indeed inevitable, to maintain investments and plan transactions
to secure the benefit of a stepped-up basis as death.21 It is certainly arguable that
transactional complexity would be reduced were section 1014(a) repealed and transfers at
death (or by lifetime gift) treated as recognition events. Opponents might well assert an
increase in the overall level of tax complexity; who among the living, after all, knows the
adjusted basis of the decedent’s property measured immediately prior to death? Those who,
like me, find the subject difficult to separate from the balance of the capital gain debate
are encouraged to address it on January 12. I address it again, below, in the context of a
proposed solution to the cherry picking problem.

It is now, I hope, appropriate to repair to that most nettlesome problem, the capital
loss limitation. Assume at the outset that a capital gain rate preference will not reenter the
law. Major reduction in statutory complexity-elimination from the Code of the capital
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asset, sale or exchange, and holding period definitions for a start--is now at hand. All we
need do is permit the deductibility of a loss to be determined without regard to the capital
or not capital nature of the property sold. But what of the cherry-picking problem?
A. Any concern of loss limitation evaporates if we dump the realization requirement
and annually force accrual of all property gains and losses. Professor David Shakow has
argued the mechanics and merits of forced accrual with great insight and much conviction.22
I am impressed but ultimately unpersuaded.23
B. If we do not dump the realization requirement and embrace unlimited annual
accrual of property gains and losses, sensibly we ought to look in the opposite direction
and reexamine the scope of our cherry-picking concern. A "taxpayer enjoying a sizable
portfolio of readily marketable securities, many appreciated and others depreciated in value,
absent an effective deduction limitation easily could and surely would retain gain assets and
sell loss assets to offset ordinary income. But the opportunity, if not the desire, to cherry
pick losses attenuates when the depreciated investment is not readily marketable. Consider,
in that light, the following "mandatory mark to market regime"--the focus is on the
"market"~to replace the capital loss limitation.

1.
For all marketable property, we scrap the realization requirement and
value the property at year-end, as if it were sold at that value on that day. Marketable
property would be defined, expansively but not outlandishly, to include inter alia open-end
mutual fund shares as well as readily tradeable securities, and otherwise nonmarketable
rights, options, and convertible instruments the value of which derives, positively or
negatively, in significant part from residual securities that are marketable.
2.
The concept of a capital asset or gain or loss is expunged. Other
deduction limitations are preserved, for example §469 and §267(a)(1),24 and loss generated
in a sale-leaseback transaction is disallowed currently and capitalized to the leasehold
interest.
3.
Gain is recognized on a gift of appreciated property. Section 1014 is
repealed, gain and loss are recognized on the transfer of property by reason of death, and
problems of liquidity are ameliorated through a generous but not lunatic expansion (well
beyond the current six months) of section 6161(a)(1).

C. Arguably, there is a third choice, in a tax world stripped of the capital loss
limitation, in addition to forced annual accrual of all property gains and losses on the one
hand, and forced annual accrual of only marketable property gains and losses on the other
hand. The realization rule would be fully preserved, but net realized losses on marketable
property (and perhaps on some or all nonmarketable property)25 dispositions would be
deductible in any year only if and only to the extent such property disposition losses exceed
the taxpayer’s net unrealized marketable property gains measured at year-end. A taxpayer
receiving dividend income ineligible for a section 243 deduction26would, in this third choice
regime, treat that income as if it were gain recognized on a disposition of marketable
property.27 The remaining features of the mandatory mark-to-market regime, including
elimination of any capital loss limitation, preservation of the limitations under §469 and
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§ 267(a)(1) (perhaps expanded), and recognition of gain on gift and of gain and loss on
death, also would be features of the third-choice regime.

When it was put forward in the spring of 1987 at the Invitational Conference on
subchapter C, the third-choice proposal attracted some favorable comment and a criticism
which seems to me persuasive. Under this proposal, the taxpayer has a strong incentive to
isolate in a separate entity, or in the hands of a friendly offspring, marketable property
investments deemed likely to appreciate in value. In this way the taxpayer, cherry-picking
losses on other investments, need not offset the unrealized appreciation in the marketable
securities he has placed in other hands. Thus, if adopted, the third-choice regime very
likely would incorporate complicating attribution concepts and almost certainly would
engender significant transactional complexity.

The mandatory mark-to-market regime, on the other hand, does not suffer from an
equivalent infirmity. It does little good to place appreciating marketable property in entity
or offspring hands if at year-end the holder must accrue and pay tax on the gain.28
All in all, to replace the capital loss limitation, I cast my own vote for plan B, the
mandatory mark-to-market proposal, under which nonmarketable property gains can be
deferred for a time, while losses are enjoyed but cannot be interminably deferred by gift
and will not be avoided at death.
I look forward to the debate.

I-V-5

ENDNOTES
1 Professor Walter J. Blum’s seminal 1957 paper of that title, recently republished
in Tax Notes (September 4, 1989), 1145, remains the starting place for thinking more
broadly about preferential tax treatment for capital gains. In the ensuing decades, of
course, countless thousands of pages have been published by tax professionals and
academics and by economists of all persuasions. Of that which I have read, I do not
understand most of it and disbelieve the larger part of the balance.
2 The papers are: "Reexamining Subchapter C: An Overview and Some Modest
Proposals to Stimulate Debate" (1987), reprinted in A Report of the Invitational Conference
on Subchapter C. 39 (1988); and "Whatever Happened To Tax Simplification," Record of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (1987): 765.
3 Code § 1271(a)(1).

4 Code § 1271(b)(1).

5 Code § 1241.

6 Code § 1221.
7 Code § 1231.
8 See, e.g., Code §§ 483//9d)(4), 1235, 1237, 1274(c)(3).
9 See, e.g., Code §§ 1245, 1249, 1250, 1252, 1253, 1254, 1273(b)(3), 1274.

10 See Code § 1235(a).

11 See, e.g., Code § 1233(b) (certain short sales).
12 The 1986 Act Conference Report, H.R. Rep. No. 99-841, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. IT106 (September 18, 1986), explicitly states that the "current statutory structure for capital
gains is retained in the Code to facilitate reinstatement of a capital gains rate differential
if thee is a future tax rate increase." 1986 Code § l(j) will reinstitute the long-term capital
gain rate preference (at 28 percent) if the maximum rate generally imposed on individuals
is increased above 28 percent, and 1986 Code § 1201(a) performs a similar service for
corporations (at the 34 percent rate).

13 Except $3,000 of capital loss offset under Code §1211.
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14The Task Force (seven members) reached this determination by majority vote with
one member noting an increase in planning for tax deferral through nonrecognition
exchanges (a no doubt welcome confirmation that tax planning is not dead and tax planners
are not likely to become extinct).

15 While attesting to reduced concern with planning for capital gain, a number agreed
with the Task Force members who found on the increase planning for tax deferral, and
mentioned recent special effort to avoid the adverse impact of Code § 453A, a task
Congress in the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1989 has made a good deal more onerous.
16 See Blum, supra n. 1, at 1151 (argument 19 for preferential treatment of capital
gains).
17 Id.
18 Cohen, "The Pending Proposal to Index Capital Gains," Tax Notes (October 2,
1989), 103, reprinting Professor Cohen’s address of September 23, 1989 to the New York
State Bar Association Section of Taxation.
19 Perhaps this will help to start the ball rolling. Surely it is perfectly clear, in the
case of an investment that substantially appreciates in value over time, that the realization
requirement in deterring the taxable event until the asset is disposed of reduces very
substantially the effective tax burden relative to the burden that would be imposed were the
investor required to accrue profit annually. In practical effect, then, while we tax an
inflated nominal gain, through the realization requirement we tax that nominal gain at far
less than the nominal tax rate. Of course, it is not perfect--what is--but in an imperfect
world, why is it not an adequate "simplifying" offset?

20 In general, a lifetime gift of Code § 1014(a) qualifying property is not a taxable
event and shifts the gain to the donee, while a lifetime gift of Code § 1014(c) property
generally is either a taxable event to the donor-see Code § 453B-or an invalid attempt at
assignment of income.
21 This was the genesis of the famous National Starch Code § 351 transaction,
involving the issuance by a newly formed corporation of shares of a complexly tailored
preferred stock. See Rev. Rul. 84-71, 1984-1 C.B. 106.
22Shaow, "Taxation Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual Taxation," U. Pa.
L. Rev., 134 (1986): 1111.

23Testifying before a Congressional Committee on a tax reform proposal a decade
ago, the late Converse Murdoch summed up his opposition in a sentence I thought
wonderful then and find all the more compelling with the passage of time. "An old
complexity," he announced, "is better than a new complexity, particularly if you are an old
lawyer."
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24 The relevant relationships described in Code § 267(b), however, merit re
examination. For example, in Code § 267(b)(2) the reference to a more than 50 percent
(in value) shareholder might be reset at a lower number.

25 If you are persuaded that, essentially, the cherry-picking problem equates to the
taxpayer’s ability to cull marketable investments, in aid of reduced complexity you will not
extend the new deduction limitation to any nonmarketable property losses. If, however,
you believe the problem encompasses some nonmarketable property investments~for
example, real estate-you may be willing to incur a measure of added complexity and
announce that net realized losses on marketable property and real estate dispositions will
be deductible in any year only if and only to the extent such property disposition losses
exceed the taxpayer’s net unrealized marketable property gains measured at year-end.
26 An individual taxpayer receives no deduction benefit under Code § 243. If that
provision were amended to limit its benefits to direct corporate investors, a reform that
has been proposed by some and opposed by others, all dividends on portfolio stock
investments would be ineligible for the Code § 243 deduction.
27 To illustrate the significance of this income characterization, assume that during
the taxable year Ms. A, on sales of marketable property, recognizes gains of $20,000 and
losses of $120,000, or a net recognized loss on actual marketable property sales of $100,000.
During the year Ms. A also receives salary income of $200,000 and dividend income of
$75,000. At year-end the marketable securities owned by Ms. A, if sold on that date, would
produce a net gain of $90,000. If dividend income is not treated as marketable property
gain, under the proposal Ms. A is permitted to deduct currently against ordinary income
$10,000 of her $100,000 net recognized loss on marketable property disposition, and the
$90,000 balance of Ms. A’s recognized loss is carried forward to the following year. If,
however, Ms. A’s $75,000 of dividend income is treated as marketable property gain, an
additional $65,000 of her recognized loss is currently allowable and only the $25,000 balance
of that loss is currently disallowed and carried forward to the following year.
28 It would do some good if the holder were in a lower tax bracket, but taking
account of the subchapter C double tax regime and the high Code § 11 burden, the
generally flat rates of individual tax, and the Kiddie Tax, this is not currently a serious
concern.
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COMMENT ON "INCOME TAX COMPLEXITY:
CAPITAL GAIN AND LOSS ISSUES"

JOHN S. NOLAN
*

Martin Ginsburg-in his customary fascinating, incisive, and thorough manner--has
identified all of the critical structural issues with respect to capital gains and losses. He
does not, however, address critical economic efficiency and fairness considerations. These
must be faced, because the role of capital gains in our income tax system is far more a
matter of equity and economic policy than it is a problem of complexity. Furthermore, I
am persuaded that we would achieve even simplification games under his favored plan B.

In these comments, I address the income tax system as it is traditionally applied in
the United States, one that taxes nominal gains on sales of assets but only when realized.
Norman Ture believes strongly that an income tax should tax amounts saved or the return
on savings, but not both. Under this ideal model, capital gains in our structure should not
be taxed at all because the property has been purchased with assets that have already been
subject to income tax. I take a more parochial view that our progressive income tax
structure has been indelibly shaped by fairness considerations to achieve some redistribution
of wealth or, as some prefer to state it, to share the burdens of government on the basis
of ability to pay. In this real world, when appreciation in the value of a taxpayer’s assets
is realized, it is taxed, even though in a broader sense that results in the double taxation
of returns on savings.
Initially, I agree with Martin Ginsburg and others that we have achieved much
transactional simplification by taxing capital gains as ordinary income, even though we have
been left with the entire capital gain/loss complex statutory structure. I no longer spend
sleepless nights worrying about whether particular transactions involve section 306 stock or

*John S. Nolan is a member of the law firm of Miller & Chevalier, Chartered,
Washington, D.C. He served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy
from April 1969 to December 1971, with responsibility for the formulation and execution
of United States domestic and international tax polices. Mr. Nolan was graduated from the
University of North Carolina in 1947, where he was elected to Phi Beta Kappa and was
awarded the Delta Sigma Pi Scholarship Key. He was alter graduated from the Harvard
Law School in 1951, receiving his degree magna cum laude.

Mr. Nolan’s appointments include the following: chairman of the American Bar
Association Section of Taxation (1981-82), member of the Advisory Group to the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (1967-68, 1983-84), vice-chairman of the ABA Section
of Taxation (1965-68), and adjunct professor of Law at the Georgetown Law School (195559, 1971-78). Mr. Nolan was awarded the Alexander Hamilton Award, the Treasury
Department’s highest honor, on January 21, 1971.
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collapsible corporations. And while sections 302 and 304 are still important, they are of far
less application than they once were.

My first quarrel with Marty relates to indexation. He suggests that the benefit of
deferral of tax on capital gains resulting from our realization requirement can be viewed
as a simplifying offset to the detriment of taxing the inflation component of realized gains.

The report of the Capital Gains Task Force of the ABA Taxation Section recognized
in early 1989 that indexation is vital to the correct measurement of income and
recommended indexing the basis of all assets, subject to an interest charge for the deferral
of tax. Indexation was recommended in Blueprints of Basic Tax Reform, issued by the
Treasury Department in 1977; in Treasury I in 1984; by the sixty-ninth American Assembly
at Arden House by a group of tax policy experts under the leadership of Joe Pechman in
April 1985 under the title "Reforming and Simplifying the Federal Tax System"; and by
many other tax policy experts. This correct measurement of income as a result of
indexation, however, is just as important in measuring real losses incurred where there is
no such deferral offset. In fact, the deferral of losses under the realization requirement in
a theoretical sense exacerbates the mismeasurement of taxable income in an unindexed tax
system. While the taxpayer is, theoretically, free to sell the asset to realize the loss, it is
not always possible to sell loss property without forfeiting important economic or social
values, such as preservation of a family business. In addition, market imperfections inhibit
the sale of nonliquid assets.
Furthermore, even if real gain exists, an implicit interest charge as a simplifying
offset to basis adjustments for inflation is not justified unless there is a reasonable
correlation between the market interest rate and the rate of inflation used to adjust the
basis of assets, which frequently does not exist. Furthermore, real gains will not accrue
ratably over the life of the assets, which is the only basis on which we can compute an
interest charge.

Indexation without an interest charge for deferral may be defended on economic
incentive grounds. The effect of deferral is to gradually reduce the effective rate of tax as
the holding period lengthens, providing greater benefits to more permanent investments,
without the need for complex, multiple holding periods to achieve lower effective capital
gain tax rates for long-lived investments. A 28-percent rate effectively falls to 23 percent
after five years and to 11-percent after twenty-five years.
Indexation, however, is enormously complex, particularly with respect to passthrough entities, common in the United States because of our unintegrated corporate
income tax. It also requires more than mere indexation of the basis of assets in order to
account for debt. The adjustment to the liability side of the taxpayer’s balance sheet to
recognize that the taxpayer with debt benefits from inflation, except to the extent he or she
reimburses the lender by a higher interest rate, is also inordinately complex. Treasury I
attempted to deal with this problem by reducing the taxpayer’s deduction for interest on
debt by the inflation component. The lender’s income would be reduced by the same
amount. The Treasury I proposal was flawed, and no one has come forward since with a
satisfactory alternative.
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For these and other reasons, I am reluctantly persuaded that despite its essential
merit in correctly measuring income or loss, indexation is too complex for our income tax
system. A capital gain preference, particularly one with lower rates for longer holding
periods, is a very rough and imperfect substitute for indexation. But a series of holding
periods would itself create new complexities. We now see sprinkled throughout the Code
and the regulations, in connection with provisions of narrow compass, exceedingly complex
rules to attack transactions transferring ownership in form when in substance the benefits
and burdens of ownership are retained. If the effective capital gain rate were successively
lower for longer holding periods, parties would reverse these schemes. They will structure
transactions that in substance transfer the benefits and burdens of ownership but do not
do so in form until the last holding period has been reached.
Accordingly, purely from the standpoint of complexity, because we have achieved
substantial transactional simplification by lower tax rates generally and have eliminated the
capital gain preference, it may be concluded that we should not reintroduce a capital gain
preference. But this is true only as long as the present low rates exist. More important,
as stated earlier, is that considerations of fairness and economic efficiency far exceed the
significance of the complexity problem in resolving this issue.

As to fairness, the present system of capital gains as ordinary income may be entirely
appropriate to achieve reasonable progressivity in our current low rate structure, given that
capital gains are realized to a much higher degree proportionately by higher income classes.
As to economic efficiency, I defer to the economists on the question whether the stimulus
of a lower capital gain rate is necessary or desirable to sustain higher levels of capital
formation, business investment, and prosperity in the United States.
On the other hand, if reinstitution of a capital gain preference is to be accompanied
by an increase in the top tax rate, it is arguable that there is a much stronger case for
opposing it on the grounds of complexity. The present top effective rate of 28 percent
makes a far greater overall contribution to simplification by reducing the otherwise
irresistible pressures to create other preferences to ameliorate high rates of income tax.

To sum up, complexity considerations argue strongly against the capital gain
preference if it can be obtained only at the price of a higher top effective rate. If, however,
there is no such coupling, complexity is a consideration, but fairness and economic
considerations are far more important in determining whether we should have a capital
gains preference.
I have now strayed considerably from the thrust of Martin Ginsburg’s paper. His
paper assumes no capital gain preference is adopted. He then seeks to eliminate the
complexities of the retained capital gain/loss statutory structure by dealing with the capital
loss cherry-picking problem. Marty poses three alternatives and opts in favor of plan B:
limited annual accrual of gains and losses on marketable property. He would mark to
market at each year-end open-end mutual fund shares, readily tradable securities, and
property interests, the value of which derives significantly from such marketable securities.
This would permit abandonment of the concept of capital asset in the Code, and all the
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statutory baggage that goes with it. This is so because, for the most part, the problem of
the cherry-picking of losses would no longer exist.
Under Marty’s preferred plan B, gains making gifts, and gains and losses at death,
would be recognized. More liberal provisions for deferred payment of tax as to
nonmarketable assets would be provided.
We are on common ground as to taxing gains on gifts and recognizing gains or losses
at death, with liberal provisions for deferred payment of the tax. I testified in favor of that
change in the 1979 hearings on the repeal of carryover basis. I think that change should
be made in all events, irrespective of the general treatment of capital gains and losses.
Except in the consumption income tax model, there is no justification in our income tax
system for a zero rate of tax on gains at death. Taxing gains at death would achieve
substantial transactional simplification, greater fairness, and increased economic efficiency
by eliminating the most severe, existing lock-in effect.
But Marty’s preference for annual accrual of gains and losses for marketable
property only seems to me to present severe problems of economic efficiency and
complexity. It would materially distort investment decisions to favor nonmarketable assets.
It would create tremendous incentives to avoid the "tradability" of securities and to find
ways to bury tradeable securities in non-tradable property interests. There would certainly
be great controversy about this distinction.

Accordingly, I opt instead for Marty’s plan C, whereby capital losses could be
deducted in full to the extent they exceed net unrealized appreciation with respect to
marketable property held by the taxpayer. Some pressure would exist, as under plan B, to
avoid the marketable property classification of assets, but to a far lesser degree. I would
extend this limitation on the allowance of losses to include losses on nonmarketable
property. I see no particular reason to allow unrestricted realization of losses on
nonmarketable property when the taxpayer has net unrealized appreciation in marketable
property. This third solution was also endorsed in the sixty-ninth American Assembly at
Arden House.
Martin Ginsburg notes that this third solution has been criticized because a taxpayer
could isolate his or her marketable property in a separate entity or in the hands of a
friendly offspring. I think we could handle the entity problem with our sophisticated
attribution rules. This would add little overall complexity because we already apply such
concepts for many other similar purposes in the Code.
If, as we both suggest, we tax gains on gifts, the offspring problem would be resolved.
If we do not, the problem might call for a slight extension of the "kiddie tax" rationale, to
take into account net unrealized appreciation of marketable property in the hands of minor
descendants. If the taxpayer has made a complete gift of property to relatives who are not
minors, we should not treat the taxpayer as having any interest in that unrealized apprecia
tion. On the other hand, if the gift is not complete, the transfer would be ineffective for
this purpose.
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In any event, the limited added complexity from these rules to prevent abuse is far
overshadowed by the advantages of simplification, fairness, and economic efficiency by
allowing recognition of the taxpayer’s losses except to the extent he or she has net
unrealized appreciation in marketable property.
I hope I have added another dimension to the debate.
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COMMENT ON "INCOME TAX COMPLEXITY:
CAPITAL GAIN AND LOSS ISSUES"

NORMAN B. TURE
*

Despite Marty Ginsburg’s and Jack Nolan’s preemptive strikes, I do intend to
demonstrate to you once more that lawyers and accountants on the one hand and
economists on the other march to different drummers.

Marty initiated his oral presentation with us this afternoon by indicating that he
had interpreted his assignment as requiring his single-minded focus on simplification issues.
And I would say notwithstanding his disclaimer that other issues will not intrude on his
discussion, I think it is, or should be apparent--at this point agreeing with Jack Nolanthat it is virtually impossible, and indeed vacuous, to assess the simplification aspects of the
law or proposals for its revision and ignore in that assessment what the likely impact of
those proposals will be on the true substance of the law and on the way in which the law
will change the incentives and disincentives confronting the people who must comply with
the tax law.
Simplification as a stand-alone issue, it seems to me, is, if not sterile, very close
thereto. Everybody has his own favorite example of the ultimate simplification scheme.
I have yet to hear of one that improves on Professor Milton Friedman’s two-line tax return:
line 1, How much did you make last year? line 2, Send it in.

*Norman B. Ture is president and founder of the Institute for Research on the
Economics of Taxation (IRET), a nonprofit public economic policy research institute based
in Washington, D.C. Dr. Ture has served as president of IRET since its founding in 1977,
with the exception of a leave of absence when he served as Under Secretary of the Treasury
in the Reagan Administration (1981-1982). His reputation as an entrepreneur and an
expert in economic policy-making and research is well known. Prior to founding IRET, Dr.
Ture had already founded his own economic consulting firm, Norman B. Ture, Inc. From
1968 to 1971, he was a principal of the Planning Research Corporation, a diversified
contract research company in McLean, Va. He was Director of Tax Studies at the National
Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. from 1961 to 1968.
Dr. Ture was a consultant to the Treasury Department on tax matters from 1962
to 1965, and was a member of task forces on taxation for Presidents Kennedy and Nixon.
He was a staff member of the Joint Economic Committee of Congress from 1955 to 1961
and a member of the Treasury Department’s tax analysis staff from 1951 to 1955. He has
taught economics at George Washington University (1969-70,1975-76), the Wharton School
of Finance at the University of Pennsylvania (1968-69), and Illinois College (1947-50). Dr.
Ture holds an M.A. and a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Chicago.
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I think it is perhaps churlish of me--having been invited to participate in this splendid
conference, having been wined and dined the other evening as part of that-to stand in front
of you and tell you that I disregard or treat very lightly simplification issues per se and, at
the very least, insist that all such issues and all such proposals should be evaluated in terms
of something to which in tax policy I believe we should give a much higher priority.

In the present circumstances, given what’s happened to the income tax over the last
several years, it seems to me that top priority certainly must be assigned to questions of tax
neutrality, questions of evaluating a body of the law and the thrust of the proposed changes
therein in terms of whether the tax law will continue-somewhat less or somewhat more-to alter the relative prices and costs that, as taxpayers, we will confront in the market
system.

It seems to me we ought to insist that the existing law be revised to minimize those
distortions. Doing so, we are at the same moment, whether we recognize it or not, focusing
on issues of efficiency, saving and investment, and economic growth. I will try to amplify
on that very briefly in just a moment or two.
Professor Ginsburg has given us, I think, an enchanting exposition, both on paper
and orally, of his solutions to problems that I think are misidentified. The fact of his
solutions and his misidentification of problems and issues, I think, derives from the
analytical context in which he and most tax policy people operate. It is a context provided
us, though many of us are not aware of this, by Professor Henry Simons, who I believe has
had more influence on the thinking about income taxes and about tax policy in general-I know this sounds like an extravagant statement, but I am prepared to back it up--than any
other human being in history.
Now, having made so hyperbolic an assertion, let me just briefly spell out for you
what Simons’s paradigm was. It was that we should rely primarily--if not, indeed,
exclusively--on an income tax, the base of which optimally would consist of an individual’s
consumption and the change in his or her net worth during the tax period. Notice there
would be no taxes on corporate entities or any entities other than real live human beings.

Now, one might ask whether that definition that virtually everybody either explicitly
or implicitly assumes to be correct indeed is the uniquely right definition of income for tax
purposes. It was challenged. It was challenged vigorously by some of the outstanding
economists of Henry Simons’s day, in particular by Professor Irving Fisher at Yale
University. Simons’s response was simple and all the more elegant for its simplicity. He
said, "There is one reason for an income tax. It is to reduce inequality in the distribution
of income and wealth." And one might ask, Why should that be an objective of policy?
"Because," Simons responded, "I, Henry C. Simons, regard inequality in the distribution of
income and wealth as aesthetically repulsive and morally repugnant."

Well, not all of us share that view, and I will now attest that I find it beautiful and
morally essential to have inequality in the distribution of income and wealth.
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Simons insisted that his concept of income and all of the prescriptions that he
offered for embodying it into an income tax law had a single purpose, to facilitate
equalizing the distribution of income and wealth. He granted that if you were to assign
another policy objective to taxation, his concept, the whole structure that he had erected,
might very well collapse.
Well, it is in the context of this Simons vision of an income tax and its reasons for
existence that we can identify as serious problems that are cast up by the existing tax
treatment of capital gains and losses, the problem of accrual versus realization, and the
cherry-picking problem that Professor Ginsburg has presented us.

Suppose we look at an alternative way of casting up an analytical context for
examining and assessing tax provisions. Suppose we start with the observation that an
income tax of essentially the basic structure that we now enjoy-or not, as the case may
be--is inherently biased against saving and, therefore, capital formation and in favor of
current consumption uses of current income. This bias can be represented algebraically or
arithmetically, and shows that under an income tax of essentially this character, the tax has
the effect of making it relatively more costly to use one’s income for purposes of acquiring
sources of future income than to use one’s income for current consumption.

The question is: What social purpose is served by such a tax? Clearly, it is
antisocial to bias us against saving and in favor of current consumption uses of our income.
Simons, incidentally, recognized explicitly, repeatedly, and frequently that his tax
prescriptions would, indeed, if implemented anywhere near fully, have the effect of
socializing saving and capital formation, because, if fully implemented, there would be no
impetus, no incentive for anyone to save and to invest. His response to that was: So be
it. As far as he was concerned, the objective of equalizing the distribution of income and
wealth was far more consequential, deserved much more of our attention, than any concerns
about the efficiency with which the economy operated. His answer to this charge was:
Well, let the state do the saving and investing.
For people who, particularly in the recent weeks, perceive the failure of statism, of
collectivization of such decisions in the hands of the state, it seems to me Simons’
prescriptions and their basis, conceptual and philosophic, require careful re-examination at
this time.

Suppose that in lieu of the Simons approach we were dedicated to designing an
income tax that was as nearly neutral as it could be, at least with respect to its impact on
the choice between saving and consumption uses of current income. As Jack Nolan has
indicated, what we would do under those circumstances is either to include in current
taxable income the amount the taxpayer saves and exempt from tax all of the returns on
that saving or to do the reverse. We would allow him to deduct from his current income
for current income tax purposes all of his current saving but fully tax the gross proceeds
representing the returns on that saving. Analytically, these are perfectly equivalent
approaches.
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Now notice what falls out if, indeed, we take one or the other of these approaches.
We would look at the existing treatment of income that is saved, and we would detect a
fundamental bias because we tax both the amount that is saved and all the returns thereon
and tax them, incidentally, over and over and over again in one way or another. We would
also identify the tax on capital gains as essentially equivalent, in the case of most assets, to
a third tier or layer of tax on the identical income stream.
The tax on capital gains in the case of, say, common stocks, which represents a very
substantial fraction of Marty’s marketable assets, is essentially the same thing as currently
taxing the undistributed earnings of corporate entities. But by virtue of the realization
criterion, we defer that tax. That tax deferral and the benefit that follows therefrom should
not be regarded, in the context I have just offered to you, as a benefit but as a modest
abatement, a modest amelioration of the penalty of the third layer of tax on the returns on
saving.
Therefore, that context suggests there certainly is no analytical impulse for
accelerating for tax purposes the realization of capital gains. Anything that moves in that
direction is counterproductive. For that very reason, it seems to me, Marty’s prescription
(A, B, or C) is counterproductive. It would, indeed, somewhat enhance the penalty tax that
is represented by taxing capital gains.

By the same token, his concern about the cherry-picking of losses, it seems to me,
ought to be viewed in the tax neutrality context for assessing the existing tax treatment. We
do limit very severely the deductibility and offsetting of capital losses against other income.
Notice what that does, whether we intend it as such or not. In doing so, we skew the
probability distribution of tax gains or losses in the government’s favor, the consequence
of which is that we increase the risk-laden rate of discount or investment in capital assets.
What social purpose is served by that? I hesitate to say. I know of none that I can identify
for you.
Cherry-picking should be seen not as an evil, not as a failure of the tax to deal fairly
and efficiently with particular situations in the law. Rather, it should be seen as only the
most modest modification of a very substantial bias that the existing law exerts against
savings and investment. By the same token, the general proposition that Marty puts before
you (that is, marking to market for purposes of accelerating, in fact if not in theory, the
realization of capital gains) has, it seems to me, the effect of intensifying, of enhancing the
effective rate of this third-tier tax on capital gains.

In a policy context in which we are concerned about the alleged inadequacy of saving
and of capital formation in this country, it seems to me that the principal way in which we
ought to assess propositions of this sort is in terms of their likely effect on the cost of saving
as compared to the cost of current consumption. I think it is inescapable that this sort of
proposal must necessarily increase the cost of saving relative to the cost of current
consumption.

Thank you very much.
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Part II

The Conference Proceedings

WELCOMING COMMENTS-JANUARY 11, 1990

ARTHUR S. HOFFMAN
*

Good morning, and welcome to the Invitational Conference on Reduction of Income
Tax Complexity. It is under the joint sponsorship of the Tax Division and the American
Bar Association’s Tax Section.

We are fortunate to have a distinguished steering committee, which has been chaired
by Stewart Dunn and Don Summa, representing the Section and the Division, respectively.
The members of that committee are Dave Glickman, Dick Katcher, Ray Sommerfeld, Jay
Starkman, Alvin Warren, and Don Wiese.
Our attendance is not only an expression of interest in the subject but also is a
tribute to the members of that steering committee. Their reputations indicate to us that
the conference is a dead-serious effort to accomplish a tangible result.

The conference manual is a collection of excellent papers by outstanding tax
professionals. It is clear from those papers that we know, in heart and mind, that the
legislative process cannot continue unabated. The tax law is being contorted to produce
targeted revenue estimates. These days, policy and concern for administrability appear to
be forsaken.
Charles McLure detects a "general fiscal craziness" and a "pervasive incoherence."
He says that "tax policy has been put together badly because tax policy is, in the words of
the old definition of a camel, a horse designed by a committee.
The great fear that we as tax professionals and as responsible citizens should have
is that a large body of otherwise compliant taxpayers will say, "I can’t understand how the
law applies. I know that the IRS cannot enforce it. So the hell with it. I’ll take whatever
position is best for me, catch as catch can."

*Arthur S. Hoffman is the chairman of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA) Federal Taxation Executive Committee. Mr. Hoffman has previously
served as chairman of the AICPA Tax Policy and Planning Subcommittee and president of
the New York State Society of CPAs. He is a partner in the firm of Spicer & Oppenheim
in New York City.
Mr. Hoffman graduated from Columbia University (B.S., 1958) and New York
University (J.D., 1963). He is a member of the American Institute of CPAs, the New York
Society of CPAs, the American Bar Association, the New York Bar Association, and the
Estate Planning Council of New York City.
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Now, what good are revenue estimates in those circumstances? What terrible
damage those circumstances would do to the indispensable factor of voluntary compliance.

This conference has been called because, as we see the weight and the density of
new provisions and their regulations, it is apparent that the tiny priesthood of lawyers and
accountants who are supposed to understand the law’s arcane provisions is shrinking, and
taxpayer compliance will follow--that is to say, will shrink.
Now, why is this happening? Charles McLure makes a highly perceptive point: One
possible interpretation of events of the past decade is that the budget deficit, together with
the reconciliation process, has opened up the tax-writing process as never before to the
influence of non experts in the Congress--non experts who have little appreciation for the
damage their seemingly well intentioned proposals can wreak on simplicity and no
allegiance to a coherent and stable tax system.

I believe that interpretation is correct.
I wonder whether if genetic engineers were given freedom to act without policy
constraints, they would create a no-legged, two-headed, four-armed human being. They
might do so on the compelling theory that such a person would be more productive to
society: For one thing, they could operate two computer terminals at one time.
Unfortunately, absent policy constraints, certain recent tax legislation contains analogously
monstrous characteristics and displays a similar lack of concern for the ultimate cost to
society.
I see an equation between certain taxpayer and legislative behavior. It is quite
proper to criticize a taxpayer who chooses to play the "audit lottery"-taking a position
which is highly questionable and even frivolous-hoping he won’t get caught. How
degrading to the self-assessment system. I put it to you that it is more degrading of the
system for those who draft tax laws to engage in the "legislative lottery"--sponsoring a
provision while ignoring the impossibility of its application by taxpayers and the IRS--in the
hope that this brutalization of tax policy will not be disclosed as such in hearings or by tax
professionals.
What can we do? Tax professionals should stop being tolerant and resigned to
seeing proposals that further complicate the law. We can be so understanding of their
causation that we can contribute to the deterioration of the system by our silence.

Bob Shapiro says the following:

Three major groups will have to lead this charge: professional tax advisors
who deal more directly with the system in advising clients; the Treasury
Department which, from its position as regulator and collector, is closest to
the system; and Congress, which must be willing to participate and take a
lead role.
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He asks: "Why would Congress take the initiative? "Because," he says, "Complexity
breeds a contempt for the system and the members." How true! And why should
professional tax advisors and Treasury and all of us take initiatives against complexity?
Because we are part of the system and are not free of the stigma.
Yet it is a repeated theme to say that "there is no public constituency for tax
simplification" and none in the legislative process.
I appeal to the participants in this conference not to be defeatist. We know
perfectly well what is the right thing to do. I believe that the public constituency for
simplification is vast, but it needs the focus and articulation we can provide.

Over the last two years, subcommittees of the AICPA Tax Division have developed
positions in areas of possible legislation, especially those areas where complexities existed
or complexities were threatened to exist. The Executive Committee reviewed and adopted
those positions early enough to be ready for Congressional hearings, and we testified in
areas such as civil tax penalties, section 89, leveraged buyouts, corporate alternative
minimum tax, and section 2036(c).
Incidentally, the civil tax penalty provisions were reformed and simplified in 1989
through a marvelously successful collegial process involving IRS, Treasury, the staff of the
House Ways and Means Oversight Subcommittee, the ABA, the AICPA, and other
organizations. The approach is a model for future attacks upon complexity.

In every area of testimony, we stressed how complexity damages the system, and we
will again. We will be ready for submission of positions in the upcoming debates on, to
mention a few, unrelated business income taxation of tax-exempt organizations, integration
of taxation of corporations with shareholders, and estate and gift taxation.
In addition, we want to chip away at the complex provisions of the Code. We have
a Subcommittee on Simplification chaired by Jay Starkman, who is on the task force of this
conference. That subcommittee is assembling recommendations by the dozens. They are
being designed to be a part of a comprehensive simplification act that, at least in principle,
every Congressman we have spoken to would like to sponsor.

I want the participants to know that the resources of the Tax Division of the AICPA
will be devoted to delivery of the message that develops out of this conference. It will be
delivered to the Congress, to the media, and to the public.
Since these are opening remarks on our first day, I am not in a position to define
our final message; but even this early in the morning, I know that we will say that tax laws
should not be passed the way the papers in the conference manual describe as current
practice. Let us dedicate ourselves to making this conference merely the first volley in the
civil war of the nineties to produce a tax law which is more understandable and
administrable and more worthy of respect.
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I want to conclude with the following. It is my recommendation that we see what
develops over these two days and that we express our views on whether we should declare
ourselves charter members of an ad hoc group to promote the theme of this conference and
whether we believe that the ABA Tax Section and AICPA Tax Division should maintain
the steering committee to create events such as this conference, and perhaps, to organize
us at times to rise up and smite some particularly ill conceived proposal.

Thank you very much.
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KEYNOTE ADDRESS -JANUARY 11, 1990

LAWRENCE B. GIBBS
*

It is a distinct honor and a personal pleasure for me to be able to offer my remarks
today as your keynote speaker. I commend and congratulate the American Bar Association
Taxation Section and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants Tax Division
for sponsoring this timely and important conference.
I know I express the feelings of all of us in thanking our co-chairmen, Don Summa
and Stewart Dunn, and the other members of the steering committee for their hard work
and leadership in preparing for and presenting this Invitational Conference on Reduction
of Income Tax Complexity.
For the next two days, we will be exploring ways to reduce the complexity of our
federal income tax system. It is relevant to our discussion to note that twelve years ago at
the Airlie House here in the Washington area a similar conference was held to discuss the
simplification of our tax laws. It is significant, I think, that twelve years later, the emphasis
is on the reduction of tax complexity rather than on simplicity--how to make our tax system
less complex, not how to make it simple.

This is an honest approach to a difficult problem. It is an approach that recognizes
that our tax system-the law, its formulation, administration, and enforcement--is, in fact,
inherently and necessarily complex. By its very nature, our tax law reflects the change and
complexity of our economy and society. It reflects the incredible diversity and ingenuity
that are our country’s traditional hallmarks from Wall Street to Main Street.
As we begin our discussion, let us also recognize, and state the significance of the
fact, that our tax law is legislated, administered, and enforced by our federal government
--itself a system that has all of the complexities and inefficiencies that result from the
checks and balances that were intentionally built into the system by our Founding Fathers.

*Lawrence B. Gibbs is currently a shareholder and director in the law firm of
Johnson & Gibbs in Washington, D.C. Mr. Gibbs served as Commissioner of Internal
Revenue in Washington, D.C., from August 1986 to March 1989. He also served as
Assistant Commissioner (Technical) of the Internal Revenue Service from November 1973
to December 1975, and as Deputy Chief Counsel and Acting Chief Counsel for the IRS
from November 1972 to November 1973.
Mr. Gibbs graduated from Yale University (B.A. 1960) and University of Texas
School of Law at Austin (J.D. 1963). He is a member of the American College of Tax
Counsel, the American College of Probate Counsel, the American Law Institute, the
Supreme Court of the United States, the American Bar Association, the Federal Bar
Association, the Texas Bar Association, and the Dallas Bar Association.
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The Legislative Branch, particularly the House of Representatives, was purposely designed
to ensure that the views of each of the diverse and competing constituencies would be
heard. The failure to adopt a parliamentary system -- thereby assuring the possibility of
conflicting political and ideological philosophies between the executive and the legislative
branches - was intentional. The bifurcation of the formulation of tax policy and its
administration was deliberate, as was the decision to give the Department of Justice and
the courts the power to interpret and enforce (or withhold enforcement of) tax legislation
and tax regulations.
But even allowing for the inherent complexity of our society, economy, and system
of government, a feeling has developed that the tax law today has become overly complex
to the point where there is concern whether the tax law continues to be administrable by
the Internal Revenue Service, and no longer comprehensible by most taxpayers and many
of their advisers.

Part of the complexity is attributable to the magnitude and the velocity of changes
to the statute itself--an incredible 153 separate amendments to the Internal Revenue Code
in the last fifteen years, an average of more than ten separate changes each year for the
last decade and a half. Each year’s changes are seemingly more voluminous than the last-ERTA, TEFRA, DEFRA, REA, TAMRA, COBRA, OBRA, and of course, TRA ’86, just
to mention a few.

And the changes do not affect only the so-called wealthy and sophisticated. For
example, after the TRA ’86, one of the most common errors on the 1040As and the
1040EZs-the simplest forms that are generally used by lower-income taxpayers-was the
failure to claim the standard deduction, which for these taxpayers was the largest tax benefit
that they received under TRA ’86. Were the errors attributable to the complexity of the
law or of the computation? No. The errors were attributable to TRA ’86 change from the
zero-bracket amount, which was built into the tax tables before 1986, to the standard
deduction, which required a separate computation after the 1986 act. Or, as one of the top
IRS taxpayer service assisters said to me one day: "The rules change so fast that on busy
days during the filing season, I have real trouble remembering whether the rule I am
explaining to the taxpayer on the telephone applies to last year’s return, this year’s return,
or next year’s return."

Quite apart from the magnitude and the velocity of the tax changes, the provisions
themselves have often become incredibly complex. Our subjects for tomorrow-the at-risk
rules, the passive activity loss provisions, employee benefits, and capital gains--literally
boggle the mind. Provisions having wide application are becoming more and more
complex-the alternative minimum tax and the accounting provisions in the general business
area, the international tax rules, even the interest and penalty provisions that are applicable
to individuals, corporations, and other taxpayers.
Again, the complexity is not limited to the wealthy and the sophisticated. Over the
last three years, in attempting to determine why the IRS had such a low accuracy rate in
answering questions about the deduction for personal exemptions (which every individual
taxpayer can claim), I was astonished to learn that in order to give a technically correct
II-A-6

answer to a taxpayer’s question about the personal exemption deduction, an IRS assister
might be required to sort through some forty-two separate questions with the taxpayer.

I believe it is important for us therefore to focus on the impact of change and
complexity in our tax law. Many in our audience today and tomorrow are members of the
so-called tiny priesthood of lawyers and accountants who generally understand what our
tax laws and our tax system is all about. The tax law change and complexity that we are
going to discuss is, in my opinion, affecting the priesthood. I am frankly disturbed about
the trend toward increasing specialization and the concomitant trend toward larger
professional organizations among tax practitioners within the government as well as in the
private sector. I am equally concerned about the prospect of a national court of tax
appeals, driven in no small part by the concerns about the increasing complexity of our tax
law. But frankly, I am most concerned about the plight of practitioners in communities and
firms that are too small to permit specialization.
I think we should remember that the overwhelming majority of federal income tax
returns are prepared by non-CPAs in relatively small firms. This takes on added
significance when we realize the growing trend of taxpayers to rely on paid preparers to fill
out their tax returns.
According to the IRS, almost 50 percent of individual filers now use a paid preparer,
and the IRS suspects that the actual figure is even higher in the sense that many taxpayers
rely on others-a family member or friend-to prepare their return without compensation.

If the Money article of last year was correct in suggesting that only a handful of
accounting firms accurately prepare relatively simple individual tax returns, and if the IRS
taxpayer service polls last year were correct that IRS employees give correct and complete
answers no more than 65 percent of the time, what does that mean for non-CPAs and
taxpayers in general?
Regardless of what it means, is the question important? I submit that it is
important. Why? Because our tax system really does depend on the voluntary compliance
of our taxpayers. In order to voluntarily comply, taxpayers must be both willing and able
to comply. If, because of change and complexity, trained practitioners and the IRS have
difficulty in understanding how to comply, do we really believe that relatively untrained
taxpayers and less sophisticated practitioners will be better able to comply?

Perhaps a more telling point: If taxpayers believe that the law is so complex that
not even tax lawyers and accountants or the IRS can get the right answer, are taxpayers
going to be willing to comply?
Some say yes - because of the economic and potential criminal sanctions applicable
if a taxpayer fails to comply. I disagree. Although I believe that such sanctions are
important, I do not believe that you can rely on the fear of sanctions to motivate 200
million taxpayers. Indeed, at some level of change and complexity, I believe it is both
unfair and counterproductive to rely on sanctions to encourage compliance. This was
certainly an important premise of the recent legislation to simplify and reduce the tax
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penalty provisions.

And in any event, the tax gap studies by the Service suggest that after-the-fact com
pliance and enforcement efforts are irrelevant in the face of substantial noncompliance.
That is, the tax gap studies indicate that even if you give the IRS all of the compliance
resources that it can absorb, the IRS can collect on a cost-effective basis no more than
about 35-40 percent of the net tax gap because the remainder is likely to be in such small
amounts over so many taxpayers that it is simply not cost-effective for the IRS to collect it.

It is my opinion that for a variety of reasons most American taxpayers today
voluntarily attempt to comply with their tax obligations. The real threat of change and
complexity in our tax system is that they may so undermine the willingness and ability of
a sufficiently large number of our taxpayers to voluntarily comply that it could substantially
and adversely affect our tax system. And our tax system, let us remember, is currently
raising in excess of $1 trillion annually, which is quite literally the price that we are paying
for the standard of living that we enjoy today.

Will it happen? Will change and complexity lead to a substantial increase in
noncompliance? I do not know, but the rising noncompliance rates during the recent tax
shelter era should give us cause for concern. In this connection, the 1987 report on the
ABA Commission on Taxpayer Compliance, which grew out of the 1983 Reston Conference
on Compliance, recognizes that change and complexity are significant sources of
noncompliance. The report urges Congress to address change and complexity "so that
ignorance of or uncertainty about the law will become less important as a source of
noncompliance."
In evaluating the risk that continued change and complexity may lead to substantial
increase in noncompliance, remember that each one-percent change in the compliance rate
involves an estimated loss or gain of $5.5 billion in annual tax revenue. My point is that
some risks are so great that they should not be taken, and I believe this is one of them.
This is therefore my basis for believing that we should properly be concerned about the
impact of change and complexity on our tax system.
What can we do about change and complexity? I believe that our discussion during
the next two days will provide a good start in developing answers to this important but
difficult question. As with any problem, it seems that the best way to start is to determine
the root causes of change and complexity in our tax law. Experience teaches us that we
should not be surprised if there are many causes. I urge that in the process, we resist the
temptation to lay blame or to look for quick fixes.

I believe that for the most part, we will find that the causes are not people problems
but systemic problems. The background papers by Charles McLure, Buck Chapoton,
Roscoe Egger, Bobby Shapiro, and Deborah Schenk do an excellent job in illuminating
some of these systemic causes, not the least of which are the political, economic, and
governmental processes that make up our tax system.

Although I concur with the sentiment expressed by some of our speakers that it is
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likely to be difficult to develop a constituency for reduction of income tax complexity, I
believe that the constituency can be developed if (1) the dangers of complexity can be
explained to the public, (2) the causes can be fairly and comprehensively described, and (3)
realistic, reasonable solutions can be proposed.

I do not suggest that the task will be easy, but I do suggest that the task will be no
more formidable than was that of educating and mobilizing the American public about the
importance of reducing the federal budget deficit.
Another cause for my optimism lies in the fact that each of several of our speakers
proposes that different parts of our tax system should take the lead in finding ways to
reduce income tax complexity. Bob Shapiro suggests that the leadership should be in the
Joint Committee on Taxation and its staff. Buck Chapoton suggests that the Treasury
Department through the Office of the Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy) should take the lead.
Roscoe Egger suggests that the Internal Revenue Service should play a key leadership role.

My own opinion is that because of the number and types of causes of the problem,
it will be necessary to have substantial leadership and participation from both the public
and private sectors to identify causes and develop solutions. Certainly the nature of our
system of government is such that a collegial, if not consensual, approach will be necessary.
In this regard, I wish to highlight a significant difference between the agenda for this
conference and that of the Airlie House Conference, namely, the increased emphasis at this
conference on possible changes in the processes by which the tax law is legislated,
administered, and enforced, as well as the more traditional discussion of structural reform
of the Code itself. Ultimately, it seems to me likely that Congress, its tax writing
committees and staffs, the Office of Management and Budget, Treasury and IRS, the
Department of Justice and the courts, state and foreign governments, professional and
taxpayer groups, the media, and others will have to be involved in some fashion if we are
to successfully address the problem and the challenge of reducing income tax complexity.

I am encouraged that the breadth of this participation has already begun.
Increasingly, we hear from members and staff of Congress that reduction of income tax
complexity is beginning to make an appearance on their radar screens-validation, perhaps,
that media and constituent mail are increasingly targeting Congress for the growing
complexity of tax forms and instructions. Treasury and the IRS have already begun to
address complexity issues in the regulations and administrative process, and I was delighted
to learn that the IRS recently has adopted the reduction of income tax complexity as one
of its specific objectives in its strategic business plan. I think it was constructive that the
IRS Research Conference explored this issue; I also was delighted to learn that the
American College of Tax Counsel, in conjunction with the Southern Federal Tax Institute,
has taken a substantial step to fund a major study in this area.
Another reason for my optimism is that history validates the impact that conferences
like this can have. Looking back, I honestly believe that the Reston Conference on
Compliance in 1983 was one of the most significant factors of the last decade in addressing
the causes and solutions of the noncompliance problem. And as I mentioned earlier, I am
concerned that change and complexity may well become the noncompliance project for the
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1990s. In short, I am hopeful that over the next several days we can make a difference,
even if it is simply to take the first steps of that thousand-mile journey.
Continuing in the Chinese vein, it seems to me that we do indeed live in interesting
times. With the events in Eastern Europe last year, I think all of us have been impressed
by how quickly major changes can and do occur in our world today. Why not, therefore,
a change designed to reduce change and complexity in our tax system? Would such a
change be any more remarkable than the other changes that are occurring around us?

To conclude my opening remarks, I wish to look beyond the discussion of the next
two days. Some already are understandably questioning what we and this conference are
likely to accomplish. Will our concerns and our discussion simply be "sound and fury,
signifying nothing," to borrow Shakespeare’s phrase, or will they lead to something more
lasting? The difficulty in reducing income tax complexity and the substantial time and
talents of those who previously have attempted to do so suggest the wisdom of
underpromising in hopes of overperforming.

And yet, the importance of reducing tax complexity and the risks of failing to do so
suggest that we should be bolder and more assertive. I therefore urge each of us over the
next two days to be energetic and provocative as we begin to explore the causes of tax
complexity and seek solutions for reducing it. I further call upon the ABA Taxation
Section and the AICPA Tax Division, the sponsors of our conference, to take up where we
leave off tomorrow and to provide the continuing leadership for finding ways to bring about
a meaningful, lasting reduction of income tax complexity.
And as we approach these challenges, I think we have something going for us that
we should neither forget nor underestimate. Unlike most of the countries around the
world, the United States made a voluntary decision to adopt a federal income tax. It was
not imposed by a conquering nation, nor exacted by the government. It was ratified by the
American people almost eighty years ago.

Over the last eighty years, there have been many challenges to our income tax
system. We have always had the will and developed the leadership to respond to these
challenges to make our tax system grow and prosper. I believe it is important that we
rekindle the ingenuity and energy to do it again. It will not be easy. It will take patience
and persistence. I look forward to our discussion today and tomorrow.
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Sources of Tax Complexity:
The Budget Process

Session 1: Thursday Morning, January 11, 1990
Presenter:
Moderator:
Panelists:

Charles E. McLure, Jr.
Alvin C. Warren
David F. Bradford
David H. Brockway
*

The purpose of this session was to focus on the role of the budget process in
contributing to tax complexity. Charles E. McLure, Jr.1 began the session by suggesting
that the interaction between the budget process and complexity in the tax law is a relatively
recent phenomenon, having its roots in the Budget Act of 1974, the end of easy expansion
of federal spending, the 1981 tax cut, presidential promises of ”no new taxes,” and the
budget limitations imposed by the Gramm-Ruddman-Hollings Act.

These forces have led to tax writing that is more motivated by meeting revenue
targets than by careful consideration of tax policy, by reliance on politically innocuous but
complex "loophole closers," by frequent use of transition rules, and by too little attention
to technical details when legislation is written. In spite of these complexity-increasing
forces, the new budget process has led to greater recognition of the costs associated with
tax expenditures.
Professor McLure offered three proposals to improve the tax legislation process.
The first is to meet budget targets by adjusting tax rates rather than adjusting the tax base.
He acknowledged that there are problems associated with this approach but believed the
outcome would result in less complexity than under the current system. Alternatively, he
proposed a more radical approach, in which only basic rules would be written by Congress,
with greater responsibility for writing regulations delegated to the Treasury Department.
This proposal would reduce the power of the Congress to "fine tune" legislation to satisfy
special interest groups. A third proposal would be to do nothing, under the assumption
that the underlying problem is the federal budget deficit, not the budget process.

*Charles E. McLure, Jr. is a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford
University.
Alvin C. Warren is Professor of Law at Harvard Law School.
David F. Bradford is Professor of Economics and Public Affairs at Princeton
University.
David H. Brockway is a tax partner in the New York and Washington, D.C. offices
of Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood and former Chief of Staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation of the U.S. Congress.
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Professor David Bradford2 concluded, however, that there is no compelling link
between the annual budget cycle and our increasingly complex tax law. Instead, he placed
blame on the ’’inadequacy of the budget language”; that is, a constraint that requires
increased revenue without changing rate schedules ("no new taxes") leads to complex tax
rules to accomplish what could have been produced with a simple change in nominal rates.
In particular, he noted that tax expenditures can be manipulated to avoid the appearance
of a tax increase.

Professor Bradford called for a budgetary language with clear, economic content.
Because he is pessimistic about achieving such "radical reform of the language," he offered
an alternative suggestion: to move toward "a system in which the inadequacies of the
income definition . . . will do less harm and in which the complexity will be concentrated
among fewer taxpayers." Two specific suggestions were to tax business and capital income
at a uniform rate and to tax both forms of income at source. The effect of these two
changes would be to reduce the significance of legal form and reduce the number of
taxpayers who would have to deal with complex rules.

The second panelist, David Brockway,3 asserted that the problem is with the people
attending the conference, who, in their various roles, represent individuals who do not want
simplification if it hurts them or their clients. Moreover, even tax reformers put their
desire for equity or for increased saving and investment above the goal of simplification.
To achieve simplification, all parties must be willing to compromise some of their
substantive desires.
Mr. Brockway disagreed with Professor McLure that the budget process has a great
deal to do with increasing tax law complexity. Indeed, he believes there has been no
rigorous analysis of the overall effect of the relationship between the budget process and
tax legislation. He rejected both of Professor McLure’s positive proposals (limiting the role
of Congress in writing tax law and a "rates only" approach to achieving revenue neutrality)
as unrealistic and unsupported by any evidence that they would result in simplification of
the tax law. Simplification can be achieved only when it is the principal goal, not when the
principal goal is some substantial political objective.
Following the general remarks by the panelists, Professor Warren noted that
although Professor Bradford’s proposal to tax income at a uniform rate at source would
certainly simplify the tax law, Mr. Brockway would characterize this plan as a perfect
example of the conflict between simplicity and other goals such as progressivity. Professor
Bradford pointed out that he had proposed taxing business and capital income--not labor
income-at a uniform rate.

Comments and questions were then offered from the floor. One participant stated
his belief that complexity has increased for the vast majority of individual taxpayers.
Further, he blamed some of the increased complexity on the fact that legislators are more
interested in revenue neutrality than they are in well-thought-out proposals to change the
tax law. Mr. Brockway responded that the greatest resistance to simplification comes from
individual taxpayers who do not want simplification if it costs them more in taxes. He
asserted that in the aggregate, filing tax returns is simpler for individuals because of
changes such as the 2 percent floor on miscellaneous deductions.
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Another participant wondered if a change in campaign finance laws would lead to
greater simplicity in the law. He noted that this solution seems more viable than some of
Professor McLure’s proposals.
It was pointed out that substantive tax reform is not necessarily inconsistent with
simplicity. For example, charitable contributions could be limited to basis, and installment
sales treatment eliminated. Mr. Brockway agreed that both suggestions would be good tax
policy and would lead to simplification. Referring to the previous comment, he doubted
that reforming campaign contribution laws would lead to much simplification because
eliminating tax preferences is never popular.
One participant asked Professor Bradford if his idea of collecting tax at a uniform
rate at the source might produce distortions and inequities because of the large amount of
interest income that flows to tax exempt organizations and to foreigners. Professor
Bradford agreed that these questions would have to be addressed.

Another participant noted that Mr. Brockway’s comments that substantive changes
lead to complexity is typical of statements from the Joint Committee; that is, there is no
concern for simplicity or ease of compliance. Instead, there seems to be an obsession with
closing loopholes. Mr. Brockway responded that political pressures prevent simplification
from being the highest priority. "I just think you are misunderstanding what the political
process is about," he stated.

The final question came from a participant who was skeptical that delegating tax
writing authority to the Treasury Department would result in simplification. Audience
response indicated that many shared his opinion. Professor McLure admitted it is not a
definitive answer but rather a proposal for discussion.
A final exchange between Professors McLure and Bradford concerned the latter’s
proposal to treat tax expenditures and "expenditure expenditures" in the same way in the
budget process. Professor McLure noted that the conference is concerned with tax
complexity, and such a proposal would clutter up the tax law "with things that could better
be done in the budget." Professor Bradford responded that distinguishing a tax from an
expenditure does not do away with complexity as a matter of substance.
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FOOTNOTES
1 Professor McLure’s Conference Paper is reproduced in Part I (A-l).

2 Professor Bradford’s Conference Paper is reproduced in Part I (B-l).

3 Mr. Brockway’s comments are reproduced in Part I (C-l).
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The Role of the Treasury Department in Reducing Tax Complexity

Session 2: Thursday Morning, January 11, 1990
Presenter:
Moderator:
Panelists:

John E. Chapoton
David G. Glickman
Frederic W. Hickman
Donald C. Lubick
*

The purpose of this session was to focus on the Treasury Department’s role in
reducing tax complexity. The moderator, David G. Glickman, noted that the speaker and
panelists, each a former Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, were well qualified to discuss
this subject.

John Chapoton1 began the session by stating that his goal was to present some
specific "real world" solutions that he believes can be implemented, albeit with difficulty.
He first classified levels of complexity by taxpayer type. Level 1 is experienced by taxpayers
who prepare the simplest tax returns. They do not itemize deductions, and their
transactions are generally uncomplicated. Mr. Chapoton asserted that tax compliance has
been simplified for level 1 taxpayers. Level 2 taxpayers itemize deductions and may have
some complex investments or personal circumstances (such as divorce). These taxpayers
engage in little or no tax planning but probably need professional help to prepare their
returns. Level 3 taxpayers are the most sophisticated. They include businesses, and they
engage in extensive tax planning. These taxpayers require professional advice in planning
and accounting for their transactions.

Mr. Chapoton stated his belief that the causes of complexity are the frequency of tax
legislation, the speed of the legislative process, and the fact that much legislation is
revenue-driven. Furthermore, there is no serious constituency in the legislative process for
simplification. His conclusion was that it is critical to fix responsibility and accountability
for complexity in the Office of Tax Policy at the Treasury Department with the Assistant
Secretary for Tax Policy. Mr. Chapoton selected this office because it is somewhat more
removed from the political process than the tax writing staffs, it initiates most tax
legislation, it has a great deal of independence, and it works closely with the IRS in solving
complexity problems. The Assistant Secretary of Tax Policy would therefore have the best
chance of building a constituency for simplification.
*John E. Chapoton, Frederic W. Hickman, and Donald C. Lubick all have served
as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy. Mr. Chapoton is now a partner with
the law firm of Vinson & Elkins in Washington, D.C.; Mr. Hickman is a senior partner with
the law firm of Hopkins & Sutter in Chicago; and Mr. Lubick is a partner in the firm of
Hodgson, Russ, Andrews, Woods & Goodyear in Washington, D.C. David G. Glickman is
the Managing Director of the Washington, D.C. office of the Dallas law firm Johnson &
Gibbs.
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If Mr. Chapoton’s suggestion were accepted, he would have the Assistant Secretary
designate a "simplification czar" who would engage in hypothetical simplification proposals
involving certain areas of the Code. The purpose of this effort would be to demonstrate
that meaningful simplification can be accomplished and to develop techniques to
accomplish it. He argued this would give simplification intellectual credibility in the Office
of Tax Policy and should help create a constituency for simplification in that office. One
goal should be to protect level 2 taxpayers from rules that really are aimed at level 3
taxpayers. Another goal should be to provide sufficient certainty at reasonable cost for
Level 3 taxpayers.
A specific technique suggested by Mr. Chapoton is to have more "dollar thresholds"
built into the law to reduce the number of taxpayers who have to worry about provisions.
Another is to have "gross income thresholds" under which certain taxpayers do not have
to worry about particular provisions. In drafting provisions, exceptions should all be in one
place so that some taxpayers can easily determine that they are unaffected. Finally, he
endorsed "horizontal drafting," suggested in 1979 by Ward Hussey. Under this technique,
the same concept applies across-the-board to a number of Code provisions. For example,
this technique could be applied to the various constructive ownership rules.
In summing up, Mr. Chapoton emphasized that the simplification director he
proposes should be a major player in any legislative proposals put forward by the Office of
Tax Policy. Further, all proposals sent forward from the office should be drafted in
legislative language. Finally, the IRS should have a counterpart to the simplification
director, with similar authority to deal with complexity problems in the regulations.

The first panelist, Frederic Hickman,2 noted that several conditions at the Treasury
Department would limit and shape any effort to do the things suggested by Mr. Chapoton.
The first of these is the fact that the Treasury Department staff are intelligent but also
inexperienced. He endorsed the view, expressed elsewhere, that while the veteran lawyer
will deliberately decide not to draft against every contingency he can foresee, the
inexperienced lawyer does not have the judgment or the self-confidence to know when to
stop elaborating. He emphasized that in endorsing that view he was not complaining, but
only reporting on an unavoidable condition that must be taken into account.
The second limiting fact is what Mr. Hickman referred to as a "theological
commitment" to the Haig-Simons definition of income, a definition that Professor Simons
intended as an ideal standard, not as a definition to be enacted. Mr. Hickman asserted that
good tax policy requires frequent departures from the Haig-Simons ideal.

Given these limiting factors, Mr. Hickman had four comments regarding Mr.
Chapoton’s proposals. First, he noted that Mr. Chapoton’s proposed "simplification czar"
would have to be the Assistant Secretary of Treasury himself in order to have the capability
to do the job. Second, he noted that although it is a useful idea for the Office of Tax
Policy to be held "publicly accountable" for simplification, the Joint Committee is much for
responsible for legislation and there can be no real simplification unless it is an enthusiastic
partner in the effort. Third, horizontal drafting is a useful technique, but it is not practical
in the near term to redraft the Internal Revenue Code. Finally, Mr. Hickman stated that
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his one disagreement with Mr. Chapoton’s paper is with its lack of emphasis on the role of
regulations. This is one area in which the Treasury Department can have an impact on
simplification without "endless political compromises."
The second panelist, Donald Lubick,3 agreed with Mr. Chapoton that the most
serious complexity problems are faced by level 3 taxpayers. However, the number of
taxpayers in this group is probably smaller than it once was.

Mr. Lubick disagreed that a tax simplification czar would solve the problem. He
believed it would not be wise to "take any of the heat off Joint Tax or off Ways and Means
or Senate Finance staffs." In fact, he stated that the staffs deserve primary responsibility
for several of our most complex sets of rules, including section 89 and the pension rules.
Further, he noted that the Office of Tax Policy is not independent of Bush administration
pressure and may be obsessed with the "adoption of intricate devices to keep waterproof
the legislative dikes." In short, Mr. Lubick asserted that simplification must be a high
priority for the Assistant Secretary of Tax Policy as well as the Joint Committee and the
Senate Finance and Ways and Means chiefs of staff.
Specific projects such as those proposed by Mr. Chapoton should be funded by
Office of Tax Policy contract money. These projects should include alumni of the Treasury
and staffs with practical experience.

The moderator, David G. Glickman, then opened the floor for comments and
questions. The first came from a participant who stated his belief that the proposals
presented would not be enough. He recalled the experience of the Office of Industrial
Economics, which in 1971 was given authority to develop and implement the ADR system.
That office was unable to deal with the various pressures brought to bear on it and finally
ceased to function. What is needed is broad commitment, not just from the Treasury
Department but from the Office of Management and Budget, by the chairmen of the Ways
and Means and Finance Committees, by the ranking minority members of these
committees, and by the leadership of the House and Senate.

Another participant endorsed the notion of horizontal drafting, especially with regard
to elective provisions. These rules could be reduced to a series of uniform rules without
conflicting with tax policy or revenue objectives.
A third participant noted the need for attention within the Treasury Department to
the regulatory process. In particular, the speaker called on the Treasury Department to
provide guidelines for future regulations.

Further, on the subject of regulations, a participant described a New York State Bar
Association project to redraft the section 752 regulations. This group of experienced
attorneys succeeded in reducing these regulations from sixty-two to fourteen pages and
intends to undertake further projects.
A former Treasury Department staff member supported Mr. Hickman’s observation
that there is a single-minded pursuit of a "correct" definition of income and that pursuit
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may add complexity to the law. This is particularly true when the complexity also leads to
increased revenues.
Another participant stated that progress toward simplification is already occurring
and that new IRS Commissioner Fred Goldberg is a "simplification czar." He also noted
that making simplification changes in groups or pairs may work by achieving a sort of
"rough justice" between winners and losers. Finally, he challenged the premise of the
speakers that leadership for simplification should come from the Treasury Department and
asserted that it should come instead from those who have to administer the law: the IRS.

A requirement that tax bills include not only an estimate of revenue effects but also
a statement of the effect on complexity was suggested by another participant. A uniform
measure (such as cost per taxpayer to comply) should be developed.
Another participant complained that too little attention is paid to the needs of
practitioners in small firms with small clients. The regulations should be oriented toward
these practitioners rather than to those who represent the largest clients.

The final comment came from a college professor who supported Mr. Hickman’s
position that the Haig-Simons income definition is a worthwhile goal but that pursuit of this
goal often leads to complex compromises and sometimes to confusion.
Mr. Glickman then called on the three panelists for final comments. Mr. Chapoton
reiterated his position that we need to fix responsibility for complexity not to diffuse it. Mr.
Hickman agreed with several participants who criticized Mr. Chapoton’s lack of emphasis
on regulations. He noted this is one area in which the Treasury can make progress, and
he applauded Commissioner Goldberg’s efforts. Mr. Lubick had the last word. He
maintained his position that all responsibility for simplicity cannot be with the Treasury
Department.
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ENDNOTES

1 Mr. Chapoton’s Conference Paper is reproduced in Part I (D-l).
2 Mr. Hickman’s comments are reproduced in Part I (E-l).
3 Mr. Lubick’s comments are reproduced in Part I (F-l).
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LUNCHEON ADDRESS-JANUARY 11, 1990

KENNETH W. GIDEON
*

Last night at dinner, I warned Stewart Dunn that he might choose to introduce me
after I spoke, after he has had an opportunity to assess whether I would be allowed to keep
my "Simplify" button and be considered a simplifier in good standing. Indeed, some might
consider the idea of an assistant secretary for tax policy supporting simplification as an
oxymoronic notion, given the frequency with which I and my recent predecessors--and Buck,
that includes you-have advocated changes in the tax law.

Most members of the tax community take it as axiomatic that our lives would be
simpler if we’d simply leave the Code alone for a while. With time, practitioners and the
public would learn about the new provisions, guidance would be issued to resolve
ambiguities, and predictability would improve for both taxpayers and the government.
While there is a great deal to be said for stability, both in terms of economic efficiency
and in reducing our collective anxiety in confronting the seemingly ceaseless train of tax law
changes, that stability is likely to elude us for some time to come.
Our federal budget deficit is an unavoidable if unpleasant reality. While I can join
sincerely in our common chorus of regret that tax policy is currently and has for some time
been driven by budgetary constraints, I must tell you quite frankly that I do not challenge
the primacy of budgetary policy, and indeed I support it. Given the adverse impact of the
deficit on investment and savings, getting federal spending under control must remain, at
least for a while longer, our primary objective. Would we have better tax policy without
current budget constraints? Sure, just as we could have more investment in transportation
infrastructure, more environmental initiatives, more low-income housing, or your favorite
outlay.
Budget-driven tax policy may not be-certainly, is not-ideal. But as long as our
political consensus remains-as I think it should--that we must reduce the federal deficit,
it is likely that the tax code will be pressed into service to achieve that end. This reality,
which I urge each of you to accept if you really hope to focus on attainable simplification,

*Kenneth W. Gideon was confirmed by the U.S. Senate as Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury for Tax Policy on June 8, 1989, and appointed by President Bush on June 9. As
Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, Mr. Gideon serves as the chief Treasury spokesman and
adviser to the Secretary in the formulation and execution of domestic and international tax
policies and programs.
Prior to his nomination to the Assistant Secretary post, Mr. Gideon was a partner
with the law firm of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver, and Jacobson in Washington, D.C. He
served as Chief Counsel for the Internal Revenue Service, from 1981 to 1983. Mr. Gideon
graduated from Harvard University (B.A. 1968) and Yale Law School (J.D. 1971).
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means that simplification of the law, which will result in significant revenue loss, simply
cannot be enacted unless revenue offsets are provided. Ideally, those offsets arise within
the same simplification project, thereby increasing the likelihood that those who benefit
from the simplification will also bear the revenue burden of the offset. Indeed, when
simplification results in a significant shift in the burden of taxation, only the winners are apt
to regard the proposal as improving the law. The losers can be counted on to denounce
it, as usually being unfair, inefficient, bad tax policy, and yes, complex.
Which brings me to one of the more interesting paradoxes of my experience at the
Treasury. Proponents of simplification almost invariably bemoan the fact that the proposed
simplification loses money and hence-though desirable-runs afoul of the great budgetary
jabberwock. My difficulty with these presentations is there does not appear to me to be
any necessary relationship between simplification and revenue loss. Indeed, if the tax code
is amended to delete a deduction formerly permitted, that change not only simplifies the
Code but also usually raises revenue.

Now I don’t mean to advocate the other extreme, that only revenue-enhancing
simplification is desirable, but simply to note that simplifying changes come in both
revenue-gaining and revenue-losing flavors and that there seems to be no reason why the
two cannot be packaged to avoid budgetary cost and thereby attain overall simplification.
Indeed, I simply don’t believe that the political process will often decide that revenue
reducing simplifications are sufficiently desirable to take precedence over other competing
claims for the same funds in the federal budget.
But neutral or near-neutral simplifications are attainable. Indeed, the 1989 Act
contains provisions on both the alternative minimum tax and penalties, and these must be
regarded as significant simplifications. Making these kinds of changes happen requires a
willingness to accept trade-offs, balancing revenue-gaining and revenue-losing simplifications
and balancing simplicity, fairness, and effectiveness.

Now I have heard the remark attributed to my new deputy Mike Graetz that fairness
and simplicity are opposite ends of the same seesaw. Rougher-cut rules are clearly simpler,
but that simplicity often comes at the price of ignoring reasonable claims for relief. There
remains the significant political question as to whether the relatively low purr that emanates
from those who benefit from reduced complexity will be louder than the bellows of the
gored oxen.
That brings me to the final observation on simplicity that I want to make on the
legislative process. I believe that fairness and good policy concerns are more important
than simplicity on large-scale policy issues, which by their very nature are important and
affect many taxpayers. In our current capital gains debate, for example, inflation indexing
is clearly complex and administratively burdensome. I simply do not believe, however, that
any of us is prepared to rule it out as a policy option simply because it is complex, although
that complexity may well give us reason to pause.

On the other hand, it seems to me that complexity concerns are relatively more
important when considering relatively minor or narrow issues. Indeed, many of our
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problems of complexity derive from the sheer volume of little rules enacted to take care
of this or that minor problem. Individually, these rules almost never appear invidious, but
if we enact eighty special rules in a bill, the entire tax community must become familiar
with all of them, not just the intended beneficiaries or targets.
Now I freely admit that these complications arise sometimes from overdeveloped
staff concern about potential abuse as well as taxpayer lobbying for advantageous special
rules. The problem is one of balance. While I don’t believe that swearing off broad
based tax legislation is either feasible or even necessarily desirable, the
development of a political constituency that could be counted on to oppose complicated
small changes of both kinds could be a beneficial development. It will, however, require
substantial wisdom, discipline, and patience to teach the gored ox to purr.

Progress in the legislative area toward simplification requires what is often an
unattainable political consensus. In the area of Treasury regulations, however, the issue
is somewhat more manageable. A commissioner and an assistant secretary committed to
simplification can at least attempt to make it happen, and Fred and I are trying. In general
our approach-as you will discern in projects soon to be published-has been to adopt the
simplification philosophy that I think underlies our successful legislative simplification
efforts.
First, while we attempt to resolve regulatory issues without primary focus on revenue
concerns, we simply cannot adopt interpretations that would defeat the revenue objective
of the enacting Congress. Second, within that general constraint, however, we have opted
for simpler, less complex alternatives over complex options. In doing so, we have
attempted to make rough cuts that do not unduly favor either the government or the
taxpayer, but that will produce simpler, and we hope, more predictable results for both.
There is no particular formula for obtaining these objectives. In some cases, the
adoption of a relatively more stringent basic rule allows the paring away of complicated
provisions that would otherwise be required to prevent abuses. We recognize also that
shorter is not always better. A regulation that fails to answer basic questions and thereby
fosters uncertainty about frequently recurring and important issues is not in any true sense
simplifying. Nevertheless, we are asking ourselves as we go through the process whether
we really need this or that special rule.

In short, we have heard you, and we are taking your expressed desires to heart.
The reaction to these projects when they are published-and I really don’t anticipate that
you’ll have much difficulty discerning which ones I am referring to when you read them-will be an important test of the priority that the tax community really places on simpli
fication. The rules will be simpler, but they will be more rough-cut. If they really are
better for that reason, groups like this one must lend them public support. We know we
will hear from those who want special relief and its attendant complications. The
simplification constituency must also make itself heard in that process.
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Tax Administration Considerations in the Development of Tax Policy

Session 3: Thursday Afternoon, January 11, 1990
Presenter:
Moderator:
Panelists:

Roscoe L. Egger, Jr.
Don J. Summa
William F. Nelson
Jennie S. Stathis
*

The purpose of this session was to focus on the role of tax administration in the
development of tax policy. Roscoe Egger1 began by noting that the Tax Reform Act of
1986 was once dubbed "tax reform for fairness, simplicity, and economic growth.” The
effort to achieve simplicity fell quite short. He then discussed the role of Congress, the
Treasury, and the IRS in contributing to this problem.

Prior to 1962 tax legislation occurred at a more orderly pace, with ample time for
hearings and revision. Since then, hearings have been held on "concepts without the benefit
of legislative language," and the entire process has been characterized by haste. Congress
alone is not responsible for this change. Both the Treasury and IRS have participated-the Treasury through legislative initiatives and the IRS with its regulations.
Some of the problems could have been mitigated had Congress had a mechanism for
a thorough review of administrative impact or if review by the congressional Budget Office
were not perfunctory. Within the IRS, review of interpretive regulations for administrative
burden has also been perfunctory in recent years.
As desirable as simplification sounds, a number of forces within our system work
against it. For example, the fact that much legislation is revenue-driven can lead to
complex provisions that have a onetime impact on revenue. Further, almost all recent tax
legislation has been enacted in a crisis atmosphere. Mr. Egger expressed little optimism
for improvement in the legislative process as long as budget pressures remain.

*Roscoe L. Egger, Jr. is presently a consultant with Price Waterhouse, Washington
National Tax Office. He was formerly Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
Don J. Summa is Professor of Accounting and Applied Research in Taxation at the
School of Business Administration of Monmouth College in New Jersey. From 1948 to
1986, he was the Senior National Tax Partner with the firm of Arthur Young.
William F. Nelson is a partner in the firm of King & Spalding. From 1986 to 1988,
he served as Chief Counsel for the Internal Revenue Service.

Jennie S. Stathis is the Director of Tax Policy and Administration Issue for the U.S.
General Accounting Office.
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There may be room for improvement in tax administration, however. He suggested
an expanded role for the Assistant to the Commissioner for legislative liaison. Regulations,
published rulings, and revenue procedures should be reviewed objectively for administrative
impact. A taxpayer ombudsman could play a role in identifying problems before
regulations and rulings are published. The objective would be to provide a mechanism for
identifying problems and an effective liaison with Treasury Tax Policy.

The first panelist, Jennie S. Stathis,2 agreed with Mr. Egger that lack of credible
evidence of the effect of proposals contributes to complexity. She noted that the IRS
already has a great deal of information about the effect of changes in the law on taxpayers,
but that, unfortunately, it is not accumulated in one site. One example is the tax forms
committee that puts together prototype forms. Their efforts often reveal unexpected
complexities. In addition, IRS focus groups are sometimes used to evaluate forms.
Compliance teams in IRS service centers study tax returns as they are filed to identify
problems early, and from time to time the IRS polls taxpayers and conducts interviews.
Ms. Stathis suggested that the IRS should also provide information on how proposals
affect its ability to administer the law. Ways should be found to solicit such information
from the IRS’s own professional staff. Of course, for all this information to be useful, the
IRS needs time to react to new proposals, and it is important that people who will use and
evaluate the information have some practical experience as well as professional training.
It also would help if new legislation provided for delayed effective dates or for a period of
time to evaluate effects.
Ms. Stathis concluded her remarks by agreeing with several earlier speakers that
the structural deficit problems must be solved. Otherwise, revenue concerns will continue
to take precedence over complexity concerns.

William F. Nelson,3 the second panelist, stated that the IRS has learned from past
mistakes and now recognizes that is has no interest in greater complexity. The Service,
however, has had relatively little ability in recent years to affect legislation.
The Treasury speaks for the administration on tax policy matters and must support
its positions even if complexity is increased. If the Treasury raises complexity issues, those
complaints may be used against administration proposals. Policy concerns must come first,
and Mr. Nelson noted, "simplicity is really at the other end of the seesaw from all the other
policy considerations."

In spite of these factors, Mr. Nelson noted that the Service can help reduce
complexity (for example, by testing forms and providing better guidance through its
regulations). These should not necessarily be short-they must answer taxpayer questions.
Nor should they answer questions that do not need to be answered. They can and should
be written more clearly. Mr. Nelson observed, however, that such changes require
substantial time and effort and would not have a major impact on simplification.
Following Mr. Nelson’s remarks, Don J. Summa asked Mr. Egger to comment on
whether the Service can be more effective in dealing with legislative changes at the
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congressional level or by working through the Treasury Department. Mr. Egger reiterated
his belief that complexity is often introduced as a result of legislation motivated primarily
by revenue concerns. Examples are acceleration of the remittance of withheld taxes and
the uniform capitalization rules. Mr. Egger believes the Service can be more effective in
administering the tax law with its writing of instructions, development of forms, and wording
of regulations.
Mr. Nelson commented than when complex regulations go forward, it usually is
because someone-the Commissioner or Assistant Secretary-has decided they should go
forward in spite of the complexity because other policy considerations are considered more
important. An advocate of simplicity should be someone who understands these
considerations.

Mr. Egger then returned to Mr. Summa’s original question. He stated that the
Service should work through the Treasury to the greatest extent possible; it would not be
desirable to have both the Treasury and the Service attempting to deal with Congress on
policy issues.

Mr. Summa then invited questions and comments from the floor. The first
participant agreed with Mr. Egger that the Service and Treasury cannot act independently
on the Hill in drafting legislation. However, the Service can play a role in the development
of legislation as it did with the 1969 Act, by drafting legislation before it is considered for
enactment. The speaker noted that TRA 1986 was actually voted on without being drafted
and that the recent trend has been to release temporary regulations without opportunity for
public comment. He called for a return to full participation in the development of
legislative and regulatory language. Mr. Nelson followed up on this comment by noting
that the Taxpayer Bill of Rights requires that proposed and temporary regulations be
finalized within three years.
Another participant proposed several ideas to change the attitudes of policymakers
toward complexity. One was to develop ways to define and measure costs associated with
complexity. These would include such costs as lower taxpayer compliance and additional
training for IRS employees. Another idea was to attempt to validate whether the current
approach to regulation writing (that is, trying to answer every potential question) is
necessary. A third idea was to bring individuals other than attorneys, accountants, and
economists into the discussion. Suggestions include experts from psychology, management,
public relations, and computer science.
The next participant noted that in recent years effective dates for tax legislation
have been in the last quarter of the year, giving the Service very little time to design forms
and write instructions. He recommended barring tax legislation after a certain date, to give
the Service the needed time. Both Mr. Nelson and Mr. Egger supported this proposal.
The recent changes in civil penalties (development of a uniform base for accuracy
penalties, elimination of interest components, and coordination of the delinquency penalty
with other penalties) were pointed out by another participant as an example of
simplification that was accomplished without revenue costs. The process began in 1987
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and involved the General Accounting Office, the Commissioner’s Advisory Group, the
American Bar Association, and the AICPA. Other parts of the Code could also be
identified and simplified through similar cooperative efforts.

The final comment came from a participant who suggested that the GAO put a
higher priority on its studies that relate to complexity, that renewal of district conferences
be considered as a way to resolve many issues at a less intense level, that complexity is
compounded by differences between financial accounting and tax accounting (such as the
uniform capitalization rules), and that it would be desirable to increase the program for
short-term assignment of IRS personnel to Hill positions.
Mr. Summa then called for final comments. Mr. Egger stated that most of the
comments were consistent with his own objective of identifying a mechanism by which the
Service could help reduce complexity. Mr. Summa agreed and stated his hope that some
of the suggestions could find their way into actual use.
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ENDNOTES

1 Mr. Egger’s Conference Paper is reproduced in Part I (G-l).
2 Ms. Stathis’s comments are reproduced in Part I (H-l).
3 Mr. Nelson’s comments are reproduced in Part I (1-1).
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Complexity in the Tax Legislative Process: Problems and Proposals,
Role of the Congressional Staffs and Taxpayer Representatives

Session 4: Thursday Afternoon, January 11, 1990
Presenter:
Moderator:
Panelists:

Bernard M. Shapiro
Jay Starkman
Robert N. Mattson
Ronald A. Pearlman
*

The purpose of this session was to focus on complexity in the tax legislative process.
The moderator, Jay Starkman, began the session by noting that the drafters of the
Constitution never envisioned an income tax and that the original proponents of the income
tax probably did not envision its present complexity.
The first speaker, Bernard M. Shapiro,1 stated that the source of much of his paper
was a diary he kept during his years on the Hill. He noted that when he was a member of
the Joint Committee staff, a number of simplification projects were undertaken and that
simplification had a high priority for the staff. In spite of this emphasis, Congress was not
always receptive to simplification. Mr. Shapiro cited the example of a project begun in
1966 to remove ’’deadwood" from the Code. It was completed by 1969 but not enacted
until 1976 when the perseverance of the Chief of Staff finally paid off.
The purpose of Mr. Shapiro’s conference paper was to focus on tax simplification in
the present environment of the legislative process. In this environment, he stated, there
must be a vocal constituency for simplification, and the legislative process must change.
With regard to the first issue, he drew the conclusion that there is no public
constituency for tax simplification. Of course, members of Congress and the public would
respond affirmatively if asked if they support simplification. When they are confronted with
choices between simplification and self-interest or constituent interest, however,
simplification loses.
*Bernard M. (Bob) Shapiro is the National Director of Tax Policy and Legislative
Affairs for Price Waterhouse. From 1977 to 1981 he was Chief of Staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation.

Jay Starkman is a CPA with his own firm in Atlanta Georgia. He is Chairman of
the Tax Simplification Subcommittee for the American Institute of CPAs.
Robert N. Mattson is Assistant Treasurer, IBM Corporation.

Ronald A. Pearlman is Chief of Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation.
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Mr. Shapiro then examined the tax policy causes of complexity. When the system
is used for purposes other than revenue raising, complexity is introduced. When taxpayers
begin to benefit too much from tax incentives, tax reform is introduced. This, of course,
adds new complexity. Finally, compliance provisions are required to enforce the new
provisions.
In the 1980s, presidential politics--in particular, campaign promises-have shaped tax
policy. The resulting changes, coupled with the effect of indexing and the budget deficit,
have led to tax bills, written under great time pressure, of which revenue was the driving
force.

Since finding a public constituency for tax simplification is unlikely, Mr. Shapiro
believes changes within the process must be made. First, the federal budget process must
be dealt with so that tax bills are not entirely revenue-driven. Possibilities are a "deficit
surcharge," suspending or cutting back indexing, and adoption of a two-year budget cycle.
More promising than changes in the budget process, perhaps, is the possibility of a
constituency within Congress for simplification, with the Joint Committee as the focal point.
The statute that created the Joint Committee in 1926 calls for it to investigate measures
and methods for the simplification of federal taxes and to publish from time to time an
examination and analysis of these measures and methods. This committee could work with
the Ways and Means and Finance staffs and with the Treasury and IRS to initiate projects
in which simplification is considered before revenue issues are raised. Simplification should
be part of every proposal that comes from the Treasury Department and from the
congressional staffs. The tax writing committees should each have a task force with the
responsibility of raising the question of simplification when proposals come up. The
hearing process should be more deliberative, with a panel dedicated to raising issues of tax
simplification. Finally, more time is needed for drafting statutory language. Today, the
pressures of the drafting schedule leave too much detail to regulations and technical
correction bills without considering the added complexity.

The first panelist, Robert N. Mattson,2 called for a disciplined approach and greater
accountability on the part of drafters of statutory language. In particular, he was critical
of statutory language designed to correct perceived abuses or restrictive rules. Such rules
causes transactional and compliance complexity and are better left to administrative
regulation or rulings.
Mr. Mattson noted that large corporations have experienced an increased burden in
data collection costs and a significant increase in tax return preparation time. He offered
the foreign-source income area as a particularly frustrating example.
Mr. Mattson agreed with Frederic Hickman that excessive language in the Code
does not reduce ambiguity but may, in fact, increase uncertainty. He disagreed that a
deficit surcharge, such as that suggested by Mr. Shapiro, will reduce complexity. Instead,
such rate increases would kill the effort to achieve simplification. This would happen
because rate increases result in competitive losses to U.S. businesses and lead to further
complexity as the need for incentives and exceptions filters into the system. Further, to
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require that simplification be directly tied into a revenue-raising bill would have the result
of making simplification a "stalking horse" for a tax increase. Like Mr. Shapiro, Mr.
Mattson called for leadership from the Joint Committee to suggest ways to simplify the
Code.
The second panelist, Ronald A. Pearlman,2 is the current Chief of Staff of the Joint
Committee. He began by asserting that members of Congress and their staffs also find
the volume of recent tax legislation overwhelming. Unfortunately, it is unrealistic to expect
this activity to subside, partly because of the need for revenue and partly because of
increased numbers of proposals from many sources for new programs and tax incentives.
He further noted that increasing tax rates will not resolve the problem. The effort to
accurately measure taxable income is and should be an ongoing process.

In spite of these facts, Mr. Pearlman stated that complexity in the tax law is a
concern for people involved in the tax legislative process. It is not, however, at the top of
their agenda, sometimes because of politics and sometimes because of lack of time.
He noted that there have been some successful efforts to reduce complexity. Recent
examples are the provision to allow parents to include children’s income on the parents’
return and the 1989 alternative minimum tax change.

For the immediate future, the staffs may not have time to enumerate and draft
simplification projects, but it is possible for them to identify discrete projects for further
consideration. Mr. Pearlman suggested the personal interest expense deduction and the
foreign provisions as promising areas for simplification.
Mr. Pearlman concluded by noting that the real difficulty is how to identify and
respond to complexity that develops as new tax proposals evolve. Part of the problem is
lack of time; part of it is lack of outside input, even when proposals have been public for
some time. He stated that members of the staffs are genuinely interested in addressing the
problem and happy to work with others in the government as well as professional
organizations to make progress.

The moderator, Jay Starkman, responded that the AICPA Tax Simplification
Subcommittee had experienced no difficulty in reaching members of the Joint Committee
staff. He then opened the floor for questions and comments.
The first participant asked if there is room in the legislative process for substantive
tax rules that would have the effect of removing incentives for complex taxpayer behavior.
As an example, he suggested treating all gifts and bequests as income and repealing the
estate and gift tax. A second example would be adoption of a single uniform rate for all
taxpayers, corporate and individual, thereby reducing incentives to shift income. Mr.
Pearlman noted that it is very difficult to make a single rate system progressive, even with
personal exemptions or standard deductions. With regard to the first example, he observed
that repealing section 102 (exclusion of gifts and inheritances from gross income) would be
less popular than repealing the estate tax.
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The next comment came from a participant who offered two examples of taxes that
may be characterized as "simple" but cause complexity for taxpayers. The first was the
employment tax, which can be very complicated if the issue is who falls within the
withholding system. The second example was any provision that is simple for most
taxpayers and complex only for large (corporate) taxpayers. These provisions make
voluntary compliance difficult and subject taxpayers to the substantial underpayment
penalty.

The next question was addressed to Mr. Pearlman. The participant asked what is
the future of the Subchapter C Revision Bill of 1985 given the repeal of the General
Utilities doctrine and what is the role of explicit statutory elections in subchapter C. Mr.
Pearlman stated that the best way to deal with complexity that arises out of subchapter C
provisions is on an incremental basis and not in a massive revision.
Another participant challenged the group to oppose any efforts to reduce the capital
gains rates. He noted that such a change would benefit many of the participants and their
clients but would greatly increase complexity.

The next participant opposed the notion that the appropriate way to meet budgetary
needs is to make adjustments to the tax base. Recent adjustments have been tied to the
amount of revenue they produce, not to making the base more logical or simple. Raising
revenues should be accomplished instead by raising rates.
The tendency to blame complexity on taxpayers who do not want simplification
unless it is to their benefit was criticized by another participant. He asserted that the focus
of the conference should be on the cost to companies of complying with complex provisions
such as the uniform capitalization rules. Such provisions cause advertent and inadvertent
noncompliance. Mr. Shapiro responded that attention to the benefits and detriments of tax
provisions is appropriate because that is how individuals look at tax simplification. He
agreed that a broader perspective is also appropriate.

The difference between complexity and uncertainly was discussed by another
participant. He noted that some "simple" provisions such as section 269 (acquisitions made
to evade or avoid income taxes) are difficult to comply with whereas a very complex
provision such as section 382 (loss carryforwards) may actually be relatively easy to comply
with because of greater certainty. Mr. Mattson responded that uncertainty is a major
problem for large corporations because of the number of issues for which there is little or
no specific guidance.
The final comment came from a participant who suggested that each person
attending the conference "undertake the education" of members of Congress in their
districts who are members of the tax writing committees. In particular, he suggested
enlisting others (such as fellow ABA members) who would form a constituency to
communicate with legislators and their tax legislative assistants. Mr. Shapiro noted that
specific proposals are needed, not just general support for simplification.
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Mr. Starkman then called for final comments. Mr. Shapiro stated that in his paper
he is not calling for a deficit surcharge but rather he is criticizing the current process by
which budget bills raise revenues. If there were a deficit surcharge in the budget process,
he believes members would support budget cuts in lieu of rate increases.
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ENDNOTES

1 Mr. Shapiro’s Conference Paper is reproduced in Part I (J-l).
2 Mr. Mattson’s Conference Paper is reproduced in Part I (K-l).

3 Mr. Pearlman’s comments are reproduced in Part I (L-l).
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Eliminating Complexity for Individual Taxpayers:
A Revenue Loser Without a Constituency?

Session 5: Thursday Afternoon, January 11, 1990
Presenter:
Moderator:
Panelists:

Deborah H. Schenk
Donald C. Wiese
Betty R. Jackson
Steven D. Kittrell
*

The moderator, Donald C. Wiese, noted that whereas the four previous panels focused on
the process by which complexity is introduced into the tax law, the purpose of this and the
subsequent panels was to focus on complexity in specific areas of the law. This particular
panel was concerned with the effect of complexity on individual taxpayers and the family
unit.
Professor Schenk1 began by quoting several conference speakers who had asserted
that tax complexity is not really a problem for most individual taxpayers. She noted that
this assertion is inconsistent with the fact that even though 71 percent of taxpayers do not
itemize deductions, 50 percent use a paid preparer and many others have unpaid assistance.
She acknowledged that TRA ’86 did remove a number of taxpayers from the rolls
and that there is a general belief that tax return preparation is simpler for many other
individuals. Several examples, however, illustrated the complexity that can be associated
with commonly faced issues such as determination of filing status or deductibility of
interest.

Professor Schenk agreed that individuals are more interested in reduction of tax
liabilities than simplification. In spite of this, there should be a constituency for
simplification because of the effect of complexity on compliance by so-called level 2
taxpayers. Further, low-income taxpayers (level 1) are losing benefits targeted at them
because they cannot understand the provisions.
*Deborah H. Schenk is Professor of Law at New York University School of Law.

Donald C. Wiese is a Senior Partner in the National Tax Group of Deloitte &
Touche. He is a member of the AICPA Federal Taxation Executive Committee.

Betty R. Jackson is an Associate Professor of Accounting at the University of
Colorado.
Steven D. Kittrell is with the law firm of Golden, Freda & Schraub, PC, in
Washington, D.C.
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Professor Schenk then turned to some specific suggestions that would reduce
complexity for level 1 and level 2 taxpayers. Her primary thesis was that these taxpayers
should be expected to comprehend the fewest possible concepts. Therefore, to the extent
possible, definitions and qualifying thresholds should be uniform. As an example, a single
qualifying threshold for claiming a dependent could be printed on the face of a tax return.
Only those taxpayers who do not meet that threshold would need to read or understand
more rules.
Three possible approaches to developing unifying principles for thresholds were
proposed. The first approach would be to make sure each new piece of legislation that
relates to low- or average-income taxpayers uses uniform thresholds. The second approach
would be to eliminate small but complex requirements in the hope that over time the
remaining qualifying rules and thresholds would be simpler. The third, and more radical
approach, would be to provide "bright line" tests, with the understanding that some equity
might be lost.

As an example of the third approach, Professor Schenk proposed that head-ofhousehold status could be based solely on whether the taxpayer has a dependent. A further
simplification would be to allow a person who is separated but unable to divorce for
economic reasons to claim the "abandoned spouse" status.
Such an approach would greatly simplify the law and process for level 1 taxpayers.
It also would improve equity because taxpayers who are entitled to benefits would not be
denied them because they could not understand the rules. It could be made revenue
neutral by reducing the associated tax benefit or by limiting the use of benefits by higherincome taxpayers. Another way to view it is that the "revenue" lost should never have
been considered revenue at all.
Another "radical" proposal would be to provide a single support allowance that
would not be subject to federal income tax. The allowance should vary with level of
income, family size, and marital status and would replace the current system of standard
deductions, exemptions, and the earned income credit.
Professor Schenk then discussed approaches to reducing complexity for level 2
taxpayers. These people face complex recordkeeping requirements and regulations that
are often ignored. An example would be an individual who owns a single rental unit.
One way to reduce complexity for this taxpayer would be to require that rental expenses
equal a fixed percent of rental income. Record keeping would be greatly reduced and the
passive loss rules could be ignored. Obviously some taxpayers would benefit and some
would not, but the rules could allow the losers to keep records if they wished to prove their
losses.

Professor Schenk also discussed some domestic relations issues. For example, she
proposed allowing taxpayers to designate payments as child support or alimony without
complicated tests. With regard to the "kiddie tax," she proposed requiring that children’s
unearned income be reported on parents’ returns.
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In conclusion, she made an appeal for better coordination of state and federal tax
laws. While not offering any solutions, she noted that for many taxpayers, simplification of
federal tax law would provide only limited relief if not accompanied by state simplification.
The first panelist, Betty R. Jackson,2 began with reference to the equity-versussimplicity seesaw analogy. She stated that "we have been feeding the equity side too many
high calorie meals," and that it is now "time to starve equity a bit so that simplicity can
have enough weight to balance the seesaw."
Referring to Professor Schenk’s paper, she supported the proposal to eliminate the
AMT for individuals. The number of taxpayers affected decreased from 609,000 in 1986
to 114,000 in 1987. Although some revenue would be lost, it would be more rational to
attack remaining preferences directly rather than to maintain a dual tax system.

Professor Jackson also noted the difference between what is fair and what is
perceived to be fair. In our system, we sometimes go to elaborate lengths to achieve equity
only to create a system taxpayers perceive as unfair. She offered the 33 percent "bubble
rate" as an example. Even her students, who understand how the rate structure is
constructed, perceive it to be unfair. She believes this perception can be explained by
research in psychology that demonstrates that people perceive outcomes according to the
way a situation is framed. The tax benefit given on lower-income levels is viewed as an
endowment bestowed on every taxpayer. The "bubble rate" of 33 percent is viewed as
unfair because loss of the benefit is more painful than the pleasure of the gain from the
endowment.
Professor Jackson warned that if we choose to give up simplicity for the sake of
equity, we must try to structure the law so that taxpayers perceive an increase in equity.
She also noted that revenue estimates associated with changing the law often ignore
behavioral responses to these changes.

The second panelist, Steven D. Kittrell,3 began by agreeing with Professor Schenk
that there is at best a very limited constituency for individual taxpayer reform. He noted
that only the AICPA and ABA have been moderately effective voices for individual tax
simplification.
He offered the example of the ABA/AICPA domestic relations tax reform project.
After several years of work, a proposal was put forth. It took two more years to get the
attention of Congress. At every step of the process, starting with Ways and Means
hearings, complex provisions were added to the proposal. In each case, the intent was to
try to prevent some perceived abuse or inequity. For example, the alimony recapture rules
were designed to prevent front-loaded alimony payments with little attention to whether this
was a bad thing to happen. The result of this process was a minor reform instead of a
substantial reform.

Mr. Kittrell stated his belief that a conceptual framework is as important for
addressing individual tax issues as it is for reforming Subchapter C. He proposed as a
framework the concept that, whenever possible, the law should follow the expectations of
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individual taxpayers as to what the right result should be. He asserted that taxpayers are
more likely to follow the system if it conforms to their expectations. For example, most
taxpayers would assume that alimony payments are deductible by the payer and taxable to
the recipient. Likewise, aggregation of a child’s income with the parents’ income conforms
to our understanding of the parent-child relationship. Mr. Kittrell noted that Professor
Schenk’s proposal in her paper to treat a simplified support test as the first screen for
determining the dependency exemption also conforms to taxpayer expectations.

Mr. Kittrell concluded with a discussion of the "morass of current child support
rules" as the direct effect of efforts to eliminate any perceived bad effects. A better
alternative, one that would conform to what people expect, would be to use the amount
designated by a judge as child support.
Mr. Wiese then called for questions and comments. The first came from an
individual who noted that in studies of complexity, credits such as the child care credit and
the earned income credit score very high in complexity ratings. These same credits are
associated with significant compliance problems, even when returns are prepared by paid
preparers.

Another participant noted that Congress, their staffs, and practitioners all have
limited time to devote to the reduction of complexity and that priorities must be set.
Professor Schenk agreed and stated that the issues she raised should be at the top of the
list.

The next participant emphasized the effect of complexity on taxpayer compliance.
He stated that if we are not getting revenues, we are realizing equity gains only on paper.
Professor Schenk’s proposal to use a tabular approach to the standard deduction
reminded another participant of the fact that TRA ’86 Act replaced the zero bracket
amount because Congress thought taxpayers would get a good feeling from explicitly taking
the standard deduction. He then asked the panel if any of them agreed that TRA ’86 also
had reduced problems for many taxpayers. Professor Schenk responded that those
taxpayers who no longer have to file returns are better off. TRA ’86 also removed the
double deduction of the personal exemption for dependent children but unfortunately did
not simplify the definition of an exemption.
Another participant attributed much of the complexity discussed to patching
provisions as problems arise. He proposed having a task force come up with proposals to
simplify the tax system for individuals. Such proposals should be presented to the tax
writing committees in much the same way as the recent penalty provisions were presented.
The next participant noted the lack of emphasis on the effect of complexity on tax
administration. He stated that in his experience a number of level 1 and level 2 taxpayers
do not understand the tax administration system and do not have the resources to hire
professionals to protect their interests. Professor Schenk agreed that a great deal of anger
taxpayers feel toward the system is caused by their contact with those who administer the
system.
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One of the conference organizers stated that the organizers share Professor Schenk’s
orientation. He noted that only four substantive areas were included in the program and
that many subjects "closer to the pocketbooks" of participants, such as uniform capitalization
rules, were not included.

The final comment of the day came from a participant who stated that the ABA
Tax Section had made Professor Schenk’s dependency exemptions proposals its highest
priority among recommendations to the tax writing committee.
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ENDNOTES

1 Professor Schenk’s Conference Paper is reproduced in Part I (M-l).
2 Professor Jackson’s Conference Paper is reproduced in Part I (N-l).

3 Mr. Kittrell’s comments are reproduced in Part I (0-1).
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WELCOMING COMMENTS-JANUARY 12, 1990

Jere D. McGaffey
*

On behalf of the ABA Tax Section, I want to welcome you all to this conference.
We have for a long time been devoted to simplification. You can see the results of our
past efforts in the Internal Revenue Code, though we do take some pride in some of the
items where the simplification effort has been successful, such as in the installment sale
provisions and S corporations.
Yesterday, we devoted a great deal of time to the process. With the last paper
yesterday and in the papers today, we are devoting our time to various individual items.
I believe and hope that the problem of tax complexity is not as simple a construct as the
seesaw example that we were given, with simplicity on one side and tax policy and revenue
on the other. I’m hopeful, at least, that it is a more complex vehicle and that we can
identify areas in which these two items are not mutually exclusive.

We would hope that the papers that we’re discussing today and the last one of
yesterday will stimulate all of us to work, through our organizations, to identify various
areas in which there can be a solution that is simpler, without changing the balance which
policy and revenue has reached.
This work may not be as exciting as changing the tax policy or finding revenue
raisers or reducing taxes, but it is certainly a very important contribution to the tax law
for our clients and for ourselves. I think we must continue to devote ourselves to being
that constituency that favors tax simplification, and we must be heard more often on that
subject.
*Jere D. McGaffey, chair-elect of the American Bar Association Taxation Section,
is a partner in the firm of Foley & Lardner in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Mr. McGaffey is a
fellow, of the American College of Tax Counsel, and a member of the American Law
Institute, the advisory board of the CCH Tax Transactions Library, and of the Miami Estate
Planning Institute. He is also the author of Tax Analysis and Forms: Business
Transactions and Estate Planning (Callahan) and Buying, Selling, and Merging Businesses
(ALI-ABA).
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A PRACTITIONER’S CONCERNS ABOUT UNDUE COMPLEXITY

JANUARY 12, 1990

HERBERT J. LERNER
*

While the title of this presentation is "A Practitioner’s Concerns," it’s obvious we’re
all practitioners and all have similar concerns about this issue or we wouldn’t be taking
our time to address it at this conference. This is just one practitioner’s view, with a little
more slant toward the CPA’s concerns.

As many of the speakers at this conference have indicated, there’s not much serious
debate about whether the present system is complex. It is so. I think we can fairly
acknowledge that, and it probably has to be so in our present business environment. We
can debate in general terms its degree, but I think most practitioners who have reason to
deal with the compliance and planning aspects of our present system would say that it is
unduly complex for them as tax professionals. I say that with a lot of feeling about trying
to serve clients in both the area of compliance and planning advisory services.
Most CPAs or lawyers who serve individual or corporate clients, who have business
activities or engage in transactions that cause them to be subject to the high degree of
complexity of our present system, really face that in spades because of the nature of their
client base. This is the so-called category 3 client, the one who needs expert service, the
one whose transactions are impacted by special rules, and the one who suffers most from
burdensome recordkeeping requirements. They often have activities that subject them to
complex rules such as those associated with the AMT.

*Herbert J. Lerner is the National Director of Tax Services for Ernst & Young.
He is a certified public accountant and a member of the bar in the District of Columbia.
Mr. Lerner has served in multiple capacities for the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, including Chairman of the AICPA Relations With the Bar Committee, VicePresident and member of the Board of Directors, member of the AICPA Council, and
Chairman of the Federal Taxation Executive Committee. He is also a member of the
American Bar Association Section of Taxation, a member of the American Taxation
Association, and a member of the Board of Trustees for the American Tax Policy Institute;
has served as a member of the Advisory Group to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue;
and has held numerous other positions and memberships.

Mr. Lerner received his B.S. from Rutgers (1959) and his LL.B. from Georgetown
University (1963). He has served as an adjunct professor at Georgetown University Law
Center and has lectured before numerous tax institutes. He is the author of numerous
articles, which have appeared in such publications as Taxation of Accountants, TAXES, the
Tax Adviser, the Banking Law Journal, the Journal of Taxation, and the National Law
Journal.
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That isn’t true for the universe of taxpayers, but it clearly is true for the clients who
are served by most lawyers and CPAs as outside advisers. It’s true for our corporate clients
and most of the clients of tax professionals who are full-time tax professionals serving
corporations with multinational interests. The foreign rules are excessively complex. The
current consolidated return rules are complex, although I think the post-1965 version of
those rules is a significant improvement over the older rules.

But we continue to see a layering of changes, since there are other changes in the
tax law that get layered into an otherwise detailed set of rules reflected in the consolidated
return area.

Depreciation-with its multiple calculations for state tax, federal tax, AMT purposes,
and so on--is obviously faced by this corps of clients whom most of the active tax
professionals tend to serve, as is true for earnings and profits calculations if you serve
multinational clients having to deal with complex rules for regular purposes and different
rules for section 902(d) purposes, and perhaps different elections for section 964 purposes,
and on and on.

Many of our clients also face special industry rules, special incentives (such as the
R&D credit), and the other general rules, some of which are going to be discussed later
today, dealing with passive losses or the complex pension provisions. I think it’s fair to say
that historically, there has been a lack of empathy on the part of tax-writing committees
and their staff, as well as perhaps staff in the Treasury, to this problem of complexity for
those who should be in the know, the assumption being that the tax practitioner community
can effectively deal with any level of complexity because they are being paid fees by
wealthy individuals or large taxpaying businesses and, therefore, can suffer the burdens of
complexity in it. I would certainly agree it’s easier to do so than for the more modest
taxpayer population.
But I’m convinced that these groups, lawyers and CPAs advising their clients, have
reached their capacity to cope with the present system. I don’t think we’re at just an
upward trend in the level of complexity. I think we have a crisis situation. I say that both
for lawyers and CPAs, but I think the CPA may have a special burden, largely because
while both lawyers and CPAs are involved in the planning aspects of tax practice, CPAs are
much more directly involved in the compliance side of practice. And so it isn’t long after
a 1989 enactment that CPAs have to deal with first-quarter financials that are impacted
by changes in the 1989 act. The same thing was true in 1988 and 1987: first-quarter
financials impacted by a major series of changes without the benefit of even reasonably
prompt guidance because that guidance can’t be expected to occur within the first three
months following the change in the law.

The same is true for purposes of filing returns. CPAs assisting in the preparation
of returns need to address problems such as estimated tax payments for those who choose,
and are able, to file a timely return. There’s a very short time frame between detailed
legislation and a required significant effort on the part of CPAs to both understand and
then apply very recent tax law changes.
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Everyone expressed yesterday the concerns about lack of certainty in our present
system. But I want to share with you that deep-seated concern that I think CPAs have
about the pace of legislative change. That concern is reflected in a number of
developments. First, I think there are a discernible number of tax practitioners who have
just given up on the tax profession. They thought it was a nice profession to be involved
with, but rather than face ten tax acts in the last ten years and try to assimilate that, they’ve
just given up on the profession. That’s unfortunate, not because we may not need room for
other tax practitioners, not because those who aren’t mentally nimble can’t effectively serve
clients. I think it’s the frustration of dealing with the degree of change that we’ve been
involved with.
I think, also, that there is a lack of the same degree of satisfaction in tax practice,
both from a lawyer’s and a CPA’s standpoint, by virtue of the absence of meaningful tax
policy reflected in legislative change. It’s okay to deal with specific rules, a rule-directing
system, but that isn’t what provides the kind of mental stimulation that most people who
are involved in tax practice find satisfying. So there is today a much less satisfying
atmosphere for tax practitioners which reflects the fact that we do not have a coherent tax
policy in the Code that we, as professionals, are dealing with.
Some examples of that would be hard to justify in dialogue with a client, such as
the effect of three successive one-year extensions of credits like R&D, targeted jobs tax
credit, and so on. Three successive one-year extensions are less costly to the budget than
one three-year extension! We extend things to September 30, 1990, rather than for three
years, because even if we come back to deal with it in 1990 and extend it another year, the
overall impact on the budget will be diminished. It will be diminished because we take into
account the certainty of taxpayer activity which, given a three-year extension, would permit
people to plan for and effectively utilize an intended benefit.

Short-term extensions cause less application of the benefit and, as a consequence,
have less impact on the budget. That’s a sad circumstance. It’s difficult to justify to clients,
and difficult to justify to ourselves, frankly, as part of the overall tax system.
Reflective of the impact of complexity on practitioners is a noticeable increase in the
number of both favorable and unfavorable responses to Form 9100 requests. As you know,
this permits a taxpayer to secure an additional extension of time from a reg-prescribed time
filing to take some action (typically, an election provision) that was missed because of
reliance in good faith on advice of a third party, a CPA, or a lawyer. Typically, it is
predicated on that circumstance, and when identified, one can go into the Service and seek
a further extension of time for performance.

That IRS request requires an acknowledgment on the part of that professional
adviser, the CPA, or lawyer that his or her advice was faulty, and the faulty advice of the
professional adviser is the basis for the IRS’s favorable response. Now there isn’t a clear
indication of how many Form 9100 requests are submitted and not responded to favorably
by virtue of their being withdrawn after dialogue with the Service. But we do know, for
example, that there’s been a substantial and growing number of these cases over the past
number of years, ranging from a low in 1984 under my calculation of just over 150
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responses (including a denial rate of only 15 percent) to approximately 500 responses in
1989. And the Form 9100 requests in the area of missed-accounting-period and accounting
method issues, which really impacts CPAs in practice more than other professionals, are a
large portion of the 1989 figure.

I think professionals, who are no less interested in advising clients correctly today
than they were before, are just unable to cope with the degree of change and, therefore,
their quality of service has been diminished. That ought to be troublesome to all of us.
It’s troublesome to the in-house lawyers at our firm. I’m sure it’s troublesome to our
clients who receive faulty advice, and we’re not unique in that respect. It’s a difficult,
disturbing development.

I think also the fact that we have a need for a degree of increased specialization
(whether that’s functional specialization such as in the ERISA area, or industry
specialization such as in the banking or health care or other areas) causes some individuals
who are so highly specialized not to be able to see the forest for the trees. And as a
consequence, their ability to deal with more general issues is diminished.
In a large firm one can have specialists and generalists attacking a client problem,
if the client is large enough and the problem is meritorious enough and significant enough
to justify all that involvement. I feel much more sympathy for the smaller practitioner who
doesn’t have that kind of capability and still must face those problems. It’s an exceeding
ly difficult and unfortunate problem, and it’s a reflection of the present system that we
have.

The use of the Tax Code to regulate other nonfiscal behavior has also fueled the
fan of complexity. And while all of us have dealt with things like the ’’golden parachute’’
rules, gas guzzlers for autos, just think about the 1989 act provision dealing with ozone
depleting chemicals. I and a whole lot of other interested people think that we ought to
do something globally to decrease the penetration of the ozone layer. It’s obviously a
serious problem. We now have a provision enacted in the 1989 act that would apply to
all those ozone-depleting chemicals that were listed in the Montreal protocol in which all
the industrialized nations agreed to try to reduce their production and consumption of
ozone-depleting chemicals. So we have an excise tax that’s accomplished by varying rates
applicable to different specified chemicals and differing periods. It isn’t limited to that.
It has exceptions and exemptions for recycled ozone-depleting chemicals and for those used
in making rigid foam insulation; halons are dealt differently than other chemicals, and so
on.
The tax isn’t just imposed on manufacturers who in their manufacturing process use
ozone-depleting chemicals; it’s applied to those who import products produced abroad that
included those same kinds of chemicals, so that refrigerators, computers, VCRs, and a
whole host of items of that type-electronic typewriters, stereo tapes, washers and dryers,
computers, tape recorders, sterile packaging, and so on--are listed as possible products that
have ozone-depleting chemicals and may give rise to floor stock taxes for all U.S. retailers
of all of those products that are imported and on their premises as of January 1, 1990. A
very, very complex problem, one that I’m sure most of the retailers in the United States
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have no understanding of other than their interest in the general notion about saving the
atmosphere. It’s because we’re predisposed to using the tax system in that manner and with
that kind of complexity that I think we face problems like that.

I think it’s fair to say that, from this practitioner’s standpoint, the current law can’t
be effectively or efficiently administered by the IRS in its field operations, largely due to
the level of complexity. We face the same problems of training a multitude of people in
a large firm. The IRS faces an incredible problem of trying to train its people in the
legislative developments as well as the reg developments. A recent survey by the AICPA
identified this as a clear view of the majority of responding CPAs. The last commissioner,
Commissioner Gibbs, and other commissioners indicated in communications to the chief
counsel’s office their concern about the current level of quality of attorneys in the IRS chief
counsel’s office. That’s not to suggest that we don’t have quality, but the quality may not
be keeping pace with the degree of increased complexity. It’s a very serious problem, now
recognized by both professions.

Well, what should we do about it? A lot of things are going to come out of this
conference that are going to address the problem. The most important item, I think, is-without regard to your view on the desirability of the present system-that we would all
benefit from a marked moratorium on legislative change, except if it served an overriding
economic need or if it served to diminish the level of complexity in the present system.
That’s easy to say and obviously very hard to implement, but we need to feel that is an
important objective, because if we don’t even talk about it in those terms, there won’t be
a shared sentiment that many of us have expressed at this conference.
I think we’ve got to reinstate those approaches that were preferable in prior years
in terms of dealing with legislative change. We’ve had a lot of discussion here about the
favorable results in the installment sales area. Well, it was both a privilege and pleasure
to deal with that subject in 1980; I think it was also a personal pleasure to deal with a point
person from the ABA, Marty Ginsburg, who did the job on that subject, and people in the
Treasury like Hank Guttman and Don Ricketts, who did work when he was on the Joint
Committee staff. A fine collegial effort in that area--it was true of divorce and alimony,
and it was true of subchapter S, in which where the Bar, AICPA, Treasury, and Hill staff
collaborated to end up with useful, complexity-decreasing legislation. Penalty reform in
1989 is another good example.

An example of a lousy one, frankly, is the effort of the AICPA in 1987 to seek to
remedy a major problem from the CPA practitioner’s standpoint (that is, dealing with fiscal
year legislation and otherwise-required change for S corporations and partnerships to the
calendar year). We did not have a collegial effort on that problem. We did not have
participation by the Bar Association on that problem. We did not have active support from
the Treasury Department on that problem. Late support, but not in the ongoing process.
We did, through effective grass roots effort, solve a very critical problem for the CPA
profession. Concentration of work in such a short period of time would have accentuated
the problems of quality of service if all the smaller entities in the United States that were
on fiscal years had been required to go on a calendar year. And we solved it with a not
uncomplex section 444 and deposit arrangement. It’s sad because we had a problem that
could have been resolved in a different matter had we had the benefit of collegial effort.
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What we need to do is reinstitute and rededicate ourselves to that kind of effort,
from the CPA standpoint, the Bar standpoint, and the Treasury standpoint. It’s in
everyone’s interest. It isn’t just a matter for CPA concern.

I’d like to just touch base for a moment on some areas that I think collegial efforts
would be particularly useful for. We need to establish one or more uniform rules for
attribution that would have application across the Code. We really don’t need multiple
rules. We may need wide nets and narrow nets, but we don’t need five different degrees
of narrow nets in the Code.
In the area of pension matters to be discussed later by my partner, Dave Kautter,
it’s clear that there is a need for a collegial effort to address that area. We need a new
'’deadwood" bill. I was interested in Bobby Shapiro’s remarks yesterday about the tenyear period in order to get a deadwood bill passed from the time of introduction in 1966
to 1976. Well, there’s been a lot of deadwood reflected in the Code since 1976. A
renewed effort in that area would be highly desirable.
We need to address and simplify the personal interest deduction. Even done clearly
on a revenue-neutral basis, it still could be improved. In the foreign provisions, I think that
we’ve got a hopeless problem unless we seek to simplify that area. And an area that is very
ripe and not terribly difficult to deal with is the classification of employee versus
independent contractor. Jim Merritt made mention of that yesterday. It seems to me that
it wouldn’t be too difficult to establish a legislative presumption that all payments to
individuals are payments to employees and subject to employment tax, unless the payor
receives an exemption certificate that causes it to be characterized as a payment to an
independent contractor. Put the onus there. Don’t leave the classification as an open
issue, and don’t face monthly the majority of such issues being reflected in private letter
rulings and tech advices.

That’s what we really need to home in on: those areas in which we have major
controversy. We can see the proliferation of problems. It’s reflected in the reporting that
we either see in our practice or see reflected in publications of private letter rulings and
tech advice. Those are areas we can deal with as professionals, and we can solve those
problems. But we have to make a serious effort to do so.
I’m personally very encouraged by the kind of enthusiasm that I think is reflected
at this conference. I would hope that enthusiasm is reflected in action by each of the
constituent organizations (that is, government organizations, the AICPA, and the ABA).
I would hope, for example, that the GAO would undertake that ultimate task that Jennie
Stathis was so concerned about, and I think I understand her concern about trying to
develop an equation between complexity and administrability. Get a relationship and be
able to test and evaluate legislation and reg changes based on some standardized
methodology to deal with that relationship, perhaps keyed into the revenue to be derived
by the given provision.

I would hope that the Treasury would undertake independent studies on the level
of complexity at some point after legislation is enacted. I would also hope that the Office
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of Tax Policy within the Treasury would be substantially enlarged. I appreciate normal
budgetary problems, but this is a major crisis for us. For example, the idea of having one
accounting adviser in the Treasury Department’s Office of Tax Analysis is, when you step
back from it, an absurd circumstance. Having only twenty attorneys to deal with all of the
Office of Tax Policy’s concerns is shortchanging the public, shortchanging professionals, and
shortchanging those twenty people who are working their tails off to try to solve those
problems. A major focus of the Commissioner’s Advisory Group ought to be to address
and identify the kinds of problems that we’re talking about here.
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At-Risk and Passive Activity Limitations:
Should Complexity Be Reduced?

Session 6: Friday Morning, January 12, 1990
Presenter:
Moderator:
Panelists:

Stanley A. Koppelman
Ray M. Sommerfeld
Sally M. Jones
Stefan F. Tucker
*

This session was devoted to the question of whether complexity should be reduced in the
at-risk and passive-activity-limitation rules. The moderator, Ray M. Sommerfeld, began
with a quote from Elihu Root:

I guess you will have to go to jail. If that’s the result of not understanding
the income tax law, I shall meet you there. We will have a merry, merry
time, for all of our friends will be there. It will be an intellectual center.
For no one understands the income tax law except those who have not
sufficient intelligence to understand the questions that arise under it.

Stanley Koppelman1 began his presentation by discussing the passive activity loss
provisions and some possibilities for their simplification. He noted that these provisions
disallow real economic losses as well as artificial losses and thus are unfair to taxpayers
with real losses. The passive activity provisions are inherently complex because they are
based on the "basket approach," under which current passive activity losses can be used only
to offset passive activity income. This approach invites transactional complexity. Moreover,
congressional efforts to limit transactional complexity have added further complexity.
In spite of these defects, Professor Koppelman did not advocate the repeal of section
469. He stated that the result of repealing section 469 is unknown. One view is that repeal
*Stanley A. Koppelman is Professor of Law at Boston University School of Law.
Ray M. Sommerfeld is the James L. Bayless/Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc. Chair of
Business Administration and Professor of Accounting at the University of Texas at Austin
Graduate School of Business.

Sally M. Jones is Professor of Accounting at the University of Texas at Austin
Graduate School of Business.
Stefan F. Tucker is a member of the firm of Tucker, Flyer, Sanger & Lewis, PC, in
Washington, D.C.
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would cause a return to the pre-1986 days of tax shelters. Another view is that various
other provisions (such as reductions in the cost recovery rates, the elimination of the
investment tax credit, and the demise of the capital gain preference) would prevent a reemergence of tax shelters. Professor Koppelman stated that he had no firm conviction as
to which view is correct but observed that the possibility of reinstating a capital gains rate
preference militates against repeal.

He next addressed the question of alternatives to the passive activity loss rules that
might provide greater equity and simplicity. One alternative would be to repeal section 469
and broaden the tax base. This alternative, although politically desirable, is unlikely. A
second alternative would be the adoption of the limitation on artificial losses (LAL)
approach proposed in the 1970s. Under this approach, artificial tax losses from an activity
are temporarily suspended until they can be offset against income from that or related
activities. This approach is preferable to the passive activity loss rules because it does not
require suspension of real economic losses. Although it is thus potentially a more equitable
approach, it does not necessarily promote simplification. It does, however, eliminate the
need to define material participation and in that sense is simpler than the current rules.
On the other hand, it requires the definition of artificial losses, adding a new complication.
Since limitation of artificial losses is not a simple idea to implement, Professor
Koppelman then explored the possibility of simplifying the existing passive activity loss
rules. He suggested that limited simplification is possible. For example, a gross income
threshold could make the rules inapplicable to certain lower-income taxpayers. Further,
some provisions (such as the exception for working interests in oil and gas properties) could
be eliminated. Although the regulations that define an activity have been criticized as
unduly complicated and unfair, Professor Koppelman was not optimistic that they could be
meaningfully simplified. He noted that proposals to make these regulations shorter do not
necessarily make them simpler; rather, shorter regulations may simply leave more
unanswered questions.

He then turned to the at-risk rules. These rules were designed to limit abusive tax
shelters and to correctly measure income in a system with a realization criterion. The issue
is whether the at-risk rules can be eliminated in the interest of simplification. To do so
would reduce complexity for those owning investments producing tax losses attributable to
nonrecourse financing, but their elimination could increase transactional complexity for
other taxpayers. The at-risk rules also simplify enforcement of rules preventing
overvaluation of property. With no clear gain in simplicity from repealing the at-risk rules,
Professor Koppelman favored their retention, arguing that they are consistent with the
principle that a taxpayer should not be entitled to a deduction for a cost that he or she is
not obligated to bear.

The first panelist, Professor Sally M. Jones,2 focused on the at-risk rules. Unlike
Professor Koppelman, she recommended repeal of section 465. She noted that before the
at-risk rules were adopted in 1976, the tax writing committees had considered the limitation
of artificial losses but rejected the notion because of its complexity. Two years later,
Congress extended the at-risk rules to include not just specific types of shelters but any
business activity except real estate.
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Professor Jones observed that the passive activity loss limitation rules are much
broader in impact than the limitation-of-artificial-loss rules Congress considered and then
rejected in 1976. It would have been logical in 1986 to repeal section 465, which had
proved to be ineffective at curbing shelters. Under current rules, a partnership with a loss
is confronted with a series of Code sections that must be applied sequentially, beginning
with the section 704(b) allocation rules, then the section 752 rules allocating nonrecourse
debt to partners, then the section 465 at-risk rules, and finally the section 469 passive
activity loss rules. To illustrate her point, Professor Jones referred to an example from
Professor Koppelman’s paper in which an individual has invested $200,000 of his personal
funds in an activity financed with $800,000 of nonrecourse debt. The section 465 and 469
rules affect only the timing of the taxpayer’s deduction of the $200,000 investment.
Professor Jones asserted that the at-risk rules have "lasted well beyond their time" and
should be repealed.

In conclusion, Professor Jones argued that there is no theoretical basis for allowing
losses from one passive activity to affect income from another passive activity. In other
words, section 469 should be activity-specific. She suggested this would simplify the statute,
remove incentives to create PIGs, and relieve Treasury of the responsibility of writing
regulations to interpret the existing rules.

The second panelist, Stefan F. Tucker,3 began by noting that his perspective is that
of a practitioner who represents clients in the real estate industry. To illustrate the
complexity he and his clients face, he produced two volumes (1,517 pages) and three
notebooks of section 469 regulations. He stated that additional "technical corrections" of
these regulations are anticipated.
Mr. Tucker disagreed with an earlier speaker who predicted that tax practitioners
will leave practice because of the complexity of the tax law. Instead, he stated his concern
that younger practitioners will become autistic idiot savants, knowing everything about
section 469 (or some other section) and very little about the remaining law.

Unlike Professor Jones, Mr. Tucker did not support the repeal of section 465 but
called for a few changes making it applicable only to abusive tax shelters. He asserted
that practitioners cannot live with section 469, particularly its regulations. He stated that
in some cases it is impossible to provide clients with answers to basic questions such as
whether income is active or investment income. He further noted that the regulations often
produce surprising results. For example, holding land for the future construction of an
office building can be treated as a trade or business rather than as a passive activity or
investment.

Mr. Tucker noted that the type of client typically affected by section 469 is not a
widely held C corporation but an entrepreneur who prefers playing the audit lottery to
paying a tax adviser who cannot determine from the regulations what the "correct"
treatment of an activity is. That fact alone, he asserted, is sufficient to call either for the
repeal of section 469 or for the simplification of the regulations. With the elimination of
the investment tax credit, longer depreciation lives for real estate, the regulation of S&Ls,
the alternative minimum tax, and uniform capitalization rules, section 469 is not necessary.
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Professor Sommerfeld then called for questions and comments from the floor. The
first came from a participant who wondered if applying section 469 on an activity-byactivity basis might increase rather than decrease complexity. He noted that the purpose
of section 469 was to prevent the offset of passive losses against labor income. As an
alternative, he proposed combining section 163(d) and section 469. Both sections are
concerned with income from capital, and combining them would eliminate the need to
distinguish among different types of interest. Professor Jones agreed that the proposal of
combining portfolio income with passive income would be theoretically sound and would
simplify the tax law. Professor Koppelman questioned whether creating a broader basket
would increase transactional complexity. Mr. Tucker endorsed the proposal. Professor
Sommerfeld pointed out that this proposal might raise some new issues concerning the
classification of income from property and services for purposes of allocating that income
to the "labor” or the "capital" basket.

The next participant wondered if section 469 could have been avoided by more
prompt action from the IRS on partnership classification or profit motivation issues.
Professor Koppelman responded that earlier enactment of such changes as the ACRS
modifications and repeal of the ITC might have avoided the need for section 469, but he
doubted that regulations alone could have prevented the proliferation of tax shelters. Mr.
Tucker responded that the real problem was not the classification regulations but the
failure of the IRS and Treasury to focus on basis issues. The participant noted that these
are audit-level questions, and that the tax shelter industry could not have thrived had the
regulations not been skewed in the direction of finding a partnership.
Another participant suggested that without deduction of the inflationary component
of interest, it would be difficult to develop shelters. He asked if dealing directly with the
interest deduction might eliminate the need for some of the other provisions designed to
get at tax shelters. Professor Koppelman agreed but noted that a comprehensive indexing
package would also be very complex.

The next participant suggested that marginal situations should be dealt with in the
courts rather than in the Code. Professor Koppelman noted that good regulations can also
be used to deal with marginal situations.
Another participant proposed doing away with the at-risk rules and with partnership
basis derived from nonrecourse debt. He also noted that section 469 affects two types of
taxpayers: investors and people in the real estate industry. He suggested that the former
group will be out of real estate shelters in a few years and that it would be fair to allow the
latter group to put all income associated with real estate into one basket. Mr. Tucker
supported this idea but noted that combining service income with passive losses from real
estate could lead to perceived abuses.

The final comment came from a participant who referred back to the proposal to
combine sections 163(d) and 469. He observed that individuals with only service and
portfolio income currently have no incentive to participate in tax shelters whereas this
proposal would make tax shelters attractive to them. Professor Jones responded that other
changes in the law that already have been enacted should prevent a resurgence of abusive
tax shelters.
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ENDNOTES

1 Professor Koppelman’s Conference Paper is reproduced in Part I (P-1).

2 Professor Jones’s Conference Paper is reproduced in Part I (Q-l).
3 Mr. Tucker’s comments are reproduced in Part I (R-l).
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Employee Benefits: Statutory Simplification

Session 7: Friday Morning, January 12, 1990
Presenter:
Moderator:
Panelists:

David J. Kautter
Richard Katcher
Harry J. Conaway
Susan P. Serota
*

The moderator, Richard Katcher, noted that following the enactment of ERISA in
1974, ’’Congress began a period of constant activity" in the employee benefits area.
Through 1989, fourteen acts have amended ERISA, and numerous regulations, rulings,
revenue procedures, and announcements have added to the complexity faced by taxpayers
and practitioners. The focus of this panel was on how to reduce that complexity.
David J. Kautter1 began by noting that three sets of rules govern employee benefits:
qualified plan rules, rules dealing with welfare (fringe) benefits, and non-qualified
compensation rules. He devoted most of his talk to the most complicated rules-those
related to qualified plans.

He cited three primary causes of the current state of these rules. The first is
"relentless layering of change upon change without an effort to integrate all those
subsequent changes into the preceding changes." The second is obsession with theoretical
purity by policymakers, especially with regard to equity and non-discrimination. The third
is practitioners and their clients, who desire flexibility, which in turn causes complexity.

Mr. Kautter’s approach was to offer proposals that reduce complexity while retaining
as much of the underlying principles of current legislation as possible; that is, his proposals
would retain the long-standing tenets of the area such as plans, trusts, participation rules,
and vesting.

*David J. Kautter is National Director of the Compensation and Benefits Tax
Services of Ernst & Young.
Richard Katcher is a partner in the law firm of Baker & Hostetler in Cleveland.

Harry J. Conaway is a principal of Mercer Meidinger Hansen in the firm’s
Washington, D.C. office.
Susan P. Serota is a partner in the firm of Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts
in New York.
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Two structural changes were included among Mr. Kautter’s proposals. The first
was to eliminate old Code names (profit sharing, pension, and stock bonus plans) and
retain ERISA names (defined benefit and defined contribution plans), thereby describing
qualified retirement plans with a single set of terms. The second was to segregate
leveraged ESOPs from the retirement plan provisions. This would collect all of the ESOP
rules in one place and eliminate these special rules from the retirement plan provisions
where they add complexity to already complex rules.

As to plan qualifications, Mr. Kautter proposed repealing the top heavy rules. Rules
passed since 1982 affecting compensation limits, vesting schedules, and Social Security
integration make it less likely that any plan can skew benefits to favor the highly paid.
Thus the marginal contribution of the top heavy rules to equity is now outweighed by the
marginal contribution to complexity.
Mr. Kautter also proposed repealing the minimum participation rules of section
401(a)(26), which are accompanied by 118 pages of regulations. Congress could have
accomplished its goal more directly and simply by changing the existing comparability rules.
With regard to benefit accrual rules, Mr. Kautter proposed eliminating the actual
deferral percentage test in 401(k) plans in which all employees (over age 21 and with one
year of service) are eligible to participate. The need for this test, which was designed to
prevent highly paid employees from contributing large amounts relative to rank-and-file
employees, has been mitigated by the existing dollar limit of $7,000 per year (indexed).
Relatively little discrimination can occur with a fairly low dollar cap.

Mr. Kautter also supported repeal of the 403(b) annuity rules, which allow
employees of tax exempt organizations to defer compensation on a tax exempt basis. These
employees could make contributions to 401(k) plans with similar benefits.
Another proposal regarding benefit accrual rules would be to eliminate the ability
of employees to make after-tax contributions to qualified plans. Other alternatives such
as annuity contracts exist; there is no need to allow these contributions to qualified plans.
Mr. Kautter also suggested eliminating permitted disparity rules, which give an employer
credit for the employer’s contribution to Social Security. He conceded that this proposal
might cause some employers to terminate their plans.

Mr. Kautter offered two proposals regarding plan participants. The first would be
to eliminate income averaging for lump-sum distribution from qualified plans. The rules
are complicated, the option requires an analysis from individuals who often cannot afford
to make a mistake, and lump-sum distributions are inconsistent with the notion of wage
replacement. The second proposal would be to eliminate most of the restrictions on rolling
over distributions from a qualified plan to either an IRA or another qualified plan.
Finally, Mr. Kautter discussed several proposals regarding fringe benefits. Several
might be eliminated, including the section 101(b) $5,000 death benefit exclusion and the
group legal services exclusion. The section 127 educational assistance exclusion should be
made permanent, since it is simpler than the trade or business deduction available to most

II-A-54

taxpayers who benefit from section 127 plans. In addition, the $50,000 group-term life
insurance exclusion should be increased.
With respect to non-discrimination tests, Mr. Kautter suggested that design-based
tests are preferable to usage-based tests. Design-based tests could eliminate most
discrimination as well as the complexity associated with usage-based tests.

In summing up, Mr. Kautter emphasized the importance of reducing complexity in
the employee benefits area. Failure to do so will result in increased noncompliance, much
of it unintentional.
The first panelist, Harry J. Conaway,2 began his comments by raising the issue of
the level at which we desire to achieve simplification. For example, simplification can be
achieved in the written law, in the regulations, or in the practical effect on plan sponsors
and taxpayers.
Second, he noted that trade-offs may be necessary. For example, simplification and
flexibility may be incompatible; that is, simple rules may not fit existing practice and
therefore may be more disruptive than complex rules. Likewise, special transitional rules
may be fair, but they can make practice more difficult for plan sponsors and taxpayers.
In addition, simple rules may not achieve horizontal and vertical equity.

It is also important to note that some complexity in this area affects only plans that
operate at the edge of permissible practice. Sponsors could choose to operate in the
mainstream and thereby elect out of much of the complexity.

Part of the complexity in the benefits area arises from the high tax expenditure
costs. It is reasonable to expect that Congress would want to devise rules to target the tax
expenditures at the intended beneficiaries.
Multiple objectives also contribute to
complexity.

Mr. Conaway advocated explicit recognition of the nature of the two approaches to
achieving non-discrimination (design-based testing versus annual or usage-based testing)
followed by a debate concerning which approach will achieve the non-discrimination
objectives and minimize the compliance burden. In some cases, it should be noted that the
compliance burden falls on the plan sponsor (section 415(e), for example) while in others
it falls on the participant (section 4980A, for example).
In closing, Mr. Conaway discussed a proposal that had been considered at Treasury
during the development of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. In short, the proposal was that
Congress, Treasury, and the Labor Department join together to create a set of prototype
qualified plans. These would be the only plans available to employers. Flexibility would
be limited, but complexity would be greatly reduced.
The second panelist, Susan P. Serota,3 began by noting some special aspects of the
employee benefits area. First, it is affected by numerous laws other than the tax law and
by a number of agencies. Second, plans are important to our economy because of the
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significant value of the assets they control. Third, there is a natural tension between the
goals of a national retirement policy and the cost to subsidize it through qualified plans.

Ms. Serota recounted how her own employee benefits practice has grown over the
years as the laws have become more complex and the stakes have become more important
for all the parties. She noted the difficulty of practicing in an area of constant change.
Complexity in this area comes from three sources: incremental overload, the obsession to
chase tax abuse, and the desire of practitioners and plan sponsors to retain flexibility. No
number of standard or prototype plans will satisfy everyone.
Ms. Serota noted that Mr. Kautter’s proposals would help address the first type of
complexity. The second and third sources are more difficult to address. Eliminating
complex rules would simplify the Code but possibly at the cost of equity. In addition,
severely restricting flexibility may prevent employers from meeting their goals (such as
rewarding their most productive employees).

The top heavy rules are an example of a provision that should be repealed. The
ABA has called for the repeal of these rules because the amount of complexity required
to differentiate and regulate top heavy plans is not worth the small increment in the
minimum benefit provided for the workers it affects. Congress could accomplish the same
goal more simply by mandating a minimum pension accrual or by raising taxes or increasing
Social Security benefits.
Likewise, the minimum participation rules of section 401(a)(26) should be repealed
or amended. The original purpose of these rules was to stop the proliferation and
continued existence of individual defined benefit plans. However, they create complexity
for many plans that were not targets of the original legislation.

Ms. Serota concluded by noting that real simplification requires employers to be
willing to live with less flexibility in plan design and for the Government to be willing to
live with less equity in benefit delivery.

Mr. Katcher then called for questions and comments from the floor. The first
comment came from a participant who challenged Mr. Conaway’s notion that we need to
think about for whom we wish to eliminate complexity. He noted that if we eliminate
complexity at any level, we free effort.
The next participant observed that the private pension plan system has been very
successful in meeting public goals. However, the complexity of the law has encouraged
many small businesses to terminate plans. It may be necessary to provide incentives for the
owners of these business to reinstate or provide plans.
Another participant expressed concern for the complexity faced by an individual
who is retiring and trying to decide which option is best. He also noted that much of the
complexity for plans comes from sources other than the tax law. Integration of all these
rules is needed. Finally, he observed that it is critical to reduce complexity in the employee
benefits area now, before a national health care system is added.
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Mr. Kautter’s proposals were praised by the next participant. However, she criticized
Mr. Conaway’s suggestion of prototype plans. The problem is not with plan documents, she
stated, but with understanding the rules for implementing and operating plans. Further, she
questioned the ability of Treasury to write reasonable regulations.
The final participant referred to the benefits area as a "major disaster area." He
stated that a complete overhaul is needed, with particular attention to the problems of
small businesses.

Mr. Katcher then called for final comments from the panelists. Mr. Kautter stated
that the difficulty of reducing complexity is that the rules in the statute are based on good
intentions, and it is therefore difficult to challenge them on a theoretical basis. However,
if we are to have a pension system that is sound, some simplification must be achieved.

ILA-57

ENDNOTES

1 Mr. Kautter’s Conference Paper is reproduced in Part I (S-l).

2 Mr. Conaway’s comments are reproduced in Part I (T-l).
3 Ms. Serota’s comments are reproduced in Part I (U-l).
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FRED T. GOLDBERG, JR
*

You know, I’ve talked on a fair number of occasions about the lengths of regulations
and argued vociferously for limitations on the number of pages. And I have a confession
to make: I was always the worst basketball player in school, and I’m telling you, folks, I’m
here to say short is beautiful.

Very briefly, I’d like to comment on the role of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue. I strongly believe that the Office of the Commissioner-indeed, the entire
Internal Revenue Service--has as its first and foremost job to speak for and represent
revenue agents and the small practitioners: the "Joe Six-packs," little folk out there trying
to deal with the tax system. That is a critical part of the job, and that is one reason why
the Commissioner should carry as heavy a club as possible in dealing with problems like
complexity and the burden on the taxpayer.
Before giving what really are a number of random observations on the subject of
simplification, I’d like to thank both the ABA, the AICPA, Stewart Dunn, Don Summa, and
all the folks who put this conference together. This is a vitally important subject to the
future of the tax system and to the future of tax administration. And I think that you have
made a major contribution in the content of what your panelists and speakers have laid out.

More important, you have made a contribution by making clear that the question
of simplification, the question of burden, is now a legitimate, out-of-the-closet subject that
we have to consider whenever we review a ruling, a regulation, a revenue procedure, or a
piece of legislation. The mere fact of making simplification a subject that has to be
addressed is a very important contribution to the process.

*Fred T. Goldberg, Jr. was sworn in as Commissioner of Internal Revenue on July
5, 1989. Before accepting this position, he was a partner in the Washington office of the
law firm of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom. Mr. Goldberg was the IRS Chief
Counsel from 1984 to 1986, when he served as the principal legal adviser to the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue and also was an Assistant General Counsel for the
Treasury department. Earlier he was an assistant to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
from 1981 to 1982 and was acting director of the former legislation and regulations division
in the Office of Chief Counsel in 1982. Before joining the IRS in 1981, Goldberg was a
partner in the Washington office of Latham, Watkins & Hills.

Mr. Goldberg earned his bachelor’s degree form Yale University (1969) in
economics. He earned a law degree from Yale Law School (1973), where he was an editor
of the Yale Law Journal. From 1971 to 1973, Mr. Goldberg served as an instructor of
political science and economics at Yale College and was also assistant dean of Calhoun
College and Yale University.
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As I said, I have a number of somewhat disconnected thoughts on the subject. The
starting point is, at least from my perspective, that simplification comes in several guises
and complexity comes in several guises. It’s important to keep each of them in mind as you
address any particular subject.

The first guise is substantive complexity. What do the rules mean? How hard is it
to figure out what the rules are? How hard is it to work through the section 752
regulations just to figure out what the substantive rules are in trying to address what you
ought to be doing and the consequences of the transactions you enter into?
Transactional complexity, I think, is a separate level of inquiry. What is the impact
of a given set of rules on a series of commercial transactions? What are the transaction
cost implications of any particular set of standards? We are working on the 1031
regulations. Well, if you believe that Congress believes that ’’like kind" exchanges are an
appropriate form of transaction, what is your job in terms of the barriers you either create
or the barriers you take down, and how does it affect the transactional ease of getting a
like-kind exchange done? What do you think about accommodation parties? What do you
think about escrow arrangements? How do you think about the transaction cost
implications of the rules you adopt?
At a third level, the complexity discussion has to do with administrative complexity,
the recordkeeping burden, and the documentation burden. What are we requiring of
taxpayers, and what material are we requiring our revenue agents to deal with in assessing
compliance with the law? Each of those three levels plays differently, depending the
subject you’re talking about and the kind of guidance you’re trying to provide.
A second area I refer to as the "common myths." One of the traps you can fall into
when talking about this subject is the "Have you stopped beating your wife" question. And
the questions run: Do you really want to give up revenue to achieve simplicity? Do you
really want to give up certainty and clarity to achieve simplicity? Do you really want to
give up fairness to achieve simplicity?
You can understand that debate, and to some extent those are very real questions.
But those apparent quandaries may not be real. I think that from Ken Gideon’s comments
about revenue, looking in the real world at the kind of issues we are addressing, it is crystal
clear that simplification comes in both flavors, as Ken put it. It can be revenue-raising; it
can be revenue-losing.
Let me comment on a different aspect of revenue. I believe we have for some time
equated detailed, elaborate, well-honed rules as the desired tool-the tool of preference-in dealing with abuses, loopholes, and anomalies in the tax system. My own personal
belief is that if you look back at the impact of a lot of those detailed, elaborate,
cumbersome rules, you come to the conclusion that they may well not have achieved the
revenue-preserving effects they were intended to accomplish.

And I think that those who are practitioners of the mysterious art of tax planning
and creating cutting-edge transactions, financial products, and the like will tell you that
II-A-60

the brighter the lines and the more the lines, the more likely it is you’re going to find one
of those little holes to go down and never reappear. So I question the assumption that
elaborate, detailed rules are synonymous with closing loopholes and solving revenue
problems.

The same thing can be said about certainty. It is not at all clear to me that a
detailed, elaborate set of rules and provisions is necessarily synonymous with certainty. I
credit Gordon Henderson with a wonderful concept. He wrote a wonderful paper called
"Hyperlexus and the Law of Ambiguity” in which he made a reference to the law of
conservation of ambiguity. It’s a great notion because it conjures a very clear vision. If you
have one rule, one line, there are questions on both sides. Well, the more rules you write
and the more lines you draw, the more sides to the figure, the more situations you are
going to have where there is uncertainty and there is ambiguity. I question the basic
premise that more rules assures greater certainty.

Ken mentioned yesterday that Mike Graetz has been quoted as saying that fairness
and simplicity are opposite ends of the seesaw. That’s an important idea to talk about,
too. I will confess that in some respects, that’s a harder one to think about because to me,
the fallacy in the logic isn’t as immediately apparent. But the analogy that I would draw
is to what the economists would refer to as a "public-good problem." To put it in its
simplest terms, your fairness is my overhead. When you analyze the question, that you are
providing certainty to three taxpayers or providing fairness to three taxpayers but the net
effect of that is that tens and tens of thousands of taxpayers have to spend hundreds of
thousands of hours and millions of dollars grinding through a bunch of rules that turn out
to have no application, it seems to me that the notion of certainty and fairness becomes
much more opaque.
That was a point that Ken made yesterday, that the eighty little pieces of legislation
that sound fair, reasonable, or appropriate in the abstract turn out, when added up, to lay
an enormous burden on the rest of the community. That spillover cost, it seems to me,
makes the choice between fairness versus simplicity or certainty versus simplicity a lot less
clear than some would have it be. I am not as persuaded by those myths or those choices
as others.

Pushing that analysis a step further, we are all trained to think about specific cases,
specific questions, specific issues, specific taxpayers. It’s important to step back and look
at the tax system as a whole and to ask ourselves very seriously the question of what is the
impact of the cumulative burden we are placing on the American taxpayer (whether you’re
talking about a low-income individual or a Fortune 50 company). If you conclude that the
cumulative burden we are placing on the system-not just through legislation and
regulations, not just through how we audit taxpayers--and you look at all of that cumulative
weight, you can get very troubled by where our income tax system is going.
If you are troubled by that idea, it may change how you deal with these equations
and how important simplification, the shortcuts, and lifting the recordkeeping and reporting
burden are to you. My personal judgment is that the tax system does have serious
problems in this regard, and that because those problems are serious, the tradeoff says
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you ought to be paying more attention to lifting the burden, making it easier to comply in
what is essentially a voluntary compliance system.

I’d like to talk about prospects for progress, and I’d like to start with my friend Ken.
With all due respect to his predecessors--and I’ve known a number--I think the system is
uniquely fortunate right now that Ken comes to his job with experience as IRS chief
counsel, which makes him sensitive to issues of burden, administrability, and how the
system is really running out there. It is a personal pleasure to work with him, and I think
that he brings to his office a remarkable sense of the preservation of the system. We’re all
very fortunate for it.

As I said before, the fact is that complexity is on the table. It is now a legitimate
subject to discuss. You’ve got to ask the questions. And I believe that, in and of itself, is
going to have a significant, positive impact.
I’ve stayed away from legislative matters. That was covered yesterday, and I will
forego all of my temptations to bash the Congress and will really move on. There is a very
important issue that we need to think about in terms of taking the chain off. If you look
at the legislation that’s being enacted today, you frequently see (notwithstanding the statute
and all the legislative history) language such as 'Treasury should carry out congressional
intent,"--whatever that is. I believe that does not mean simply to write regulations to be
sure that every loophole is stitched up tighter than a drum. I think it also means something
else.

I do not believe the Congress of the United States intends to pass statutes that are
unadministrable, unworkable, and incomprehensible. I believe in the context of delegated
regulatory authority and the inherent rule-making authority in section 7805, we have much
broader latitude to write regulations that help assure the administrability, comprehensibility,
and workability of the statutes Congress passes. I think we have a lot of authority, and I
think it’s an authority that we are making every effort to use.

One of the things you learn quickly at the Service is that what’s measured moves.
That basic axiom of Management 101 has an application here. To the extent we attempt
to measure and pay attention to the burden we’re placing on the taxpayer (the transaction
costs implicit in the rules we write) we’re going to have to deal with it. And quantifying
that burden is hard-to-impossible. I understand all that. But the effort to measure, the
effort to deal with it, is an essential ingredient to dealing with the issues you folks have
been talking about.

This is a process of marginal change and marginal improvement. Or you can talk
about it as an effort at radical change and a significant reversal in how we are doing
business. Certainly, marginal change is appropriate. There are areas where marginal
improvement is desirable and achievable, and I think we’re going down that road.
But I’ve got to say that we are not brain surgeons. If we slip, it just doesn’t matter
that much in a lot of respects. We ought to take some chances to do some things very
differently from the way we’ve always done them. We ought to be willing to take that
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plunge. It isn’t going to bring the world to an end. I think we have to be sensitive to the
revenue issues. If you do build a big hole that way, it is unacceptable, it’s a nonstarter;
but subject to that qualification, we can do things very differently and we should do things
very differently.
You know, one of the great treats of being the Commissioner is spending a lot of
time on the rubber-chicken circuit talking to small practitioner groups and chambers of
commerce and all that stuff. And I always have this standing joke. I say, "You know, we
really believe in simplification, and when these pointy heads from the"-excuse me, Your
Honor-"New York State Tax Bar come in and talk about simplification, you’re tempted to
ask them to help. But you know if you ask those suckers to help, those 400-page
regulations are going to be 800 pages before they’re done." It’s sort of like academics,
Don.
I have a public confession to make: We have talked to some folks in the New York
State Bar about this issue, and I am here to publicly eat crow. We had asked them to look
at a number of projects. I gather they circulated the draft to you of their rewrite of the 752
regulations. They take a rather hefty package and get it down to, I don’t know, fifteen or
twenty pages. Now they left out the preamble and introductory material, so their draft is
destined to be forty, but they don’t know that yet. But it is a credible, workable effort at
taking a difficult subject and trying to say the same thing differently and in a manner that’s
shorter, easier to read, and hopefully more workable as far as revenue agents and the world
at large is concerned.

Now, I haven’t gone through the product. I do not know where it’s going to lead us.
But I think what’s important is that it is a real effort. And I think it’s important that we
start to serve up those kinds of questions. Whether it’s in this product or in a number of
the projects that Ken alluded to where we are making this kind of effort, it’s beyond the
talk stage. It’s a question of serving it up and making our decisions.

If it turns out that kind of simplicity leads to rampant uncertainty, rampant
inequities, or significant loss of revenue, that’s fine. That’s what we learned. And we’re
stuck with what we’ve got. But at least we know that’s what we’ve got and why we’ve got
it. And I think that making that effort is so important.
I’d like to switch gears for a second and talk about information returns. When we
talk about simplification, at 300 bucks an hour it’s one thing. But there’s a different level
at which all of this stuff works. I know TRA ’86 is everybody’s favorite whipping boy with
respect to complexity. But if you look at the impact of legislation starting in 1982 and
culminating in 1986, you see something very remarkable. What is happening is obviously
the simplification associated with relieving lower-income folks from the burden of filing.
If you don’t have to file, it is a real world, human being simplification.
More important, based on our preliminary looks, it appears that 40-plus percent of
the American taxpayers now file tax returns based solely on information return documents.
It doesn’t include K-ls, which no one would think of honestly as an information return
document. It doesn’t include broker transaction-reporting documents. But the point is, you
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can’t overlook the importance of that fact. Because what that says is that for 40 percent
of those taxpayers out there, you can get that information returns program working
properly, which means that you’re getting timely, accurate, readable, and understandable
information to those taxpayers, so that their filing responsibility is largely transcription.
That is, I believe, a profoundly important breakthrough in the system if what you’re
interested in is simplification.

Will Nelson made a comment yesterday that I want to mention. He said, "You
know, the Service is at its limits in terms of its ability to transcribe, process, and use
information return documents." I believe there is another important aspect of the
information returns program, and it is not our ability to generate a "gotcha" notice. It’s the
ability of taxpayers to get the kind of information that lets them voluntarily comply up
front. And while our ability to process the information and use the information is obviously
very important, we shouldn’t lose sight of the fact that the fundamental reason for that
program is to make it easier on the taxpayer. It’s a reason why we should be working
vigorously to be sure the program is working.
As some of you know, Treasury and the Service jointly have under way a project
looking at partnership reporting, to see if we can’t make partnership reporting--at least at
the larger partnership level, more of a true information-reporting system where folks are
getting coherent, easy-to-use information off their returns.

When you listen to taxpayers and practitioners talk out there, their biggest complaint
is they cannot read the 1099s well enough to figure out what the hell is even being
reported. What should we do to make that system work better, recognizing that we can no
more willy-nilly impose a burden on the payor community than we can on any other group
of taxpayers but appreciating the importance of getting good, sound, usable information to
taxpayers.
Another area that is worth mentioning--and it’s an observation I have after six
months-is that there are many structural imbalances in the IRS. One of the imbalances
that is most troublesome to me is that our automated ability to initiate contacts with
taxpayers has far outstripped our ability to respond to those taxpayers when they choose to
reply.

It’s important for us to begin to think about everything we do to be sure we try to
re-establish that balance. Our systems are limited. We have to invest in systems
modernization to put us in the position to find that balance. But it reflects a kind of
thinking that is very important. You start with regulations like 752s and 368s and all that
stuff. Those are important subjects, but they are a subset of a broader subject, which is the
continued ability of the taxpayer to comply at any level in our system. That’s the biggest
challenge we face, and that’s what we ought to spend our time on. Thanks.
*

*

*
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MR. SUMMA: Thank you, Commissioner Goldberg.
Fred, I think the applause spoke for itself. We heard some comments that I
personally, and I think all of us, found very refreshing and encouraging in terms of where
we are going from here, and we all look forward to the implementation of them.
Fred has kindly agreed to accept any questions from the group, and I’ll let you field
them, Fred. You don’t need my help.
QUESTION: A question either for you or for the Assistant Secretary to test your
commitment to simplification: would you recommend to the President that he veto any
piece of tax legislation that does not involve a substantial net simplification of the system?
This leads us into our discussion for this afternoon.

MR. GOLDBERG: Absolutely not.

You know, this kind of discussion is fun, and it is fine to have. The point that Ken made
is right on the mark. Obviously, when you are talking about macroeconomic policy,
investment policies and the unseemly high cost of capital in this country, tax policy has to
be responsive to broader concerns. Taxes don’t run the world; they can’t. The only point
you can make is a point that I believe Mr. Gideon has made as effectively as it can be
made: Do it, but do it simple, don’t do it hard. That is the proper role for the Internal
Revenue Service. Economic policy takes precedence. In the context of tax legislation,
addressing economic policy again, the object is if you are going to do it, that’s fine, but do
it as best you can and in administrable fashion.
QUESTION: Fred, I think you are right on the mark with Ken in your new initiative.
Those of us who have been in the business for a long time remember that there was a time
when tax practitioners gave opinion letters on controversial issues, and I note that lately
when there is difficulty getting a quick response from the Service, the practitioners have
started giving opinion letters instead of waiting twelve or eighteen months. That may be
the result of simplification of regulations as well, and I find no difficulty in ten people
giving an opinion letter rather than having an extra thirty pages of regulations.

MR. GOLDBERG: I agree with you, and I think that the role of the practitioner is very
important. One of the things you get when you talk about simplification is that if you do
all this stuff, folks are going to skate to the edge, there are going to be touchy-feely rules
and unanswered questions, and folks are going to rip the system off to beat the band. That,
probably more soberly stated, is a concern that you obviously have and we need to be
sensitive to it, but I think you need to remember we are living in a world where there is
compound interest, as opposed to ten years ago when it was simple interest; we are living
in a world with a substantial understatement penalty. I am willing to place my faith in the
practitioner community. I think that is where it belongs.
QUESTION: I was just wondering, from your standpoint as Assistant Secretary, in terms
of the training of the members of staff on regulations, is there any component of their
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training--I don’t even know if they have training-that allows them to start having a sense
of the line between being technically correct and being practically useful?
MR. GOLDBERG: That is a line that all of us are struggling to find; I wouldn’t limit
trying to find it to the folks in the Treasury and the Service. I think it is and should be
an open process. As you know, the Treasury staff consists entirely of folks who have had
private-sector experience. Increasingly the Service is hiring folks with private-sector
experience. Folks who are coming to the Service directly out of law school are hopefully
having more and more frequent exchange and interaction with folks out there. And it is
a concern that we are trying to pay attention to, but it is a line that all of us are struggling
to find. We are moving in that direction.

QUESTION: I would like to know what is being done, or what you think should be done,
at your level with agents all the way down to the field and office level who just simply do
not understand cost. Some of us in this room who have referred to ourselves as "priests"
in the last few days don’t understand some of the complicated rules of passive losses and
everything else. It is true that with ’87 audits, the first ones that went through with the new
law, agents in a couple of different cases did not understand the AMT and they certainly
did not understand the passive loss rules. Does that mean that the laws are too
complicated? And if not, what does it mean? And then what I am really interested in
finding out is what the Service is going to do to deal with it. I see the system crumbling,
to be very sarcastic about it.
MR. GOLDBERG: Well, there are a couple of answers to that question. One, as I said
before, is that when we do this kind of stuff, we need to be sensitive to how well we can
administer the law. But in terms of what we are doing about it, we have a number of
initiatives under way. The rest of the world has learned that for better or worse,
specialization is a necessity. The notion that all 17,000 revenue agents out there are going
to have to learn the passive loss rules that would be visited upon them is a nightmare. I
mean, that is "Friday the 13th, Part 8". You can’t do that.

On the other hand, what you can do is focus expertise and get a limited number of
agents who are expert in a number of areas, and I think you can better mine that expertise
which is effectively what law firms and accounting firms do. We are reviewing the
possibility of completely revamping our large case program, to deal with that kind of quality
issue, and it is one that we are concerned about and are pursuing pretty vigorously.

MR. SUMMA: Fred, thank you.
Let me again thank both the Commissioner and the Assistant Secretary for being
with us both of these days. We appreciate your interest in our problems.
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*

Martin D. Ginsburg1 began the session by noting that the purpose of his paper was
to address a narrow issue-the effect on income tax complexity of differential treatment of
capital gains and losses—and not to consider issues of equity or economic efficiency. He
concluded that a special capital gain/loss taxing regime adds significantly to the complexity
of the system. To illustrate the point, Professor Ginsburg offered the following example:
Just nine months ago, Mr. A purchased a contingent trust remainder for
$20,000 from an unrelated seller. Today, A received notice from the trustee
that, against all odds, both preceding beneficiaries had died early and in an
actuarially unlikely order. As a result, the remainder interest Mr. A bought
nine months ago has now vested. Over the next sixty days, the trustee plans
to sell the trust corpus, consisting of marketable securities currently worth
$100,000, and will distribute the proceeds and any unsold securities to Mr. A
sixty days from now.

Questions that arise from this simple set of facts include(1) What is the tax treatment to A of his receipt of $100,000 from the trustees sixty
days from now? What will happen to him if he promptly reinvests the $100,000, makes a
good investment, and three months later sells the securities for $125,000?

*Martin D. Ginsburg is Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center in
Washington, D.C.
H. Stewart Dunn, Jr. is a partner in the firm of Ivins, Phillips & Barker in
Washington, D.C.

John S. Nolan is a member of the law firm of Miller & Chevalier, Chartered,
Washington, D.C.
Norman B. Ture is President and Founder of the Institute for Research on the
Economics of Taxation, a non-profit public economic policy research institute based in
Washington, D.C.
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(2) Alternatively, Mr. A, prior to the trust distribution, sells the remainder interest
to an unrelated purchaser for $100,000, takes the cash, and reinvests in securities, which he
sells three months later for $125,000.
(3) Alternatively, the trustee does not sell the securities and instead distributes them
to Mr. A in kind sixty days from now. Mr. A holds the distributed securities for another
three months, after which he sells them for $125,000.

In each case, Mr. A put $20,000 at risk and ended up after fourteen months with
$125,000. In each case, the question is, Does Mr. A have ordinary income, long-term
capital gain, short-term capital gain, or some mixture? Professor Ginsburg reminded the
audience that his example, unlike problems in practice, includes simple facts and precise
questions. Yet it clearly demonstrates the complexity associated with differential capital
gain treatment. This complexity has been reduced by eliminating the capital gains rate
differential.

Professor Ginsburg then turned to the question of why in 1986 Congress chose to
retain in the Code all the provisions related to capital gains and losses. One reason was
the anticipation of a return of a capital gain rate preference. Another was unwillingness
to give up the loss limitation rules because of the "cherry-picking problem." This problem
arises out of the opportunity to abuse the realization system by deferring gains and realizing
losses when it would be advantageous to do so for purposes of reducing taxes.
Professor Ginsburg suggested three alternative approaches to the cherry-picking
problem. The first would be to force annual recognition of all property gains and losses,
whether realized or not. He characterized this solution as the "appraisers’ full employment
act."

The second solution would be a mark-to-market regime, in which annual recognition
of gains and losses would be required for all marketable property. In this regime, as he
conceived it, the concept of a capital asset is not required, other deduction limitations are
preserved, gain is recognized on gift of appreciated property, and gains and losses are
recognized on transfers of property at death.
A third alternative would be to preserve the realization rules but allow deduction
of net realized losses on the disposition of marketable property only to the extent they
exceed the taxpayer’s net unrealized marketable property gains, measured at year-end.

On balance, Professor Ginsburg favored the second plan as a fairer treatment than
the present loss limitation rules. It would work, however, only in a world with a single tax
rate applied to all sources of income.

The first panelist, John S. Nolan,2 noted that Professor Ginsburg had not addressed
issues of economic efficiency and fairness. These must be faced, he stated, because "the
role of capital gains in our income tax system is far more a matter of equity and economic
policy than it is a problem of complexity."
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Mr. Nolan offered a number of arguments why indexation is vital to the correct
measurement of income and losses. In spite of these arguments, he recognized that
indexation is enormously complex, particularly with regard to pass-through entities. It also
requires adjustment to liabilities as well as to assets. Mr. Nolan therefore reluctantly
concluded that indexation is too complex for an income tax system.
Purely from the standpoint of complexity, he concluded that we should not
reintroduce a capital gain preference as long as the present low rates remain in effect.
From the standpoint of equity, the present system may be appropriate in that it helps
achieve reasonable progressivity given that capital gains are realized to a high degree by
higher income classes. Mr. Nolan deferred to the economists on whether lower capital
gains rates are necessary or desirable for economic efficiency. Even if a persuasive
economic efficiency case can be made for a capital gain rate preference, complexity
considerations argue against such a change if it can be obtained only at the price of a
higher top effective rate.

Finally, Mr. Nolan considered Professor Ginsburg’s suggestions for simplifying the
capital gain/loss statutory structure if no capital gain preference is enacted. He argued that
Professor Ginsburg’s preferred plan, in which gains and losses on marketable assets would
be recognized annually, would materially distort investment decisions in favor of
nonmarketable assets. He therefore preferred the third plan, in which a taxpayer’s capital
losses would be deductible to the extent they exceed net unrealized gains on marketable
property. Mr. Nolan would extend Professor Ginsburg’s proposal to include losses on
nonmarketable property, and he would add rules to prevent abuses. He concluded that the
limited added complexity would be overshadowed by "the simplification, fairness, and
economic efficiency advantages.”
The second panelist, Norman B. Ture,3 stated his belief that it is virtually impossible
to assess proposals to simplify without considering the impact on incentives and
disincentives confronting those who must comply with the tax law. Indeed, all such
proposals should be evaluated in terms of minimizing distortions in prices and costs.

Dr. Ture attributed Professor Ginsburg’s "misidentification of the problems and
issues" to "the analytical context in which he and most tax policy people operate." This
context is derived from the work of Henry Simons, who believed we should rely on an
income tax based on the taxpayer’s consumption plus the change in his or her net worth.
Simons supported this formulation because of his belief that the reason for an income tax
is to reduce inequality in the distribution of income and wealth.
Dr. Ture challenged this vision of an income tax. He asserted that the present tax
structure is inherently biased against savings and favors current consumption. Dr. Ture
proposed that we should be dedicated instead to designing an income tax that is as neutral
as possible in its impact on the choice between savings and consumption. We currently, tax
both the amount saved and the returns on the amount saved. In addition, the tax on
capital gains, in the case of most assets, adds a third layer of tax on the same income
stream. The tax deferral allowed by the realization criterion is but a "modest abatement"
of that third layer of tax. Any of Professor Ginsburg’s proposals, all of which would
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accelerate the tax on capital gains, would be counterproductive. With regard to "cherry
picking," Dr. Ture stated that it should not be seen as evil but as a "modest modification"
of the bias in the law against savings and investment.
Dr. Ture concluded by stating that proposals such as those supported by Professor
Ginsburg and Mr. Nolan should be evaluated in light of current concerns about the
adequacy of savings and capital formation. The likely effect of these proposals is to
increase the cost of saving relative to the cost of current consumption.

The first comment came from a participant who proposed adoption of the Canadian
system, in which gains and losses are realized at death and at the time of a gift with no
estate or gift tax. Dr. Ture expressed his opposition to a system of constructive realization
of gains and losses on property transferred by gift or death. Mr. Nolan urged consideration
of the plan, which might permit elimination of the existing estate and gift tax system. The
basic question is whether we wish to retain a transfer tax system to achieve a further
redistribution of wealth.
The next participant asked for comments regarding a three-part proposal to index
the basis of capital assets acquired after enactment of the change, expand the $125,000
lifetime exclusion of capital gains on a principal residence to include any capital gains, and
to require the recognition of unrealized gains over the life expectancy of any taxpayer at
age 701/2.

Mr. Nolan responded that he could think of no justification for adopting a system
to index assets acquired after a certain date. As to the lifetime exclusion, he stated that
whether one supports it depends on whether one supports Dr. Ture’s concept of the tax
structure or the traditional structure. Dr. Ture stated that indexing does not address the
core of the problem, which is multiple taxation of an income stream resulting from savings.
Indexing might be a desirable supplement to reducing the tax on capital gains, but it should
not be adopted in lieu of rate reduction. Mr. Nolan added that indexing should not be
adopted without compensating adjustment to debt. Professor Ginsburg suggested that the
third part of the proposal could introduce substantial new complexity into the law with
regard to basis adjustments.
At this point, Mr. Dunn summarized the positions of the three panel members. He
stated Dr. Ture’s position to be that complexity is a relatively minor factor in the issue of
how capital gains and losses should be taxed; economic and other factors are more
important even if the result is more complexity. Mr. Dunn stated Mr. Nolan’s position to
be that he would be willing to have some capital gain preference if it did not result in an
increase in the ordinary income rates. He characterized Professor Ginsburg’s position as
"ducking the issue" by focusing only on simplification aspects.

Mr. Nolan restated his position that if a capital gain preference is reinstated and if
other rates remain the same, complexity is a concern but considerations of equity and
economic efficiency may be far more important. He deferred to fiscal policy experts on
the last point. If, however, the top effective rate of 28 percent is increased, complexity
considerations become much more important.
II-A-70

Dr. Ture responded that he did not want to leave the impression that he utterly
disregards simplification. Simplifying bad law, however, is a waste of time and energy.

The next participant questioned whether Dr. Ture’s proposal would include denying
the deduction for pension plan contributions or currently taxing the benefits to future
retirees. Dr. Ture responded that he would recommend neither. He stated his belief that
the current provisions governing these matters conform to his prescription for neutrality.
The participant then stated that taxpayers are taxed twice on income subject to Social
Security. Dr. Ture agreed. He further characterized the Social Security system as a
"dreadful system" that would have gone bankrupt had it been in the private sector.
Another participant agreed with Professor Ginsburg that taxing capital gains
differently leads to complexity in the income tax system. However, he noted that leaving
the capital gain provisions in the Code did not add transactional complexity but only
complexity of language. Professor Ginsburg expressed doubt that a taxpayer making a gift
of appreciated property to a charity would agree. The participant then suggested that the
proposal to recognize unrealized gains on marketable assets would open evasion
possibilities such as putting marketable assets into a closely held corporation with an
operating business. Professor Ginsburg responded that his plan would tax the holder of the
asset, whether an individual or a corporation. Dr. Ture reiterated his position that treating
capital gains as ordinary income is conceptually correct only if one accepts the Simons
concept of income.

Another participant supported the concept of recognition of income on property
transferred at death. However, trading off recognition at death for repeal of the estate
tax would be regressive in view of the relative rate structures of the income tax and transfer
tax.
The next question came from a participant who asked Dr. Ture to clarify how the
sale of an investment security would be taxed in his system. He responded that when the
security was purchased, the purchase price would be removed from the tax base.
Thereafter, gross proceeds would be included in income unless they were reinvested.
The final comment came from a participant who observed that even if the
consumption tax favored by Dr. Ture were adopted, all of the papers presented at the
conference would remain valid with the possible exception of the current session. It would
be devoted to complexity caused by a system that is biased against consumption and in
favor of savings. The roles and responsibilities of practitioners would be the same under
either system. Dr. Ture responded that his system would simplify the treatment of capital
gains. He conceded there would be other problems.
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ENDNOTES

1 Professor Ginsburg’s Conference Paper is reproduced in Part I (V-l).
2 Mr. Nolan’s comments are reproduced in Part I (W-l).
3 Dr. Ture’s comments are reproduced in Part I (X-l).
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